Waste Management and Waste Management v. Labor Commission , 293 P.3d 384 ( 2012 )


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  •                           IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    ‐‐‐‐ooOoo‐‐‐‐
    Waste Management and Indemnity               )         MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Insurance of North America,                  )
    )            Case No. 20110450‐CA
    Petitioners,                          )
    )
    v.                                           )                  FILED
    )              (December 6, 2012)
    Labor Commission and Cathie Hartley,         )
    )              
    2012 UT App 339
    Respondents.                          )
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    Original Proceeding in this Court
    Attorneys:      Brad J. Miller, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Petitioners
    Michael G. Belnap, Ogden, for Respondent Cathie Hartley
    Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Labor Commission
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    Before Judges Orme, Thorne, and Roth.
    ORME, Judge:
    ¶1     Petitioners Waste Management and Indemnity Insurance of North America
    (Waste Management) ask us to review the Labor Commission Appeals Board’s decision
    awarding Respondent Cathie Hartley temporary disability compensation and the costs
    of recommended surgery and medical treatment. We decline to disturb the Board’s
    decision.
    ¶2     Hartley was injured when a garbage can containing a large piece of cement fell
    on top of her while she was working as a garbage truck driver for Waste Management.
    As a result of the accident, she sustained injuries to her lower extremities and tailbone.
    Hartley’s injuries were evaluated by Dr. Bean, who recommended a course of treatment
    that included a tailbone excision surgery. She was also evaluated by Dr. Moress, who
    opined that a tailbone excision surgery was not reasonably necessary to treat Hartley’s
    injury. Despite Dr. Moress’s contrary opinion, Dr. Bean maintained that although a
    tailbone excision is a rare procedure, it was necessary given Hartley’s condition.
    ¶3      Hartley requested a hearing before the Utah Labor Commission, claiming that
    she was entitled to “[m]edical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total
    disability compensation, permanent partial disability compensation, travel expenses
    and interest.” Due to the disparate recommendations from Dr. Bean and Dr. Moress, the
    Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) commissioned an independent medical panel to
    examine Hartley. The panel opined that if Hartley decided to forgo the excision
    procedure, her tailbone condition would medically stabilize by July 17, 2007.1 If,
    however, she elected to have the surgery, the panel believed that her condition would
    stabilize approximately six months thereafter. The panel also concluded that Hartley
    was a viable candidate for the excision procedure and deferred to the expertise of Dr.
    Bean “to discuss the [excision] procedure, risks, and possible outcomes.”
    ¶4     After considering the panel’s opinions and conclusions, the ALJ awarded
    Hartley, inter alia, temporary total disability compensation from February 24, 2007, to
    October 29, 2007,2 as well as reasonable expenses for the excision surgery. The Board
    affirmed the ALJ’s order. In its decision, the Board specifically “interpret[ed] the
    1
    Curiously, the ALJ and the Board identified different dates when referring to the
    medical panel’s July 17, 2007 stabilization date. In her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
    Law and Order, the ALJ stated at one point that the panel’s stabilization date was July
    17, 2007, but at another point stated it was June 17, 2007. The Board identified the
    medical panel’s stabilization date as November 2007. The exact date of predicted
    stabilization without surgery does not, ultimately, affect our decision.
    2
    Hartley was unemployed but actively looking for work during this period. On
    February 24, 2007, she had been terminated by Davis County, where she had worked as
    an animal control officer, because as a result of her industrial injury, she was physically
    unable to perform assigned duties such as lifting a dog without assistance. She was
    unemployed until October 30, 2007, when she was hired as an animal control officer for
    Brigham City. That position affords her the opportunity to work with a partner, who
    can assist with heavy lifting.
    20110450‐CA                                  2
    medical panel’s opinion as endorsing the recommended [excision surgery] as necessary
    treatment for Ms. Hartley’s work‐related [tailbone] injury.” By determining that the
    surgery was necessary, the Board necessarily concluded that Hartley did not stabilize
    by July 17, 2007, and will not stabilize until approximately six months after the surgery
    is performed.
