Ramos v. Cobblestone Centre ( 2020 )


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  •                  This opinion is subject to revision before final
    publication in the Pacific Reporter
    
    2020 UT 55
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    ALBERTO RAMOS
    Petitioner,
    v.
    COBBLESTONE CENTRE; UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE CO.; and UTAH
    LABOR COMMISSION
    Respondents.
    No. 20190348
    Heard May 22, 2020
    Filed July 31, 2020
    On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
    Attorneys:
    Loren M. Lambert, Midvale, for petitioner
    Jeffrey A Callister, Chad P. Curtis, Salt Lake City, for respondents
    Cobblestone Centre and Utah Business Insurance Co.
    Christopher C. Hill, Salt Lake City, for respondent Utah Labor
    Commission
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in
    which ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS,
    JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
    Introduction
    ¶1 Mr. Ramos appeals the amount of an award for permanent
    partial disability under the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA).1
    Pursuant to Labor Commission (Commission) guidelines, the
    administrative law judge based the amount of Mr. Ramos’s award
    __________________________________________________________
    1   See UTAH CODE §§ 34A-2-101 to -1005.
    RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    on a report provided by an assigned medical panel. Mr. Ramos
    argues that this process for determining permanent partial
    disability benefits is unconstitutional.
    ¶2 Mr. Ramos argues that the Commission’s process for
    determining disability benefits is unconstitutional in two respects.
    First, Mr. Ramos argues the Commission’s use of medical panels is
    unconstitutional because it delegates to medical panels the
    administrative law judge’s authority to adjudicate WCA claims.
    Second, he argues that the Commission’s rule adopting the 2006
    Supplemental Impairment Rating Guide (Utah Guidelines) and the
    5th Edition of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the
    Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guidelines) violates
    various provisions of the federal and Utah constitutions because it
    provides an arbitrary method for assigning impairment ratings that
    results in constitutionally inadequate compensation.
    ¶3 We reject Mr. Ramos’s assertion that the Commission’s
    process for determining permanent partial disability benefits is
    unconstitutional. First, we hold that the Commission has not
    unconstitutionally delegated to medical panels the authority of
    administrative law judges to adjudicate workers’ compensation
    benefits. Medical panels merely assist administrative law judges in
    exercising their adjudicative authority. Second, we decline to reach
    the merits of Mr. Ramos’s other constitutional claims challenging
    the Utah Guidelines’ method for assigning impairment ratings
    because he has not adequately briefed them.
    ¶4 In addition to his constitutional arguments, Mr. Ramos
    asserts the administrative law judge erred in failing to augment the
    medical panel’s impairment rating by 3 percent, resulting in an
    increased compensation award. He argues that, because of his
    subjective pain, he is entitled to this increased compensation. We
    disagree. We conclude that the administrative law judge was not
    permitted to increase the amount of Mr. Ramos’s award in the way
    Mr. Ramos suggests.2
    __________________________________________________________
    2 Cobblestone Centre (Cobblestone) argues Mr. Ramos’s appeal
    is moot because he does not challenge the medical panel’s report
    and assigned impairment rating, only the Commission’s process in
    determining his award. Because Mr. Ramos could have been
    entitled to a new hearing and a new determination of benefits
    before the Commission had we ruled in his favor on any of his
    (Continued)
    2
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                                 Opinion of the Court
    Background
    ¶5 While he was employed by Cobblestone, Mr. Ramos
    assembled and moved metal trestles weighing about 300 pounds.
    One day, he and his co-worker were loading a trestle on a forklift
    when the trestle fell, temporarily pinning Mr. Ramos and bending
    his left knee inward. He received medical treatment that same day
    and, after an MRI, was diagnosed with an MCL tear and
    “compressive bone marrow edema and microfractures involving
    the postoerolateral aspect of both the lateral femoral condyle and
    the fibular head.” After receiving treatment for his injury,
    Mr. Ramos did not “achieve 100% recovery” and “was left with a
    residual limp,” a “significant bump on the side of his left knee,”
    and residual pain “that interferes with his activities.” As a result,
    he filed a claim for permanent partial disability benefits with the
    Commission.
    ¶6 Permanent partial disability, one of the benefits provided
    by the WCA, provides compensation for workers who become
    permanently impaired because of a workplace accident.3 The WCA
    provides an express list of some of these impairments, and includes
    a specific compensation schedule.4 In addition to the schedule
    provided in the statute, the legislature has granted the Commission
    the authority to provide benefits for permanent impairments that
    are not on its express list, so long as the Commission bases a
    compensation award on “medical evidence,” and the award is
    “proportionate” to the schedule provided in the statute. 5
    ¶7 To help in its efforts to provide proportionate awards for
    permanent impairments not expressly listed in the statute—like
    Mr. Ramos’s impairment—the Commission has adopted a rule
    requiring medical providers to use the Utah Guidelines in order to
    diagnose an impairment, and then to assign a numerical value,
    referred to as an impairment rating.6 This same rule also adopts the
    __________________________________________________________
    claims, the parties’ rights could have been affected by this appeal.
    As a result, his appeal is not moot.
    3   UTAH CODE § 34A-2-412.
    4
    Id. § 34A-2-412(4). 5
      Id. § 34A-2-412(6).
    6 
      UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 612-300-9(A) (2019).
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    RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    AMA Guidelines, which apply when the Utah Guidelines fail to
    address a specific impairment.7
    ¶8 According to the Commission, the Utah Guidelines
    provide uniformity and consistency in the diagnostic and rating
    process among different medical providers.8 They accomplish this
    by specifying objective medical diagnoses, in which medical
    providers consider various factors—including the method of
    injury, initial presentation of the injury, radiological findings, and
    subsequent limitations—and then provide categories based on the
    severity of these factors.9 After the medical provider diagnoses and
    categorizes an injury, the Utah Guidelines provide an assigned
    numerical value.10 This numerical value is referred to as an
    impairment rating, which the Commission’s administrative law
    judge utilizes to calculate a permanent partial disability
    compensation award.11
    ¶9 Mr. Ramos’s impairment was not expressly listed in the
    schedule provided in Utah Code section 34A-2-412. As a result, in
    filing a permanent partial disability claim, he submitted evidence
    that his treating physical therapist determined that his impairment
    constituted a “whole person impairment rating of 6 [percent].” On
    the other hand, his employer’s physician conducted a medical
    examination, and determined that “there was no objective evidence
    to support that [Mr. Ramos] had any impairment.” Because of the
    conflicting medical evidence, the administrative law judge was
    required, by rule, to appoint a medical panel in order to provide an
    independent assessment. Utilizing the Utah Guidelines, the
    medical panel diagnosed Mr. Ramos with a lower extremity
    painful organic syndrome and concluded that his impairment
    constituted a 1-percent-whole-person impairment rating. The
    medical panel submitted its findings in a report to the
    administrative law judge.
