Optimization Consulting, Inc. v. United States ( 2013 )


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  •        In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    No. 13-103 C
    (Filed: November 22, 2013)
    *******************************************
    *
    OPTIMIZATION CONSULTING, INC.,            *
    *
    Plaintiff,              *                Bid Protest; Judgment on
    *                Administrative Record;
    v.                            *                Competitive Range; Factors:
    *                Mission Capability, Past
    THE UNITED STATES,                        *                Performance, Price;
    *                Supplementation of AR;
    Defendant,              *                Claim of Material Misrepre-
    *                sentation of Competing
    and                                       *                Offeror; Referral to Small
    *                Business Administration
    GOLDBELT GLACIER HEALTH                   *                for Responsibility
    SERVICES, LLC,                            *                Determination
    *
    Intervenor-Defendant.   *
    *
    *******************************************
    Sharon O. Steele, Watson & Associates, LLC, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff.
    John S. Groat, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department
    of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.
    Elizabeth M. Gill, Patton Boggs, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor-Defendant.
    ______________________
    OPINION AND ORDER
    ______________________
    DAMICH, Judge:
    In this post-award bid protest, Plaintiff and Defendant have filed cross-motions
    for judgment on the administrative record (AR) with respect to a request for proposals
    (RFP), No. W9133L-12-R-0024 (the Solicitation) issued by the National Guard Bureau
    (NGB) on July 6, 2012, for proposals to provide psychological health support services to
    the Army and Air National Guards (ARNG and ANG, respectively). The RFP was issued
    as a small business set-aside and provided for the award of multiple, indefinite-
    delivery/indefinite quantity contracts with a 3-year base period and a 2-year option
    period. AR 854.
    There were 10 proposals submitted in response to the Solicitation. See Def.’s
    Mot. for J. upon the AR and Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the AR with App. (Def.’s Mot.)
    at 4. The NGB selected four offerors, not including OCI, for inclusion into a competitive
    range for the purposes of further communications or clarifications. AR 5935. Per Section
    L.1.2 of the Solicitation, “In evaluating the proposals, the Government may establish a
    Competitive Range to reduce the Offerors participating in the competition to only those
    Offerors most likely to receive the award.” AR 968-969.
    OCI protests its exclusion from the competitive range, arguing that the NGB: 1)
    erred in its evaluation of the price and past performance elements of OCI’s proposal; 2)
    failed to exhibit good faith and fair dealing; 3) improperly evaluated the past performance
    of a competing offeror Goldbelt Glacier Health Services (Goldbelt Glacier); 1 and 4)
    should have referred OCI to the Small Business Administration (SBA) for a
    responsibility determination before excluding it from the competitive range.
    Defendant asserts, however, that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear OCI’s
    complaint because OCI has failed to meet its burden to establish standing to bring its
    action. OCI, the government avers, has the burden to prove that it is an “interested
    party,” by showing a direct economic interest that would be affected by the award. Rex
    Serv. Corp. v. United States, 
    448 F.3d 1305
    , 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The thrust of the
    Government’s argument is that OCI “would still have been excluded from the
    competitive range even if the NGB had calculated OCI’s price in the manner that OCI
    now contends the solicitation required,” and thus “suffered no possible competitive harm
    and no prejudice.” Def.’s Mot. at 13.
    Defendant further argues, inter alia, that the record reflects substantial evidence in
    support of the NGB’s rating of OCI based on past performance and its exclusion of OCI
    from the competitive range on that basis.
    For the reasons stated below, the court denies OCI’s motion for judgment on the
    AR and grants Defendant’s cross-motion.
    I.       Background
    OCI is a minority-owned, service-disabled veteran-owned, small disadvantaged
    business, Compl. at 6. Prior to the procurement at issue here, it served as a contractor for
    the NGB providing mental health support services to the ANG on a pilot project. Pl.’s
    Mem. in Support of J. on AR (Pl.’s Mot.) at 34-35. The pilot project was less
    1
    Goldbelt Glacier, Intervenor- Defendant here, was one of two bidders who were subsequently awarded
    contracts under the Solicitation. See Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), U.S.
    Department of Defense (March 21, 2013), available at
    http://www.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5002 (last visited November 21, 2013).
    -2-
    comprehensive geographically and substantively than that proposed in the instant
    Solicitation. Transcript of Hearing, Feb. 12, 2013 at 18:16-25. According to OCI, over
    80% of its employees and revenues derive from the support services provided via the
    pilot project. Pl.’s Mot. at 35.
    In the course of its work on that contract, OCI developed dissatisfaction with the
    performance on the project of its National Director of Psychological Health, Dr. Beth
    Zeiger. Pl.’s Mot. at 10; see also Decl. of Richard Holmes, OCI Chief Operations
    Officer, Apr. 22, 2013, Docket # 29. Dr. Zeiger was subsequently placed on a
    performance improvement plan and ultimately terminated her employment. OCI relates
    that key agency personnel were discomforted that they were not informed in advance of
    OCI’s actions with respect to Dr. Zeiger. See “Post Meeting Report,” Docket # 30,
    Attachment 1 (“Post Meeting Report”). 2 The Dr. Zeiger matter features notably in OCI’s
    objections to NGB’s rating of OCI’s past performance.
    The RFP was issued on July 6, 2012. In its terms, it provided that proposals
    would be evaluated on a best-value basis, encompassing three non-price factors and one
    price factor. AR 984-85. In order of priority, the factors were: Mission Capability, Past
    Performance, Small Business Participation, and Price. 
    Id. 3 The
    non-price factors, when
    combined, were more important than the price factor. 
    Id. The mission
    capability factor
    included two subfactors of equal weight: 1) overall capability and 2) representative tasks
    for ANG and ARNG Director of Psychological Health (DPH) support. 
    Id. The overall
    capability subfactor included four elements: “Corporate Experience,” “Corporate
    Resources,” “Continuous Quality Improvement Plan,” and “Quality Control Plan.” AR
    595-96.
    With respect to past performance, the RFP provided:
    The Government will evaluate past performance of three
    (3) current or previous contracts for relevancy based on
    how well the contractor performed on projects of similar
    dollar value, scope, and complexity. Offerors are advised
    that the Government may use past performance information
    obtained from centralized past performance databases and
    sources other than those identified by the offeror . . .
    AR 598.
    2
    Defendant objects to any consideration of the Holmes Declaration and the “Post Meeting Report” as
    impermissible “extra record evidence.” Def.’s Mot. at 25. The Court addresses the Government’s
    objections in due course.
    3
    Thus, an offeror’s proposal was to consist of five volumes: Volume I – Mission Capability; Volume II –
    Past Performance; Volume III – Small Business Participation; Volume IV – Cost/Price; and Volume V –
    Solicitation, Offer and Award Documents and Certifications/Representations. AR 591.
    -3-
    Each offeror was provided an alphanumeric code to use in its proposal in order to
    preserve anonymity. AR 968. OCI’s code was 09C4. AR 2854. The original deadline
    for submission of proposals was August 6, 2012. AR 197. Amendment 3 to the
    Solicitation, posted on July 30, 2012, changed the response date to August 8, 2012. AR
    713. Amendment 4, posted on August 3, 2012, changed the due date to August 9, 2012.
    AR 789. OCI submitted its proposal, under its code “O9C4,” by the August 9 deadline.
    On August 30, 2012, however, after the earlier August 9, 2012, due date for
    proposals had passed, the NGB issued Amendment 5, in which offerors were provided a
    revised “price model” and instructed to “provide revisions, specifically, updated pricing
    in accordance with the updated Price Model, Attachment J-3 attached hereto no later
    than” midnight on September 5, 2012. AR 826. The revised price model was intended
    “to facilitate evaluation of proposed prices for task orders and ceiling prices for various
    labor categories,” AR 827, 4 and was to be submitted electronically “in Microsoft Excel
    file format.” AR 826. Questions relating to Amendment 5 were required to be submitted
    no later than 4:00 p.m. on August 31, 2012. 
    Id. As in
    the previous price models, the
    revised price model called for offerors to calculate a Total Contract Life Price (TCLP).
    “Offerors are advised that the TCLP as determined by the price model formulas will be
    used for the purpose of price evaluation only . . .” AR 828.
    Additionally, Amendment 5 provided:
    Any explanatory pricing notes shall be provided on a
    separate PDF document. Pricing notes should be limited to
    explanation of details not readily discernible from the price
    model and shall not contain qualifications or options which
    could result in a change of price or lack of clarity as to the
    offeror’s proposed price as the price model and the TCLP
    calculated by the price model will be the only price
    evaluated.
    
    Id. On September
    1, 2012, the NGB issued Amendment 6, providing a second
    revision to the price model, with a cover email stating, “The attached amendment
    revising [sic] providing responses to offeror questions and additional corrections to the
    price model for this solicitation is hereby issued.” AR 830. Amendment 6 included a
    question and response table for questions apparently submitted in accordance to the
    instructions of Amendment 5. AR 842. A question posed by OCI, see AR 6235, was:
    Is the Government requesting that contractors transfer all
    information from their finalized price quote (submitted on
    4
    This language from Amendment 5 is almost a verbatim repetition of similar instructions in Amendment
    2, posted on July 28, 2012: “Offeror’s [sic] are required to submit the attached Price Model (Attachment J-
    3) to facilitate evaluation of its proposed prices for task orders and ceiling prices for various labor
    categories.” AR 603.
    -4-
    August 9th, 2012) into the newly updated spreadsheet
    format? If this is not the case, does this mean the
    Government is providing contractors with the option of
    recalculating and resubmitting a new price quote other than
    what was required to be calculated and submitted by
    August 9th?
    The agency’s response in the table incorporated within Amendment 6 was:
    Offerors are permitted to recalculate price as they see fit
    and are advised to ensure proposed prices comply with all
    requirements of the most recently provided amendments
    and any updated appendices found therein. Offerors may
    provide additional detail not originally provided as they see
    fit in order to ensure the Government has sufficient basis to
    determine reasonableness and realism of proposed prices.
    AR 842.
    On September 4, 2012, the NGB issued yet another amendment to the pricing
    model, Amendment 7, which advised, “On tab II.b TCLP, cell ‘G25’ should read as:
    =’II.a – Ceiling Rates ‘!C9. For expediency, you may wish to modify the current price
    model that you are working with as it is no [sic] locked like the original version of the
    file.” Offerors needing additional clarification were directed to contact the NGB
    contracting officer by email, “though I cannot guarantee a response prior to the time
    revisions are due.” AR 6243.