    ¶5      In essence, Waste Management’s challenge raises two issues. The first is whether
    the Board incorrectly determined that Hartley would not medically stabilize without
    the tailbone excision surgery. “Stabilization is a factual question to be determined by
    medical evidence contained in the record.” Griffith v. Industrial Comm’n, 
    754 P.2d 981
    ,
    983–84 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). When reviewing factual findings, we will only overturn
    those findings that are “not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
    the whole record before the court.”3 Utah Code Ann. § 63G‐4‐403(4)(g) (LexisNexis
    2011).
    ¶6      Second, Waste Management argues that awarding Hartley temporary disability
    compensation up to October 29, 2007, was improper because Hartley had medically
    stabilized by July 17, 2007. Temporary disability compensation is only available during
    the time that an injured claimant is recuperating from work‐related injuries, up until
    she reaches medical stabilization. See Griffith, 
    754 P.2d at 983
    . That compensation is
    calculated according to specific statutory criteria. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A‐2‐410
    3
    A party challenging the Board’s factual findings must marshal “all of the
    evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in
    light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
    substantial evidence.” Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 
    776 P.2d 63
    , 68 (Utah Ct.
    App. 1989). While Waste Management repeatedly refers to the medical panel’s opinion
    that Hartley would have stabilized without surgery by July 17, 2007, Waste
    Management ignores the fact that the medical panel also believed Hartley to be a viable
    candidate for the surgery and deferred to the expertise of Dr. Bean, who believed that
    the surgery was necessary for Hartley to stabilize. The Board accepted Dr. Bean’s view,
    and this conclusion was the crux of the Board’s decision on the stabilization issue. It is
    Waste Management’s burden to marshal that evidence along with all other “evidence
    supporting the findings.” See 
    id.
     Waste Management, instead, presents only the facts
    most favorable to its own argument, ignoring the ample evidence in the record
    supporting the Board’s stabilization determination.
    20110450‐CA                                 3
    (LexisNexis 2011). Because the Labor Commission Act expressly grants the Board
    discretion in applying the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, see Murray v.
    Labor Comm’n, 
    2012 UT App 33
    , ¶ 15, 
    271 P.3d 192
    , cert. granted, 
    280 P.3d 421
     (Utah
    2012), we review the Board’s award of temporary disability benefits “for an abuse of
    discretion, applying a test of reasonableness and rationality,” see id. ¶ 27.
    ¶7     Waste Management insists that Hartley medically stabilized on July 17, 2007,
    basing its argument entirely on the medical panel’s opinion that without the surgery she
    would stabilize by that date. “Stabilization means that the period of healing has ended
    and the condition of the claimant will not materially improve.” Booms v. Rapp Constr.
    Co., 
    720 P.2d 1363
    , 1366 (Utah 1986). When an injured claimant reaches the point of
    medical stabilization, she is no longer entitled to receive temporary disability benefits.
    See Griffith, 
    754 P.2d at 983
    . As previously indicated, in concluding that Hartley would
    not stabilize without surgery, the Board relied on (1) the medical panel’s opinion that
    the surgery was a viable option and (2) Dr. Bean’s recommendation that Hartley
    undergo the surgery. Thus, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
    Board’s pivotal finding.
    ¶8      After considering Hartley’s “prolonged conservative treatment” and “prolonged
    course of pain,” Dr. Bean recommended the excision surgery and opined that “it might
    significantly help [Hartley’s] ability to sit.” Despite Dr. Moress’s contrary opinion, Dr.
    Bean did not waver in his belief that the procedure offered many potential benefits to
    someone in Hartley’s condition. The medical panel, while acknowledging the rarity of
    the procedure, concluded that Hartley was a viable candidate for excision surgery.
    Moreover, the medical panel explicitly deferred to the expertise of Dr. Bean.
    ¶9      Although consistent with the alternative conclusion that the excision surgery is
    reasonable but not absolutely necessary, this evidence is substantial enough to support
    the Board’s findings that surgery is necessary and that Hartley has not yet stabilized.