    __________________________________________________________
    7
    Id. r. 612-300-9(B) (2019).
       8 UTAH LABOR COMM’N, UTAH LABOR COMMISSION’S 2006
    SUPPLEMENTAL IMPAIRMENT RATING GUIDES § 1.1b.iv (hereinafter
    Utah Guidelines).
    9   See, e.g.
    , id. § 5.2b. 10
      Id. § 1.0a.
    11 
      Id.; UTAH CODE § 34A-2-601(2)(b).
    4
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                           Opinion of the Court
    ¶10 After receiving the medical panel’s report, Mr. Ramos
    objected. He claimed that he was entitled to a higher impairment
    rating based on his persistent pain and continuing limitations. In a
    declaration he submitted in support of his objection, Mr. Ramos
    stated that, at his new place of employment, he cannot work a full
    day “without any pain or difficulties.” He also stated that he
    experiences pain after walking for ninety minutes, sitting for an
    hour, walking up three to four flights of stairs, running for more
    than ten minutes, or playing soccer for more than five minutes.
    After considering Mr. Ramos’s objection and declaration, the
    administrative law judge asked the medical panel to review the
    additional evidence and provide a supplemental report.
    ¶11 After it reviewed Mr. Ramos’s objection and declaration,
    the medical panel maintained that his impairment constituted a
    1-percent-whole-body impairment rating. It submitted its
    determination to the administrative law judge, along with its
    reasons supporting that determination, in a supplemental report.
    Mr. Ramos objected to the supplemental report, arguing that the
    panel’s assessment was incorrect, resulting in an impairment rating
    that was too low. He made various challenges to the panel’s
    findings, including those regarding (1) the mechanism for injury;12
    (2) the initial presentation of injury;13 (3) the radiological
    assessment; and (4) his limitations. And he asked that the
    administrative law judge increase the panel’s assigned impairment
    rating based on his ongoing subjective pain.
    ¶12 Mr. Ramos also challenged the constitutionality of the
    Utah Guidelines, which the panel relied on in its assessment of
    Mr. Ramos’s impairment. He argued that the methods provided in
    the Utah Guidelines for diagnosing and assigning impairment
    ratings are arbitrary and fail to serve the purpose of the WCA.
    ¶13 The judge rejected Mr. Ramos’s objections. First, she
    reviewed the challenged findings, taking into account Mr. Ramos’s
    __________________________________________________________
    12 “Mechanism of injury” refers to the manner in which the
    injury occurred. See JP’s Landscaping v. Labor Comm’n, 
    2017 UT App 59
    , ¶¶ 21–32, 
    397 P.3d 728
    ; see also Utah Guidelines § 5.3a
    (providing an example of a car running over a person’s foot as a
    “moderate” mechanism of injury).
    13 The “initial presenting signs” of an injury include a medical
    provider’s objective observations like swelling, redness, and
    bruising. See Utah Guidelines § 4.4g.
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    RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    allegedly contrary evidence. After determining that none of the
    other evidence on the record contradicted the panel’s findings, she
    admitted the medical panel’s findings and assigned impairment
    rating.
    ¶14 The judge also rejected Mr. Ramos’s argument that she
    should increase the panel’s assigned impairment rating based on
    his continuing subjective pain. In doing so, she stated she would
    not “give [Mr. Ramos’s] subjective complaint more weight than . . .
    the objective evidence.”
    ¶15 Finally, the administrative law judge rejected Mr. Ramos’s
    arguments that the Utah Guidelines are unconstitutional. In
    rejecting his claims, she noted that the Utah Guidelines provide a
    uniform assessment, increase accuracy in diagnoses, and ensure a
    timely award.14 In addition, the judge determined that because
    Mr. Ramos received a particularized assessment of his injury and
    impairment, his award was not arbitrary.
    ¶16 After rejecting all of Mr. Ramos’s objections, the
    administrative     law      judge       adopted    the     panel’s
    1-percent-whole-body impairment rating and awarded Mr. Ramos
    $1,045.20 in permanent partial disability compensation. Mr. Ramos
    appealed this decision to the Commission’s Appeals Board, who
    affirmed the administrative law judge’s order, and rejected
    __________________________________________________________
    14 Although the administrative law judge reached Mr. Ramos’s
    arguments, she noted that the Utah Guidelines are not law and, as
    a result, not subject to a constitutional challenge. But this is
    incorrect. “An agency’s written statement that is made as a rule in
    accordance with the requirements of [the Utah Administrative
    Rulemaking Act] is enforceable and has the effect of law.” UTAH
    CODE § 63G-3-202(2). Because an agency’s rule has the force and
    effect of law, it is subject to a constitutional challenge.
    Id. § 63G-4-403(4)(a). We
    also note that an important issue underlying the arguments
    presented in this case is whether the Commission has the statutory
    authority to promulgate the regulations at issue. But because
    Mr. Ramos does not challenge the Commission’s legal authority to
    enact its rule adopting the Utah Guidelines, we need not reach this
    issue. Instead, we assume in this opinion that the rule adopting the
    Utah Guidelines is a valid exercise of the Commission’s authority
    and note that any valid rule carries the force and effect of any law
    passed by the legislature. See
    id. § 63G-3-202(2). 6
                               Cite as: 
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                              Opinion of the Court
    Mr. Ramos’s constitutional arguments. Mr. Ramos appealed to the
    court of appeals, which then certified the matter to this court under
    Utah Code section 78A-4-103(3) and rule 43 of the Utah Rules of
    Appellate Procedure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
    section 78A-3-102(3)(b).