    OCI avers that it “attempted to insert the new rates into the updated excel
    spreadsheet provided by the Agency in Amendment 7.” Pl.’s Mot. at 7. Just prior to its
    submission of its revised and final price proposal on September 5, 2012, OCI
    encountered, however, what it characterizes as “calculation errors” still remaining in the
    spreadsheet.” 
    Id. It asserts
    that it attempted to advise the Contracting Officer, but the
    AR reflects only an ambiguous email on the afternoon of September 5, 2012, from OCI
    to the NGB: “This message serves as notification that we had an error in migrating data
    from the original pricing spreadsheet to the most recent version amended yesterday and
    our revised pricing model is forthcoming.” AR 6199.
    In its final submission, OCI’s price model provided a TCLP of $265,619,111.06.
    AR 4703. In its motion for judgment on the AR, OCI claims, however, that the price
    model itself utilized an erroneous formula to determine the TCLP, because the price
    model’s TCLP failed to take into account variable labor rates based on geographic
    regions and instead relied on ceiling rates for several labor categories. Pl.’s Mot. at 15.
    Thus, OCI argues that its price model TCLP was “artificially inflated” compared to
    OCI’s independent, off-price model total price of $199,444.166.45 “based on actual labor
    rates OCI offered for each of the various labor categories by geographic regions.” 
    Id. at 14.
    -5-
    Therefore, just below the price model’s field indicating OCI’s TCLP of
    $265,619,111.06, OCI inserted its conflicting total price calculation of $199,444.166.85
    into an otherwise blank section of the price model. AR 7403. Perplexingly, OCI also
    provided explanatory notes stating a total price of $199,464,082.04. AR 7407.
    The evaluation of the proposals was governed by the Source Selection Plan (the
    Plan), issued July 5, 2012, for the Solicitation. AR 52. The Plan provided for a Source
    Selection Authority (SSA), who would be the individual designated to make the ultimate
    best-value decision. AR 81. The SSA would be advised by a Source Selection Advisory
    Council (SSAC), who would represent specific functional areas from which the SSA
    would require expertise. AR 82. The performance of “a comprehensive review and
    evaluation of proposals against the RFP requirements and the approved evaluation
    criteria” was to be principally the task of a Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB). 5
    AR 84. The Plan prescribed an adjectival rating scale – Outstanding, Good, Acceptable,
    Marginal, and Unacceptable – to be used to evaluate the Mission Capability and Small
    Business Participation factors. AR 62. It also provided, however, “To receive
    consideration for award, an offer must receive no less than an ‘Acceptable’ rating for the
    Mission Capability Factor and sub-factors.” AR 57. 6
    The Past Performance Factor would be evaluated via a relevancy rating – ranging
    from Very Relevant to Relevant, Somewhat Relevant, or Not Relevant. AR 63. An
    overall past performance confidence assessment rating would also then be assigned,
    ranging from Substantial Confidence to Satisfactory Confidence, Limited Confidence, or
    No Confidence. 
    Id. The SSEB
    completed its report on September 7, 2012. AR 5436 –
    5545.
    OCI’s proposal received a rating of “Marginal” on Mission Capability. AR 5494.
    It received a “Good” rating on Small Business Participation. AR 5505.
    OCI’s rating of “Marginal” on Mission Capability as a whole was reflected in
    similar “Marginal” ratings on both of the Mission Capability sub-factors. On the first
    sub-factor, Overall Capability, the evaluators found “7 noted strengths” but that they
    were “insufficient to offset the increased risk inherent in” 11 noted weaknesses. AR
    5495. The evaluation detailed these strengths and weaknesses in detail in the context of
    the elements of Corporate Experience, Corporate Resources, Continuous Quality
    Improvement Plan, and Quality Control Plan. For example, weaknesses in Corporate
    Experience were “the limited depth of similar experience presented” (“the only apparent
    behavioral health experience specifically being the previous ANG DPH contract”),
    failure to “articulate clearly how they were effective in developing a resolution, plan of
    5
    One of the three members of the SSEB was Lt. Col. David Bringhurst, see AR 5436, who was also a
    participant in the meeting during which OCI was criticized by agency personnel for its handling of the Dr.
    Zeiger matter, according to the Post Meeting Report.
    6
    A “Marginal” rating was described as: “Proposal does not clearly meet requirements and has not
    demonstrated an adequate approach and understanding of the requirements. The proposal has one or more
    weaknesses which are not offset by strengths. Risk of unsuccessful performance is high.” AR 62.
    -6-
    action or tracking lessons learned,” a “weak” description of corporate management (e.g.,
    proposing email and weekly activity reports rather than simple conference calls), and
    reactive rather than proactive “identification and rectification of areas of risk.” 
    Id. Weaknesses under
    Corporate Resources were identified as the “lack of awareness of the
    benefits available to traditional Service Members” (“oversimplifying the spectrum of
    resources available and the need to address benefits on a case by case basis”), a limited
    provider network described as “a risk in terms of both the size of network and the direct
    access approach,” and a data tracking and reporting methods plan viewed as “lacking
    substance” (“The offeror does not appear to understand the depth of scope for the
    requirement and proposes no behavioral health data elements under Subfactor One
    Corporate Resources”). AR 5496.
    Two weaknesses were noted with respect to Continuous Quality Improvement: no
    plan “ready to be implemented” and failure to propose performance indicators. These
    weaknesses suggested to the SSEB that “the plan is a textbook description with no
    tailored plan for the National Guard.” 
    Id. As to
    Quality Control, OCI merely described
    “roles and procedures in lieu of details” and, though citing Quality Control “metrics,”
    failed to identify metrics specific to the National Guard. 
    Id. at 5496-97.
    It also made no
    mention of “Primary Source Verification.” 
    Id. OCI was
    also given a rating of Marginal on sub-factor 2 regarding
    “Representative Tasks 1 & 2 – ANG & ARNG DPH Support Tasks” (“Representative
    Tasks”). AR 5500. For this sub-factor, the proposal was to address the offeror’s
    proposed solution to certain tasks, including such elements as its Task Execution
    Approach, Key Personnel, and Transition/Staffing Plan. AR 70-71. As with sub-factor
    1, the SSEB itemized 12 weaknesses that were not offset by 6 noted strengths of the
    proposal. 7 AR 5501-02. For example, the evaluation board questioned OCI’s
    population-based regional distribution plan because of its “potential to lead to confusion,”
    its proposal for a “project charter” which risked “time lost toward implantation,” an
    “ANG [-]centric Task Execution approach” which suggested a risk to ARNG task
    execution, its outline for Affiliate Liability Insurance demonstrating inadequate
    “understanding of the Mental Health field,” its unfeasible approach to the availability of
    Traumatic Event Management response teams, and miscellaneous services too generic
    and not specific to ARNG. In addition, the SSEB found that proposed ANG and ARNG
    Directors “do not meet the minimum requirements, did not find “sufficient depth” in
    OCI’s plan for ARNG transition, and faulted the proposal’s repeated “Wing” references
    as inapplicable to ARNG concerns. AR 5500-01. The evaluation concluded, “Overall,
    though the Board feels the offeror could potentially perform the required services, it
    would likely have significant issues during implementation and throughout performance,
    presenting a high risk to the Government.” AR 5501.
    On Past Performance, however, OCI was given a rating of “Somewhat Relevant”:
    7
    Although the opening paragraph of the SSEB “Supporting Rationale” for this sub-factor cited 6 strengths
    and 11 weaknesses, the itemization of weaknesses that followed the textual description numbered 12
    weaknesses. Compare AR 5500 with AR 5501-02.
    -7-
    Upon reviewing all three contracts submitted for past
    performance for offeror 09C4, there was relevancy in the
    ANG DPH contract covering one half of the Nation from a
    capability standpoint. The other two contracts presented
    medical readiness/LOD determination which was
    somewhat relevant for a medical model but no specific
    experienced [sic] tied to a psychological health program
    was sited [sic] hence the overall rating of Somewhat
    Relevant for past performance.
    AR 5503.
    With respect to confidence assessment, OCI was given a “Limited Confidence”
    rating by the SSEB. While the SSEB credited OCI with having provided “one example”
    of a project of similar scope, related to “mild adjustment disorders,” it considered OCI’s
    other two examples, relating to medical support services in general, physician
    deployment scheduling, and medical readiness support services, as not demonstrating “a
    behavioral health focus.” 
    Id. Furthermore, the
    SSEB noted, “Based on the offeror’s
    recent/relevant performance record, the Government has a low expectation that the
    offeror will successfully perform the required effort.” 
    Id. The context
    of this SSEB
    comment is reflected in the additional observation in the report:
    However, one of the reviewers had prior experience with
    the offeror related to the ANG Psychological Health
    Program, and found the [sic] there were problems with
    project management and handling personnel, both of which
    are not accurate, as this company has struggled with
    meeting performance objectives and managing personnel.
    
    Id. These comments
    and the “Limited Confidence” rating clearly were based on the
    “Dr. Zieger matter” as it arose in the course of OCI’s performance on the pilot project.
    With respect to price, the Source Selection Plan established a Price Evaluation
    Team (PET) charged with providing a Price Analysis to the SSAC and to the Source
    Selection Authority. AR 5546, 5571. The PET evaluated each offeror’s TCLP and
    determined “whether the Offerors have completed all aspects of the price proposal
    properly and whether the amounts listed in the price proposal are calculated accurately.”
    AR 5547. The price evaluation process did not employ adjectival ratings. 
    Id. The steps
    involved included a comparison of each offeror’s total price with other offeror’s proposed
    prices, comparison with the agency’s own Independent Government Cost Estimate
    (IGCE), review of each proposal for completeness, reasonableness, and realism, and
    consideration of any other significant items of concern. AR 5548.
    -8-
    OCI’s proposal was judged complete, but that “additional notes which could not
    be interpreted were included on the worksheets and the offeror added additional
    Emergency Affiliate Provider (EAP) costs to the firm-fixed price for DPH services.” AR
    5555. The PET did not adjudge OCI’s proposal as “fair and reasonable when compared
    to other prices received” in response to the RFP. It noted in particular that OCI’s TCLP
    of $265,619,111.06 was the “highest proposed”: 37.36% above the government estimate
    and 51.17% above the average of all the offerors. 
    Id. OCI’s prices
    were not determined
    to be unrealistic, but that its “extremely high price and labor rates may reflect an unclear
    understanding of the requirement.” 
