B&B Medical Services, Inc. v. United States ( 2014 )


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  •            In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    No. 13-463C
    (Filed Under Seal: June 23, 2014)
    (Reissued for Publication: July 22, 2014) *
    ***************************************
    B&B MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.,             *
    *
    Plaintiff,            *
    *
    v.                                      *
    *
    THE UNITED STATES,                      *
    *
    Defendant,            *
    *
    and                                     *
    *
    ROTECH HEALTHCARE, INC.,                *
    *
    Defendant-Intervenor. *
    ***************************************
    OPINION AND ORDER
    Earlier this year, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) awarded a
    contract for home oxygen services to defendant-intervenor Rotech Healthcare, Inc. (“Rotech”).
    Plaintiff B&B Medical Services, Inc. (“B&B”) protested the VA’s award decision, alleging
    errors in the VA’s responsibility determination, past performance evaluation, and best value
    tradeoff. While the parties were engaged in briefing on cross-motions for judgment on the
    administrative record, the VA commenced corrective action and defendant moved to dismiss the
    protest as moot. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendant’s motion.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. The Solicitation
    On May 31, 2013, the VA issued solicitation number VA256-12-R-0059 for the Veterans
    Integrated Service Network (“VISN”) 16 Home Oxygen Services contract. 1 AR 129, 2908-09.
    *
    This reissued Opinion and Order incorporates the agreed-to redaction proposed by the
    parties on July 18, 2014. The redaction is indicated with a bracketed ellipsis (“[. . .]”).
    1
    The court derives the facts in the background section from the administrative record
    (“AR”) and the exhibit attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss.
    The contract work involved the furnishing of “all labor, supervision, equipment, training,
    supplies, delivery and maintenance and incidentals to provide an effective home oxygen services
    program” within VISN 16, an area that included ten VA medical centers serving 6,300 oxygen-
    using patients in nine southern and midwestern states. 2 
    Id. at 140-44.
    The VA anticipated
    awarding two contracts; work for two of the medical centers was set aside for a small business,
    while competition for the remaining work was unrestricted. 
    Id. The contracts
    were to be
    awarded for one base year, with four one-year option periods. 
    Id. at 140.
    Offerors were to submit their proposals in three parts: a technical proposal, a volume
    containing past performance information for up to ten similar government or commercial
    contracts from the previous three years, and a price proposal. 
    Id. at 232.
    They were also to
    submit a small business subcontracting plan. 
    Id. at 235.
    The VA intended to evaluate the
    offerors’ proposals on five factors: (1) technical capability, (2) quality control program, (3) past
    performance, (4) participation of service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (“SDVOSB”)
    and commitment to small businesses, and (5) price. 
    Id. at 242.
    Upon evaluating all of the
    proposals on these factors, the VA would “award a contract . . . to the responsible offeror whose
    offer, conforming to the solicitation, [would] be most advantageous to the Government, price and
    other factors considered.” 
    Id. at 241.
    B. The Source Selection Plan
    The exact procedures that the VA would use to evaluate proposals were not set forth in
    the solicitation. Rather, the procedures were outlined in the source selection plan that was
    approved by the contracting officer on May 28, 2012. 3 
    Id. at 99-108.
    First, the VA would
    determine the acceptability of the proposals, i.e., it would ascertain whether the offerors
    complied with the solicitation. 
    Id. at 106.
    Second, a source evaluation team, also referred to as a
    technical evaluation board (“TEB”), 4 would evaluate the proposals under the technical factors. 5
    2
    The nine states are Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida,
    Arkansas, Missouri, and Kansas. AR 141-44.
    3
    The body of the source selection plan departs from the plan’s table of contents in
    significant respects. For example, the body of the plan does not contain sections describing how
    technical capability, SDVOSB participation, and price would be evaluated and rated, even
    though such sections appear in the table of contents. Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain whether
    certain sections were omitted intentionally or accidentally because the section numbering within
    the body of the plan–specifically within section 4–is inconsistent. For example, there is no
    section 4.0, and there is a section 4.2.2, but no section 4.2.1. Compare AR 100, with 
    id. at 105-
    06.
    4
    Compare AR 103 (“source evaluation team”), 106 (“SET”), with 
    id. at 101
    (“technical
    evaluation board”), 107 (“TEB”).
    5
    The source selection plan confusingly provides: [. . .]. AR 106 (emphasis added). The
    solicitation does not contain a section M, see 
    id. at 131-32;
    past performance, SDVOSB
    -2-
    