    Standard of Review
    ¶17 We have “jurisdiction to review all final agency action
    resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.”15 We may “grant
    relief” to individuals “seeking judicial review” if they are
    “substantially prejudiced” because an “agency action, or the statute
    or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on
    its face or as applied”16 or because “the agency has erroneously
    interpreted or applied the law.”17 “A person is ‘substantially
    prejudiced’ when the agency’s erroneous interpretation or
    application is not harmless. We review that agency’s interpretation
    or application of the law for correctness.”18
    Analysis
    ¶18 Mr. Ramos challenges his permanent partial disability
    compensation award. He argues that the Commission’s process for
    determining benefits is unconstitutional, and that the
    administrative law judge should have increased his compensation
    award based on his continued, subjective pain.19
    ¶19 Mr. Ramos argues that the Commission’s process for
    determining     permanent       partial    disability  benefits    is
    unconstitutional. First, he argues that the adjudicative authority of
    administrative law judges has been unconstitutionally delegated to
    medical panels. But because administrative law judges retain the
    __________________________________________________________
    15   UTAH CODE § 63G-4-403(1).
    16
    Id. § 63G-4-403(4)(a). 17
      Id. § 63G-4-403(4)(d).
    18 
     Petersen v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 
    2017 UT 87
    , ¶ 8, 
    416 P.3d 583
    (citation omitted).
    19In his opening brief, Mr. Ramos raised an additional issue on
    appeal. He argued that the medical panel improperly applied the
    Utah Guidelines in determining his impairment rating. But in his
    reply brief, he states that he “acknowledges that Respondents’
    argument [on this point] has significant merit” and he “withdraws
    it.”
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    RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    power to determine permanent partial disability benefits under the
    WCA, we conclude that their authority to adjudicate workers’
    compensation claims has not been unconstitutionally delegated to
    medical panels.
    ¶20 Second, Mr. Ramos raises a number of other constitutional
    arguments, asserting that the methods established in the Utah
    Guidelines for determining impairment ratings are arbitrary and
    fail to achieve the legislative purpose of the WCA. But these
    arguments are inadequately briefed, so we decline to address them
    on their merits.
    ¶21 In addition to Mr. Ramos’s constitutional arguments, he
    argues that the administrative law judge failed to properly consider
    subjective pain in determining his impairment rating. But
    administrative law judges cannot augment impairment ratings in
    the way he suggests, because the Utah Guidelines do not allow for
    consideration of a claimant’s subjective pain.
    ¶22 Finally, we note that Cobblestone argues that Mr. Ramos’s
    claims are moot, and we therefore need not address them.
    According to Cobblestone, Mr. Ramos’s claims are moot because he
    does not challenge the medical panel’s assigned impairment rating
    on appeal. But Mr. Ramos’s claims are not moot because, were he
    to prevail on any of his claims, he could be entitled to a new hearing
    and a new determination of benefits before an administrative law
    judge, so the parties’ rights could be affected by this appeal. In
    other words, if the adjudicative authority of the administrative law
    judge was unconstitutionally delegated to a medical panel (as
    Mr. Ramos argues it was), the judge erred in admitting the medical
    panel’s report into evidence and relying on its findings in her final
    determination. And if the methods for determining impairment
    ratings under the Utah Guidelines are unconstitutional, the
    administrative law judge erred in relying on them to calculate
    Mr. Ramos’s compensation award. Additionally, if the Utah
    Guidelines permit the administrative law judge to augment
    Mr. Ramos’s impairment rating based on his subjective pain, the
    administrative law judge erred in determining that she did not
    have the authority to grant his request. Any of these errors could
    result in a remand for a new determination. Because mootness is a
    threshold determination, we address this argument before
    addressing Mr. Ramos’s claims.
    I. Mr. Ramos’s Appeal is Not Moot
    ¶23 Before we address the merits of Mr. Ramos’s claims, we
    must first address Cobblestone’s assertion that this case is moot.
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                            Opinion of the Court
    Cobblestone argues the case is moot because Mr. Ramos does not
    challenge the medical panel’s assigned impairment rating on
    appeal. But because Mr. Ramos could have been entitled to a new
    hearing and a new determination of benefits before the
    Commission were we to rule in his favor on any of his claims, the
    parties’ rights could be affected by this appeal. As a result, his
    appeal is not moot.
    ¶24 “An issue on appeal is considered moot when the
    requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.”20
    If, during an appeal, the circumstances or facts of a case “change or
    develop,” such that “an actual controversy” no longer exists, then
    the case is moot. 21
    ¶25 In this case, Cobblestone argues an “actual controversy”
    no longer exists because Mr. Ramos does not challenge the medical
    panel’s 1-percent-whole-body impairment rating based on its
    application of the Utah Guidelines to the facts of his case. But
    although Mr. Ramos has not challenged the medical panel’s report
    and 1 percent impairment rating on appeal, he requests that this
    court vacate the Commission’s final order upholding the
    administrative law judge’s decision and instruct her to augment the
    medical panel’s 1 percent impairment rating to 4 percent based on
    her findings that he continues to experience subjective pain and
    that pain limits his daily activities. And he asserts that he is entitled
    to this relief because (1) the Commission, through administrative
    law judges, has unconstitutionally delegated to medical panels its
    authority to determine WCA compensation; and (2) the methods
    for determining impairment ratings under the Utah Guidelines are
    unconstitutional. These arguments are not moot.
    ¶26 Were we to rule that the adjudicative authority of
    administrative law judges has been unconstitutionally delegated to
    medical panels, then the judge erred in admitting the medical
    panel’s report into evidence and improperly adopted its assigned
    impairment rating in her final order. Additionally, were we to rule
    that the methods for determining impairment ratings under the
    Utah Guidelines violate any of the federal or Utah constitutional
    provisions that Mr. Ramos cites, then the judge similarly erred in
    __________________________________________________________
    20 State v. Sims, 
    881 P.2d 840
    , 841 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    21Salt Lake County v. Holliday Water Co., 
    2010 UT 45
    , ¶¶ 18–21,
    
    234 P.3d 1105
    .
    9
    RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    admitting and relying on the medical panel’s report because the
    findings are based on the methods outlined under those
    Guidelines. Finally, if the administrative law judge was permitted,
    under the Guidelines, to augment Mr. Ramos’s impairment rating
    based on his subjective pain, she erred in determining that she did
    not have the authority to do so. Because Mr. Ramos could be
    entitled to a new hearing and a new determination of benefits
    before the Commission were we to rule in his favor on any of his
    claims, the parties’ rights could be affected by this appeal. As a
    result, his appeal is not moot.