    See generally Hurley v. Board of Review, 
    767 P.2d 524
    , 526–27 (Utah 1988) (noting that an
    agency’s findings of fact “are accorded substantial deference and will not be overturned
    if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is
    permissible”). Read together, the medical panel’s findings and Dr. Bean’s
    recommendation indicate that Hartley is an ideal candidate for the surgery and will
    likely continue to experience high levels of discomfort without it. Despite Waste
    Management’s protestations to the contrary, the medical panel’s opinion that
    stabilization would occur on July 17, 2007, without surgery is not conclusive proof of
    20110450‐CA                                 4
    stabilization on that date, especially in light of the medical panel’s approval of and
    deference to Dr. Bean’s expertise and his specific recommendation that the tailbone
    excision surgery be performed. Consequently, we decline to disturb the Board’s
    determination that the excision surgery is necessary and that Hartley will not stabilize
    until six months after the surgery.
    ¶10 Waste Management next asserts that the award of temporary disability benefits
    from February 24, 2007, to October 29, 2007, is improper because Hartley stabilized on
    July 17, 2007.4 Temporary disability compensation “provides an employee with income
    during the time [s]he recuperates from work‐related injuries until [her] condition has
    reached medical stabilization.” Griffith v. Industrial Comm’n, 
    754 P.2d 981
    , 983 (Utah Ct.
    App. 1988). In light of our holding on the stabilization issue, the compensation award
    was not unreasonable.
    4
    Waste Management also challenges the award for anticipated surgical expenses
    because Hartley has not yet had the excision surgery. Waste Management claims that
    this is because she has refused the surgery up to this point. Waste Management
    intimates that Hartley’s refusal is a ploy to continue receiving disability benefits while
    delaying the corrective surgery.
    We have previously refused to adopt a rule excusing the payment of disability
    compensation when circumstances beyond the insurer’s control cause a claimant’s
    surgery to be delayed, see King v. Industrial Comm’n, 
    850 P.2d 1281
    , 1296 (Utah Ct. App.
    1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Murray v. Labor Comm’n, 
    2012 UT App 33
    , ¶¶ 17–18, 
    271 P.3d 192
    , and we see no reason here to excuse payment when
    the insurer may very well be the cause of the delay. Waste Management has not pointed
    to any evidence in the record—likely because there is none—to support its assertions
    that Hartley is at fault for the surgery not having yet occurred. Plenty of contrary record
    evidence exists, however. At the hearing, Hartley testified that she wished to have the
    surgery performed as soon as she obtained approval. In her factual findings, the ALJ
    noted that Hartley has made continual efforts to have the surgery despite Waste
    Management’s refusal to approve the procedure. Indeed, the evidence suggests that
    Waste Management, and not Hartley, is to blame for the fact that Hartley has not yet
    had the surgery, by reason of its continued campaign to have the procedure declared
    unnecessary.
    20110450‐CA                                  5
    ¶11 Because Hartley has not yet medically stabilized and will not until six months
    after the excision surgery, the medical panel’s theorized July 17, 2007 stabilization date
    is not controlling in our analysis of whether the compensation award was appropriate.
    Because of her compromised physical abilities, Hartley was terminated by Davis
    County on February 24, 2007. She actively looked for work from that point until she was
    hired by Brigham City as an animal control officer on October 30, 2007, where she has
    apparently been employed ever since. It appears, therefore, that temporary disability
    compensation was only awarded during the period in which she was unemployed and
    actively seeking work. Given that she did not stabilize at any point during that period,
    it is reasonable and rational to conclude that Hartley was entitled to the compensation
    awarded. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A‐2‐410 (LexisNexis 2011); Griffith, 
    754 P.2d at
    983–84.
    ¶12 In conclusion, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s
    finding that the tailbone excision surgery is necessary and that Hartley will not stabilize
    without it. The Board’s award of temporary disability compensation is both reasonable
    and rational. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Board’s decision.
    ____________________________________
    Gregory K. Orme, Judge
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    ¶13    WE CONCUR:
    ____________________________________
    William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
    ____________________________________
    Stephen L. Roth, Judge
    20110450‐CA                                  6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20110450-CA

Citation Numbers: 2012 UT App 339, 293 P.3d 384

Filed Date: 12/6/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023