    Id. Each evaluator
    was to identify and document the significant strengths, strengths, weaknesses,
    significant weaknesses, and deficiencies of each proposal and then assign a rating–Excellent,
    Good, Marginal, or Unsatisfactory–for each factor. 6 
    Id. at 104-06.
    Third, a past performance
    evaluation team would evaluate the proposals under the past performance factor and then assign
    an appropriate confidence rating. 7 
    Id. at 106-07.
    Fourth, the TEB would meet to discuss the
    evaluations and arrive at a consensus, after which the chair of the TEB would prepare a
    “Capability Assessment Memorandum (Consensus Evaluation Report)” summarizing the TEB’s
    findings. 
    Id. at 107.
    In particular, the report was to include [. . .]. 
    Id. Additionally, the
    TEB
    was to [. . .]. 
    Id. Fifth, upon
    receipt of the TEB’s report, the contracting officer could, if she chose to do
    so, [. . .] and then place these proposals in a best value pool. 
    Id. Sixth, if
    a best value pool was
    established, the VA might conduct exchanges with the offerors and/or request proposal revisions.
    
    Id. at 107-08.
    Seventh, upon receipt of revised proposals, the TEB would conduct a final
    evaluation, and then the chair of the TEB would [. . .] 
    Id. at 108.
    The final step of the process
    was the selection of the source:
    [. . .]
    Id.; see also 
    id. at 101
    ([. . .]). As described in the following section, the source selection process
    ultimately employed by the VA did not precisely conform to the source selection plan.
    C. Evaluation of Proposals
    The VA received nine proposals by the August 13, 2012 proposal deadline. 
    Id. at 1225-
    26, 1234. The contracting officer found [. . .]. See, e.g., 
    id. at 1033-34.
    From August 26, 2012,
    through August 31, 2012, the TEB convened to evaluate the proposals. 
    Id. at 1220.1.
    The TEB
    participation, and price were not technical factors or subfactors in the solicitation, see 
    id. at 232-
    35, 242-48; only the past performance evaluation team was to evaluate the proposals under the
    past performance factor, see 
    id. at 106;
    and the TEB was not supposed to have access to price
    information, see 
    id. at 104.
    However, because the TEB’s actual evaluations reveal that it only
    evaluated the proposals under the technical capability and quality control program factors, see 
    id. at 1161-220,
    the court presumes that that was the intent of the source selection plan.
    6
    Although the body of the source selection plan indicates that the adjectival ratings to be
    used were [. . .], AR 105-06, the scoring sheets attached as exhibits to the source selection plan
    indicate that adjectival ratings of [. . .] should be used, 
    id. at 118,
    121. The TEB ultimately used
    the latter, not the former, ratings. See 
    id. at 1161-220,
    1227.
    7
    In the source selection plan, only the abbreviation “PPET” is used, AR 106; the
    abbreviation is not defined, nor are the members of the past performance evaluation team
    identified. The earliest document containing the missing information is the contracting officer’s
    January 2, 2013 best value pool determination. See 
    id. at 1221-39.
    -3-
    members evaluated the proposals under the technical capability and quality control program
    factors, identifying the proposals’ strengths and weaknesses and assigning appropriate ratings.
    See, e.g., 
    id. at 1161-220.
    And, it appears that the past performance evaluation team met and
    evaluated the proposals under the past performance factor. 8 See 
    id. at 1227;
    see also 
    id. at 1110
    (containing one page of handwritten notes regarding B&B’s past performance), 1135 (containing
    one page of handwritten notes regarding Rotech’s past performance).
    The chair of the TEB sent the TEB’s report to the contracting officer on December 12,
    2012. 
    Id. at 1220.1-.8.
    In the report, the TEB chair summarized the contents of each of the nine
    proposals with respect to the technical capability and quality control program factors. 
    Id. However, contrary
    to the process set forth in the source selection plan, the report did not include
    an analysis of each proposal’s strengths and weaknesses. Rather, the TEB chair merely noted
    what the offerors included in their proposals, what the offerors did not include in their proposals,
    and, in some cases, the quality of what the offerors included in their proposals. 
    Id. Also contrary
    to the source selection plan, the TEB’s report lacked a recommendation of
    the highest rated technical proposal. Indeed, although the chair of the TEB wrote that the TEB
    identified three offerors who could perform the contract and who should be considered for
    award, 
    id. at 1220.1,
    he did not name those offerors in the report. Nor did he include the TEB’s
    consensus adjectival ratings for the proposals under the technical capability and quality control
    program factors.
    On January 2, 2013, the contracting officer issued her best value pool determination. 
    Id. at 1221-39.
    Based on the contents of the document, the contracting officer considered the
    following information: the TEB’s report; other information provided by the TEB but not
    included in the administrative record, such as the TEB’s consensus ratings; the evaluations of the
    past performance evaluation team, which also were not included in the administrative record; and
    her evaluations of the SDVOSB/small business and price factors. 
    Id. In section
    IV(c) of the
    document, she reproduced the summaries of the contents of the nine proposals from the TEB’s
    report, 9 provided summaries of how each proposal fared under the past performance factor,
    8
    There is no contemporaneous documentation, such as evaluation forms or a report, of
    the past performance evaluation team’s meeting. The first indication that the team met appears
    in the contracting officer’s January 2, 2013 best value pool determination. See AR 1221-39; cf.
    
