Sweezer v. United States ( 2017 )


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  •                                         ORIGINAL
    3Jn tbe Wniteb ~tates Qeourt of jfeberal Qelaims
    No. 16-1393C
    (Filed: May 31, 2017)
    FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                    MAY 3 1 2017
    U .S. COURT OF
    )
    FEDERAL CLAIMS
    TARSHIKA SWEEZER, et al                         )
    )
    Pro Se Plaintiff,             )
    )        Pro Se; Lack of Subject Matter of
    v.                                              )        Jurisdiction; Dismissal
    )
    THE UNITED STATES,                              )
    )
    Defendant.             )
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~- )
    OPINION
    Pending before the court is the motion of the defendant, the United States, to
    dismiss the complaint filed by the named plaintiff, Tarshika Sweezer, on her own behalf
    and on behalf of others in connection with the execution of a search wa1Tant and arrest by
    the Chicago Police Department in March 20 16. The defendant argues that the complaint
    should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim
    upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rules 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of
    the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC").
    The complaint filed on October 24, 2016 identifies six plaintiffs, including three
    minor children, who all reside at 5346 W. Quincy, Chicago, IL. Compl., "Parties,"~~ 1-
    6. 1 The complaint alleges that on or about March 16, 2016, an officer with the Chicago
    1 Plaintiffs seek to file this complaint in Jonna pauperis. The request is granted for purposes of deciding
    this motion only.
    Police Depattment executed a search warrant on plaintiffs' residence. Comp!.,
    "Statement of Facts," ii I. Following the search, the police arrested "PlaintiffNo. 3,"
    John Sweezer. Id. The complaint alleges a variety of claims arising from that search and
    arrest. The claims are similar to the claims that had originally been filed with the court
    on June 20, 2016, in a document entitled "Statement of Complaint in Support of Motion
    for Writ of Habeas Corpus." Complaint, Sweezer v. United States, No. 1: l 6-cv-00730-
    NBF (Ct. Fed. Cl. June 20, 2016) (Sweezer I complaint). The Sweezer I complaint
    included multiple counts of negligence, personal injury, violations of unidentified
    constitutional rights, and property damage. Sweezer I Comp!. 2-3. The Sweezer I
    complaint also alleged that plaintiffs are "descendants of the Cherokee Nation and [that]
    the premises [plaintiffs' residence at 5346 W. Quincy] are an Indian Reservation." Id. at
    3.
    On July 6, 2016, the Comt ordered the Sweezer I complaint returned to plaintiffs
    for correction and confirmation, because it had been filed under the caption of the United
    States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and because it appeared to seek
    habeas corpus relief under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2251
     and§ 2254, 2 which falls outside this comt's
    jurisdiction. Order, Sweezer I (July 6, 2016). Plaintiffs never responded to the July 6,
    2016 Order and on October 12, 2016, the court dismissed Sweezer I pursuant to RCFC
    41(b). Order of Dismissal, Sweezer I (Oct. 12, 2016).
    2 
    28 U.S.C. § 2251
     gives federal judges with authority over habeas corpus the right to "stay any proceeding
    against the person detained in any State comt ... for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding."
    28 U .S.C. § 2254 grants federal judges authority over writs of habeas corpus and states in pe1tinent part that
    "[t]he Supreme Comt, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a
    writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State comt."
    2
    In this new October 24, 2016 complaint, plaintiffs allege that the dismissal of
    Sweezer I "breached the defendant's fiduciary duties as guardian, trustee, and guarantor."
    Comp!., "Statement of Facts," ii 3. Plaintiffs also allege that the court violated provisions
    of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), the Rules of the United States Court of
    Federal Claims, and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1631
    , when it ordered plaintiffs to clarify and confirm
    the Sweezer I Complaint. 
    Id.
         ii 4.   Plaintiffs further allege that the court violated RCFC 5,
    14, and 18, because it failed to notify the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of Illinois of this action. 
    Id.
       ii 5.   With regard to the search and mTest of John
    Sweezer, the pending complaint alleges that "[t]he Defendant breached a contract and
    breached fiduciary duties as guarantor, gum·dian, and trustee owed to Plaintiff(s)."
    Comp!. 4, lines 7-11. Plaintiffs assert jurisdiction based on 
    28 U.S.C. §1491
     and §1505
    and42U.S.C. § 1983.
