Carlton v. Brown , 2014 UT 6 ( 2014 )


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  •               This opinion is subject to revision before final
                        publication in the Pacific Reporter
    
                                   
    2014 UT 6
    
    
                                     IN THE
          SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    
                           CHRISTOPHER CARLTON,
                                 Appellant,
                                        v.
                        SHALANDA BROWN and
                  THE ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, INC.,
                               Appellees.
    
    
                                No. 20120268
                           Filed February 25, 2014
    
    
                       Fourth District, Provo Dep’t
                     The Honorable Steven L. Hansen
                             No. 114400552
    
    
                                   Attorneys:
              Wesley D. Hutchins, West Jordan, for appellant
       Larry S. Jenkins, Lance D. Rich, Salt Lake City, for appellees
    
    
      CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in
               which ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING,
         JUSTICE PARRISH, JUSTICE LEE, and JUDGE ROTH joined.
                 Having recused herself, JUSTICE DURHAM
               does not participate herein; Court of Appeals
                        JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH sat.
    
    
       CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
                              INTRODUCTION
       ¶1 In this case, Christopher Carlton asks us to once again
    consider both the constitutionality of the Utah Adoption Act (Act)
    as well as the extent of the rights it affords to putative fathers who
    wish to contest adoptions in Utah. Mr. Carlton argues first that
    the Act is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him,
    and second, that the district court erred when, based on a lack of
                            CARLTON v. BROWN
                           Opinion of the Court
    standing, it dismissed his Amended Verified Petition to Establish
    Paternity, which included his constitutional challenges to the Act
    as well as numerous tort claims. For the reasons set forth below,
    we affirm in part and reverse in part.
        ¶2 First, although we disagree with the district court’s
    reasoning regarding Mr. Carlton’s lack of standing to assert the
    constitutional claims, given the current state of the pleadings we
    would ultimately reach the same conclusion, albeit for different
    reasons. Nevertheless, because we also conclude that it was error
    for the district court to deny Mr. Carlton leave to amend his
    petition—which would have cured the standing defects identified
    below—we conclude that the district court’s dismissal of
    Mr. Carlton’s constitutional claims was also erroneous.
    Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of
    Mr. Carlton’s constitutional claims and on remand we instruct the
    district court to allow Mr. Carlton to amend his petition.
        ¶3 Second, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
    Mr. Carlton’s tort claims due to his failure to state a claim upon
    which relief could be granted, with the exception of one of his
    claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Mr. Carlton
    asserted an IIED claim against both Shalanda Brown and The
    Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. (Adoption Center). As to the
    former, we affirm the district court’s dismissal due to inadequate
    service of process. But as to the latter, we reverse because the
    district court’s primary reason for dismissing this claim—Mr.
    Carlton’s failure to establish parental rights under the Act—turns
    on the outcome of the constitutional issues that were erroneously
    dismissed by the district court. Accordingly, we remand this case
    to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
                            BACKGROUND
        ¶4 Mr. Carlton and Ms. Brown are both residents of
    Pennsylvania and have never been married. In 2009, Mr. Carlton
    and Ms. Brown were involved in a romantic relationship that
    resulted in Ms. Brown becoming pregnant. The relationship
    appears to have continued until May 2010 when, just four weeks
    prior to her delivery date, Ms. Brown mysteriously left
    Mr. Carlton without any notification or indication as to her
    whereabouts. Despite the close proximity to her due date,
    Mr. Carlton did not take any action in either Utah or Pennsylvania
    to protect his parental rights to the unborn child.
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                            Opinion of the Court
        ¶5 Unbeknownst to Mr. Carlton, Ms. Brown had traveled to
    Utah where she gave birth to a baby girl on June 24, 2010. On June
    26, 2010, Ms. Brown relinquished her parental rights to Adoption
    Center. That same day, Ms. Brown also executed a Birth Father
    Affidavit wherein she stated that she was unmarried and refused
    to identify the birth father. Instead, she stated that the birth father
    had been abusive towards her and had tried to use the child as a
    tool to keep her in a relationship with him.
        ¶6 After giving birth, Ms. Brown returned to Pennsylvania
    and allegedly tried to “rekindle” her relationship with
    Mr. Carlton. But when Mr. Carlton asked Ms. Brown about the
    child’s whereabouts, she informed him that the child was a boy
    and that he had died. Aggrieved, Mr. Carlton inquired about the
    location of the child’s grave, but Ms. Brown refused to disclose it,
    and when Mr. Carlton continued to press this inquiry, Ms. Brown
    sued him for harassment.1 It is undisputed that these
    communications occurred after Ms. Brown had already
    relinquished her parental rights to Adoption Center.
       ¶7 Meanwhile, on June 29, 2010, and July 20, 2010, Adoption
    Center requested and received verifications from the Utah Office
    of Vital Records and Statistics confirming that no putative father
    was registered with respect to the child. Adoption Center also
    confirmed that, as of October 15, 2010, the Pennsylvania
    Department of Public Welfare had not received an
    acknowledgement or claim of paternity. Consequently, Adoption
    Center commenced adoption proceedings for the child.
        ¶8 Once it became apparent that he was not going to get any
    information from Ms. Brown concerning the child, Mr. Carlton
    filed a paternity action in Pennsylvania on November 5, 2010.
    Mr. Carlton’s action was sent to mediation, and on November 23,
    2010, Ms. Brown “broke down” and informed Mr. Carlton that the
    child was actually a girl, that she was still alive, and that she had
    been given up for adoption in Utah. That same day, the
    Pennsylvania court dismissed Mr. Carlton’s action for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    
       1 The case was ultimately dismissed on the grounds that there
    was a legitimate basis for these communications and that
    therefore they could not be classified as “harassment” as a matter
    of law.
    