    id. at 1110
    (containing an undated page of handwritten notes regarding B&B’s past
    performance), 1135 (containing an undated page of handwritten notes regarding Rotech’s past
    performance). It also bears noting that according to the best value pool determination, the past
    performance evaluation team evaluated past performance using adjectival ratings not previously
    defined in the solicitation or source selection plan: Exceptional, Very Good, Satisfactory,
    Neutral, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory. 
    Id. at 1228.
    It is unclear how these adjectival ratings
    were translated into the confidence ratings ultimately assigned by the contracting officer. See 
    id. at 1235-37;
    see also 
    id. at 246
    (containing the source selection plan’s description of the five
    available confidence ratings).
    9
    The court did not compare the TEB’s report with the best value pool determination
    -4-
    summarized her findings under the SDVOSB/small business factor, and discussed the price
    factor. 
    Id. at 1228-39.
    She ultimately concluded that there should be a best value pool
    consisting of the proposals from three offerors: B&B, Rotech, and [. . .]. 
    Id. at 1238.
    The
    contracting officer decided to conduct exchanges with these three offerors and then provide them
    with the opportunity to submit revised proposals. 
    Id. at 1239.
    The contracting officer advised the offerors that their proposals were part of the best
    value pool on January 10, 2013. 
    Id. at 1240,
    1245. Attached to her notification letters were
    questions that the offerors needed to address in writing and during oral presentations scheduled
    for January 23, 2013. 
    Id. at 1240-49.
    During the two days following the oral presentations,
    members of the TEB reevaluated the proposals, presumably in light of what they learned during
    the exchanges. 
    Id. at 2747-813.4.
    Then, on January 25, 2013, the contracting officer advised the
    offerors of the remaining weaknesses with their proposals and invited the submission of revised
    proposals by February 4, 2013. 
    Id. at 1271-73.
    D. Evaluation of Revised Proposals
    Rotech submitted its revised proposal on February 1, 2013, 
    id. at 2746.3,
    and B&B
    submitted its revised proposal on February 4, 2013, 
    id. at 2746.2.
    Although the source selection
    plan indicated that the TEB would evaluate the revised proposals and the chair of the TEB would
    modify the TEB’s report in accordance with its final evaluations, the administrative record does
    not contain any evaluation forms, notes from TEB members, or a TEB report postdating the
    receipt of final proposals. However, in her February 12, 2013 source selection decision
    document, the contracting officer asserted that the TEB convened on February 6, 2013, to
    “review” the revised proposals. 
    Id. at 2925.
    E. The Responsibility Determination
    On February 4, 2013, the same date that the proposal revisions were due, the contracting
    officer prepared a responsibility determination for Rotech. 10 
    Id. at 2836-38.
    In that document,
    she concluded:
    Based on the above, Rotech Healthcare Inc. has been determined to be a
    responsible contractor, in accordance with [Federal Acquisition Regulation
    (“FAR”)] Subpart 9.1, for performance under Contract No. VA260-P-0891 [sic], I
    hereby determine that award be made to Rotech Healthcare Inc. in the amount of
    $68,300,732.76 for the . . . base period of April 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014 with
    word for word, but an examination of the two documents seems to indicate that the contracting
    officer copied and pasted the summaries prepared by the TEB chair.
    10
    The administrative record lacks any evidence that the contracting officer prepared
    responsibility determinations for the other two offerors in the best value pool.
    -5-
    four (4) twelve (12) month option periods, said contract price being fair and
    reasonable and in the best interest of the U.S. Government.
    