    Id. The SSAC
    reported that OCI in effect had taken “exception” to the Government’s
    price model, but that the PET had “verified the propriety of all formulas in the submitted
    price model and found that the calculated price of $265,619,111.06 was determined on
    the same basis as all other offerors’ TCLP and therefore the only valid figure for
    evaluation.” AR 5701. Furthermore, the SSAC advised, albeit merely summarily, that
    “if the Government were to consider all offerors based on a similar construct to that used
    by [OCI], its price would still be the highest evaluated.” 
    Id. It concluded,
    Whether this offeror’s evaluated price was
    $199,464,082.04 or $265,619,111.06 makes no difference
    in the recommendation to exclude the offeror from the
    competitive range, as the offerors [sic] rating of ‘Marginal’
    for Factor 1, and the constituent discriminators on which
    this rating was based could not be mitigated by even the
    lower price the offeror specified.
    
    Id. The SSAC
    recommended that a competitive range be established limited only to
    the four most highly rated proposals, “each of which was rated ‘Good’ or above for
    Factor 1,” Mission Capability, which was the most important of all the ratable factors.
    
    Id. “Here a
    clean break exists between the most highly rated proposals and those not
    among the most highly rated. Furthermore as the acquisition strategy states an intended
    target of 2-3 awardees, the 4 most highly rated proposals represent an efficient quantity at
    which competition may be conducted and awardees selected.” 
    Id. Goldbelt, Intervenor-
    Defendant in the case at bar, was one of the four offerors whose proposals were deemed
    to fall within the competitive range. AR 5752.
    On September 17, 2012, OCI was informed by letter that its proposal was
    determined to fall outside the competitive range. AR 6815. On September 20, 2012,
    OCI filed a bid protest at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) protesting its
    exclusion from the competitive range. AR 6384. OCI alleged that the NGB’s had based
    its determination on “erroneous pricing information.” AR 6389. “The Agency claimed
    that the price quoted by OCI was for $265,619,111.06. This is false. In actuality, the
    OCI price expressly quoted and submitted to the Agency for review was
    $199,464,082.04.” AR 6390. OCI blamed the NGB’s “malfunctioning pricing
    -9-
    spreadsheet” and the agency’s failure to credit the explanation that OCI had provided in
    its submission. 
    Id. GAO denied
    OCI’s protest on December 28, 2012. AR 6427. It noted that OCI
    had submitted multiple total prices, but that “the agency reasonably evaluated
    Optimization’s price proposal in a manner consistent with the RFP.” AR 6434. The
    agency had explicitly advised that an offeror’s TCLP would be evaluated “based only” on
    the price model and that, despite OCI’s assertion that the price model contained formula
    errors, “the protester has not identified any such errors or shown how its final revised
    $266 million price was miscalculated.” 
    Id. The GAO
    decision also addressed OCI’s
    challenges to the NGB’s evaluation of its proposal under the mission capability factor
    (apparently raised in a supplemental protest 8). AR 6435. “We find that [Optimization’s
    arguments] largely reflect the protestor’s disagreement with the agency’s technical
    evaluation, and offer no basis to sustain the protest.” 
    Id. Although the
    protester may disagree with the agency’s
    evaluation of its mission capability proposal, the record
    demonstrates that the SSEB and the CO considered all of
    the information submitted by offerors and available to the
    agency, and issued a well-reasoned and rational evaluation
    report and competitive range determination that extensively
    highlighted key discriminators between Optimization’s and
    other offerors’ proposals.
    AR 6436.
    The GAO decision concluded, “In sum, Optimization has not shown that the
    agency’s evaluation of its price and mission capability proposals was unreasonable or
    inconsistent with the RFP, and the protestor’s disagreement with the agency’s judgment
    does not establish that the agency acted unreasonably.” AR 6437.
    II.      Legal Standards
    A. Standing
    The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to render
    judgment in actions by an interested party challenging the award of a contract in
    connection with a procurement. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1); EREH Phase I LLC v. United
    States, 
    95 Fed. Cl. 108
    , 112 (2010). In its cross-motion for judgment on the AR,
    however, the Government argues that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s
    complaint because Plaintiff lacks standing to bring its protest. Standing is clearly a
    “threshold” jurisdictional requirement. Myers Investigative and Security Services, Inc., v.
    United States, 
    275 F.3d 1366
    , 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “[t]he party invoking
    8
    Although OCI’s supplemental protest to GAO raised a challenge to the NGB’s evaluation on mission
    capability, it evidently did not challenge before the GAO, unlike here, its rating on past performance. AR
    6435, n.18.
    -10-
    federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [the] elements [of standing.]” 
    Id. (citing Lujan
    v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561 (1992).
    “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the
    court decide the merits of the dispute . . .” Warth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 498 (1975).
    The reason for this threshold inquiry is to respect “both constitutional limitations on
    federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” 
    Id. There are
    three
    elements of standing: 1) a plaintiff must show that it has suffered an “injury in fact” that
    is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or
    hypothetical”; 2) injury must be “fairly traceable” to the action of the defendant; and 3)
    “it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
    favorable decision.” Magnum Opus Techs., Inc. v. United States, 
    94 Fed. Cl. 512
    , 528
    (2010) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., 
    528 U.S. 167
    , 180-
    81 (2000). The requirement of standing on a bid protest in the Court of Federal Claims,
    however, is even more particular. “In this court, plaintiffs face the further hurdle of
    statutory standing.” Magnum 
    Opus, 94 Fed. Cl. at 529
    .
    Under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, plaintiffs in bid protest actions
    are limited to those who are actual or prospective bidders and who can demonstrate that
    they possess “a direct economic interest.” 
    Id. (quoting Rex
    Serv. Corp. v. United States,
    
    448 F.3d 1305
    , 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The showing of “direct economic interest”
    amounts to a showing of prejudice. “[T]he Federal Circuit has construed the second
    element, the ‘direct economic interest’ prong, to mean that a successful protestor must
    also establish that the errors complained of caused prejudice.” Textron, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    74 Fed. Cl. 277
    , 283 (2006). The hurdle is not trivial. “[A] bid protester must
    have a substantial chance of receiving an award in order to have an economic interest in it
    and therefore standing to file a bid protest.” Labatt Food Service, Inc. v. United States,
    
    577 F.3d 1375
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 9
    The court in Textron noted that the prejudice standard is not only an element of
    standing (which is a non-merits-based inquiry, see Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper
    Deck Co., 
    334 F.3d 1366
    , 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003)), but also a required showing in a later
    stage, merits-based determination warranting injunctive relief. 
    Textron, 74 Fed. Cl. at 284
    . 10 It cautioned accordingly against “a round-robin through the arguments on the
    merits in order to resolve a jurisdictional issue. Such is not a desirable or appropriate
    procedure.” 
    Id. at 284-85.
    11 To thread its way carefully through this dual-stage inquiry,
    9
    The court notes that decisions in this court and in the Federal Circuit have variously referred to plaintiffs
    in bid protests as “protesters” or “protestors.” This court will employ the latter spelling, except where
    citing the former in a quotation.
    10
    “This court thus looks twice at prejudice, first weighing prejudice as it pertains to standing, and then
    more thoroughly weighing prejudice to determine whether a plaintiff shall be afforded relief.” L-3 Global
    Comunications Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 
    82 Fed. Cl. 604
    , 608 n.4 (2008).
    11
    The court in Magnum Opus similarly observed that, because a plaintiff’s failure to establish standing
    precludes a ruling on the merits, the corollary is that a plaintiff cannot be required “to prove the merits of
    its case in order to demonstrate standing.” Magnum 
    Opus, 94 Fed. Cl. at 530
    n.12. In Archura LLC v.
    -11-
    it adopted an approach to standing focusing on the status of the protestor and avoiding the
    parties’ arguments on the merits: a protestor would have standing only if it was
    (1) either a bidder or proposer that has been prevented from
    bidding or proposing due to some infraction other than the
    terms of the solicitation itself; or (2) either a bidder or
    proposer who would be in contention absent an
    unreasonable procurement decision or violation of
    applicable procurement regulations.
    
    Id. at 285
    (emphasis added). Accord Bilfinger Berger AG Sede Secondaria Italiana v.
    United States, 
    97 Fed. Cl. 96
    , 135 (2010).
    In a similar vein, the court in Night Vision Corp. v. United States, 
    68 Fed. Cl. 368
    ,
    391, 392 & n. 23 (2005), characterized the prejudice inquiry for purposes of assessing
    standing as a “limited review” in search of the “minimum requisite evidence” of injury
    to a protestor’s “substantial chance of obtaining the contract, assuming that the
    protestor’s substantive allegations bear out.” Nevertheless, if, despite the alleged
    procurement error, the protestor would still not have been “in contention” or still had a
    “substantial chance” of obtaining the contract, then the protestor has not been prejudiced
    and lacks standing. “Without a showing of harm specific to the asserted error, there is no
    injury to redress, and no standing to sue.” 
    Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1381
    .
    Another approach to viewing the two distinct applications of the prejudice inquiry
    was addressed in L-3 Commc’ns Corp. v. United States: “The difference between the two
    [prejudice standards] is that the prejudice determination for purposes of standing assumes
    all non-frivolous allegations to be true, whereas the post-merits prejudice determination is
    based only on those allegations which have been proven to be true.” L-3 Commc’ns
    Corp. v. United States, 
    99 Fed. Cl. 283
    , 289 (2011).
    In Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, the gravamen of
    its complaint is that the NGB erred in its evaluation of OCI’s proposal with respect to: 1)
    price (“the Government’s reliance on the artificially inflated $265,619,111.06 ‘price’ is
    thus improper,” Pl.’s Mot. at 1) and 2) past performance (“The Agency’s past
    performance evaluation is not reasonably supported by the record, nor is it in accordance
    with the Solicitation’s evaluation criteria,” 
    id. at 18).
    OCI further alleges that its past
    performance evaluation was “skewed” by the agency’s animus towards OCI relating back
    to the Dr. Zeiger matter during the pilot project. 
    Id. at 1,
    26-28.
    B. Bid Protest Standard of Review
    Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims reviews the agency’s decision
    in a bid protest “pursuant to the standards set forth in section 706 of title 5” of the
    United States, on the other hand, the court observed, “In some cases, however, the analyses become
    intertwined, such that consideration of the merits will relate back to the initial standing inquiry.” [citation]
    (citing Comint Sys. v. United States, 
    700 F.3d 1377
    , 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    -12-
    Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706). 28 U.S.C. §
    1491(b)(4). Under the APA, the inquiry is whether the agency’s action is “arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law” or “without observance
    of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The Federal Circuit has described the
    standard of review as whether the procurement decision “lacked a rational basis” or
    “involved a violation of regulation or procedure.” Impresa Construzioni Geom.