    
    
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                           CARLTON v. BROWN
                          Opinion of the Court
        ¶9 Back in Utah, the adoption proceedings for the child were
    finalized on December 29, 2010. It is undisputed that, as of this
    date, no paternity action was pending in any state.
        ¶10 Mr. Carlton then hired local counsel in an attempt to
    intervene in the adoption proceedings. Counsel prepared a
    motion to intervene in January 2011 but could not identify the
    proper case in which to file the motion. Consequently, Mr. Carlton
    began seeking replacement counsel and hired current counsel in
    March 2011. That counsel immediately filed a Verified Petition to
    Establish Paternity (Petition) for Mr. Carlton on March 8, 2011.
       ¶11 Mr. Carlton amended his Petition on May 2, 2011
    (Amended Petition) in order to add Adoption Center as a party.
    He also added the following claims to the Amended Petition: (1) a
    request to set aside the adoption; (2) constitutional challenges to
    the Act; (3) tort claims against both Adoption Center and
    Ms. Brown for fraud, tortious interference with parental rights,
    unlawful activity, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of
    emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress;
    and (4) a request for declaratory relief. Mr. Carlton admits that
    Ms. Brown has been served only with the Petition, not the
    Amended Petition, and that she has “not [been] involved in these
    proceedings.”
        ¶12 In response to the Amended Petition, Adoption Center
    filed a Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary
    Judgment (Motion) on May 24, 2011. Mr. Carlton opposed the
    Motion. Additionally, he filed motions for leave to amend the
    Amended Petition and for a rule 56(f) continuance. The district
    court conducted a hearing on all of these motions on
    November 14, 2011, and entered its order granting Adoption
    Center’s Motion and dismissing all of Mr. Carlton’s motions, as
    well as his Amended Petition, on February 3, 2012. Mr. Carlton
    timely appealed. As this case was certified to us by the Court of
    Appeals, we have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-
    3-102(3)(b).
                       STANDARD OF REVIEW
       ¶13 “A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss based
    upon the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint[] presents a
    
    
    
    
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                           Opinion of the Court
    question of law that we review for correctness.”2 Additionally,
    “[c]onstitutional issues, including questions regarding due
    process, are questions of law that we review for correctness.”3
    Finally, “[w]e apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing
    the denial of a rule 56(f) motion” and a motion for leave to amend,
    “and overturn . . . only if the denial of the motion exceed[s] the
    limits of reasonability.”4
                                ANALYSIS
        ¶14 In his Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton raised several
    constitutional challenges to the Act based primarily on alleged
    violations of both state and federal guarantees to due process and
    equal protection. He also asserted six tort claims against
    Ms. Brown and Adoption Center. The district court dismissed all
    of these claims on the ground that Mr. Carlton lacked standing to
    assert them, or, in the alternative, that he had failed to state a
    claim upon which relief could be granted.5 The district court also
    
    
       2 Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 
    2010 UT 29
    , ¶ 10,
    
    232 P.3d 999
     (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
       3Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 
    2012 UT 84
    , ¶ 47, 
    299 P.3d 990
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
       4 Petersen v. Riverton City, 
    2010 UT 58
    , ¶ 25, 
    243 P.3d 1261
     (third
    alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hudgens
    v. Prosper, Inc., 
    2010 UT 68
    , ¶ 15, 
    243 P.3d 1275
     (“We review a
    district court’s denial of leave to amend for an abuse of
    discretion.”).
       5  The district court’s alternative holding actually treated
    Adoption Center’s Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary
    judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
    Procedure. And in granting the motion, the district court
    expressly dismissed Mr. Carlton’s claims with prejudice. This was
    error, however, because the district court did not give the parties
    notice of the conversion, nor did it allow the parties to
    supplement the record under rule 56. Oakwood Village LLC v.
    Albertsons, Inc., 
    2004 UT 101
    , ¶ 12, 
    104 P.3d 1226
     (observing that
    “[r]ule 12(b) mandates that a motion to dismiss shall be converted
    into one for summary judgment if ‘matters outside the pleadings
    are presented to and not excluded by the court’ and all parties
                                                         (continued…)
    
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                             CARLTON v. BROWN
                            Opinion of the Court
    dismissed Mr. Carlton’s Motion for Leave to File Second
    Amended Petition and for a rule 56(f) continuance because it
    reasoned that, given Mr. Carlton’s lack of standing, both motions
    would be futile. Mr. Carlton argues that both of these conclusions
    were erroneous.
       ¶15 Although we disagree with the district court’s reasoning
    regarding Mr. Carlton’s lack of standing to assert the
    constitutional claims, we agree with its ultimate conclusion given
    the current state of the pleadings. But because Mr. Carlton’s
    proposed amendment to his petition would have cured these
    defects, and because we conclude that his motion to amend was
    improperly denied by the district court, we hold that the district
    court’s dismissal of the constitutional claims was also erroneous.
    Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of the
    constitutional claims and remand this case with the instruction
    that Mr. Carlton be granted leave to amend his petition.
        ¶16 With respect to the tort claims, we agree with the district
    court’s decision to dismiss these claims on the ground that
    Mr. Carlton has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
    granted, with the exception of Mr. Carlton’s claims for intentional
    infliction of emotional distress against both Ms. Brown and
    
    receive ‘reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to
    such a motion by Rule 56’” (emphasis added) (quoting UTAH R. CIV.
    P. 12(b))). In fact, the district court expressly denied Mr. Carlton’s
    request to submit additional evidence pursuant to rule 56.
    Accordingly, we review the district court’s alternative holding
    under the rule 12(b)(6) standard, and affirm only if “without
    considering material outside the complaint, we conclude that
    [Mr. Carlton has] failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
    granted.” Tuttle v. Olds, 
    2007 UT App 10
    , ¶ 10, 
    155 P.3d 893
    . We
    will also specifically indicate on a claim-by-claim basis whether
    we are affirming the district court’s dismissal with or without
    prejudice, recognizing the general rule that “dismissal under Rule
    12(b)(6) generally is not final or on the merits and the court
    normally will give plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint”
    except in situations where “it appears to a certainty that plaintiff
    cannot state a claim,” in which case dismissal with prejudice is
    appropriate. Alvarez v. Galetka, 
    933 P.2d 987
    , 991 (Utah 1997)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    
    