    II. The Labor Commission’s Process for Determining Permanent
    Partial Disability Benefits is Constitutional
    ¶27 Mr. Ramos argues the Commission’s process for
    determining       permanent     partial    disability   benefits   is
    unconstitutional. First, he argues that the Commission’s
    administrative law judges’ authority to adjudicate permanent
    partial disability claims is unconstitutionally delegated to medical
    panels. According to Mr. Ramos, this authority is delegated by
    generally allowing medical panels to make credibility
    determinations, and in his case, when the medical panel made a
    determination about his “subjective experience” of pain.
    Additionally, he argues the medical panel should not have been
    permitted to categorize the severity of his injury—that only the
    administrative law judge has the authority to do so. Because he
    believes the medical panel exceeded its proper role in this case (by
    allegedly acting as the “ultimate finder of fact”), Mr. Ramos
    contends the panel’s report should not have been admitted into
    evidence. We hold that under the Commission’s process for
    determining disability, the adjudicative responsibility of
    administrative law judges has not been unconstitutionally
    delegated to medical panels. Medical panels merely assist
    administrative law judges in exercising their authority to
    adjudicate WCA claims. Additionally, in permitting the use of
    medical panels in the adjudication process, the legislature has
    provided a procedure for parties to challenge the admission of a
    medical panel’s report into evidence.
    ¶28 Mr. Ramos makes a number of other constitutional
    arguments, asserting that the methods for determining impairment
    ratings under the Utah Guidelines are arbitrary, “grossly fail[] to
    advance the WCA’s goals,” and “den[y] injured workers equal
    protection under the law, and adequate procedural and substantive
    due process.” He also asserts they violate the Labor and Open
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                           Opinion of the Court
    Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution. He argues this is the case
    because workers are left without an adequate remedy due to the
    gross under-compensation resulting from the methods established
    in the Guidelines. But because Mr. Ramos has inadequately briefed
    these claims, we do not reach their merits.
    A. Medical Panels Do Not Perform an Administrative Law Judge’s
    Quasi-Judicial Function Because They Merely Assist the Judge in
    Determining Permanent Partial Disability Benefits
    ¶29 Mr. Ramos argues that medical panels unconstitutionally
    serve as the final arbiter of permanent partial disability claims. He
    acknowledges, however, that the Commission’s administrative law
    judges may, but are not required to, adopt a medical panel’s report
    assigning an impairment rating. Still, he argues that the
    adjudicative authority of administrative law judges has been
    unconstitutionally delegated because, in practice, the medical
    panel’s assessment is never rejected.22 But even if Mr. Ramos is
    correct, this does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of
    the administrative law judges’ quasi-judicial function to a medical
    panel.
    ¶30 As already discussed, the Utah Legislature has delegated
    adjudicative authority to the Commission, allowing it to determine
    compensation awards pursuant to the WCA.23 The Commission’s
    __________________________________________________________
    22Mr. Ramos provides no evidence on this point. In fact, as the
    Utah Court of Appeals has indicated, if, after a party’s objection, an
    administrative law judge fails to make a determination that the
    medical panel’s report is supported by “substantial evidence,” it
    would be an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Foye v. Labor Comm’n, 
    2018 UT App 124
    , ¶¶ 24–26, 
    428 P.3d 26
    (holding that there must be a
    “reasonable basis” in the record for an administrative law judge’s
    decision to admit a medical panel’s report after an objection).
    23 See UTAH CODE § 34A-1-301 (“The commission has the duty
    and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the
    facts and apply the law in [the WCA].”). We note that Mr. Ramos
    does not challenge the legislature’s delegation of adjudicative
    authority to the Commission, only the alleged further delegation
    from the Commission to medical panels. In Vega v. Jordan Valley
    Medical Center, LP, we were asked to determine whether the
    legislature’s delegation of adjudicative authority to an
    administrative agency was unconstitutional. 
    2019 UT 35
    , ¶ 15, 449
    (Continued)
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    Division of Adjudication is assigned to adjudicate WCA claims,24
    and employs administrative law judges to serve as the arbiter of
    such claims.25 When the Commission, through its administrative
    law judges, acts in this quasi-judicial role, it cannot delegate its
    adjudicative authority without running afoul of article VIII of the
    Utah Constitution. 26 But this court has determined that the
    adjudicative function does not “include functions that are generally
    designed to assist courts, such as conducting fact finding hearings
    . . . and making recommendations to judges.”27 So a non-judicial
    body, including medical panels, may assist in an ultimate
    fact-finding role without running afoul of article VIII.
    ¶31 In this case, Mr. Ramos claims that medical panels serve as
    the “ultimate fact-finder,” rather than merely assisting the
    administrative law judge. As a result, he argues that a judge’s
    authority has been unconstitutionally delegated in violation of
    __________________________________________________________
    P.3d 31. In that case, we determined that the legislature’s
    delegation of authority to a prelitigation panel, which determined
    whether a medical malpractice claim had merit and could be filed
    in district court
    , id. ¶ 4,
    was an unconstitutional delegation of the
    “core judicial power,”
    id. ¶ 15,
    because the panel’s decision was
    final and unappealable.
    Id. ¶ 13.
        Mr. Ramos has not challenged the legislature’s delegation of
    adjudicative authority to the Commission to determine WCA
    benefits. As a result, we do not address the delegation of authority
    in the first instance, only the Commission’s further delegation to
    medical panels.
    24  UTAH CODE § 34A-1-302(1)(a) (providing that the
    Commission’s “presiding officer” shall “conduct hearings and
    adjudicative proceedings” when a claim “is filed with the Division
    of Adjudication”).
    25See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 34A-2-801(2)(a) (referring to an
    administrative law judge’s ability to hear cases filed with the
    Commission’s Division of Adjudication).
    26 Vega, 
    2019 UT 35
    , ¶ 15. Article VIII, section I of the Utah
    Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial power of the state shall be
    vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction
    known as the district court, and in such other courts as the
    Legislature by statute may establish.”
    27   Vega, 
    2019 UT 35
    , ¶ 15.
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                             Opinion of the Court
    article VIII. But because medical panels do not serve as the ultimate
    fact-finder, the adjudicative authority of administrative law judges
    has not been unconstitutionally delegated. We so conclude because
    (1) medical panel recommendations are only one part of the overall
    process of adjudication of benefits; (2) the WCA’s statutory
    structure allows parties to challenge a medical panel’s
    recommendation; and (3) the administrative law judge retains the
    discretion to reject the medical panel’s recommendation.