    Domenico Garufi v. United States, 
    238 F.3d 1324
    , 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Med.
    Devel. Int’l, Inc. v United States, 
    89 Fed. Cl. 691
    , 700 (2009). For a determination
    whether the decision had a rational basis, the scope of review is narrow: “The Court will
    look to see if an agency ‘examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory
    explanation for its action.” Gulf Group Inc. v. United States, 
    61 Fed. Cl. 338
    , 351 (2004)
    (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
    Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 20
    , 43 (1983). When the protest alleges a violation of regulation or
    procedure, the disappointed bidder must show that the violation was “clear and
    prejudicial.” 
    Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1333
    .
    The protestor bears a “heavy burden” of showing that the award decision had no
    rational basis. 
    Id. The burden
    is even higher in a “best value” procurement.
    “Procurement officials have substantial discretion to determine which proposal represents
    the best value for the government.” E. W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 
    77 F.3d 445
    , 449
    (Fed. Cir. 1996); Galen Med. Asso., Inc. v. United States, 
    369 F.3d 1324
    , 1330 (Fed. Cir.
    2004) (“the contracting officer ha[s] even greater discretion than if the contract were to
    have been awarded on the basis of cost alone”). “And in cases such as this, when a
    negotiated procurement is involved and at issue is a performance evaluation, the greatest
    deference possible is given to the agency – what our Court has called a ‘triple whammy
    of deference.” Gulf 
    Group, 61 Fed. Cl. at 351
    (citing Overstreet Electric Co. v. United
    States, 
    59 Fed. Cl. 99
    , 117 (2003)).
    Procedurally, the court proceeds in “two steps.” Bannum, Inc. v. United States,
    
    404 F.3d 1346
    , 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “First . . . the trial court determines whether the
    government acted without rational basis or contrary to law when evaluating the bids and
    awarding the contract. Second . . . if the trial court finds that the government’s conduct
    fails the APA review . . . then it proceeds to determine, as a factual matter, if the bid
    protester was prejudiced by that conduct.” 12 
    Id. In a
    post-award bid protest, such as
    here, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the errors in the procurement process
    “significantly prejudiced” it. 
    Id. at 1353.
    “To establish ‘significant prejudice’ [the
    plaintiff] must show that there was a ‘substantial chance’ it would have received the
    contract award but for the errors . . .” 
    Id. (citations omitted).
    Pursuant to Rule 52.1(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), the
    court considers the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record as
    “akin to an expedited trial on the paper record.” L-3 Global Commc‘ns Solutions, Inc.,
    
    82 Fed. Cl. 604
    , 608 (2008). The court inquires whether a party has met its burden of
    proof, and makes fact determinations as necessary, based on the existing administrative
    record. 
    Id. at 607-608;
    Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1356
    .
    12
    This is the second, merits-based prejudice inquiry to which the court referred in Textron, supra.
    -13-
    III.      Discussion
    A. Supplementing the Administrative Record
    Underlying much of OCI’s complaint and motion for judgment is its allegation
    that OCI’s past performance rating “appears to be entirely based on OCI’s decision to
    terminate one of its employees, Ms. Zeiger, who was apparently a former colleague and
    friend of members of the evaluation team, rather than any issues with OCI’s actual
    performance under the [pilot] contract.” Pl.’s Mem. at 20. OCI asserts that its evaluation
    was “improperly skewed” by Lt. Col. Bringhurst’s “affinity towards” Dr. Zeiger, 
    id. at 1,
    complains of a “lack of objectivity,” “personal animosity,” and “Government ill-
    sentiment” that operated “to the prejudice of OCI,” 
    id. at 2,
    and accordingly argues that
    the Government violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to which it is
    bound in evaluating a bidder’s proposal. 
    Id. at 28.
    In addition, OCI complains that the utilization by the NGB of a contract
    employee, Karen Klepadlo, to assist in the Solicitation “tainted the entire procurement
    process” in favor of Goldbelt Glacier. Pl.’s Mem. at 29-30. Ms. Klepadlo is an
    employee of Alutiiq, a subsidiary of Afognak Native Corporation, an Alaskan Native
    Corporation (ANC). 13 Prior to her employment with Alutiiq, she had worked for
    TCoombs & Associates, LLC, whose website identifies Goldbelt Wolf as one of its
    “Manufacturer and Security Services Partners.” Pl.’s Mem. at 29; Def.’s Mot. at 27.
    Goldbelt Wolf is a “sister-company” of Goldbelt Glacier, the Intervenor-Defendant here,
    as both are subsidiaries of a parent company, Goldbelt, Inc. Among other assignments,
    Ms. Klepadlo assisted Capt. Joan F. Hunter, the Chair of the SSEB, AR 2, and prepared
    the Independent Government Cost Estimate. AR 5547. OCI alleges that actions of Ms.
    Klepadlo “compromised the integrity of the procurement and caused OCI irreparable
    harm as key employees were encouraged to move to OCI’s competitors before an award
    determination had even been made,” Pl.’s Mem. at 29, referring to an email that Ms.
    Klepadlo sent out on July 30, 2012, for distribution to “State and Wing DPH Program”
    personnel. AR 6609-10.
    In support of the allegations of bias against OCI, OCI filed what it described as a
    “Declaration of Harm,” Docket # 29, a declaration of its Chief Operations Officer,
    Richard Holmes, executed April 22, 2013 (“the Holmes Declaration”), subsequent to the
    filing of its amended complaint and prior to the filing of its motion for judgment on the
    administrative record. On April 29, 2013, OCI filed a motion for leave to file various
    attachments that had been referenced in, but not included with, the Holmes Declaration.
    These attachments, Docket # 30, consisted of a resume of Dr. Zeiger, an internal OCI
    memo to Dr. Zeiger placing her on probation in November 2011, a string of emails to and
    from Dr. Zeiger referencing “glitches” regarding insurance coverage in the pilot program,
    and the Post Meeting Report, that is, OCI’s summary of a meeting held May 29, 2012, to
    discuss the “way ahead, concerns and plans after termination of Dr. Zeiger.”
    13
    Neither Alutiiq nor Afognak were offerors for the solicitation at issue here.
    -14-
    In its cross-motion and response to OCI’s motion for judgment on the AR,
    Defendant also submitted extra-record materials specifically with respect to OCI’s
    complaints about the role of Ms. Klepadlo because “OCI now attempts to draw a
    connection between Ms. Klepadlo and [Goldbelt Glacier].” Def.’s Mot. at 27. These
    materials included a statement from Alutiiq, the NGB contracting officer’s determination
    that there was no potential for an organizational conflict of interest, a declaration of Ms.
    Klepadlo, Ms. Klepadlo’s resume, an Alutiiq Employee Confidentiality Agreement and
    Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Responsibility Statement (both signed by Ms.
    Klepadlo), and the email message sent by Ms. Klepadlo for distribution to the “State and
    Wing DPH Program” managers and points of contact regarding the Solicitation process.
    In the email message, Ms. Klepadlo wrote:
    The intent is to educate our staff members on the
    contracting and transition process and to offer a forum for
    communication regarding any concerns they may have
    regarding the upcoming contract award. . . As you may
    know, a Solicitation has been released . . . I invite each of
    you to familiarize yourselves with the Solicitation process. .
    . It is good business practice that current staff members in
    good standing will be offered ‘First Right of Refusal’ for
    the position which they currently hold, should a new
    company win the contract award. I do however, encourage
    you to visit the interested vendor’s websites and apply on
    their career pages for your position of interest. This aids
    the transition process along and ensures that each company
    knows that you have an ongoing interest in a position with
    the program.
    AR 6609-10.
    Generally, as the Federal Circuit has noted, “‘the focal point for judicial review
    should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made
    initially in the reviewing court.’” Axiom Resource Management, Inc. v. United States,
    
    564 F.3d 1374
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 
    411 U.S. 138
    , 142 (1973)).
    In Axiom, it was emphasized that the reviewing court is tasked with applying
    Administrative Procedure Act standards to the agency decision “based on the record”
    presented by the agency. 
    Id. “The purpose
    of limiting review to the record actually
    before the agency is to guard against courts using new evidence to ‘convert the “arbitrary
    and capricious” standard into effectively de novo review.’” 
    Id. at 1380
    (quoting
    Murakami v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl 731, 735 (2000), aff’d, 
    398 F.3d 1342
    (Fed. Cir.
    2005).
    Accordingly, supplementation of the administrative record should only be allowed
    in circumstances where ‘“the omission of extra-record evidence precludes effective
    judicial review.’” 
    Id. The Federal
    Circuit elaborated that supplementation may be
    -15-
    warranted “if the existing record is insufficient to permit meaningful review consistent
    with the APA.” 
    Id. at 1381.
    One example of an insufficient record would be where there
    is a “strong showing or bad faith or improper behavior” by agency officials such that
    “effective judicial review” requires “examining the examiners themselves.” Citizens to
    Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 
    401 U.S. 402
    , 420 (1971), overruled on other
    grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 
    430 U.S. 99
    (1977). Applying these considerations, the
    Court of Federal Claims has appropriately reasoned that supplementing the AR may be
    necessary in order to prove wrongdoing by an agency:
    Allegations of bias, prejudice and bad faith . . . which
    depend upon a Government official’s past conduct toward a
    bidder necessarily cannot be subsumed within the record of
    a challenged award decision.
    Int’l Res. Recovery, Inc. v. United States, 
    61 Fed. Cl. 38
    , 41-42 (2004).
    Such allegations of bias and prejudice, however, cannot rest merely on “argument,
    suspicion, or conjecture.” Office Depot, Inc. v. United States, 
    94 Fed. Cl. 294
    (2010).
    Absent a threshold showing, “a plaintiff[‘]s bare allegations of bad faith are insufficient
    to place the issue or the proffered extra-record evidence before the court.” 