    Id. at 2838.
    In other words, two days before the TEB evaluated the revised proposals and eight
    days before she signed and issued the source selection decision document, the contracting officer
    decided to award the contract to Rotech.
    F. Selecting a Source
    As noted above, the contracting officer issued the source selection decision document on
    February 12, 2013. 
    Id. at 2908-33.
    In section IV(c) of the document, the contracting officer
    provided a summary of the initial evaluations of the three proposals in the best value pool.
    Instead of reproducing what she included in her best value pool determination, however, she
    provided amended and expanded versions of the technical capability, quality control program,
    and past performance factor summaries. 11 For example, in the summaries pertaining to the
    technical capability and quality control program factors, she provided additional details and
    specifically identified strengths and weaknesses. 
    Id. at 2918-24.
    And, in the summaries
    pertaining to the past performance factor, she provided significantly more detailed information
    regarding the offerors’ past performance. 
    Id. at 2920-24.
    After describing the initial evaluation of proposals in the best value pool, the contracting
    officer summarized what occurred during the exchanges–both the questions that the VA had for
    the offerors and the offerors’ responses. 
    Id. at 2925-28.
    She also set forth revised ratings for
    each offeror’s proposal and the prices contained in the revised proposals. 
    Id. at 2928-29.
    However, the contracting officer did not indicate whether her summaries or the revised ratings
    were derived from the TEB’s consensus after evaluating the revised proposals or reflected her
    independent judgment.
    Section IV of the source selection decision document concluded with the contracting
    officer’s tradeoff analysis. 
    Id. at 2930-32.
    The contracting officer concluded this analysis by
    recommending that Rotech be awarded the VISN 16 Home Oxygen Services contract. 
    Id. at 2932.
    The contract was, in fact, awarded to Rotech on March 9, 2013, 
    id. at 2934,
    with
    performance to begin on April 1, 2013, 
    id. at 2937.
    G. Postaward Proceedings
    After obtaining a written debriefing from the contracting officer on March 13, 2013, 
    id. at 3056-57,
    B&B lodged a protest with the United States Government Accountability Office
    11
    Because the additional information included in these summaries was not derived from
    the TEB’s report or any formal documentation from the past performance evaluation team, the
    court presumes that the contracting officer added it as she was preparing her source selection
    decision document. It is unclear why the contracting officer would retroactively add information
    related to the initial evaluation of proposals.
    -6-
    (“GAO”) on March 18, 2013, 
    id. at 3060-89,
    and a supplemental protest with the GAO on March
    25, 2013, 
    id. at 3090-145.
    During the GAO proceedings, the contracting officer submitted a
    statement of facts dated April 17, 2013, 
    id. at 3710-17,
    as well as an undated supplemental
    statement of facts, 
    id. at 3930-31.
    The latter fact statement contains the following explanation
    regarding how proposals were evaluated under the past performance factor (all errors are the
    contracting officer’s): 12
    [T]he Contracting Officer convened the TEB on August 27-31, 2012 in Jackson,
    MS. . . . Due to the fact the Contracting Officer was on-site to conduct the on-
    site evaluation, the Contracting Officer was able to meet with the members of the
    Past Performance Evaluation Team (PPET) Offeror to provide instruction on the
    procedures for conducting the past performance evaluations. Explanation for the
    adjectival assessment in the solicitation and to answer questions the PPET may
    have in their role in the evaluation. The PPET was provided with the past
    performance information provided by each Offeror as part of their proposal and
    questionnaire submittals, along with the criteria outlined in the solicitation
    Instruction to Offeror Section and Solicitation Evaluation Factor Section. The
    PPET reviewed the documents provided and then each Offeror was discussed
    with the Contracting Officer and notes on a hotel note pad were taken by one
    member of the PPET. At the conclusion of this meeting the PPET had made a
    determination of ratings for Past Performance for each Offeror. . . . Upon
    returning from the on-site evaluation the Contracting Officer prepared the
    Contracting Office’s Best Value Decision (Source Selection) document which
    contains the Past Performance ratings which were determined by the PPET while
    the Contracting Officer was on-site with the PPET . . . . 13
    12
    The court generally does not consider statements prepared by the contracting officer in
    response to a bid protest if those statements constitute after-the-fact explanations of the basis of
    the contracting officer’s decision-making process. See Jacobs Tech. Inc. v. United States, 
    100 Fed. Cl. 198
    , 208 (2011). The information quoted by the court does not constitute such an
    explanation.
    13
    The contracting officer did not issue her source selection decision until February 12,
    2013, AR 2908-33, almost six months after she met with the past performance evaluation team.
    The court presumes that the contracting officer meant to refer to her January 2, 2013 best value
    pool determination, which is the earliest-dated document that includes formal past performance
    factor evaluations. See 
    id. at 1221-39.
    It is unclear from her statement whether the contracting
    officer immediately drafted the summaries of the past performance evaluations upon her return
    to her office after the on-site meeting, or whether she drafted the summaries just prior to issuing
    her best value pool determination on January 2, 2013. The court would be troubled if it was the
    latter, as the administrative record lacks notes or other contemporaneous documentation
    reflecting the past performance evaluation team’s consensus evaluations and ratings from which
    the contracting officer could refresh her recollection. (The handwritten notes by one of the team
    members bear no indication that they represent the team’s consensus evaluations; nor do they
    reflect a confidence rating. 
    Id. at 1110,
    1135.) Further, regardless of when the contracting
    -7-
    
