Williams v. Kingdom Hall , 2021 UT 18 ( 2021 )


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  •                             
    2021 UT 18
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    RIA WILLIAMS,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    KINGDOM HALL OF JEHOVAH‘S WITNESSES, ROY, UTAH1
    Respondents.
    No. 20190422
    Heard November 9, 2020
    Filed June 3, 2021
    On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
    Second District, Ogden
    The Honorable Mark R. DeCaria
    No. 160906025
    Attorneys:2
    Robert Friedman, Amy L. Marshak, Mary B. McCord, Washington,
    D.C.; Irwin M. Zalkin, Alexander S. Zalkin, San Diego, California;
    Matthew G. Koyle, John M. Webster, Riverdale; for petitioner
    Karra J. Porter, Kristen C. Kiburtz, Salt Lake City, for respondents
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS,
    JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.
    _____________________________________________________________
    1Additional Respondents: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of
    New York, Inc., Harry Diamanti, Eric Stocker, Raulon Hicks, and
    Dan Harper.
    2Attorneys for Amicus Curiae: Troy L. Booher, Beth E. Kennedy,
    John J. Hurst
    WILLIAMS v. KINGDOM HALL
    Opinion of the Court
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
    Introduction
    ¶1 Ria Williams filed an intentional infliction of emotional
    distress claim based on the manner in which Elders of the Kingdom
    Hall of Jehovah‘s Witnesses (Church) conducted a disciplinary
    hearing. Applying the test the United States Supreme Court
    established in Lemon v. Kurtzman,3 the district court concluded that
    the adjudication of this claim would violate the Establishment
    Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
    Because recent changes in the Supreme Court‘s Establishment
    Clause jurisprudence require further development of the facts and
    legal arguments presented in this case, we vacate the decision by the
    district court and remand for additional proceedings. But the fact
    that we have overturned the district court‘s dismissal under the
    Establishment Clause should not be read to mean that an intentional
    infliction of emotional distress claim under this Clause is not an
    appropriate subject of dismissal, either generally or in this case.
    Rather, we vacate this dismissal only so that the district court may
    assess this case under the Supreme Court‘s recent modification of its
    Establishment Clause analysis.
    Background4
    ¶2 Ria Williams and her family attended the Roy
    Congregation of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses Church. When
    Ms. Williams was fourteen years old, she met another Jehovah‘s
    Witnesses congregant. Initially, Ms. Williams and this congregant
    began seeing each other socially. But the relationship quickly
    changed and over the next few months the congregant physically
    and sexually assaulted Ms. Williams.
    ¶3 Soon after, the Church began investigating Ms. Williams to
    determine whether she had engaged in the serious sin of ―porneia.‖
    _____________________________________________________________
    3   
    403 U.S. 602
    , 612–13 (1971).
    4 Because, in reviewing an order on a motion to dismiss, ―we
    accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interpret
    those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff,‖ we rely on only those facts that have been
    alleged in Ms. Williams‘s complaint or that Ms. Williams does not
    dispute. Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 
    2004 UT 101
    , ¶ 9, 
    104 P.3d 1226
    .
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    Opinion of the Court
    According to the Church, porneia is ―[u]nclean sexual conduct that
    is contrary to ‗normal‘ behavior‖ and it includes ―sexual conduct
    between individuals who are not married to each other.‖ As part of
    this investigation, four Elders in the Church convened a
    disciplinary hearing to ―determine if [Ms. Williams] had in fact
    engaged in porneia and if so, if she was sufficiently repentant for
    doing so.‖ Ms. Williams voluntarily attended the hearing with her
    mother and stepfather.
    ¶4 At the beginning of the hearing, the Elders questioned
    Ms. Williams for forty-five minutes regarding her sexual conduct
    with the other congregant. And after this questioning, the Elders
    played an audio recording of the other congregant raping her.5
    While the Elders played the recording, Ms. Williams was ―crying
    and physically quivering.‖ Despite her ―crying and protestations to
    not force her to relive the experience of being raped,‖ the Elders
    played the recording for ―four to five hours,‖ stopping and starting
    it at certain points to ask Ms. Williams ―about what was
    happening‖ and ―suggesting that she consented to‖ the sexual acts
    portrayed.
    ¶5 As a result of this meeting, Ms. Williams continues to
    experience distress. Her symptoms include ―embarrassment, loss of
    self-esteem, disgrace, humiliation, . . . loss of enjoyment of life,‖
    and spiritual suffering. As a result, Ms. Williams filed a complaint
    against the Church for intentional or negligent infliction of
    emotional distress.