    Id. at 297
    (quoting Madison Servs., Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl., 120, 130 (2010). Rather,
    courts have described the required threshold determination as that of being “well
    grounded,” L-3 Comm. Integrated Sys. v. United States, 
    91 Fed. Cl. 347
    , 354 (2010), “a
    reasonable factual predicate,” 
    id. at 355,
    “an evidentiary foundation,” Pitney Bowes Gov’t
    Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 
    93 Fed. Cl. 327
    , 332 (2010), or “a strong evidentiary
    footing,” Beta Analytics Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 
    61 Fed. Cl. 223
    , 226 (2004) (“to put
    facts relating to bad faith in play a plaintiff must first make a threshold showing of either
    a motivation for the Government employee in question to have acted in bad faith or
    conduct that is hard to explain absent bad faith”).
    The decision on supplementation is distinct from a decision on the merits of the
    allegation of bias. “The burden of proof required for supplementing the administrative
    record is lower than that required for demonstrating bad faith or bias on the merits.”
    Pitney 
    Bowes, 93 Fed. Cl. at 332
    . As noted, the test for supplementation is “whether
    there are sufficient well-grounded allegations of bias to support an inquiry.” 
    Id. On the
    other hand, to overcome an agency decision’s presumption of good faith, “the proof must
    be almost ‘irrefragable.’” Spezzaferro v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 
    807 F.2d 169
    , 172 (Fed.
    Cir. 1986).
    The thrust of OCI’s allegation of bias is that NGB personnel had an affinity in
    favor of Dr. Zeiger, alleging that she “was apparently a former colleague and friend of
    members of the evaluation team,” Pl.’s Mem. at 20, developed an “animosity,” 
    id. at 2,
    against OCI because OCI had replaced Dr. Zeiger in the pilot project, and that the
    Government’s “ill-sentiment carried over into the evaluation of OCI in the instant
    Solicitation.” 
    Id. The Holmes
    Declaration recites that the agency had suggested that OCI
    hire Dr. Zeiger to replace OCI’s original National Director of Psychological Health
    -16-
    whom the Government had directed be removed by OCI three months into the pilot
    program (and alleges that “an extensive personal history” existed between Dr. Zeiger and
    an agency contracting official, Col. Jane Klingenberger); that OCI had thereafter
    documented several incidents of Dr. Zeiger’s poor judgment, including one in which OCI
    alleges Dr. Zeiger stated in a regional conference call, “I do not think OCI should get the
    new contract and I will see to it that they don’t”; that OCI had terminated Dr. Zeiger after
    having placed her on a performance improvement plan; that the agency had convened a
    meeting with OCI to discuss Dr. Zeiger’s termination; and that during the meeting, Col.
    Jane Klingenberger “threatened” OCI, stating that OCI “should not be surprised to one
    day be working for Dr. Zeiger.” Mr. Holmes avers that OCI construed Col.
    Klingenberg’s statement as a threat to OCI bid for an award under the instant Solicitation.
    The Holmes Declaration also asserts that “[a] true copy of the meeting minutes is
    included at Attachment 2.”
    The “minutes” referenced in the Holmes Declaration are the “Post Meeting
    Report,” compiled by OCI. The Report recites the date of May 29, 2012, although it is
    uncertain whether that date is the date of the meeting or the date on which the account of
    the meeting was compiled. The Report first lists the meeting participants, including,
    among others, Mr. Holmes, Lt. Col. Bringhurst, and Col. Klingenberger; it then provides
    what is described as “Meeting Minutes”; and it concludes with a listing of “Outstanding
    Action Items.” The court notes that there is no indication of who took notes of the
    meeting or whether the meeting was recorded or when the “minutes” were compiled.
    Despite the description of the meeting discussion as “minutes,” there is no indication that
    they were ever even seen prior to this litigation by the NGB, much less whether the NGB
    ever agreed with this account, despite a selection of boxes of the Report to indicate
    “Approved,” “Disapproved,” or “Pending.” 14 Yet the Holmes Declaration describes
    them as a “true copy of the meeting minutes.”
    The “minutes” recite that “Col Klingenberger stated that OCI should have
    submitted a Contingency Plan prior to terming [sic] Zeiger. This could not have come at
    a worse time.” “Col. Klingenberger advised Mr. Holmes that he was “Not earning any
    brownie points with the ANG, as it seemed he was ‘Throwing Dr. Zeiger under a bus.’”
    “Col. Bringhurst expressed that the ANG did not know Ms. Zeiger was on a Performance
    Improvement Plan and they should have been notified.” “Col. Klingenberger stated that
    the ANGRC is the customer, and they should have been made aware of decision. She
    stated that OCI should not be surprised to run into Ms. Zeiger again. Ms. Zeiger may
    come back in a Government Position, and OCI will be working for her. If this happens, it
    will be a direct result of how OCI went about terminating Ms. Zeiger.” “Col.
    Klingenberger advised that Zeiger has been of great assistance to her personally.” “Col.
    Staresina clarified that he had no attachment connection to Ms. Zeiger. His statements
    were to emphasize the importance of notifying the client when replacing Key Personnel.”
    “Col. Klingenberger advised that . . . switch of PM has to be choreographed to make for a
    ‘win win’ situation for the government. Although it appears Ms. Zeiger was causing
    14
    As a term under parliamentary law, “minutes” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[t]he formal
    record of a deliberative assembly’s proceedings, approved (as corrected, if necessary) by the assembly.”
    [CITE format?]
    -17-
    internal issues that the government was not experiencing.” “Col. Klingenberger stated
    that the reason we were ‘beating that dead horse’ is that we have 90 people showing at
    the Readiness Frontiers and a Secretary of Defense; Zeiger is well regarded among many
    of the 90 personnel on the contract . . . perhaps not all of the personnel were as fond of
    Ms. Zeiger as previously thought. She also stated that in light of the new information
    provided, Ms. Zeiger might not be reappearing in a Government capacity.” “Col.
    Bringhurst reiterated that it was a huge disappointment because the termination came out
    of the blue; overall, Ms. Zeiger’s work was stellar; the ANG had no concept that her
    leadership may have impacted the other terminations; all they saw was stellar work.”
    “Col. Klingenberger stated . . . From her perspective, most of the OCI DPH’s trusted Dr.
    Zeiger and it is going to be a ‘blow to them.’”
    The immediate question before the court with respect to supplementation of the
    Administrative Record by the addition of the Holmes Declaration and the Post Meeting
    Report is whether they are necessary to inform the court’s consideration of OCI’s claim
    of bias in order to achieve effective judicial review. The Dr. Zeiger matter certainly
    played a role in the evaluation of OCI’s past performance by the SSEB. The court finds
    that, taken at face value, the so-called minutes suggest a sufficiently reasonable factual
    predicate for OCI’s claim, at the very least to support the court’s inquiry and to warrant
    allowing the documents as a supplement to the AR.
    To the same extent, the court is persuaded in favor of allowing Defendant’s
    proposed extra-record evidence with respect to the role of Ms. Klepadlo vis-à-vis OCI’s
    claim that her participation as a contractor for the agency effected an improper “taint” in
    favor of Goldbelt Glacier.
    Accordingly, the court will consider all of these documents in its review of the
    merits of Plaintiff’s procurement protest.
    B. The Government’s Argument on Standing
    The Government argues that OCI lacks standing to protest its exclusion from the
    competitive range for two reasons. First, with respect to price, it argues that, by failing to
    file a pre-award protest against the price model set forth in the Solicitation, OCI has
    “waived any objection to the NGB’s use of the solicitation’s price model to calculate and
    evaluate the total price that the NGB would consider in evaluating” bidders’ proposals.
    Def.’s Mot. at 9.
    Second, it argues that OCI’s failure to contest the “marginal” rating it received as
    to Factor I, Mission Capability, or either of its sub-factors, Overall Capability (sub-factor
    1) and Representative Tasks (sub-factor 2), rendered its proposal as not being within the
    competitive range. 
    Id. at 12.
    By virtue of its elimination from the competitive range on
    this basis alone, given the requirement that “[t]o receive consideration for award, an offer
    must receive no less than an ‘Acceptable’ rating for the Mission Capability Factor and
    sub-factors,” AR 57, “OCI cannot meet its burden to establish that, but for specific errors,
    it had a ‘substantial chance’ of winning the contract.” Def.’s Mot. at 12. Accordingly,
    -18-
    the Government argues, “OCI thus would have still been excluded from the competitive
    range even if the NGB had calculated OCI’s price in the manner that OCI now contends
    the solicitation required.” 
    Id. at 13
    (citing AR 5883-84).
    1. Price
    As the Government argues, the gravamen of OCI’s complaint regarding price is
    its objection to the NGB’s use of a price model, specifically the calculation of its TCLP,
    rather than what OCI considers the more meaningful price based on “the probable cost.”
    See Pl.’s Mem. at 14 (citing AR 991-92). Plaintiff avers that “the pricing model . . . does
    not accurately reflect what the Government will actually pay.” 
    Id. at 15.
    Thus, because
    the pricing model “is based on ceiling pricing for each labor category that fails to
    consider the pricing actually proposed,” OCI’s TCLP of $265,619,111.06 did not
    constitute “the probable cost to the Government.” 
    Id. at 1.
    OCI’s explanation for the disparity of its “overstated” TCLP of $265 million
    compared to its “correct” total price of $199 million is that the agency’s price model used
    “ceiling rates” to calculate the total price, “causing a calculation error drastically skewing
    OCI’s proposed quote.” 
    Id. at 8.
    OCI contends that the ceiling rates, however, “were
    applicable to only the highest cost of living areas in the country and were not intended as
    a universal rate to be applied across the entire contract.” 
    Id. In effect,
    then, the Government is correct in characterizing OCI’s position as a
    concession that the NGB properly calculated OCI’s total price utilizing the price model.
    The Government reasons that the Solicitation manifestly provided that the NGB would
    evaluate offerors’ proposals based upon “total contract life price to be determine[d] based
    upon the price model set forth reflecting the proposed prices for the two sample tasks, the
    fixed-price contract line items (CLIN), and the ceiling (or maximum) hourly rates for
    seven required labor categories.” Def.’s Mot. at 10. Accordingly, the Government
    argues that OCI’s failure to protest the terms of the Solicitation waives any present
    objection based on price.
    In Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 
    492 F.3d 1308
    , 1313 (Fed. Cir.), the
    court held that “a party who had the opportunity to object to the terms of a government
    solicitation containing a patent error and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding
    process waives its ability to raise the same objection subsequently in a bid protest action
    in the Court of Federal Claims.” The court recognized analogous doctrines of laches and
    equitable estoppel in developing its waiver rule:
    In the absence of a waiver rule, a contractor with
    knowledge of a solicitation defect could choose to stay
    silent when submitting its first proposal. If its first
    proposal loses to another bidder, the contractor could then
    come forward with the defect to restart the bidding process,
    perhaps with increased knowledge of its competitors. A
    waiver rule thus prevents contractors from taking
    -19-
    advantage of the government and other bidders, and avoids
    costly after-the-fact litigation.