    Id. at 3930-31
    (footnote added). The GAO dismissed some of B&B’s arguments on April 12,
    2013, 
    id. at 3422,
    and the remainder of its arguments on June 24, 2013, 
    id. at 4017-27.
    B&B filed the present protest on July 9, 2013. In its amended complaint, it alleges a
    number of errors in the VA’s responsibility determination, past performance evaluation, and best
    value tradeoff. It therefore seeks (1) a declaration that the VA improperly conducted the
    procurement, evaluated the proposals, and awarded the contract to Rotech; (2) a declaration that
    the VA’s responsibility determination was improper; (3) an injunction directing the VA to
    terminate the award to Rotech; (4) an injunction directing the VA to either award it the contract
    or to conduct a new competition; (5) injunctions directing the VA to conduct a new
    responsibility determination, past performance evaluation, and best value evaluation; and (6)
    other necessary, just, and proper relief, including bid preparation and proposal costs. Rotech
    intervened and the court conducted an initial status conference, during which defendant
    represented that the VA had agreed to stay Rotech’s performance of the VISN 16 Home Oxygen
    Services contract for all but one of the affected hospitals.
    Pursuant to a scheduling order entered by the court after the status conference, the parties
    began to brief cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. After reviewing the
    parties’ opening briefs, the court issued an order identifying additional issues not addressed by
    the parties and modifying the remaining briefing schedule to allow the parties to address those
    issues. One week later, defendant filed a notice indicating that the VA “intend[ed] to take
    corrective action . . . by re-conducting its source selection decision among the three offers in the
    Best Value Pool, including with respect to the agency’s consensus evaluations and responsibility
    determination.” Notice, Sept. 13, 2013, at 1. Defendant further stated that once the VA
    commenced its corrective action, it would move to dismiss the protest as moot. The court
    suspended the remaining briefing, and on September 23, 2013, defendant filed a motion to
    dismiss, indicating that the VA had commenced corrective action on September 17, 2013.
    Specifically, in a letter attached as an exhibit to defendant’s motion, the contracting officer
    indicated:
    [The VA] intends to take corrective action . . . . The corrective action to be taken
    will involve re-conducting the source selection decision among the three Offerors
    in the Best Value Pool. . . .
    This corrective action source selection decision will be based on the initial
    proposal submissions dated July 2012, the written submissions and discussions
    held in January 2013, and the revised proposals submitted in February 2013.
    officer prepared the summaries, the record lacks any documentation of the past performance
    evaluation team’s consensus evaluations and confidence ratings, leading the court to presume
    that the contracting officer relied upon her memory when drafting the summaries.
    -8-
    Mot. Attach. A. The parties have fully briefed defendant’s motion, and, deeming oral argument
    unnecessary, the court is prepared to rule.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
    Defendant raises its mootness argument in a motion to dismiss B&B’s protest for lack of
    jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims
    (“RCFC”). “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a
    legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 
    395 U.S. 486
    , 496 (1969).
    When a case is moot, there are no justiciable issues upon which the court can render a decision. 14
    Flast v. Cohen, 
    392 U.S. 83
    , 95 (1968); see also Fisher v. United States, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    , 1176
    (Fed. Cir. 2005) (panel portion) (noting that justiciability “encompasses a number of doctrines
    under which courts will decline to hear and decide a cause,” including the “doctrines of standing,
    mootness, ripeness, and political question”). The court’s inquiry into the justiciability of a case
    is distinct from its inquiry into whether it has jurisdiction over the case’s subject matter. 
    Powell, 395 U.S. at 512
    ; Baker v. Carr, 
    369 U.S. 186
    , 198 (1962); Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp.,
    