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                             Opinion of the Court
    Adoption Center. Because we conclude that Ms. Brown was not
    properly served with the Amended Petition, we affirm the district
    court’s dismissal of the claim on that ground. But with respect to
    Adoption Center, we conclude that the district court’s reason for
    dismissing this claim—Mr. Carlton’s failure to establish parental
    rights to the child—is inadequate, since the question of whether
    Mr. Carlton actually so failed depends upon the outcome of the
    constitutional challenges that were also erroneously dismissed by
    the district court. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s
    dismissal of this claim and remand this case for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                        I. INADEQUATE BRIEFING
        ¶17 Before turning to the issues raised by Mr. Carlton’s
    appeal, we first consider Adoption Center’s suggestion that we
    “either disregard portions of [Mr. Carlton’s brief] or strike the
    brief in its entirety, and award attorney fees as appropriate.”
         ¶18 “Under our rules of appellate procedure, we need not
    address briefs that fail to comply with rule 24. Specifically, rule
    24(k) states that [b]riefs which are not in compliance may be
    disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.
    And we have discretion to not address an inadequately briefed
    argument.”6 While we recognize that adoption proceedings are
    extremely time-sensitive, we take this opportunity to reemphasize
    the fact that “this court is not a depository in which the appealing
    party may dump the burden of argument and research.”7 Indeed,
    it is the responsibility of counsel to include “the contentions and
    reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
    including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in
    the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
    of the record relied on.”8 Furthermore, simply providing “bald
    citation[s] to authority” is not sufficient to discharge this
    
    
       6 Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, L.L.C., 
    2012 UT 17
    ,
    ¶ 11, 
    279 P.3d 391
     (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
       7 State v. Thomas, 
    961 P.2d 299
    , 305 (Utah 1998) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
       8   UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9).
    
    
    
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                              CARLTON v. BROWN
                             Opinion of the Court
    responsibility.9 Rather, counsel must both develop and provide
    “reasoned analysis based on that authority.”10
        ¶19 In this case, Mr. Carlton’s brief was confusing and largely
    unhelpful, due mainly to the fact that he devoted over thirty
    pages to a summary of the “facts” of the case, which included a
    lengthy summary of irrelevant telephone conversations that
    occurred between counsel’s wife, Adoption Center, and two other
    adoption agencies in Utah that are not parties to this case. Having
    spent the majority of his page allotment on such an endeavor,
    Mr. Carlton was then forced to discuss five constitutional
    challenges to the Act, six different tort claims (including a claim
    for fraud, which must be pled with particularity11), and the
    district court’s dismissal of his motion for leave to amend and
    motion for a rule 56(f) continuance in just twenty-seven pages.
        ¶20 As a result, most of Mr. Carlton’s arguments were not
    well developed, if they were developed at all. For instance,
    Mr. Carlton failed to cite any case law from any jurisdiction in
    order to set forth the elements of, or the legal standards for, his
    claims for fraud, tortious interference with parental rights, pattern
    of unlawful activity, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of
    emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, or
    declaratory relief. Where cases are cited, there is no analysis of
    those cases, nor any reasoned application of those cases to the
    facts of this case. Furthermore, in areas where there are cases that
    are directly on point (e.g., claims for violation of due process and
    equal protection), Mr. Carlton makes no attempt to distinguish
    them. Instead, he simply recognizes their existence and then
    asserts that “such cases should be overturned” without arguing
    why.
    
    
    
    
       9   Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305.
       10   Id.
       11 UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(b); Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
    656 P.2d 966
    , 971 (Utah 1982) (stating that the relevant surrounding facts
    for a fraud claim “must be set forth with sufficient particularity to
    show what facts are claimed to constitute such charges” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    
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                              Opinion of the Court
        ¶21 Due to his failure to conform to the requirements of rule
    24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, we refuse to address
    many of the arguments raised in Mr. Carlton’s brief. Arguments
    that were inadequately briefed—and accordingly disregarded—
    are noted specifically below. We decline, however, to accept
    Adoption Center’s invitation to disregard Mr. Carlton’s entire
    brief.
       II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S REASONS FOR DISMISSING
             MR. CARLTON’S CLAIMS DUE TO A LACK OF
                    STANDING WERE ERRONEOUS
        ¶22 The district court’s primary reason for granting Adoption
    Center’s Motion to Dismiss was that it believed Mr. Carlton
    lacked standing to assert both the constitutional and tort claims
    that were set forth in his Amended Petition. Mr. Carlton argues
    that this conclusion was erroneous. While we agree with
    Mr. Carlton that the district court’s reasons for finding a lack of
    standing were faulty, we nevertheless agree with its conclusion
    that Mr. Carlton does, in fact, lack standing to assert these claims,
    as discussed in the next section.
        ¶23 Utah’s standing requirements are similar to the federal
    court system “in that they contain the same three basic elements—
    injury, causation, and redressability.”12 And although there are a
    few differences between our state courts and the federal system,13
    these differences are irrelevant here. In essence, Mr. Carlton
    claims that the Act deprived him of his constitutional right to a
    meaningful opportunity to develop a relationship with the child
    and that he was damaged by the allegedly tortious conduct of
    