    ¶32 A medical panel’s impairment rating is often only one of
    multiple factors in a disability compensation award
    determination.28 This is because “[i]mpairment is not equivalent to
    disability.”29 Under the WCA, an impairment is “a purely medical
    condition reflecting an anatomical or functional abnormality or
    loss.”30 Under the Commission’s methods as set forth in the Utah
    Guidelines, a medical panel “converts medical information about
    permanent losses into numerical values.”31 These numerical values
    are referred to as impairment ratings.32 In contrast, a disability is
    “an administrative determination that may result in an entitlement
    to compensation as a consequence of [a worker] becoming
    medically impaired as to function.”33
    ¶33 When an injured worker applies for disability benefits and
    is unable to perform the pre-injury job as a result of an impairment,
    the administrative law judge considers more than the injured
    worker’s impairment and corresponding impairment rating in her
    final determination: she must also determine what alternative
    employment and earning capacity is possible.34 So evidence of an
    __________________________________________________________
    28 We note, however, that in some cases, based on the
    circumstances presented, the medical panel’s impairment rating
    will be the only factual finding an administrative law judge must
    make.
    29   Utah Guidelines § 1.1b (emphasis omitted).
    30   UTAH CODE § 34A-2-102(i).
    31   Utah Guidelines § 1.0a.
    32
    Id. 33
      UTAH CODE § 34A-2-102(f).
    34But if an injured worker is able to perform the pre-injury job,
    or has found an alternate career with the same earning capacity,
    then an administrative law judge considers only the permanent
    (Continued)
    13
    RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    impairment, including the corresponding impairment rating, may
    only be one factor in the administrative law judge’s determination
    of disability benefits.
    ¶34 The Utah Guidelines provide the following example to
    illustrate this point:
    “A piano player losing a little finger would be rated
    at 5% . . . whole person impairment. He/she may also
    be rated as 100% disabled for the preinjury
    occupation, and 50% disabled from the loss of
    earning capacity (because there are other related
    careers). A physician could lose the same finger, be
    rated at 5% whole person impairment, and yet have
    little or no impact on his/her earning capacity.”35
    And so the medical panel’s assessment and assignment of an
    impairment rating, which it provides to an administrative law
    judge in a report that may be admitted into evidence, is just one
    element of the total determination of a compensation award under
    the WCA.
    ¶35 In addition to assisting in determining an impairment
    rating, which is one part of an administrative law judge’s
    determination of disability benefits, a medical panel provides
    “medical evidence”36 of an impairment by submitting a report. But
    like the medical panel’s determination of an impairment rating, this
    assistance does not unconstitutionally usurp the administrative
    law judge’s authority because this evidence is not conclusive in any
    determination of disability benefits.37 Not only may parties submit
    their own evidence of an impairment and corresponding
    impairment rating, but they may also challenge a medical panel’s
    report through written objection.38 After an objection, the
    __________________________________________________________
    impairment in determining an award. See Utah Guidelines § 1.1b
    (defining an “impairment rating” as “[m]easuring the permanent
    residual losses secondary to the injury” and “disability rating” as
    “establishing the worker’s capability”).
    35   Utah Guidelines § 1.1b.
    36   UTAH CODE § 34A-2-412(6)(a).
    37
    Id. § 34A-2-601(2)(e)(i). 38
      Id. § 34A-2-601(2)(d)(ii).
    14
    
                                Cite as: 
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                               Opinion of the Court
    administrative law judge may hold a hearing.39 And, if a party
    makes the proper “good cause” showing in their written objection,
    the judge “may order” that the chair or a member of the panel “be
    present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination.”40
    So parties have the opportunity to provide their own evidence,
    challenge the report and point to the “substantial conflicting
    evidence” on the record, and then examine members of the panel
    at a hearing.41
    ¶36 Because parties have the opportunity to challenge the
    medical panel’s report and offer their own evidence, an
    administrative law judge must make a final determination about
    the admissibility of the panel’s report as evidence. Administrative
    law judges cannot admit the challenged medical panel’s report into
    evidence unless they determine that the panel’s findings can be
    supported by other evidence in the record.42 Thus, in general, the
    medical panel’s involvement does not unconstitutionally usurp the
    authority of the administrative law judge. Nor did it do so in this
    case.
    ¶37 In this case, the amount of Mr. Ramos’s disability award
    turned on the extent of his impairment following his workplace
    injury. In order to show that he experienced a permanent
    impairment, he provided evidence from his treating physical
    therapist. His physical therapist determined that Mr. Ramos “had
    a 6 [percent] whole person impairment rating.” In contrast,
    Cobblestone’s physician conducted a medical examination and
    determined that “there was no objective evidence to support that
    [Mr. Ramos] had any impairment.”
    __________________________________________________________
    39
    Id. § 34A-2-601(2)(f). 40
      Id.
    41 
    Id. § 34A-2-601(2)(e)(ii). Additionally, 
    a party may appeal an
    administrative law judge’s decision to assign a medical panel and
    her decision to admit its report. In other words, the administrative
    law judge is not the final arbiter of WCA claims. First, a claimant
    may appeal to the Commission’s Appeals Board, which then enters
    a final decision in the administrative proceedings. See UTAH CODE
    §§ 34A-2-801(4), 63G-4-301. Second, the claimant may appeal the
    agency’s final decision to the courts, pursuant to Utah Code
    section 63G-4-403.
    42
    Id. § 34A-2-601(2)(g)(ii). 15
                       RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶38 Because the parties’ provided conflicting medical
    evidence, the administrative law judge appointed a medical
    panel.43 That panel diagnosed Mr. Ramos with lower extremity
    painful organic syndrome, and it concluded that Mr. Ramos’s
    injury—based on his limitations, the degree of swelling, the type of
    impact,    and   the    level    of    his   fall—constituted      a
    1-percent-whole-person impairment rating under the Utah
    Guidelines.
    ¶39 Mr. Ramos objected to the panel’s findings and its
    assigned impairment rating by filing a written objection. He argued
    the panel “rel[ied] on findings of fact not set forth in the Court’s
    interim order” and failed to consider Mr. Ramos’s “diminished . . .
    ability to exercise, work, and travel” in determining his impairment
    rating. He submitted a declaration outlining his limitations
    resulting from his workplace injury. After a hearing on the matter,
    the administrative law judge asked the medical panel to review
    Mr. Ramos’s declaration and submit a supplemental report.