    537 F.3d 1329
    , 1335 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Murphy v. United States, 
    993 F.2d 871
    , 872 (Fed. Cir.
    1993). In other words, the court may find that it possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of
    a case but that the dispute is nevertheless nonjusticiable. Thus, while mootness is jurisdictional
    14
    The “lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article
    III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of
    a case or controversy.” Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 
    375 U.S. 301
    , 306 n.3 (1964); see also U.S. Const.
    art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
    Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . . [and] to Controversies to which the
    United States shall be a Party . . . .”). But see Honig v. Doe, 
    484 U.S. 305
    , 329-32 (1988)
    (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (questioning the constitutional origins of the mootness doctrine by
    arguing that despite federal courts’ recognition of exceptions to mootness, such exceptions
    cannot be read into Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement); Matthew I. Hall, The
    Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 562, 575 (2009) (arguing “that
    if the mootness bar were truly a mandatory, jurisdictional rule imposed by the Constitution, then
    the exceptions . . . could not exist”). The United States Court of Federal Claims (“Court of
    Federal Claims”), as a court established under Article I of the United States Constitution, 28
    U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012), is not bound by the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III,
    Zevalkink v. Brown, 
    102 F.3d 1236
    , 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the Court of Federal
    Claims and other Article I courts traditionally have applied the “case or controversy”
    justiciability doctrines. See id.; Anderson v. United States, 
    344 F.3d 1343
    , 1350 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
    2003); CW Gov’t Travel, Inc. v. United States, 
    46 Fed. Cl. 554
    , 558 (2000); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2519
    (using the phrase “case or controversy” in describing the finality of judgments of the Court of
    Federal Claims).
    -9-
    in that it involves the court’s power to adjudicate a case, 15 an RCFC 12(b)(1) motion may not be
    the appropriate vehicle by which to dismiss a case as moot. 16
    Regardless of whether a moot claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief, the standard
    applied by the court in reviewing a motion urging dismissal of a claim as moot is the same: the
    court assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and construes those allegations in the
    plaintiff’s favor. Henke v. United States, 
    60 F.3d 795
    , 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
    B. Mootness
    A court “will determine only actual matters in controversy essential to the decision of the
    particular case before it.” United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 
    253 U.S. 113
    , 115 (1920). “The
    controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
    legal interests.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 
    300 U.S. 227
    , 240-41
    (1937). Moreover, the controversy must exist at all stages of the litigation; it is not enough that
    the controversy was alive when the complaint was filed. Steffel v. Thompson, 
    415 U.S. 452
    , 459
    n.10 (1974). Subsequent acts will render a case moot if they make it impossible for the court to
    grant “‘effectual relief.’” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 
    506 U.S. 9
    , 12 (1992)
    (quoting Mills v. Green, 
    159 U.S. 651
    , 653 (1895)). However, a case will not be rendered moot
    15
    See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 102-10 (1988)
    (characterizing the justiciability issue of standing as a jurisdictional issue); North Carolina v.
    Rice, 
    404 U.S. 244
    , 246 (1971) (per curiam) (“Mootness is a jurisdictional question because the
    Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions . . . .” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)); Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    275 F.3d 1366
    , 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[M]ootness . . . is a threshold jurisdictional issue.”); CBY Design
    Builders v. United States, 
    105 Fed. Cl. 303
    , 328 (2012) (“The mootness of a case is properly the
    subject of an RCFC 12(b)(1) motion.”).
    16
    See, e.g., 
    Baker, 369 U.S. at 196
    (holding that a case that is “unsuited to judicial
    inquiry or adjustment” should be dismissed for “a failure to state a justiciable cause of action”
    and not for “a lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter” (internal quotation marks omitted));
    Oryszak v. Sullivan, 
    576 F.3d 522
    , 526-27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting
    that when “a plaintiff makes a claim that is not justiciable . . . a court should dismiss the case for
    failure to state a claim” and that “it is important to distinguish among failure to state a claim, a
    claim that is not justiciable, and a claim over which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”);
    F. Alderete Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 
    715 F.2d 1476
    , 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
    (reciting “the long-standing rule in the Federal courts that jurisdiction is determined at the time
    the suit is filed and, after vesting, cannot be ousted by subsequent events, including action by the
    parties” (emphasis added)); see also Kontrick v. Ryan, 
    540 U.S. 443
    , 455 (2004) (“Clarity would
    be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ . . . only for prescriptions
    delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal
    jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.”).
    -10-
    by subsequent acts if some of the requested relief remains available. Intrepid v. Pollock, 
    907 F.2d 1125
    , 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1990); accord Church of Scientology of 
    Cal., 506 U.S. at 12
    (holding
    that a case is not moot so long as the “court can fashion some form of meaningful relief” for the
    injured party).
    In this protest, the subsequent act invoked by defendant is the VA’s decision to take
    corrective action. “A defendant’s voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily
    does not suffice to moot a case.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
    