    
       12   Brown v. Dep’t. of Natural Res., 
    2010 UT 14
    , ¶ 17, 
    228 P.3d 747
    .
       13  See id. ¶ 17 (explaining that “[a]lthough our standing
    requirements and the federal standing requirements are
    similar . . . they are not identical”); Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v.
    Tooele Cnty., 
    2009 UT 48
    , ¶ 9, 
    214 P.3d 95
     (reiterating that a
    plaintiff can maintain standing by asserting an “actual or
    potential” injury (emphasis added)). Federal law, in contrast,
    requires “actual” injury. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
    133 S. Ct. 1138
    , 1147 (2013) (stating that in order to have Article III standing,
    the injury “must be concrete, particularized, and actual or
    imminent” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    
    
    
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                             CARLTON v. BROWN
                            Opinion of the Court
    Adoption Center and Ms. Brown.14 Therefore, he asked that the
    district court strike down the Act on constitutional grounds and
    award him damages against Adoption Center and Ms. Brown in
    tort.
        ¶24 With respect to the constitutional claims, however, the
    district court reasoned that “because Carlton never established
    parental rights to the child [by complying with the Act], he lacks
    standing to raise constitutional arguments or otherwise contest
    the adoption.” In other words, the district court concluded that
    Mr. Carlton lacked standing to challenge the Act because he did
    not have any rights to the child in the first place (due to his failure
    to comply with the Act) and therefore could not allege an injury.
       ¶25 This argument fails due to circularity and was therefore
    erroneous. If a plaintiff wishes to challenge the constitutionality of
    a statute and has adequately shown harm, causation, and
    redressability, the allegedly unconstitutional statute cannot then
    be used as grounds for denying that plaintiff standing. For if it
    could be so utilized, it would be impossible to raise a
    constitutional challenge to any statute, no matter how
    unconstitutional, provided that the statute itself denied standing
    to putative plaintiffs who wish to challenge it. Therefore, we
    conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Carlton’s
    constitutional claims based on this reasoning.
        ¶26 A similar analysis applies to the tort claims asserted in
    Mr. Carlton’s Amended Petition, which the district court also
    appears to have dismissed due primarily to a lack of standing. In
    essence, the district court reasoned that because Mr. Carlton failed
    to comply with the Act, he did not have any rights to the child to
    begin with and thus could not show damages due to Ms. Brown’s
    and Adoption Center’s allegedly tortious interference with those
    rights. While it may be true that Mr. Carlton did not have any
    rights to the child due to his failure to comply with the Act, the
    district court’s argument presupposes that the Act constitutionally
    extinguished the rights that Mr. Carlton claims were violated by
    Ms. Brown’s and Adoption Center’s allegedly tortious conduct.
    But given that the district court had not previously analyzed the
    constitutionality of the Act, this conclusion was premature and
    
       14 See In re T.B., 
    2010 UT 42
    , ¶ 31, 
    232 P.3d 1026
     (discussing this
    right, as recognized in Lehr v. Robertson, 
    463 U.S. 248
     (1983)).
    
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                           Opinion of the Court
    therefore erroneous. The district court should have first
    determined whether the statute constitutionally deprived
    Mr. Carlton of the rights that were allegedly violated by the
    tortious conduct. Only then, if the district court decided against
    him on the constitutional claims, would it be justified in
    dismissing Mr. Carlton’s tort claims due to an inability to allege a
    redressable injury.
       ¶27 These errors notwithstanding, for the reasons stated
    below we agree with the district court’s ultimate conclusion that,
    given the current state of the pleadings, Mr. Carlton lacks
    standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the Act.
            III. MR. CARLTON LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT
                 THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS BECAUSE HIS
              INJURY IS NOT REDRESSABLE BY THIS COURT DUE
                      TO THE ABSENCE OF THE CHILD’S
                            ADOPTIVE PARENTS
        ¶28 In his Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton raised a number of
    arguments aimed at proving the unconstitutionality of the Act,
    including both facial and as applied arguments based on
    violations of procedural and substantive due process, equal
    protection, the “open courts” provision of Utah’s constitution, and
    vagueness. But Mr. Carlton lacks standing to assert these claims
    because his injury cannot be redressed by this court unless the
    Adoptive Parents are parties to this case. This is so because
    Mr. Carlton’s constitutional arguments and proposed remedies do
    not implicate the rights of either Ms. Brown or Adoption Center—
    they implicate the rights of the Adoptive Parents. So despite the
    fact that Mr. Carlton’s constitutional claims may have merit,15 he
    lacks standing to bring them because they are not redressable by
    this court until the Adoptive Parents are added to this action.
       ¶29 Although we recognize that we are not bound by the
    federal constitution’s “case or controversy” requirement, we have
    repeatedly recognized that a “justiciable controversy” is the
    
    
    
       15 Of particular potential merit is Mr. Carlton’s contention,
    which he clarified at oral argument, that the Act’s imposition of a
    deadline on out-of-state fathers whose home states impose no
    such deadline is a violation of due process.
    