    
    Id. at 13
    14.
    In other words, “‘[v]endors cannot sit on their rights to challenge what they
    believe is an unfair solicitation, roll the dice and see if they receive award [sic] and then,
    if unsuccessful, claim the solicitation was infirm.’’” 
    Id. (quoting Argencord
    Mach. &
    Equip., Inc. v. United States, 
    68 Fed. Cl. 167
    , 175 n.14 (2005).
    Yet it is plain that OCI submitted two vastly different price totals, then sat on its
    hands awaiting whether it would be successful in its bid in any event. As Defendant
    points out, the Solicitation plainly provided that offerors’ proposals would be evaluated
    based on the TCLP, which in turn was to be based on the price model “reflecting the
    proposed prices for the two sample tasks, the fixed-price contract line items (CLIN), and
    the ceiling (or maximum) hourly rates for seven required labor categories.” Def.’s Mot.
    at 10; AR 1991-02, RFP amend. 2, at 73-74; see also AR 827-28, RFP amend. 5 at 2-3.
    Sample Task 1 required offerors to submit labor rates for numerous geographical
    locations. AR 3373.
    When OCI first submitted its proposal on August 9, 2012, its TCLP was
    $196,662,107. AR 3378. Subsequently, the agency issued Amendments 5, 6, and 7
    dealing with revisions to the price model. OCI inquired about the permissibility of
    “recalculating and resubmitting a new price quote,” rather than being bound by the price
    it had quoted earlier. AR 842. The agency’s response was that offerors were “permitted
    to recalculate pricing as they see fit,” but were advised “to ensure proposed prices”
    complied with the requirements of recently provided amendments. 
    Id. One of
    the recent
    instructions had introduced the opportunity of providing “explanatory pricing notes” on a
    separate PDF document, but cautioned that the pricing notes were to “be limited to
    explanations of details not readily discernible from the price model and shall not contain
    qualifications or options which could result in a change of price.” AR 828. Further, the
    “Pricing Notes” guidance reemphasized that “the price model and the TCLP calculated
    by the price model will be the only price evaluated.” 
    Id. The import
    of these instructions is that OCI was on notice that 1) it could revise
    its originally submitted price quote, but only consistent with the price model as amended
    and 2) that it could provide explanatory notes, but the notes could not “qualify” or
    otherwise change its TCLP per the price model. OCI’s submission of different TCLP
    totals, one in the price model and the other in its notes, was contrary to these instructions.
    OCI essentially acknowledges as much (“As directed by the Agency, this information
    was intended to explain the errors in the spreadsheet as submitted,” Pl.’s Mem. At 9), but
    posits simply that it didn’t expect that the Government would nevertheless “ignore” its
    pricing notes. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the AR and Reply to Def.’s Resp. to
    Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the AR (“Pl.’s Resp. and Reply”) at 12. “Given the significance [sic]
    difference between the pricing generate [sic] by the pricing model, and that offered by
    OCI reflecting probably cost to the Government, OCI reasonably assumed that prior to
    -20-
    the submission of proposals that the Government would consider OCI’s intended and
    actual pricing.” 
    Id. To the
    extent, then, that the substance of OCI’s complaint focuses on the alleged
    disparity between the price model’s specific formulation of the TCLP and the more
    generic “probably cost to [the] Government as required by the evaluation criteria,” Pl.’s
    Mem. at 16, OCI should have raised its concern prior to the close of the bidding process.
    Furthermore, OCI mistakenly fixates on “probable cost” in alleging that the price model
    failed to take into account labor rates based on geographical regions, relying instead on
    ceiling rates for several labor categories. OCI’s reliance on its alternative “probably
    cost” price calculation is bewildering, however, because the price amendments were
    pellucid in stating that the TCLP calculated via the price model would be the only price
    evaluated. 15
    The court finds, per the caveat established by the Federal Circuit in Blue and Gold
    Fleet, that OCI has waived its objections based on price because of its failure to have
    challenged the price model and its instructions regarding the TCLP prior to the final bid
    submission deadline.
    2. Mission Capability
    The Government argues that, even if the court were to find that OCI has not
    waived its objections based on price, it would nonetheless have been excluded from the
    competitive range based on its deficient ratings under the Mission Capability factor and
    its two subfactors. The Government elaborates that OCI’s rating of Marginal as to Factor
    1, in comparison to the Good or Outstanding ratings of the companies within the
    competitive range, by itself eliminated OCI from having a substantial chance of winning
    the contract. Def.’s Mot. at 12. Thus, in not challenging its Mission Capability rating,
    OCI cannot demonstrate standing to pursue other allegations of error in the award of the
    contract. 
    Id. It is
    correct that OCI has focused on issues of price and past performance, rather
    than mission capability factor per se, in its motion for judgment on the record. Yet, while
    mission capability was the foremost of all the factors in importance, OCI is generally
    persuasive in noting that “Mission Capability requirements fall squarely within
    information challenged by OCI on its past performance and corporate experience.” Pl.’s
    Resp. and Reply at 14. The allegations of prejudice, ill-sentiment, and animosity towards
    OCI as a result of the Dr. Zeiger matter, albeit addressed in OCI’s motion under the
    rubric of past performance, also potentially implicate the ratings it received relating to
    corporate experience and key personnel, elements of sub-factors 1 and 2, respectively.
    15
    The SSAC report also noted that the Price Evaluation Team had “verified the propriety of all formulas in
    the submitted price model and found that [OCI’s] calculated price of $265,619,111.06 was determined on
    the same basis as all other offerors’ TCLP and therefore the only figure for evaluation.” AR 5701. It also
    noted, although without elaboration, that, even “if the Government were to consider all offerors based on a
    similar construct to that used by [OCI in its explanatory notes’ TCLP], its price would be the highest
    evaluated.” 
    Id. -21- In
    this respect, therefore, OCI has indeed effectively questioned its Mission
    Capability ratings, sufficiently so that the court cannot conclude that Plaintiff has waived
    its opportunity to argue on the merits in this respect.
    C. Past Performance
    OCI’s claim is founded on its perception that the NGB’s unhappiness over the
    termination of Dr. Zeiger prejudicially impacted the evaluation of OCI’s past
    performance (as suffused in both the Mission Capability and Past Performance factors)
    with respect to the instant solicitation.
    The Solicitation advised that “The Government will evaluate past performance of
    three (3) current or previous contracts for relevancy based on how well the contractor
    performed on projects of similar dollar value, scope, and complexity.” AR 975. It also
    stated, “Offerors are advised that the Government may use past performance information
    obtained from centralized past performance databases and sources other than those
    identified by the offeror . . . .” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    According to the SSEB report, OCI’s three past performance submissions were
    “one example of a similar scope which addressed mild adjustment disorders, associated
    personal problems of SM [service members] related to deployment conditions which
    adversely impacted reintegration to civilian life,” and two examples “highlight[ing]
    medical support services, physician deployment scheduling, and medical readiness
    support services, none of which demonstrated a behavioral health focus.” AR 5503.
    Based on the three past performance submissions, the SSEB gave OCI a “Limited
    Confidence” rating “due to the lack of ARNG DPH program experience.” 
    Id. It stated
    that, “[b]ased on the offeror’s recent/relevant performance record, the Government has a
    low expectation that the offeror will successfully perform the required effort.” 
    Id. Of most
    significance was the SSEB’s evident disagreement with the past performance
    ratings by the contracting officer for the past jobs to the effect that the past work, as
    summed up by the SSEB, “was accomplished with minor problems and exceeded many
    requirements.” 
    Id. Instead, the
    SSEB reported:
    However, one of the reviewers had prior experience with
    the offeror related to the ANG Psychological Health
    Program, and found the [sic] there were problems with
    project management and handling personnel, both of which
    are not accurate, as this company struggled with meeting
    performance objectives and managing personnel.
    Furthermore they failed to keep the government informed
    on key personnel decisions, firing the National Director of
    Psychological Health without prior warning to the ANG, to
    include no notification that the employee was on a
    performance improvement plan. Based on these
    -22-
    experiences and the somewhat relevant experience with no
    significant similar past performance beyond handling the
    ANG PHP program across one half of the nation, the board
    has limited confidence that 09C4 can successfully perform
    in a significantly expanded contract.
    
    Id. The SSEB
    thus itemized as OCI’s past performance “weaknesses”: 1) “Problems
    with project management and handling personnel”; and 2) “Failure to keep the
    government informed on key personnel decisions.” 
    Id. at 5503-04.
    OCI objects that, “First and foremost, evaluators were not supposed to know the
    name of the offeror being evaluated. Company names and logos were deleted from all
    proposals and alphanumeric codes were used to keep proposals anonymous.” Pl.’s Mem.
    at 21, citing the Solicitation’s instructions at AR 968. Indeed, of the three members of
    the SSEB, it was Colonel Bringhurst who had apparently also participated in the meeting
    in which agency personnel criticized the firing of Dr. Zeiger, see Post Meeting Report,
    and thus had prior familiarity with OCI.
    The Government, however, rightly points out that OCI itself made “unambiguous
    references to its own identity” in its proposal. Def.’s Mot. at 17 (citing AR 2856: “We
    are a preferred vendor of the Air National Guard (ANG) and the prime contractor for the
    eastern half of the ANG Psychological Health Program serving approximately 54,915
    service members at 48 wings. 09C4 has developed and implemented a successful
    Psychological Healthcare Program for the ANG, which began in October 2010 and is still
    active today.”). More specifically, OCI identified itself by name in its past performance
    questionnaire submissions. AR 6531-32, 6536-37, and 6541-42. In any event, even if
    OCI hadn’t noted its own name, it is not surprising that an evaluator such as Col.
    Bringhurst would have recognized OCI merely by virtue of its description of having
    performed the ANG pilot project. The court finds no abuse of discretion in the
    evaluators’ inference of OCI’s identity. “The solicitation and source selection plan
    simply did not require the NGB’s anonymous rating of proposals, which would not have
    been feasible.” Def.’s Mot. at 18.
    In addition, the court agrees with Defendant that there is no general or specific
    provision in the Solicitation or Source Selection Plan prohibiting an evaluator’s
    application of personal knowledge in rating past performance. Case authority is
    persuasive as to the propriety of doing so. Labat-Anderson, Inc. v. United States, 42 Fed.