    ¶40 After reviewing Mr. Ramos’s declaration, the medical
    panel did not increase the assigned impairment rating. This was
    because Mr. Ramos’s “knee [was] fully functional,” with “full
    extension on exam as well as intact ligaments.” The panel
    acknowledged that Mr. Ramos continued to experience pain and
    that the pain interfered with “some” of his activities, including his
    employment. But it was “unable to explain” Mr. Ramos’s
    continued pain and concluded that Mr. Ramos’s declaration,
    outlining his subjective pain but offering no objective medical
    evidence, did not change the impairment rating under the Utah
    Guidelines. The panel provided the administrative law judge with
    a supplemental report, outlining these findings.
    ¶41 Mr. Ramos objected to the panel’s supplemental report. He
    made four assertions that he argues should have increased his
    impairment rating. First, he claimed the trestle “rotated in an arc”
    before falling on his knee, which was contrary to the medical
    panel’s conclusion that his injury was the result of a unidirectional
    force. But the administrative law judge concluded that Mr. Ramos’s
    assertion about the trestle’s movement was not relevant to the
    categorization of the mechanism for injury. And she noted there
    was “no evidence” that Mr. Ramos’s “knee twisted or
    hyperextended” after the impact or that the impact caused him to
    __________________________________________________________
    43   UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 602-2-2(A) (2019).
    16
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                           Opinion of the Court
    “fall from height” such that it would increase the assigned
    categorization of his “mechanism for injury” under the Utah
    Guidelines. Because there was no conflicting evidence on this
    point, the administrative law judge concurred with the medical
    panel’s characterization of the mechanism of Mr. Ramos’s injury.
    ¶42 Mr. Ramos’s second and third objections relate to the
    panel’s alleged failure to define terms that it used in categorizing
    his injury. He asserts that the panel did not define “mild” or
    “moderate” swelling, which relates to his initial presenting signs of
    injury, or distinguish between “minimal,” “moderate,” or
    “significant” radiological findings. As a result, Mr. Ramos
    contends that the administrative law judge could not
    independently categorize Mr. Ramos’s initial presentation of his
    injury or radiological findings. As to this point, the administrative
    law judge noted that Mr. Ramos’s x-ray, taken the day he was
    injured, noted “mild swelling,” a mild initial presenting injury, and
    an “external joint” injury, a minimal to moderate radiological
    finding under the Utah Guidelines. And the judge noted that
    Mr. Ramos did not provide contrary evidence to support finding
    something more than a categorization of “mild” swelling or “mild”
    to “moderate” radiological findings. Because there was no
    conflicting evidence on this point, the administrative law judge
    concurred with the medical panel’s characterization of these two
    factors.
    ¶43 Finally, Mr. Ramos objected because the medical panel
    focused on his limitations at work, rather than the limitations he
    experiences in his daily activities, when it categorized his pain as
    interfering with “some” but not “most” of his daily activities. The
    judge reviewed the evidence provided and agreed with Mr. Ramos
    that he cannot “walk, run, or sit as comfortably” as he did before
    the injury. But the judge noted that Mr. Ramos’s pain does not
    impact his ability to sleep or work full-time. And so as a result, the
    administrative law judge agreed that this constituted “some” but
    not “most” of Mr. Ramos’s daily activities and adopted the panel’s
    categorization of Mr. Ramos’s limitations on this point.
    ¶44 As this review of the administrative law judge’s findings
    shows, the judge thoroughly reviewed each of Mr. Ramos’s
    objections. The judge made an independent ruling on each
    objection after reviewing the evidence and finding that all evidence
    supported the medical panel’s report. And the judge ultimately
    rejected Mr. Ramos’s objections, agreeing with the medical panel’s
    rationale and corresponding impairment rating, which were made
    17
    RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    in accordance with the Utah Guidelines. For this reason, the judge
    admitted the report into evidence and awarded benefits that were
    consistent with its findings. So contrary to Mr. Ramos’s assertion,
    it was the judge, and not the medical panel, who exercised
    adjudicative authority throughout the proceedings.
    ¶45 In sum, an impairment rating is only one element of a
    disability benefit award, the statutory structure allows a party to
    challenge a medical panel’s report, and an administrative law judge
    must make a final determination about the admissibility and
    reliability of the report. Accordingly, we conclude that under the
    Commission’s process for determining impairment ratings, the
    adjudicative authority of administrative law judges is not
    unconstitutionally delegated to medical panels.
    B. Mr. Ramos’s Other Constitutional Claims Asserting That The
    Methods For Determining Impairment Ratings Under The Utah
    Guidelines Violate Several Provisions of The Federal and Utah
    Constitutions Are Inadequately Briefed
    ¶46 Mr. Ramos makes several other constitutional arguments
    challenging the methods for determining an impairment rating
    under the Utah Guidelines. According to Mr. Ramos, the methods
    provided by the Utah Guidelines are arbitrary, “grossly fail[] to
    advance the WCA’s goals,” and “den[y] injured workers equal
    protection under the law, and adequate procedural and substantive
    due process.” He also asserts that they violate the Labor and Open
    Courts Clauses of the Utah Constitution because workers are
    without an adequate remedy due to the gross under-compensation
    provided by the methods established in the Utah Guidelines. But
    because Mr. Ramos has inadequately briefed these constitutional
    claims, we do not reach their merits.
    ¶47 Under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a
    party’s arguments must “explain, with reasoned analysis
    supported by citations to legal authority and the record, why [he or
    she] should prevail”44 “with respect to the issues.”45 In other words,
    we require that parties adequately brief issues they raise on appeal.
    This allows us to properly evaluate a case on its merits. Our rule 24
    standard for adequate briefing is “subjective” and we have
    __________________________________________________________
    44   UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(8).
    45 State v. Roberts, 
    2015 UT 24
    , ¶ 18, 
    345 P.3d 1226
    (citation
    omitted).
    18
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                               Opinion of the Court
    discretion to “disregard or strike briefs that do not comply with
    rule 24’s substantive requirements.”46 So while it is within our
    discretion to reach the merits of an argument that is inadequately
    briefed, a party that fails to meet rule 24’s “requirements will likely
    fail to persuade the court of the validity of their position.”47
    ¶48 When a party argues that a statute or rule violates
    provisions of the federal and Utah Constitutions, the “[m]ere
    mention of a constitutional right, phrase, or principle does not raise
    a constitutional claim.”48 In addition to “identify[ing] the provision
    allegedly infringed,” a party must “develop an argument as to how
    that provision has been violated” to meet rule 24’s standards.49 As
    we have previously explained, “[a] party may not simply point
    toward a pile of sand and expect the court to build a castle. . . . [T]he
    development of an argument is a party’s responsibility, not a
    judicial duty.”50
    ¶49 With these principles in mind, we hold that Mr. Ramos’s
    other constitutional arguments challenging the methods
    established in the Utah Guidelines are inadequately briefed.