    
    
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                               CARLTON v. BROWN
                              Opinion of the Court
    “keystone” of our judicial framework.16 Indeed, we have stated
    that the constitutional term
             ‘judicial power of courts’ is generally understood to
             be the power to hear and determine controversies
             between adverse parties and questions in litigation.
             Such core judicial powers include ‘the authority to
             hear and determine justiciable controversies’ as well
             as ‘the authority to enforce any valid judgment,
             decree or order.’17
    But “[i]n the absence of any justiciable controversy between
    adverse parties, the courts are without jurisdiction.”18
        ¶30 Thus, in order for us to retain jurisdiction over this
    appeal, Mr. Carlton is required to show that there is a justiciable
    controversy before us. The concept of “justiciability” implicates
    various categories of cases and doctrines that impose limits on our
    jurisdiction, including advisory opinions, feigned and collusive
    cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and
    administrative questions.19 For example, with respect to ripeness
    we have recently observed that “[i]n order to constitute a
    justiciable controversy, a conflict over the application of a legal
    provision must have sharpened into an actual or imminent clash
    of legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto.”20
       ¶31 In this case, we agree with the district court’s ultimate
    conclusion that Mr. Carlton lacked standing to bring his
    constitutional claims, although we reach that conclusion by a
    
    
       16   Shipman v. Evans, 
    2004 UT 44
    , ¶¶ 32–33, 
    100 P.3d 1151
    , abrogated on other grounds by Utahns For Better Dental Health-
    Davis, Inc. v. Davis Cnty. Clerk, 
    2007 UT 97
    , 
    175 P.3d 1036
    .
       17  Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 
    881 P.2d 844
    , 849 (Utah
    1994) (emphasis omitted) (internal citation omitted); see also
    Timpanogos Planning & Water Mgmt. Agency v. Cent. Utah Water
    Conservancy Dist., 
    690 P.2d 562
    , 569 (Utah 1984).
       
    18 Will. v
    . Univ. of Utah, 
    626 P.2d 500
    , 503 (Utah 1981).
       19   See Wylie v. Idaho Transp. Bd., 
    253 P.3d 700
    , 705 (Idaho 2011).
       20Carter v. Lehi City, 
    2012 UT 2
    , ¶ 93, 
    269 P.3d 141
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    
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                              Opinion of the Court
    different road. As noted above, “standing” comprises three
    components: injury, causation, and redressability.21 Although
    Mr. Carlton has adequately shown the former two, he cannot
    show the latter because “redressability” requires that the injury be
    “redressable by a favorable ruling.”22
        ¶32 Unfortunately, the district court prevented Mr. Carlton
    from joining the Adoptive Parents in this case when it denied his
    Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Petition. Consequently,
    Mr. Carlton lacks standing to bring these claims because his
    injury—the termination of his parental rights—is not redressable
    by a favorable ruling from this court. This is so because even if
    we were to agree with Mr. Carlton’s arguments against the
    constitutionality of the Act, we simply could not grant the relief
    he requests, which is that his parental rights to the child be
    reinstated and the adoption overturned. Neither Adoption Center
    nor Ms. Brown has any rights to relinquish,23 and we certainly do
    not have the authority to infringe upon the Adoptive Parents’
    rights to the child since they are not parties to this proceeding.24
    Because of the Adoptive Parents’ absence, we cannot grant the
    relief Mr. Carlton seeks. Therefore, his injury is not redressable,
    and consequently he lacks standing to assert the constitutional
    challenges set forth in his Amended Petition.
        ¶33 But despite the fact that we agree with the district court’s
    conclusion that Mr. Carlton lacks standing to assert the
    constitutional claims as they are presently pled, we nevertheless
    reverse its decision to dismiss those claims because we conclude
    that the district court erroneously denied Mr. Carlton’s Motion for
    Leave to File Second Amended Petition. The district court denied
    this motion on the basis of futility, but it is clear from the face of
    
    
       21   Brown v. Dep’t. of Natural Res., 
    2010 UT 14
    , ¶ 17, 
    228 P.3d 747
    .
       22   Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
    133 S. Ct. 1138
    , 1147 (2013).
       23  See State v. Sims, 
    881 P.2d 840
    , 841 (Utah 1994) (dismissing a
    case for lack of jurisdiction because even if the court granted the
    relief requested “it would have no legal effect on the parties”).
       24 Fink v. Miller, 
    896 P.2d 649
    , 654 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
    (observing that the “trial court exceeded the bounds of its
    authority by directing the actions of a nonparty”).
    
    
    
                                        13
                             CARLTON v. BROWN
                            Opinion of the Court
    his proposed Second Amended Petition that Mr. Carlton was
    attempting to add the Adoptive Parents, which, as we just noted,
    would have granted him standing to bring the constitutional
    claims. Hence, we conclude that the district court erred when it
    determined that the motion to amend was futile.
        ¶34 Mr. Carlton correctly notes that, under rule 15(a) of the
    Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, “leave [to amend] shall be freely
    given when justice so requires.” And in his Motion for Leave to
    File Second Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton argued, among other
    things, that no prejudice would result from the amendment
    because a trial had not yet been scheduled and no formal
    discovery had been conducted. This argument was not refuted by
    Adoption Center in its opposition to Mr. Carlton’s motion. We
    conclude that pursuant to rule 15(a), the district court should have
    granted Mr. Carlton leave to amend. Accordingly, we reverse the
    district court’s denial of this motion and remand the case with the
    instruction that the district court grant Mr. Carlton leave to amend
    his petition. And because it is clear that Mr. Carlton’s Second
    Amended Petition would have cured the standing issue discussed
    above, we also reverse the district court’s dismissal of the
    constitutional claims and remand this case to the district court for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
           IV. EXCEPT FOR MR. CARLTON’S CLAIM FOR
       INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
        AGAINST ADOPTION CENTER, THE DISTRICT COURT
     PROPERLY DISMISSED MR. CARLTON’S TORT CLAIMS FOR
                  FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
        ¶35 In his Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton asserted six tort
    claims against Adoption Center and Ms. Brown. These claims
    were for (1) fraud, (2) tortious interference with parental rights,
    (3) pattern of unlawful activity, (4) civil conspiracy, (5) intentional
    infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and (6) negligent infliction
    of emotional distress. In its order, the district court dismissed all
    of these claims due to lack of standing, or, in the alternative, for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We
    affirm the district court’s dismissal of all the tort claims for failure
    to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, except for the
    claim for IIED against Adoption Center. As discussed below,
    because Mr. Carlton has failed to properly serve Ms. Brown with
    the Amended Complaint, either personally or via alternative
    service, the district court’s dismissal of the IIED claim against
                                      14
                              Cite as: 
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                             Opinion of the Court
    Ms. Brown was proper. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of
    this claim. But we reverse the district court’s dismissal of
    Mr. Carlton’s IIED claim against Adoption Center. The district
    court’s ground for dismissal of that claim was Mr. Carlton’s
    failure to establish parental rights to the child. Our opinion
    renders this ground inadequate, however, because the question of
    whether Mr. Carlton may be able to establish his parental rights
    depends upon the outcome of the constitutional challenges that
    were also erroneously dismissed by the district court.
    Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Mr. Carlton’s IIED claim
    against Adoption Center and remand this case for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
            A.   Mr. Carlton’s Fraud Claim Fails Because There Was No
                               Detrimental Reliance
        ¶36 The district court dismissed Mr. Carlton’s fraud claims
    due to his failure to plead fraud with particularity, and because
    even if the cause of action was properly pled, Mr. Carlton had not
    suffered any injury, since the fraud occurred after Ms. Brown had
    already relinquished her parental rights to the child. Mr. Carlton
    argues that the district court’s dismissal was improper because
    “[t]here was considerable evidence of . . . fraud in the case.” We
    disagree and affirm the district court’s dismissal, except that we
    affirm the dismissal without prejudice.
      ¶37 In order to properly assert a claim for fraud, the plaintiff
    must show the following nine elements:
             (1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently
             existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which
             the representor either (a) knew to be false, or
             (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
             insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
             representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the
             other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party,
             acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;
             (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby
             induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.25
    