    528 U.S. 167
    , 174 (2000). However, the voluntary cessation of the challenged activity may
    render a case moot if there is no reasonable expectation that the activity will recur and the effects
    of the activity have been completely extinguished. Cnty. of L.A. v. Davis, 
    440 U.S. 625
    , 631
    (1979). Thus, when “corrective action adequately addresse[s] the effects of the challenged
    action, and the Court of Federal Claims ha[s] no reasonable expectation that the action would
    recur,” the case should be dismissed. Chapman Law Firm v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 
    490 F.3d 934
    , 940 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The party asserting mootness bears a heavy burden of establishing
    that the challenged activity will not recur. Friends of the Earth, 
    Inc., 528 U.S. at 189
    .
    C. B&B’s Protest Is Moot
    Defendant contends that B&B’s protest is now moot because the corrective action
    initiated by the VA–reconducting the source selection decision among B&B, Rotech, and [. . .]–
    would entail revisiting all of the decisions that B&B challenged in its protest, i.e., the VA’s
    responsibility determination, past performance evaluation, and best value tradeoff. B&B
    disagrees, asserting that there was no evidence that the VA, in taking the proposed corrective
    action described in the contracting officer’s letter, would “set aside or terminate the award made
    to Rotech, discuss the consensus evaluations, or . . . take corrective action with respect to the
    defective responsibility determination or the flawed past performance evaluations.” Resp. 4.
    More particularly, B&B avers that the VA has left the award to Rotech in place and allowed
    Rotech to proceed with performing the contracted-for services at the one hospital where contract
    performance had not been stayed. And, B&B states, defendant is incorrect to assert that the
    VA’s responsibility determination or past performance evaluations were components of the
    source selection decision that the VA intended to conduct anew. In its reply brief, defendant
    reiterates that the VA’s corrective action would include a new responsibility determination, new
    consensus evaluations, and new past performance evaluations, as reflected in its September 2013
    notice and its motion to dismiss. It further contends that Rotech’s continued performance at the
    one hospital where contract performance was not stayed is irrelevant for two reasons: (1) the
    VA’s corrective action reopens the competition to provide services at the hospital to B&B,
    foreclosing the court’s ability to grant B&B effectual relief; and (2) B&B was not the incumbent
    contractor at the hospital and accordingly never had the right to perform work there.
    The only evidence of the scope of the corrective action being taken by the VA is the
    contracting officer’s letter that defendant attached to its motion to dismiss, which indicates that
    the VA would reconduct the source selection decision among B&B, Rotech, and [. . .] based on
    the initial proposals, discussions, and revised proposals. Specific reference to new consensus
    evaluations, new past performance evaluations, and a new responsibility determination appears
    -11-
    only in defendant’s notice, motion to dismiss, and reply brief. Although the court has no reason
    to doubt the representations made by defendant in these filings, it cannot accept such
    representations as fact. See Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. United States, 
    54 Ct. Cl. 35
    , 41-
    42 (1919) (“The court can not accept asseverations of counsel, as to facts, made in argument,
    whether denied or conceded by the other side at the bar, without any stipulation duly filed or
    other evidence . . . .”). Thus, the court’s analysis is limited to whether the contents of the
    contracting officer’s letter are sufficient to satisfy defendant’s burden to establish that the VA’s
    corrective action moots this protest.
    The contracting officer states in her letter that the VA’s corrective action would involve
    reconducting the source selection decision and that the decision would be based on initial
    proposals, discussions, and revised proposals. Logically, this process must involve more than
    just the contracting officer rewriting her source selection decision document; if the TEB and the
    past performance evaluation team did not redo their evaluations, then the contracting officer
    would have no need to write a new decision. It makes more sense that the VA would re-evaluate
    the proposals according to the procedures described in the source selection plan. Although the
    source selection plan has numerous omissions and deficiencies, it can be reasonably interpreted
    to provide for, among other things, (1) an evaluation of the technical and quality control program
    factors by the TEB, (2) an evaluation of the past performance factor by the past performance
    evaluation team, (3) the convening of a TEB consensus meeting, (4) the preparation of a
    consensus evaluation report, and (5) a best value tradeoff by the contracting officer.
    Accordingly, B&B’s argument that the VA, in reconducting the source selection decision, would
    not conduct new consensus evaluations or past performance evaluations is without merit.
    More persuasive are B&B’s contentions regarding the need to conduct a new
    responsibility determination. In the solicitation, the VA clearly indicated that the contract award
    would be made to a responsible offeror. Thus, the source selection decision process necessarily
    entails a determination that the successful offeror was responsible. Problematic in this case is
    that the VA has not terminated its contract with Rotech. Accordingly, if the contracting officer
    determined, at the conclusion of the new source selection decision process, that Rotech would
    provide the best value to the VA, there is already an existing determination that Rotech is
    responsible. The contracting officer’s letter contains no indication that she would conduct a new
    responsibility determination for Rotech. Indeed, FAR subpart 9.1 reflects that responsibility
    determinations are for prospective contractors, see generally FAR 9.100, and Rotech is the
    awardee presently performing under the contract based on a currently valid responsibility
    determination. Thus, the contracting officer would not be legally required to redo her
    responsibility determination upon a finding that Rotech provided the best value to the VA. 17
    Nevertheless, there is no meaningful relief that the court could award to B&B in these
    circumstances. To be sure, B&B requests an injunction directing the VA to set aside the contract
    17
    Nevertheless, given the concerns expressed by the court in its September 16, 2013
    order, it would be foolhardy for the contracting officer to forgo preparing a new responsibility
    determination if she concluded that Rotech’s proposal represented the best value for the VA.
    -12-
    award to Rotech and conduct a new responsibility determination. However, even if the court
    issued such an injunction, it would have no practical effect because it would lead to a new
    competition, something that is already occurring by virtue of the VA reconducting the source
    selection decision. B&B is among those offerors eligible to be awarded the contract in the new
    source selection decision process, and the court’s granting of B&B’s requested relief (resulting in
    the contract award being set aside and a new responsibility determination being conducted)
    would not give B&B any greater relief than the VA’s corrective action has already provided. 18
    In the absence of available meaningful relief, the court cannot proceed. Defendant has met its
    burden to establish that the VA’s corrective action renders B&B’s protest moot.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss and
    DISMISSES B&B’s protest as MOOT. No costs. The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.
    Should B&B lodge another protest in this court in conjunction with the solicitation at
    issue here, the clerk shall waive the court’s filing fee and assign the protest to the undersigned.
    The court has filed this ruling under seal. The parties shall confer to determine agreed-to
    proposed redactions. Then, by no later than Friday, July 11, 2014, the parties shall file a joint
    status report indicating their agreement with the proposed redactions, attaching a copy of those
    pages of the court’s ruling containing proposed redactions, with all proposed redactions
    clearly indicated.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    s/ Margaret M. Sweeney
    MARGARET M. SWEENEY
    Judge
    18
    Although B&B requests an injunction directing the VA to award it the contract, it is
    well settled that in the event a court determines that the procurement was illegally conducted, the
    protestor has no right to be awarded the contract. Parcel 49C Ltd. P’Ship v. United States, 
    31 F.3d 1147
    , 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, 
    719 F.2d 1567
    , 1572-75 (Fed. Cir. 1983), and Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 
    424 F.2d 859
    , 864
    (D.C. Cir. 1970)). Further, B&B’s request for bid preparation and proposal costs is not yet ripe
    because B&B remains in the competition for the contract and may be awarded the contract.
    -13-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1:13-cv-00463