    By way ofrelief, plaintiffs are seeking a default judgment pursuant to FRCP 55,
    on the grounds that the Northern District of Illinois failed "to respond to Plaintiff(s), and
    that the Court failed to answer." Id. at 5, lines 8-11. In addition, Tarshika Sweezer,
    Yvonne Sweezer, RC, GS, and ES, seek $320,000.00 each or $20,000.00 for each of the
    "16 counts of breaches of trust." Comp!., "Parties," iii! 1-2, 4-6. Yvonne Sweezer, seeks
    the return of $813.00 "that was illegally confiscated." Id.            ii 2.   John Sweezer seeks "costs
    [to] be determined at trial by [j]ury." Id.        ii 3.   Mr. Sweezer also alleges that he is
    "unjustly incarcerated" and that "every second [of continued incarceration] constitutes
    another count of breach toward [him]." Id. at 5, lines 13-14.
    In its motion to dismiss, the government argues among other things that the
    complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because: (I) the
    3
    complaint does not allege any contract, or a money-mandating statute, that was breached
    in connection with the facts alleged in the complaint as required to support this comt's
    Tucker Act jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    ; (2) with respect to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1505
    ,
    which relates to jurisdiction over certain Indian breach of trust claims, the plaintiffs have
    not identified any fiduciary responsibility owed to plaintiffs that was breached under the
    facts alleged in the complaint; and (3) this court lacks jurisdiction over what appear to be
    civil rights claims under section 1983 or other Constitutional claims relating to the search
    of the Sweezer apmtment and Mr. Sweezer's arrest and incarceration. The defendant
    argues in the alternative that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to RCFC
    12(b)(6), because it fails to allege a plausible basis for any of the claims asserted.
    Finally, the defendant argues that the doctrine of res judicata bars the claims related to the
    search of plaintiffs' residence, and the arrest and incarceration of John Sweezer, because:
    (1) the parties to Sweezer I and this action are identical; (2) the allegations are based on
    the same transactional facts alleged in Sweezer I; and (3) the Comt's dismissal of Sweezer
    I pursuant to RCFC 41 (b) operates as an adjudication on the merits. Because the comt
    finds that the complaint is not within comt's jurisdiction the complaint is DISMISSED.
    I. Standards of Review
    In reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) with regard to subject matter
    jurisdiction, the comt will take uncontested allegations as true and will construe them in a
    light most favorable to the plaintiff. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 
    739 F.3d 689
    ,
    692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In this connection, although pro se plaintiffs are given more
    latitude in their pleadings, a prose plaintiff must still establish that this court has
    jurisdiction over the complaint. See Redondo v. United States, No. 12-489T, 
    2012 WL 9384885
    , at *l (Fed. Cl. Dec. 18, 2012), ajj'd, 
    542 F. App'x 908
     (Fed. Cir. 2013)
    4
    (holding prose plaintiff responsible for "the burden of establishing subject matter
    jurisdiction."); see also Keener v. United States, 551F.3d1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
    ("As the party seeking the exercise of jurisdiction, Taxpayers have the burden of
    establishing that jurisdiction exists."). Because jurisdiction is a threshold matter, a case
    cannot proceed ifthe comt lacks jurisdiction to hear it. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 
    546 U.S. 500
    , 514 (2006). If the comt concludes that it lacks jurisdiction, the complaint must be
    dismissed. 
    Id.
    II. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege Any Claim Within This Court's Jurisdiction
    The Comt of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction. Jentoftv. United
    States, 
    450 F.3d 1342
    , 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The jurisdiction of the comt is largely
    restricted to claims set foith in the Tucker Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    . The Tucker Act
    confers jurisdiction on the court "to render judgment upon any claim against the United
    States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
    an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States,
    or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C.
    § 149l(a)(l). "[T]he Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of action, 'in
    order to come within the jurisdictional reach and the waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff
    must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money
    damages."' Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FA.A., 
    525 F.3d 1299
    , 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
    (quoting Fisher v. United States, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    , 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
    Although the plaintiffs cite the Tucker Act in their complaint as a basis for
    jurisdiction, Comp!., "Jurisdiction," ii 1, they have failed to identify any contract with the
    United States to support their breach of contract claims. To establish jurisdiction, a
    plaintiff needs to allege an agreement with the United States. This includes setting foith
    5
    in the complaint allegations that the contract was entered into by an authorized United
    States representative or was ratified by a person with actual authority to bind the United
    States. See Trauma Serv. Group v. United States, 
    104 F.3d 1321
    , 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
    see also Sahagun-Pelayo v. United States, No. 13-929 C, 
    2014 WL 3643471
    , at *5 (Fed.