    
    
       25 Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 
    2009 UT 2
    , ¶ 53 n.38, 
    201 P.3d 966
     (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    
    
    
                                      15
                                 CARLTON v. BROWN
                                Opinion of the Court
        ¶38 Additionally, rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
    Procedure requires that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake,
    the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated
    with particularity.” This means that “a complaint cannot survive
    dismissal     by    pleading      mere      conclusory     allegations
    unsupported . . . by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts.”26
    In other words, “the mere recitation by a plaintiff of the elements
    of fraud in a complaint does not satisfy the particularity
    requirement”27—only “a sufficiently clear and specific description
    of the facts underlying the [plaintiff’s] claim of [fraud] will satisfy
    the requirements of rule 9(b).”28
        ¶39 We agree with the district court’s determination that even
    if the allegations in Mr. Carlton’s Amended Petition were
    sufficient to satisfy the requirement to plead fraud with
    particularity, his fraud claim would still fail because he has failed
    to plead detrimental reliance on such statements. Although
    Mr. Carlton alleges that his failure to file a timely petition to
    establish paternity was due to Ms. Brown’s fraud, it is undisputed
    that the fraudulent statements he identifies occurred after
    Ms. Brown had already relinquished her rights to Adoption
    Center. Thus, by the time the statements were made, Mr. Carlton’s
    petition would still have been untimely under Utah law, and thus
    he cannot show detrimental reliance. Accordingly, we affirm the
    district court’s dismissal of this claim, but without prejudice.
                    B.     Tortious Interference with Parental Rights
        ¶40 Mr. Carlton acknowledges that there currently is no cause
    of action for tortious interference with parental rights but
    nevertheless urges us to recognize that cause of action. We decline
    to do so for several reasons.
       ¶41 Mr. Carlton has not given us adequate reason to adopt a
    new tort. While it may be true that we have “the ability and
    
    
          26
          State v. Apotex Corp., 
    2012 UT 36
    , ¶ 21, 
    282 P.3d 66
     (alteration
    in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
          27   Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 
    2003 UT 14
    , ¶ 16, 
    70 P.3d 35
    .
          28
          Hill v. Allred, 
    2001 UT 16
    , ¶ 14, 
    28 P.3d 1271
     (first alteration
    in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    
                                          16
                              Cite as: 
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                            Opinion of the Court
    discretion to fashion a remedy where one may not already exist,
    based on sound principles of fairness and equity,” Mr. Carlton
    does not cite to any legal authority for his position, does not
    develop any preexisting authority, nor does he adequately
    demonstrate how the remedies that are currently available to him
    are inadequate to address his alleged injuries. In fact, Mr. Carlton
    does not even propose or discuss any legal standard for the tort he
    wishes us to adopt. Instead, he merely cites to a Virginia Supreme
    Court decision wherein the tort was recognized, referring to its
    “high persuasive value” but then fails to indicate why we should
    view it as persuasive or adopt the standard used therein.
    Therefore, due primarily to the inadequacy of Mr. Carlton’s brief,
    we decline to consider whether this tort ought to be recognized in
    Utah and affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim, with
    prejudice.
                     C. Pattern of Unlawful Activity Claim
        ¶42 Mr. Carlton argues that Adoption Center is liable for a
    pattern of unlawful activity because it “intentionally keep[s birth
    fathers] ‘in the dark’ about adoption plans” and “felonious[ly
    gifts] apartment, rent, utilities, various amenities, and most
    astonishingly ‘post placement’ case money of $3,000 - $4,000 to
    birth mothers.” The district court dismissed this claim for failure
    to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm the
    district court’s dismissal, but without prejudice.
        ¶43 Under Utah’s Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUA),29
    the plaintiff must show injury due to a “pattern of unlawful
    activity,” which is defined by UPUA as follows:
             ’Pattern of unlawful activity’ means engaging in
             conduct which constitutes the commission of at least
             three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes
             are not isolated, but have the same or similar
             purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods
             of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
             distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the
             episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful
    
    
    
    
       29   UTAH CODE §§ 76-10-1601–76-10-1609.
    
    
    