    ¶6 In response to her complaint, the Church filed a motion to
    dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
    the motion, the Church argued that the United States and Utah
    constitutions barred Ms. Williams‘s claims for intentional and
    negligent infliction of emotional distress.
    ¶7 After considering the motions and hearing arguments, the
    district court dismissed Ms. Williams‘s amended complaint, ruling
    that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
    United States Constitution barred Ms. Williams‘s claim. The court
    ruled that Ms. Williams‘s claims ―expressly implicate key religious
    questions regarding religious rules, standards, . . . discipline, [and]
    most prominently how a religion conducts its ecclesiastical
    disciplinary hearings.‖
    _____________________________________________________________
    5 The other congregant had recorded this incident and gave it to
    the Elders during their investigation of Ms. Williams.
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    WILLIAMS v. KINGDOM HALL
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶8 For this reason, the court explained that it was unable to
    ―disentangle‖ the alleged conduct from the religious ―setting and
    context‖ in which it took place. So, even though the allegations in
    the complaint were ―disturbing‖ to the court, it ruled that the
    Establishment Clause barred the court from adjudicating the claim.
    Ms. Williams appealed to the court of appeals.
    ¶9 In a unanimous decision, the court of appeals affirmed the
    decision and the reasoning of the district court, and Ms. Williams
    petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. We have
    jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).
    Standard of Review
    ¶10 ―On a writ of certiorari, we review the decision of the court
    of appeals . . . and apply the same standard[s] of review used by
    the court of appeals. In conducting this review, we grant no
    deference to the court of appeals‘ decision.‖6 When reviewing
    appeals from a motion to dismiss, we ―review only the facts alleged
    in the complaint.‖7 We ―accept the factual allegations in the
    complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences to be
    drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.‖8
    We will affirm a district court‘s dismissal ―only if it is apparent that
    as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts
    alleged.‖9 ―Because we consider only the legal sufficiency of the
    complaint, we grant the trial court‘s ruling no deference‖ and
    review it for correctness.10
    Analysis
    ¶11 The First Amendment states, in part, that ―Congress shall
    make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
    the free exercise thereof.‖11 The United States Supreme Court has
    explained that the First Amendment‘s ―first and most immediate
    _____________________________________________________________
    6 Pinney v. Carrera, 
    2020 UT 43
    , ¶ 14, 
    469 P.3d 970
     (alteration in
    original) (citation omitted).
    7  Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
    2001 UT 25
    ,
    ¶ 2, 
    21 P.3d 198
     (citation omitted).
    8   
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    9   Id. ¶ 10 (citation omitted).
    10   Id. (citation omitted).
    11   U.S. CONST. amend I.
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    Opinion of the Court
    purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and
    religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.‖12
    For this reason, past courts have treated the First Amendment as
    though it ―erected a wall between church and state.‖13 On one side
    of the wall is ―freedom‖ or ―independence from secular control or
    manipulation‖ for religious organizations.14 And on the other side,
    a protection of ―temporal institutions from religious interference.‖15
    ¶12 ―To safeguard this crucial autonomy,‖ the Supreme Court
    has ―long recognized that the Religion Clauses [of the First
    Amendment] protect a private sphere within which religious
    bodies are free to govern themselves in accordance with their own
    beliefs.‖16 In short, the First Amendment grants religions ―power to
    decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
    church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.‖17
    ¶13 But it has also long been recognized that ―[n]o significant
    segment of our society and no institution within it can exist in a
    vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts,
    _____________________________________________________________
    12   Engel v. Vitale, 
    370 U.S. 421
    , 431 (1962).
    13   Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 
    330 U.S. 1
    , 18 (1947).
    14Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N.
    Am., 
    344 U.S. 94
    , 116 (1952).
    15   Watson v. Jones, 
    80 U.S. 679
    , 730 (1871).
    16 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC., 
    565 U.S. 171
    , 199 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). The Supreme Court‘s
    decision in Hosanna-Tabor is illustrative of the common practice
    among courts of analyzing First Amendment challenges in this
    context—where governmental action intrudes into the areas of
    ―theological   controversy,     church    discipline,   ecclesiastical
    government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the
    standard of morals required of them,‖ Watson, 80 U.S. at 733—
    without distinguishing between the Establishment Clause and the
    Free Exercise Clause. Although in some contexts the protections
    provided by the two Religion Clauses differ, or even ―exert
    conflicting pressures,‖ Hosanna-Tabor, 
    565 U.S. at 181
     (citation
    omitted), in this context the protections of the Religion Clauses
    converge.