    Although he identifies several federal and state constitutional
    provisions, he fails to point us to authority interpreting them. In
    addition, he fails to develop a coherent argument, based on the
    facts of his case, as to how these constitutional provisions were
    violated. For example, in his opening brief, Mr. Ramos does not cite
    any authority interpreting the Due Process Clauses of the United
    States or Utah Constitutions, Equal Protection Clause of the United
    States Constitution, or the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of
    the Utah Constitution. And while he points us to one case
    interpreting the Open Courts Clause, he does not track the proper
    __________________________________________________________
    46
    Id. 47
     Id.; see also Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 
    2017 UT 2
    , ¶¶ 11–13, 
    391 P.3d 196
    (stating that “our analysis” of whether an appellant
    adequately briefed an issue is “focused on the ultimate question of
    whether the appellant has established a [sufficient argument for
    ruling in its favor]—and not on whether there is a technical
    deficiency in [briefing] meriting a default.” (alteration in original)
    (citation omitted)).
    48   Salt Lake City v. Kidd, 
    2019 UT 4
    , ¶ 35, 
    435 P.3d 248
    .
    49   Amundsen v. Univ. of Utah, 
    2019 UT 4
    9, ¶ 47, 
    448 P.3d 1224
    .
    50
    Id. (citation omitted). 19
                      RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    analysis for such a claim and fails to develop an argument as to
    how this provision was violated. His bare assertions—that the
    methods established by the Utah Guidelines are “arbitrary” and
    “discriminatory” and, as a result, unconstitutional—are not
    developed within the context of relevant case law interpreting the
    constitutional provisions he claims were violated.51 His failure to
    provide relevant case law and to develop an argument based on
    that law leaves us with the task of developing the contours of these
    important constitutional arguments. We decline to do so.52
    ¶50 We also note that, to the extent we can discern Mr. Ramos’s
    arguments, they appear to lack merit. For example, he makes broad
    assertions that the methods established in the Utah Guidelines are
    arbitrary and fail to relate to the purpose of the WCA, which is to
    compensate workers for a loss of his or her employability due to a
    __________________________________________________________
    51Id. (“Appending the term ‘unconstitutional’ to an argument
    adds nothing to it.”).
    52 We note that in his reply brief, Mr. Ramos attempts to comply
    with our briefing requirements by providing some additional
    citations to authority. But these additional citations do not cure his
    briefing defects because he still does not develop a “reasoned
    analysis” that is “supported by citations” to the appropriate “legal
    authority.” UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(8); cf. U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen.,
    Inc., 
    1999 UT App 303
    , ¶ 57 n.7, 
    990 P.2d 945
    (addressing an
    appellant’s arguments because the reply brief “adequately
    address[ed] the issue” “initial[ly]” raised in the opening brief, and
    so did not catch appellees by “total surprise”).
    We also note that Mr. Ramos raises some issues for the first time
    in his reply brief, a practice we have consistently rejected because
    it leaves the appellee without an opportunity to respond. See, e.g.,
    State v. Weaver, 
    2005 UT 49
    , ¶ 19, 
    122 P.3d 566
    . For example,
    Mr. Ramos asserts for the first time in his reply brief that he is in a
    “protected class” as a laborer, and under the federal Equal
    Protection Clause, he is entitled to a higher standard of review. He
    also asserts, for the first time in his reply brief, that his right to
    “have an adequate redress for his damages” as a result of his
    workplace injury is a fundamental right under the federal Due
    Process Clause. In his opening brief, Mr. Ramos did not identify
    any standard of review for his constitutional claims. And so his
    assertion that he is entitled to a heightened standard of review fails
    to give the appellees an opportunity to respond. See Allen v. Friel,
    
    2008 UT 56
    , ¶ 8, 
    194 P.3d 903
    .
    20
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                           Opinion of the Court
    workplace injury. But the Utah Guidelines provide a uniform
    method of diagnosis based on medical evidence, which is then
    converted to a numerical value, allowing administrative law judges
    to provide an award that is proportionate to the schedule listed in
    Utah Code section 34A-2-412(4). Mr. Ramos has not provided
    evidence or an adequate explanation for how these methods for
    diagnosing impairments and assigning impairment ratings are
    arbitrary.53
    ¶51 Mr. Ramos also raises a challenge under the Open Courts
    Clause.54 He seems to suggest that under the Utah Guidelines’
    allegedly arbitrary methods for assigning impairment ratings,
    injured workers receive inadequate compensation. And this
    inadequate compensation violates the Open Courts Clause.55 But
    __________________________________________________________
    53 We note that Mr. Ramos is not without remedy to address his
    policy concerns regarding the methods established in the Utah
    Guidelines. Under the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, he
    may petition the Commission to enact, amend, or repeal a rule,
    UTAH CODE § 63G-3-601(2), including the rule adopting the Utah
    Guidelines. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 612-300-9 (2019). The
    Commission must respond to such a petition within sixty days and
    state its reasons for either denying the request or initiating
    rulemaking proceedings. UTAH CODE § 63G-3-601(5). If the agency
    “has not provided the petitioner written notice that [it] has denied
    the petition or initiated rulemaking proceedings within the time
    limitations” provided in the statute, the petitioner “may seek a writ
    of mandamus in state district court.”
    Id. § 63G-3-601(7). 54“All
    courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
    to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
    due course of law . . . .” UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11.
    55  The Open Courts Clause “provides a substantive check
    against legislative power by impos[ing] some limitation on the
    legislature’s great latitude in defining, changing, and modernizing
    the law.” Petersen v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 
    2017 UT 87
    , ¶ 20, 
    416 P.3d 583
    (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). When a party challenges legislative action—like
    the WCA—and alleges that it abrogated a previously existing right,
    we proceed with a two-step analysis.
    Under this two-step analysis, a party must first “show that [a]
    previously existing right or remedy has been abrogated” by the
    legislature.
    Id. ¶ 23.