                                      17
                              CARLTON v. BROWN
                             Opinion of the Court
             conduct and be related either to each other or to the
             enterprise.30
        ¶44 With respect to this definition, we have clarified that
    “[t]he proper test for determining whether there was
    a pattern of unlawful activity is whether there was ‘a series of
    related predicates extending over a substantial period of time’ or a
    demonstrated threat of continuing unlawful activity and not
    whether there were multiple schemes.”31
        ¶45 Additionally, UPUA requires plaintiffs to plead all claims
    with particularity: “In all actions under this section, the elements
    of each claim or cause of action shall be stated with particularity
    against each defendant.”32 This requirement is imposed “in order
    for the court to determine whether the facts as pleaded are
    sufficient to show that the alleged activity would be illegal in
    Utah and would fall into one of the [statute’s] enumerated
    categories.”33 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal
    of this claim for failure to state a claim, but dismiss it without
    prejudice.
        ¶46 The district court correctly observed that Mr. Carlton’s
    Amended Petition failed to (1) plead his claim for pattern of
    unlawful activity with particularity and (2) demonstrate “at least
    three episodes” of unlawful activity. Indeed, on appeal
    Mr. Carlton merely alleges that Adoption Center is involved in an
    “ill-conceived scheme to prevent birth fathers from exercising
    their parental rights and otherwise timely objecting to the
    adoption of their children.” He does not state with specificity
    who, when, where, or what has happened in furtherance of this
    scheme, nor has he shown how this activity satisfies UPUA’s
    definition of “unlawful activity.”34
    
    
    
       30   Id. § 76-10-1602(2) (emphasis added).
       31 Hill v. Estate of Allred, 
    2009 UT 2
    8, ¶ 41, 
    216 P.3d 929
     (quoting
    H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 
    492 U.S. 229
    , 242 (1989)).
       32   UTAH CODE § 76-10-1605(7).
       33Holbrook v. Master Prot. Corp., 
    883 P.2d 295
    , 302 (Utah Ct.
    App. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
       34   UTAH CODE § 76-10-1602(4)(a)–(jjjj).
    
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                               Opinion of the Court
        ¶47 The district court also correctly noted that even if
    Mr. Carlton had adequately pled this claim with particularity, the
    actions he complains about were not unlawful. Mr. Carlton
    alleges that Adoption Center is guilty of fraud for keeping birth
    fathers “in the dark,” but this allegation ignores the fact that Utah
    law does not impose a duty upon Adoption Center to inform birth
    fathers who do not take action to preserve their right to
    notification of a pending adoption. Furthermore, Mr. Carlton’s
    second suggestion, namely that Adoption Center “feloniously”
    gives support to birth mothers, is also patently false since the Act
    permits Adoption Center to pay for certain expenses.35 For these
    reasons, the district court correctly dismissed Mr. Carlton’s claim
    for pattern of unlawful activity, and, accordingly, we affirm its
    dismissal, without prejudice.
                             D. Civil Conspiracy Claim
        ¶48 With respect to his civil conspiracy claim, Mr. Carlton
    argues that “[i]n light of the pleadings and evidence presented . . .
    the Court [should] take action in this case to reverse the lower
    court.” Unfortunately, he does not inform us to which pleadings
    or evidence he is referring. Nor does he set forth the legal
    elements of this cause of action using relevant case law or show
    how the district court erred in assessing the facts of this case in
    light of those elements. In short, Mr. Carlton does not, in any
    fashion, engage the district court’s analysis of this cause of action.
    Accordingly, we refuse to consider this claim on appeal due to
    inadequate briefing and affirm the district court’s dismissal,
    without prejudice.
                   E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
        ¶49 Mr. Carlton argues that the district court erred in
    dismissing his claims for IIED against both Ms. Brown and
    Adoption Center. We agree with Mr. Carlton with respect to his
    claim asserted against Adoption Center, but disagree with respect
    to the claim asserted against Ms. Brown.
       ¶50 In order to state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must show
    that the defendant
    
    
    
    
       35   See id. § 76-7-203(1)(a).
    
    
    
                                         19
                              CARLTON v. BROWN
                              Opinion of the Court
             intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the
             plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional
             distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would
             have known that such would result; and his actions
             are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous
             and intolerable in that they offend against the
             generally accepted standards of decency and
             morality.36
       ¶51 Furthermore, we have also observed that “[t]o be
    considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or
    revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or
    unfair.”37 And finally, “[w]here reasonable men may differ, it is
    for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine
    whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently
    extreme and outrageous to result in liability.”38
    1. The District Court’s Dismissal of the IIED Claim Brought
       Against Ms. Brown Was Proper Because She Was not Served
       with the Amended Petition
    
        ¶52 We conclude that the district court was correct to dismiss
    Mr. Carlton’s IIED claim against Ms. Brown because she was not
    properly served with the Amended Petition. “For a court to
    acquire jurisdiction, there must be a proper issuance and service
    of summons.”39 In his brief, Mr. Carlton admits that Ms. Brown
    has not been served with the Amended Petition: “Counsel for
    [Adoption Center] stated to the undersigned counsel in an email
    that [Adoption Center’s] social worker spoke with Brown on
    May 24, 2011, and Brown confirmed that she had not yet been
    served with the amended petition.” Mr. Carlton then states that
    
    
    
    
       36 Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 
    2005 UT 36
    , ¶ 55, 
    116 P.3d 323
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
       37Cabaness v. Thomas, 
    2010 UT 23
    , ¶ 38, 
    232 P.3d 486
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
       38 Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 
    2008 UT 70
    , ¶ 52, 
    194 P.3d 956
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
       39   Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 
    2004 UT 89
    , ¶ 10, 
    100 P.3d 1211
    .
    