    17   Hosanna-Tabor, 
    565 U.S. at 186
     (citation omitted).
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    WILLIAMS v. KINGDOM HALL
    Opinion of the Court
    much less from government.‖18 For this reason, the Supreme Court
    has acknowledged that ―total separation is not possible in an
    absolute sense. Some relationship between government and
    religious organizations is inevitable.‖19 So notwithstanding
    statements prohibiting the ―slightest breach‖20 in the wall between
    church and state, the Supreme Court has conceded that the ―wall‖
    between government and religion is more of ―a blurred, indistinct,
    and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
    particular relationship.‖21
    ¶14 Yet, despite acknowledging that the First Amendment
    does not contain ―precisely stated constitutional prohibitions,‖ the
    Supreme Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, attempted to establish a
    three-part test that could be used to evaluate any challenged
    governmental action under the Establishment Clause: First, the
    action must have a secular purpose; second, its ―principal or
    primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
    religion‖; and third, it must not ―foster ‗an excessive government
    entanglement with religion.‘‖22
    ¶15 The Court applied this test in Lemon. In that case, the Court
    was tasked with evaluating the permissibility of a government
    program that provided funding for teachers of ―secular subjects‖ at
    nonpublic religious schools.23 Although in a previous case the
    Court had allowed a state to provide secular textbooks to religious
    schools (on the ground that it furthered the state‘s interest in
    teaching ―secular‖ subjects to all students), the Court concluded
    _____________________________________________________________
    18   Lynch v. Donnelly, 
    465 U.S. 668
    , 673 (1984).
    19   Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
    403 U.S. 602
    , 614 (1971) (citation omitted).
    20   Everson, 
    330 U.S. at 18
    .
    21   Lemon, 
    403 U.S. at 614
    .
    22Id. at 612–13 (citations omitted). Following the Court‘s decision
    in Lemon, courts have typically focused on the final prong of the
    test—the excessive entanglement prong—in determining whether
    the adjudication of a tort would violate the Establishment Clause.
    This is most likely because the ―excessive entanglement‖ prong is
    most directly connected to the court‘s goal of preventing the
    government‘s active involvement in religious activity.
    23   
    Id. at 607
    , 615–16.
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    Opinion of the Court
    that the teacher reimbursement program at issue in Lemon violated
    the Establishment Clause.
    ¶16 The Court struck down the teacher reimbursement
    program because there was no permissible way for the state to
    verify that the state funds supported only secular education:
    ―[u]nlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to
    determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and
    subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First
    Amendment.‖24 Rather, the Court reasoned that compliance with
    the First Amendment would be possible only through a
    ―comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance‖
    of the classrooms in religious schools.25
    ¶17 The Court explained that such a comprehensive system of
    enforcement would violate the First Amendment because that
    ―kind of state inspection and evaluation of the religious content of a
    religious organization [was] fraught with the sort of entanglement
    that the Constitution forbids.‖26 In other words, any attempt by the
    state to ensure compliance with the Establishment Clause‘s
    prohibition on funding religious activities would inevitably violate
    the Establishment Clause by creating ―a relationship pregnant with
    dangers of excessive government direction of . . . churches.‖27
    ¶18 Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Lemon, courts
    across the country, including our court, have attempted to apply
    the Lemon test in Establishment Clause cases.28 But even though the
    Lemon test has become accepted in our case law, the United States
    Supreme Court has now largely discarded it.
    ¶19 The Court made its departure from the Lemon test explicit
    in American Legion v. American Humanist Association.29 In that case—
    _____________________________________________________________
    24   Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 
    392 U.S. 236
    , 248 (1968).
    25   Lemon, 
    403 U.S. at 625
    .
    26   
    Id. at 620
    .
    27   
    Id.
    28 See Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
    2001 UT 25
    , ¶ 12, 
    21 P.3d 198
     (introducing the Lemon test).