    Cl. July 22, 2014), ajj'd, 
    602 F. App'x 822
     (Fed. Cir. 2015) (dismissingpro se plaintiffs
    complaint for failure to "allege facts as to the specific agent of the government who
    contracted with him" and failure to "provide sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that any
    government employee had ... actual authority to bind the Government in contract.");
    Evans v. United States, 
    2016 WL 3006988
    , at *5, (Fed. Cl. May 17, 2016), ajf'd, 
    2017 WL 957282
    , (Fed. Cir. March 13, 2017). Here, the plaintiffs have not identified any
    agreement with the United States which could give rise to a claim for money damages.
    As such, the court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs' alleged breach of contract
    claims.
    Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the United States' breach of its "fiduciary duties
    as guardian, trnstee, and guarantor," Comp!., "Statement of Facts," 'i[ 3, are also not
    sufficient to establish jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1505
    , the Indian Tucker Act.
    Comp!., "Jurisdiction," 'i[ 2. The Indian Tucker Act confers jurisdiction on this court over
    certain claims against the United States and in favor of a "tribe, band, or other
    identifiable group of American Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United
    States or Alaska." 
    28 U.S.C. § 1505
    . Plaintiffs' assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to the
    Indian Tucker Act fails because despite the plaintiffs' citation to cases, they do not allege
    or otherwise identify the "substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or
    other duties" owed to them that the United States has failed to fulfill, and which "can
    6
    fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a
    breach of [those] duties." United States v. Navajo Nation, 
    556 U.S. 287
    , 290-91 (2009);
    see also Hopi Tribe v. United States, 
    782 F.3d 662
    , 667 (Fed. Cir. 2015). For this reason,
    the court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claims.
    To the extent plaintiffs rely on 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     to establish jurisdiction in this
    comi over their claims, the claims must be dismissed. See Comp!., "Jurisdiction," ii 1. In
    the complaint the plaintiffs allege civil rights violations in connection with a Chicago
    Police Officer's search of their residence and the arrest of John Sweezer. "Statement of
    Facts," ii 1. This court lacks jurisdiction over such civil rights claims, because Congress
    conferred jurisdiction over civil rights claims, such as section 1983 claims, exclusively
    upon the federal district courts. 
    42 U.S.C. § 1343
    (a) ("The district courts shall have
    original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person
    ... (4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of
    Congress providing for the protection of civil rights."). Where Congress has confe1Ted
    jurisdiction over claims before another comi, this comi must dismiss the claim. See
    Texas Peanut Farmers v. United States, 
    409 F.3d 1370
    , 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding
    that "Congress may withdraw any grant of Tucker Act jurisdiction" and the Court of
    Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction where "Congress has granted district courts exclusive
    jurisdiction over claims").
    Similarly, this comi lacks jurisdiction over claims in the complaint relating to the
    alleged "unjust" incarceration of John Sweezer. Comp!. 5, lines 13-14. As noted above,
    the document filed in Sweezer I raised similar allegations and was captioned as a petition
    for a writ of habeas corpus. See Sweezer I Complaint. As the comi indicated in its Order
    7
    seeking clarification, this court lacks jurisdiction over any action sounding in habeas
    corpus. Order, Sweezer I (July 6, 2016). Writs of habeas corpus on behalf of those "in
    custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" may be granted by "the Supreme
    Comt, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court." 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (a); see also
    Ledford v. United States, 
    297 F.3d 1378
    , 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[T]he habeas statute
    does not list the Court of Federal Claims among those courts empowered to grant a writ
    of habeas corpus"); Stephenson v. United States, 
    58 Fed. Cl. 186
    , 191-92 (2003)
    (explaining that "the Comt of Federal Claims is not named among those courts having
    authority to grant writs of habeas corpus"). This court does not have jurisdiction to
    consider Mr. Sweezer's objections to his incarceration in a state prison.
    Finally, to the extent the complaint can be construed as alleging other
    constitutional claims (such as due process, equal protection, or search and seizure claims)
    related to the search of plaintiffs' residence, the seizure of Yvonne Sweezer's assets, or
    the arrest of Mr. Sweezer, such claims fall outside this court's jurisdiction. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
     ("[The] district comts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
    under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."); see also Crocker v. United
    States, 125 FJd 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims correctly
    concluded that it does not have jurisdiction to hear due process or seizure claims under
    the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution."); Smith v. United States, 709
    FJd 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
    Clause" and "the Due Process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do
    8
    .   '
    not mandate the payment of money and thus do not provide a cause of action under the
    3
    Tucker Act.").
    CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is
    GRANTED . The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Fmthermore, the
    Clerk is directed not to accept future complaints from these plaintiffs without an order
    from the Chief Judge approving the filing. Each patty shall bear its own costs.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Senior Judge
    3 Having concluded that the coU1t lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims it does not have
    occasion to rule on th e government's alternative grounds for dismissal.
    9