                                       20
                               Cite as: 
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                             Opinion of the Court
             [s]ubsequent to [Adoption Center’s] communication
             with Brown, the Lycoming County Sheriff in
             Pennsylvania had [sic] been unable to serve Brown,
             on numerous occasions, even though her car was
             present at her home, where she was previously
             served with the original Verified Petition, and where
             she appeared to be home, peering out the window,
             but refused to come to the door. Efforts to serve
             Brown with the Amended Verified Petition were
             continuing for some time.
       ¶53 Despite his belief that Ms. Brown may have been
    avoiding service of the Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton did not file
    a motion “requesting an order allowing service by publication or
    by some other means”40 and has not demonstrated that service
    has been effectuated on Ms. Brown, either personally or by court-
    ordered alternative means.41 Therefore, the district court’s
    dismissal of this claim was justified due to ineffective service, and,
    accordingly, we affirm its dismissal, but without prejudice.
    2. Because We Conclude that Mr. Carlton’s Constitutional
       Challenges Were Erroneously Dismissed, the District Court’s
       Reason for Dismissing the IIED Claim Against Adoption
       Center Is Now Inadequate
       ¶54 The district court stated its primary reason for dismissing
    Mr. Carlton’s IIED claim against Adoption Center as follows:
             Because [Mr.] Carlton did not establish his parental
             rights to the child prior to the mother’s
             relinquishment of all her parental rights,
             [Mr.] Carlton was not injured by the adoption, nor
             was he injured by the acts of the Adoption Center . . . .
             [Mr.] Carlton failed to take timely action prior to the
             adoption to demonstrate that he intended to assume
             his      parental      responsibilities.    Therefore,
    
       40   UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4)(A).
       41 See Jackson Constr. Co., 
    2004 UT 89
    , ¶ 22 (“Once alternative
    service is authorized, it must be reasonably calculated, under all
    the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the
    pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or
    practicable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    
    
    
                                          21
                             CARLTON v. BROWN
                            Opinion of the Court
            [Mr.] Carlton’s [tort] claims are without merit, and
            Adoption Center’s motion [to dismiss] is granted.
    Because we today reverse the district court’s dismissal of
    Mr. Carlton’s constitutional claims, the question of whether he
    may be able to “establish his parental rights to the child” remains
    open. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of
    Mr. Carlton’s claim for IIED against Adoption Center.
                 F. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
       ¶55 Finally, Mr. Carlton argues that the district court’s
    dismissal of his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
    against Adoption Center and Ms. Brown was in error. We
    disagree.
      ¶56 In order to prevail on a claim for negligent infliction of
    emotional distress, the plaintiff must show the following:
            If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress
            to another, he is subject to liability to the other for
            resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
            (a) should have realized that his conduct involved
            an unreasonable risk of causing the distress,
            otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of
            a third person, and (b) from facts known to him,
            should have realized that the distress, if it were
            caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.42
       ¶57 We have held previously that it is not enough for a
    plaintiff to merely allege emotional distress. Instead, she must
    prove that distress by means of severe physical or mental
    manifestations.43
    
       42Anderson Dev. Co., 
    2005 UT 36
    , ¶ 57 (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
       43 E.g., Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 
    858 P.2d 970
    , 975
    (Utah 1993) (observing that “either physical or mental illness may
    support the [negligent infliction of emotional distress] cause of
    action” and that the physical or mental illness must be such that
    “a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable to
    adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the
    circumstances of the case” (alteration in original) (internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    
                                      22
                            Cite as: 
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                           Opinion of the Court
        ¶58 Here, we conclude that the district court correctly
    dismissed Mr. Carlton’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional
    distress because, in addition to the fact that Ms. Brown was not
    properly served with the Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton failed to
    allege that the distress he claimed to have suffered manifested
    itself through severe mental or physical symptoms. Therefore, we
    affirm the district court’s dismissal of this cause of action for
    failure to state a claim but dismiss it without prejudice.
     V. FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE, WE AFFIRM THE
     DISTRICT COURT’S DENIAL OF MR. CARLTON’S REQUEST
                 FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
        ¶59 In his Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton requested “that an
    order issue declaring any previous termination of [Mr. Carlton’s]
    parental rights, and/or any adoption to be set aside, and further
    that any statute upon which [Adoption Center and Ms. Brown]
    may rely to ostensibly justify their wrongful conduct . . . be
    declared unconstitutional.” As justification for such an order,
    Mr. Carlton asserted the same arguments mentioned above,
    namely the facial and as applied unconstitutionality of the Act,
    violations of due process and equal protection, violation of Utah’s
    constitutional open courts provision, and vagueness. As set forth
    above, however, we cannot reach the merits of these claims until
    the child’s adoptive parents are parties to this action, since their
    rights would be directly or indirectly implicated by the grant of
    declaratory relief Mr. Carlton seeks. Therefore, due process
    requires that the Adoptive Parents be given the opportunity to be
    heard with respect to this issue. Accordingly, we decline to
    address the merits of this claim and remand it to the district court
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                             CONCLUSION
       ¶60 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s
    dismissal of Mr. Carlton’s constitutional challenges to the Act. But
    we affirm the district court’s dismissal of all of the tort claims
    asserted in the Amended Petition for failure to state a claim, with
    the exception of Mr. Carlton’s claim for intentional infliction of
    emotional distress against Ms. Brown and Adoption Center.
    Although Mr. Carlton adequately pled the former, because he has
    not yet served Ms. Brown with the Amended Petition we must
    dismiss this claim for lack of jurisdiction. And since we now
    reverse the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Carlton’s
    constitutional claims, the dismissal of his claim for IIED against
    
                                    23
                          CARLTON v. BROWN
                         Opinion of the Court
    Adoption Center must also be reversed, for the reasons stated
    above. We now remand this case to the district court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    
    
    
    
                                  24