    
    29139 S. Ct. 2067
    , 2079–80, 2087 (2019) (―While the Lemon Court
    ambitiously attempted to find a grand unified theory of the
    Establishment Clause, in later cases, we have taken a more modest
    approach that focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to
    (Continued)
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    WILLIAMS v. KINGDOM HALL
    Opinion of the Court
    decided roughly fifty years after the decision in Lemon—the Court
    noted that although ―the concept of a formally established church is
    straightforward, pinning down the meaning of a ‗law respecting an
    establishment of religion‘ has proved to be a vexing problem.‖30
    The Court explained that ―[a]fter grappling with [difficult
    Establishment Clause cases] for more than 20 years, [the Court in]
    Lemon ambitiously attempted to distill from the Court‘s existing
    case law a test that would bring order and predictability to
    Establishment Clause decisionmaking.‖31 But, according to the
    American Legion Court, the Lemon Court‘s ―expectation‖ that it
    ―would provide a framework for all future Establishment Clause
    decisions . . . has not been met.‖32 In fact, it noted that in ―many
    cases, th[e] Court ha[d] either expressly declined to apply the
    [Lemon] test or ha[d] simply ignored it.‖33
    ¶20 According to the Court, the problem with the Lemon test is
    that it is inadequate to address the ―great array of laws and
    practices‖ that come before courts as part of Establishment Clause
    challenges.34 As examples of this problem, the Court explained that,
    although the Lemon test may have helped the Lemon Court resolve
    the issue of whether the Establishment Clause prohibits
    government funding of secular teaching in religious schools, that
    test could not ―explain the Establishment Clause‘s tolerance . . . of
    the prayers that open legislative meetings‖ or ―the public
    references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings‖ among other
    things as illustrated by the Court‘s extensive Establishment Clause
    case law.35 In other words, because a wide variety of governmental
    practices, laws, and customs potentially implicate the prohibitions
    of the Establishment Clause, the ―rigid formula‖ of the Lemon test is
    _____________________________________________________________
    history for guidance.‖). In light of this recent development in
    Establishment Clause case law, we also disregard the Lemon test and
    disavow the reasoning in our previous cases to the extent they relied
    on the Lemon test. See, e.g., Franco, 
    2001 UT 25
    , ¶ 12.
    30   Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080.
    31   Id.
    32   Id.
    33   Id.
    34   Id.
    35   Id. at 2080–81 (citation omitted).
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    Opinion of the Court
    inadequate to resolve the issues in many Establishment Clause
    cases.36
    ¶21 In lieu of the Lemon test, the American Legion Court applied
    what it described as ―a more modest approach.‖37 Under this
    approach, courts should eschew a ―rigid formula‖ in analyzing
    Establishment Clause cases.38 Instead, they should ―focus[] on the
    particular issue at hand and look[] to history for guidance‖ in
    resolving the dispute.39 As Justice Kavanaugh noted in his
    concurring opinion in American Legion, ―each category of
    Establishment Clause cases has its own principles based on history,
    tradition, and precedent.‖40 Accordingly, from this history,
    tradition, and precedent, Justice Kavanaugh suggests that courts
    should identify ―an overarching set of principles.‖41 Courts should
    determine how those principles apply to the case at hand after
    taking ―all relevant circumstances into account.‖42
    ¶22 An example of the role history can play in this approach is
    illustrated by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Marsh v. Chambers.43
    In that case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state
    legislature‘s practice of beginning each legislative session with a
    _____________________________________________________________
    36   
    Id.
    37 Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087. The Court in American Legion
    specifically prescribed this approach for cases that ―involve the
    [government‘s] use, for ceremonial, celebratory, or commemorative
    purposes, of words or symbols with religious associations.‖ Id. at
    2081. Although this case does not involve the government‘s use of
    religious words or symbols, neither does it involve the circumstances
    that were at issue in Lemon (the potential government funding of
    religious education). Because the American Legion Court‘s approach
    is broad and flexible, we conclude that it can be fairly applied in the
    context presented by this case (the government‘s adjudication of
    what may be a religious dispute).
    38   Id.
    39   Id.
    40   Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
    41   Id.
    42   Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2067.
    43   
    463 U.S. 783
     (1983).
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    WILLIAMS v. KINGDOM HALL
    Opinion of the Court
    prayer.44 In arriving at this result, the Court considered the role this
    practice had played throughout our country‘s history. It explained
    that, from ―colonial times through the founding of the Republic
    and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with
    the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom.‖45 And it
    noted that it was common practice at every level of the federal
    judiciary to begin proceedings with an announcement that ended
    with the words ―God save the United States and this Honorable
    Court.‖46 So the Court concluded that the ―opening of sessions of
    legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is
    deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.‖47
    Based in part on this conclusion, the Court held that the practice of
    opening a legislative session with prayer did not violate the
    Establishment Clause.48
    ¶23 As the Supreme Court‘s decisions in American Legion and
    Marsh49 illustrate, we need not rigidly apply the Lemon test in
    resolving Establishment Clause cases. Rather we should look to the
    principles underlying our Establishment Clause case law as a guide
    in our analysis. Additionally, we should consider whether our
    nation‘s historical practices can shed any light on the proper
    application of those principles in the context presented by cases
    such as the one now before us—where the disputed governmental
    action is the adjudication of a tort claim against a religious
    organization. The district court in this case did not conduct this
    analysis.