    If we determine that the legislature abrogated
    (Continued)
    21
    RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    we have previously determined that, as a whole, the benefits
    provided by the WCA are an adequate substitute remedy for the
    legislature’s abrogation of an injured worker’s remedy in tort
    against his or her employer under the Open Courts Clause.56
    Mr. Ramos has not asked us to overrule our prior precedent. And
    he fails to provide any reason to distinguish the facts of his case
    from our prior decision.
    ¶52 In sum, we do not reach the merits of Mr. Ramos’s other
    constitutional arguments challenging the methods established in
    the Utah Guidelines for determining impairment ratings because
    they are inadequately briefed. But we do note that Mr. Ramos may
    address his policy concerns regarding the Utah Guidelines with the
    Commission, using the methods provided under the Utah
    Administrative Rulemaking Act.
    __________________________________________________________
    an existing right or remedy, we must then consider whether the
    legislature provided a substitute for the existing right or remedy,
    or had a valid purpose in abrogating it without establishing a
    substitute right or remedy.
    Id. ¶ 29.
    If the legislature substituted the
    abrogated right or remedy with a new set of rights or remedies, we
    must determine whether this substitution is “an effective and
    reasonable alternative.”
    Id. ¶ 28.
    And if the legislature did not
    provide a substitute set of rights or remedies, we must determine
    whether the legislature’s policy decision was “justified” because it
    “eliminated” “a clear social or economic evil.” Berry ex rel. Berry v.
    Beech Aircraft Corp., 
    717 P.2d 670
    , 680 (Utah 1985). We must also
    ensure that, in eliminating such an evil, the legislature did not act
    in an “arbitrary or unreasonable” manner.
    Id. 56
    In Petersen v. Utah Labor Commission, an injured worker
    challenged the Commission’s determination that a statute of repose
    barred his claim, filed more than eight years after he was injured at
    work, for temporary total disability. 
    2017 UT 87
    , ¶ 1. We
    determined that an injured worker’s common law remedy in tort
    was abrogated by the legislature when it created the WCA.
    Id. ¶ 28.
    But we concluded that the legislature’s policy decision to replace
    injured workers’ common law remedy in tort against their
    employers with the WCA’s package of benefits was an adequate
    substitute remedy under the Open Courts Clause.
    Id. ¶ 35.
    This was
    because, as a whole, the WCA provided a comprehensive “no-fault,
    time-limited package of . . . benefits.”
    Id. 22
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                             Opinion of the Court
    III. Mr. Ramos is Not Entitled to an Augmented Impairment
    Rating Based on His Subjective Pain
    ¶53 Mr. Ramos’s argues that the administrative law judge
    erred when she failed to augment his assigned impairment rating
    based on his subjective pain. He asserts that because the
    administrative law judge found that Mr. Ramos continued to
    experience pain that affected both work and non-employment
    activities, she was permitted to increase his impairment rating by 3
    percent. But the Utah Guidelines expressly contradict Mr. Ramos’s
    argument. Under the Utah Guidelines, Mr. Ramos is not entitled to
    a 3-percent augmentation of his impairment rating based on his
    subjective pain.
    ¶54 There are various approaches as to whether an impairment
    rating may be increased based on the claimant’s subjective pain.57
    For example, under the AMA Guidelines, a “rater” may increase a
    claimant’s impairment rating by up to 3 percent based on the
    claimant’s subjective pain that “increase[s] the burden of [the
    claimant’s] condition . . . .“58 As Mr. Ramos notes, this is because
    subjective pain may be “severe and disabling” but “resistant to
    objective proof.” So under the approach outlined in the AMA
    Guidelines, a “rater” has the discretion to increase an impairment
    rating based on a claimant’s subjective pain.
    ¶55 But the Commission has explicitly rejected the AMA
    Guidelines on this point. After having “review[ed] the various
    philosophies” for increasing an impairment rating due to
    “subjective pain,” the Commission adopted a rule prohibiting
    raters from increasing an impairment rating due to a claimant’s
    subjective pain.59 It did so because it determined that allowing for
    increases based on subjective pain would decrease consistency
    among raters and increase “secondary litigation[] and cost.”60
    Accordingly, no claimants in Utah, including Mr. Ramos, are
    __________________________________________________________
    57   See Utah Guidelines § 2.0a.
    58See
    id. (quoting AM. MED.
    ASS’N, THE GUIDES TO                THE
    EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 573 (5th ed. 2001).
    59
    Id. Specifically, the Commission
    determined that “no
    additional award will be calculated for pain . . . for conditions rated
    by” the Utah and AMA Guidelines.
    Id. 60
      Id.
    23
    
                      RAMOS v. COBBLESTONE CENTRE
    Opinion of the Court
    entitled to an increased impairment rating due to their subjective
    pain.61
    ¶56 In sum, the administrative law judge could not have
    augmented the medical panel’s impairment rating based on
    Mr. Ramos’s subjective pain. As a result, he is not entitled to the
    relief he requests.
    Conclusion
    ¶57 We reject Cobblestone’s argument that Mr. Ramos’s
    appeal is moot. Because Mr. Ramos could have been entitled to a
    new hearing and a new determination of benefits before the
    Commission were we to have ruled in his favor on any of his
    claims, the parties’ rights could have been affected by this appeal.
    As a result, his appeal is not moot.
    ¶58 Although Mr. Ramos’s claims are not moot, we do, in fact,
    reject each of them. We reject Mr. Ramos’s arguments that the
    Commission’s process for determining permanent partial disability
    benefits is unconstitutional. First, the adjudicative authority of
    administrative law judges has not been unconstitutionally
    delegated to medical panels because medical panels merely assist
    administrative law judges in their ultimate fact-finding and judges
    are not bound by a medical panel’s report. Second, Mr. Ramos’s
    other constitutional arguments, asserting that the methods
    established in the Utah Guidelines violate various provisions of the
    federal and Utah constitutions, are inadequately briefed.
    Accordingly, we decline to address them.
    ¶59 We also reject Mr. Ramos’s claim that the administrative
    law judge erred in failing to increase his compensation award
    based on subjective pain. The Commission expressly precludes
    administrative law judges from augmenting an impairment rating
    based on a claimant’s subjective pain.
    ¶60 For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the Labor
    Commission.
    __________________________________________________________
    61
    Id. The Commission provides
    three exceptions to this rule,
    none of which applies in Mr. Ramos’s case. See
    id. (permitting an increase
    in an impairment rating due to subjective pain as the result
    of phantom pain from an amputation, “headaches secondary to
    severe head trauma or skull fractures,” and “post paraplegic
    pain”).
    24