Judges: Margaret M. Sweeney

Filed Date: 7/22/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014

Authorities (26)

Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. John H. Shaffer, ... , 424 F.2d 859 ( 1970 )

Oryszak v. Sullivan , 576 F.3d 522 ( 2009 )

Donald A. Henke v. United States , 60 F.3d 795 ( 1995 )

Parcel 49c Limited Partnership v. United States , 31 F.3d 1147 ( 1994 )

Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Construction Co. v. ... , 490 F.3d 934 ( 2007 )

James L. Murphy v. The United States , 993 F.2d 871 ( 1993 )

Mills v. Green , 159 U.S. 651 ( 1895 )

County of Los Angeles v. Davis , 99 S. Ct. 1379 ( 1979 )

donald-k-anderson-angel-cortina-jr-and-patricia-b-wallace-and-david , 344 F.3d 1343 ( 2003 )

Caci, Inc.-Federal v. The United States , 719 F.2d 1567 ( 1983 )

Intrepid v. Mamie E. Pollock, District Director of Customs, ... , 907 F.2d 1125 ( 1990 )

Myers Investigative and Security Services, Inc. v. United ... , 275 F.3d 1366 ( 2002 )

F. Alderete General Contractors, Inc. v. United States , 715 F.2d 1476 ( 1983 )

ophel-h-zevalkink-claimant-appellant-v-jesse-brown-secretary-of , 102 F.3d 1236 ( 1996 )

Aetna Life Insurance v. Haworth , 57 S. Ct. 461 ( 1937 )

United States v. Alaska Steamship Co. , 40 S. Ct. 448 ( 1920 )

Steffel v. Thompson , 94 S. Ct. 1209 ( 1974 )

Baker v. Carr , 82 S. Ct. 691 ( 1962 )

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental ... , 120 S. Ct. 693 ( 2000 )

Kontrick v. Ryan , 124 S. Ct. 906 ( 2004 )

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