    _____________________________________________________________
    44   
    Id. at 786
    .
    45   
    Id.
    46   
    Id.
    47   
    Id.
    48 
    Id. at 790
    . Although the Court in Marsh acknowledged that
    ―historical patterns,‖ standing alone, could not ―justify
    contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees,‖ the Court
    explained that ―historical evidence sheds light not only on what the
    draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on
    how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by
    the First Congress.‖ 
    Id.
    49See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087 (noting that the Marsh Court
    ―conspicuously ignored Lemon‖ in its history-based analysis).
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    ¶24 In dismissing Ms. Williams‘s claims, the district court
    concluded that her claims ―expressly implicate key religious
    questions regarding religious rules, standards, and discipline.‖
    Specifically, the court explained that her claims would require the
    court to consider the appropriateness of the manner in which ―a
    religion conducts its ecclesiastical disciplinary hearings.‖ For this
    reason, the court explained that it could not ―disentangle‖
    Ms. Williams‘s claims from the religious ―setting and context‖ in
    which they arose. So the court held that the adjudication of her
    claims would involve the kind of excessive entanglement
    prohibited under the Lemon test.
    ¶25 Similarly, the court of appeals concluded that allowing
    Ms. Williams‘s claims to be litigated in this case ―would require the
    district court to unconstitutionally inject itself into substantive
    ecclesiastical matters.‖50 According to the court, a challenge to the
    ―manner in which the Church conducted a religious judicial
    committee,‖51 would inevitably lead to an impermissible degree of
    ―judicial oversight‖52 into an undeniably ―religious activity.‖53
    ¶26 Although the conclusion reached by the district court and
    the court of appeals may ultimately prove to be the correct one, we
    note that in reaching that conclusion both courts relied on the
    excessive entanglement test established in Lemon. But as we have
    noted, Lemon has been overtaken by more recent Supreme Court
    cases.54 Because the district court applied the excessive
    entanglement test from Lemon instead of the approach followed in
    these more recent cases, we vacate the district court‘s decision and
    remand for any additional proceedings necessary to adequately
    _____________________________________________________________
    50 Williams v. Kingdom Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2019 UT App. 40,
    ¶ 15, 
    440 P.3d 820
    .
    51   
    Id.
    52   Id. ¶ 15.
    53   Id. ¶ 17.
    54  We note that two of these recent Supreme Court cases (Am.
    Legion, 
    139 S. Ct. 2067
    , and Our Lady of Guadalupe, 
    140 S. Ct. 2049
    )
    were issued after the district court and the court of appeals issued
    their decisions in this case. So, in vacating the district court‘s order,
    we are in no way criticizing the district court or the court of appeals
    for failing to follow the approach identified in those cases.
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    WILLIAMS v. KINGDOM HALL
    Opinion of the Court
    conduct the Supreme            Court‘s   current   approach     to    the
    Establishment Clause.
    ¶27 As noted, under the Supreme Court‘s current approach, on
    remand the district court should focus on the particular issue at
    hand and look to history for guidance as to the correct application
    of the Establishment Clause in this case.55 In examining our history
    (including our case law), the court should identify ―an overarching
    set of principles‖ and explain how those principles should be
    applied in this case.56
    Conclusion
    ¶28 Because the district court relied on the test established in
    Lemon v. Kurtzman—a test that has recently been displaced by the
    Supreme Court—we vacate the court‘s decision and remand for
    additional proceedings. On remand, the district court should look to
    our history, tradition, and precedent to identify core Establishment
    Clause principles that may be applied to the facts of this case.57
    _____________________________________________________________
    55 The court may, of course, also consider the application of the
    Free Exercise Clause as well as any other grounds for dismissal
    raised by the Church.
    56   Am. Legion, 
    139 S. Ct. at 2093
     (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
    57 We regret that we cannot, at this stage in the litigation, provide
    the district court with more guidance regarding the application of
    such a broad standard. But because the standard is so broad and
    could potentially implicate so many factors, principles, historical
    practices, and facts, we conclude that it would be better to allow the
    district court to address this standard in the first instance in response
    to a renewed motion by one of the parties, should one be filed.
    12