    Cl. 80-6, 842 n.54 (1999); Seattle Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    45 Fed. Cl. 560
    , 568
    (2000); and Pitney Bowes Gov’t Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 
    94 Fed. Cl. 1
    , 14 (2010)
    (citing Labat-Anderson and Pitney Bowes). Moreover, the Solicitation, as noted earlier,
    specifically advised that the past performance evaluation may be informed by “sources
    other than those identified by the offeror . . . .” AR 975 (emphasis added).
    -23-
    In its most substantive disagreement with the Past Performance rating
    (“Somewhat Relevant, Limited Confidence,” AR 5503) it received from the SSEB, OCI
    notes that the NGB had received two Performance Evaluations, both dated August 8,
    2012, from the ANG Contracting Officer, Christine Pettigrew, with respect to OCI’s
    work on the pilot program. In the first evaluation, Ms. Pettigrew gave OCI the highest
    rating available, “Outstanding,” on all five categories of performance – Compliance and
    Deliverables, Project Management, Timeliness, Forecasting Costs (re Cost
    Reimbursement Contracts), and Customer Satisfaction. She also added hand-written
    comments: “vendor has always been compliant and met all deliverables,” “PM [Project
    Management] has been effective with handling personnel,” “no problem with the product
    or services deliverables on time,” “vendor has always kept the customer informed,” and
    “vendor has kept the customer satisfied[,] has always looked out for best interest of
    customer.” AR 6532-33. In the second evaluation, Ms. Pettigrew rated OCI as
    Outstanding on four of the five categories of performance and “Good” on one category
    (applicable to cost-reimbursement contracts, not at issue here). Her comments were:
    “met all deliverables in a timely manner,” “PM has been effective and professional,”
    “timeliness of performance was always met,” and “kept company abrest (sic) of the hold
    (sic) contract.” AR 6537-38.
    The three members of the SSEB, comprised of Capt. Hunter, Col. Bringhurst, and
    Lt. Colonel Laura Wheeler, however took issue with Ms. Pettigrew’s ratings with respect
    to project management and personnel. AR 5503. In the individual evaluation notes, for
    instance, Capt. Hunter observed that Ms. Pettigrew’s comments such as “compliant” and
    “no problem,” although consistently stated, were inadequate, that is, “do not support” a
    rating of “outstanding.” AR 5070. Thus, she wrote that the Board “questions the validity
    of the outstanding rating bec. of lack of rationale.” 
    Id. Lt. Col.
    Wheeler wrote, “ratings
    were not backed up by solid comments or N/A.” AR 5086. Col. Bringhurst was more
    effusive: “Government rater gave ‘outstanding’ marks, but the comments reflected
    ‘acceptable’ level only. Government rater’s comments were inaccurate.” AR 5103. He
    elaborated,
    This contractor is known by this rater as they manage the
    ANG Psychological Health Program. Review of past
    performance ratings by the contracting officer show a
    discrepancy between the ratings of “outstanding” and then
    comments that suggest “acceptable.” Based on my
    personal knowledge of the companies (sic) performance
    they should be rated “acceptable.” In one case the
    contracting officer suggests the “pm has been effective in
    handling personnel” and later states, “vendor has always
    kept the customer informed.” Both of these statements are
    inaccurate. There have been problems with both their
    management of personnel and keeping the ANG informed
    of key personnel decisions.
    AR 5104.
    -24-
    Capt. Hunter gave OCI an overall rating of “somewhat relevant” because two of
    the three past performance contracts, unlike OCI’s ANG pilot program work, were “not
    specifically related to” psychological health or were “not PH focused.” AR 5070. For
    similar reasons, she gave OCI a “limited confidence” rating as well. 
    Id. Lt. Col.
    Wheeler
    similarly found “relevance” in OCI’s ANG experience, but not in the other two past
    contracts. AR 5086. With respect to confidence, Col. Wheeler determined that all three
    contracts warranted only a limited confidence rating “due to lack of ARNG DPH”
    experience. 
    Id. Col. Bringhurst
    wrote, “Their ANG contract shows direct scope but not
    magnitude of effort for a national program. So overall they have ‘somewhat relevant’ past
    performance to ‘relevant.’” AR 5104. He concluded, “based on their past performance
    challenges with a contract only ½ nationwide and no other significant similar
    performance, I have ‘limited confidence’ that 09C4 will successfully perform the
    expanded SOW [statement of work].” 
    Id. OCI argues
    that the evaluation it was given was irrational. The NGB had noted in
    the acquisition planning stage of the instant procurement, “Three small business entities
    [of which OCI was one] currently hold contracts for substantially similar requirements
    which will be subsumed by this family of contracts.” AR 37. Thus, to assert that OCI
    “had no significant similar past performance beyond handling the ANG PHP program
    across one half of the nation,” AR 5396, is nonsensical when OCI’s pilot program
    experience “likely is the most relevant past performance reference.” Pl.’s Mem. at 22.
    Yet OCI’s argument overlooks the following salient components of the SSEB’s
    determination: 1) OCI’s pilot program indeed extended to just half of the country,
    whereas the Solicitation at issue was nationwide in geographical scope; 2) OCI’s pilot
    program involved just the ANG, but that it had no experience in providing psychological
    health services to the ARNG; and 3) the SSEB’s “somewhat relevant” rating was based in
    large part on the recognition that two of the three past performance examples proffered
    by OCI were not found particularly relevant to the behavioral health focus of the instant
    Solicitation.
    Given the “heavy burden” on the protestor to demonstrate that the agency
    determination lacked a rational basis and that the court’s inquiry is limited to whether the
    agency articulated a “satisfactory explanation” for its decision, the court is hard-pressed
    to second-guess the SSEB here.
    OCI attempts to meet this burden, however, by its heavy reliance on the
    allegations related to the Dr. Zeiger matter. “This adverse past performance rating
    appears to be entirely based on OCI’s decision to terminate one of its employees, Ms.
    Zeiger, who was apparently a former colleague and friend of members of the evaluation
    team, rather than any issues with OCI’s actual performance under the contract.” Pl.’s
    Mem. at 20.
    Although this court has determined to admit the “Post Meeting Report,” it finds
    that report at best ambiguous and ultimately an unreliable and one-sided rendition of the
    discussion between the agency and OCI regarding the termination of Dr. Zeiger. There is
    -25-
    no claim that the NGB ever reviewed, agreed with, or signed off on OCI’s report of that
    meeting. The Report’s notes of “Points Discussed” and “Meeting Summary” begin under
    the heading of “Meeting Minutes,” but the term “minutes” most generally connotes an
    approved record of proceedings. Even as merely a recitation of the meeting, the Report
    does not identify who actually wrote the report, when it was compiled, or from what
    source it was compiled (contemporary notes, audio recording, etc.). The legend at the
    bottom of each page recites, “These materials are proprietary information of Optimization
    Consulting, Inc. (OCI) and may not be used, disclosed, or reproduced for any purpose
    without the prior written consent of OCI.” While the Report certainly reflects that NGB
    personnel were quite distressed with the termination of Dr. Zeiger, and the manner and
    timing in which OCI communication that decision to the agency, it does not provide a
    convincing foundation for OCI’s claims of bias in the instant Solicitation.
    Moreover, in addition to the relatively weak rating that OCI received for the Past
    Performance factor, it also was rated poorly on the most important factor, Mission
    Capability. For example, in evaluating OCI on sub-factor 1, Capt. Hunter observed that
    OCI’s proposal “Blames Wing Commanders for problems [associated] with counselor
    placement.” AR 5061. She also notes frustration with OCI’s proposal, where it “Blames
    ANG for no SOP with previous award. ‘Lack of policies at contractor start up – This
    should have been managed & policies should be developed by company before award!’”
    
    Id. She further
    critiqued OCI’s data management plan: “talks about its importance but
    does not offer ‘how or if’ it has a solution to capture data.” 
    Id. It is
    also notable that Col.
    Bringhurst rated OCI “acceptable” on sub-factor 1, whereas both Capt. Hunter and Lt.
    Col. Wheeler gave OCI only a “marginal” score on that sub-factor.
    In short, this court finds no basis for second-guessing the ratings that OCI
    received for Past Performance or for Mission Capability and thus no prejudicial violation
    of applicable statutes or regulations or of the evaluation criteria under the Solicitation.
    D. Evaluation of Goldbelt Glacier
    In a separate front, OCI faults the NGB’s evaluation of the past performance of
    Goldbest Glacier, one of the eventual awardees, in particular alleging that Goldbelt
    Glacier misrepresented – as its own – the past performance of a sister company, Goldbelt
    Wolf. “Goldbelt Glacier made a material misrepresentation because it proffered Goldbelt
    Wolf’s past performance as its own.” Pl.’s Mem. at 24.
    In order to establish this claim, OCI must demonstrate: 1) that Goldbelt Glacier
    made a false statement; and 2) that the NGB relied on that false statement in selecting its
    proposal for the contract award. Blue & Gold 
    Fleet, 70 Fed. Cl. at 495
    . “To preserve the
    integrity of the solicitation process when such a material misrepresentation influences the
    award of the proposal, the proposal is disqualified from consideration.” 
    Id. “[T]he submission
    of a misstatement, as made in the instant procurement, which materially
    influences consideration of a proposal should disqualify the proposal.” Planning
    Research Corp. v. United States, 
    971 F.2d 736
    , 741 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
    -26-
    The Solicitation provided that offerors were to submit “three (3) current or
    previous contracts for relevancy based on how well the contractor performed on projects
    of similar dollar value, scope, and complexity.” AR 975. It further instructed, “For
    contractors with limited or no relevant corporate past performance, the three (3) current
    or previous contracts submitted may reflect information regarding the past performance
    of predecessor companies, key personnel with relevant past performance, or
    subcontractors that will key aspects of the requirement. 
    Id. In its
    Past Performance submission, Goldbelt Glacier, describing itself as the
    “36D6 Team” (referencing its alphanumeric designation), presented “three Past
    Performances that are similar in magnitude and scope to the requirements of the PH-RC
    Psychological Health program.” AR 2374. The three programs it touted were: 1) NGB
    Survivor Outreach Services (“SOS”); 2) Military and Family Life Consultant Program
    (“MFLC”); and 3) USNR Psychological Health Outreach Program (PHOP) and
    Returning Warrior Workshop Facilitators (“PHOP”). It is the first of these three
    examples to which OCI takes exception.
    That contract, regarding NGB Survivor Outreach Services, was actually
    performed by Goldbelt Wolf, a “sister” company, although not a predecessor company,
    of Goldbelt Glacier. Intervenor-Def. Goldbelt Glacier Health Svcs., LLC Resp. to Pl.’s
    Mot. for J. on AR (“Intervenor’s Resp.”) at 14. Goldbelt Glacier’s proposal identified the
    “Company Name” for this past performance example as “36D6,” which, as noted, was its
    alphanumeric identifier, not that of Goldbelt Wolf. The submission also, however,
    provided the Cage Code 16 and DUNS Number 17 (per the instructions in the Solicitation,
    AR 975) that were particular to Goldbelt Wolf. AR 2374; Intevenor’s Resp. at 14.
    Goldbelt Glacier explains in its brief that, where an offeror had “limited or no
    relevant corporate past performance” of its own, it was authorized instead to submit, as
    one among three options, a “previous contract” that reflected information regarding “key
    personnel with relevant past performance.” AR 975. It avers, without any contradiction
    by OCI, that Goldbelt Glacier’s president at the time of the proposal submission, Mr.
    Steve Cook, had been president of Goldbelt Wolf prior to his having joined Goldbelt
    Glacier. In this manner, the proffer of the Goldbelt Wolf contract for the SOS services is
    properly encompassed in the “key personnel” aspect of past performance. Accordingly,
    because of Mr. Cook’s roles with both Goldbelt sister companies, Goldbelt Glacier’s
    listing of the SOS contract was consistent with the terms of the Solicitation.
    Furthermore, because the Solicitation directed offerors not to identify themselves or their
    subcontractors by name, it was not inappropriate to have identified “36D6” as the
    “Company,” along with the Cage Code and DUNS Number specific to Goldbelt Wolf.
    Moreover, as Defendant argues, Goldbelt Glacier’s identification of itself, via its
    alphanumeric code, was not material “because it did not have a significant impact on the
    16
    A CAGE (“Commercial and Government Entity”) Code is a unique identifier given to suppliers to
    various government and defense agencies.
    17
    A DUNS (“Data Universal Numbering System”) Number is an identifier issued by Dun & Bradstreet.
    -27-
    determination that Goldbelt Glacier’s proposal qualified it as within the competitive
    range. Def.’s Mot. at 23. The SSEB panel’s comments on Goldbelt Glacier’s past
    performance submissions as well as the contracting officer’s competitive range
    determination evidence that the focus of the favorable rating given to Goldbelt Glacier
    was overwhelmingly derived from a favorable impression of its MFLC and USNR PHOP
    past performance examples. AR 5120-21, 5152, 5160, 5796.
    The court thus finds no material misrepresentation by Goldbelt Glacier in its past
    performance submissions.
    E. Referral to SBA for Nonresponsibility Determination Not Required
    OCI objects that its technical evaluation ratings by the NGB amounted to a
    determination of nonresponsibility, which, by statute, requires referral to the Small
    Business Administration (“SBA”) for a conclusive finding. “The Agency’s
    determination that OCI lacks the requisite management and resources to perform the
    contract is tantamount to a non-responsibility determination.” Pl.’s Mem. at 31. Because
    no SBA finding was made in this respect, Plaintiff argues, it was improperly excluded
    from the competitive range.
    As decisions of the United States Government Accountability Organization
    (“GAO”) have noted, “Under the Small Business Act, agencies may not find a small
    business nonresponsible without referring the matter to the SBA, which has the ultimate
    authority to determine the responsibility of small businesses . . .” Capitol CREAG LLC,
    B-294958.4, 2005 CPD P 31 at 6 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7). The statute specifies that
    the SBS is empowered:
    To certify to Government procurement officers, and
    officers engaged in the sale and disposal of Federal
    property, with respect to all elements of responsibility,
    including, but not limited to, capability, competency,
    capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, and tenacity, of
    any small business concern or group of such concerns to
    receive and perform a specific Government contract.
    15 U.S.C § 637(b)(7)(A). “Responsibility concerns, among other factors, whether a
    prospective contractor will be able to comply with the required or proposed delivery or
    performance schedule, and whether it has the necessary organization, experience, and
    technical skills (or the ability to obtain them).” Capitol CREAG at 6-7 (citing FAR §
    9.104-1(b), (e).
    OCI cites three examples of what it characterizes as nonresponsibility
    determinations by the SSA relating to OCI’s ability to perform: 1) that OCI had “issues
    with MIS, data capture, lack of SOP and counselor placement which the board feels is
    indicative of a lack of relevant experience necessary to proactively address potential
    performance challenges” (AR 5625); 2) that its “description of corporate management
    -28-
    appears weak, as the offeror proposes email and weekly activity reports where the board
    feels a simple conference call would be timelier for issues resolution as well as in
    keeping communication channels open” (AR 5625); and 3) that OCI’s past project
    management and personnel handling experiences and the “no significant similar past
    performance” other than the ANG PHP program gave the board “limited confidence that
    09C4 can successfully perform in a significantly expanded contract” (AR 5633). Pl.’s
    Mem. at 31.
    Defendant responds that referrals to the SBA under section 637 are triggered only
    when there must be a determination of “all” of the elements of responsibility and that, per
    the implementing provisions of 48 C.F.R. (FAR) 19.602.1, “a contracting officer only
    makes a responsibility determination after a small business firm is determined to be an
    apparently successful offeror.” Def.’s Mot. at 30 (emphasis added); see also Capitol
    CREAG at 7 (responsibility review normally conducted post-evaluation).
    The court does not find the Government’s position here initially dispositive. It
    agrees with the GAO that, where traditional “responsibility” factors are employed as
    technical evaluation criteria and the evaluation renders an offeror’s proposal flatly
    ineligible for award, “the agency has effectively made a determination that the small
    business offeror is not a responsible contractor capable of performing the solicitation
    requirements.” 
    Id. On the
    other hand, where the “responsibility-type criterion” is applied
    in a “comparative or tradeoff analysis,” it is not “tantamount to a nonresponsibility
    determination.” 
    Id. Thus, for
    example, in Capitol CREAG, the offeror’s approach to management and
    staffing factors, which may sometimes be considered responsibility criteria, was found to
    create “a high risk of unacceptable performance” even though it was not technically
    “inadequate.” The offeror’s proposal was rated “marginal,” rather than “unacceptable.”
    The GAO re-emphasized that “no SBA referral is needed where the small business
    offeror is not selected for award merely because, while its proposal is evaluated as
    acceptable, another offeror’s proposal is evaluated as superior under a comparative
    analysis or because of a cost/technical tradeoff analysis.” 
    Id. n.6. Similarly,
    in Nomura
    Enterprise, Inc., B-277768, 97-2 CPD ¶ 148 at 3 (Nov. 19, 1997), GAO noted the general
    rule that “[a]n agency may use traditional responsibility factors [where] a comparative
    evaluation of those areas is to be made.” A “comparative evaluation” is one with
    “competing proposals [that] will be rated on a scale relative to each other, as opposed to a
    pass/fail basis.” 
    Id. Similarly, in
    Medical Info. Servs., B-287824, 2001 CPD ¶ 122 at 5
    (July 10, 2010), GAO observed that “[w]here a proposal is determined to be deficient
    pursuant to a [comparative] evaluation, the matter is one of relative technical merit, not
    unacceptability, which would require a referral to the SBA.”
    Accordingly, the question is whether OCI’s ratings – and exclusion from the
    competitive range – were the result of a comparative evaluation or the result of a
    “pass/fail” test. On the Solicitation’s adjective rating scale, “Marginal” signified that a
    “proposal does not clearly meet requirements and has not demonstrated an adequate
    approach and understanding of the requirements. The proposal has one or more
    -29-
    weaknesses which are not offset by strengths. Risk of unsuccessful performance is high.”
    AR 5575. By contrast, “Unacceptable” meant that the “proposal does not meet the
    requirements and contains one or more deficiencies. Proposal is unawardable.” 
    Id. Likewise, the
    definitions for “Limited Confidence” and “No Confidence” under the Past
    Performance factor demonstrate that, in the first instance, the agency retains some, albeit
    limited, confidence in the offeror’s ability to perform, while it has none for a recipient of
    the lowest technical rating. AR 5576-77. OCI, clearly therefore, was not ruled out of
    consideration on a pass/fail basis as it would have been had it received an “Unacceptable”
    or “No Confidence” rating (and as other offerors had been, AR 5580). Rather, its
    deficiencies related to how it proposed to perform. See, e.g., Capitol CREAG at 8.
    Three of the 10 offerors did receive “Unacceptable” ratings on one or more
    factors or subfactors, AR 5762, and were deemed “unawardable as submitted.” AR 5881.
    Of the remaining seven offerors, four were determined to qualify for the competitive
    range. Goldbelt Glacier, for example, received ratings of “Outstanding” for the most
    important factor, Mission Capability, and both of its subfactors. The other three in the
    competitive range all were rated “Good” for Mission Capability and both its subfactors.
    OCI, however, was rated “Marginal” for this factor and subfactors, while the other two
    offers who did not make it into the competitive range were rated “Acceptable,” slightly
    higher even than OCI. The “Competitive Range Determination,” signed by the
    Contracting Officer and the Source Selection Authority, is extensive in its comparative
    evaluation of the four offerors selected as within the competitive range with the three
    offerors, among them OCI, that were not deemed “unawardable” but which, nonetheless,
    were eliminated from the competitive range. See, e.g., AR 5890 (“Comparison of 36D6
    [Goldbelt Glacier] to 09C4 [OCI]”).
    There is thus no basis for finding that OCI was entitled at that stage of the
    Solicitation process to a referral to the SBA for a responsibility determination.
    IV.      Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, 18 the court finds no basis to disturb the NGB’s
    determination of the competitive range in this Solicitation. Plaintiff’s motion for
    judgment on the Administrative Record is thus denied and Defendant’s cross-motion is
    hereby granted.
    The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
    s/ Edward J. Damich
    EDWARD J. DAMICH
    Judge
    18
    The court also finds insubstantial OCI’s argument that the involvement of Karen Klepadlo as a contract
    employee for the NGB created an appearance of impropriety. The email to which OCI refers was neither
    nefarious nor an encouragement to OCI’s employees “to move to OCI’s competitors.” Pl.’s Mem. at 29.
    Similarly insubstantial are OCI’s insinuations of “taint” due to the attenuated string of Ms. Klepadlo’s past
    affiliations. 
    Id. at 29-30.
    -30-