State v. Courtney , 424 P.3d 198 ( 2017 )


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    2017 UT App 172
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee,
    v.
    CARL MACK COURTNEY,
    Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20141171-CA
    Filed September 8, 2017
    Second District Court, Ogden Department
    The Honorable Michael D. DiReda
    No. 131900508
    Emily Adams, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and Tera J. Peterson, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
    J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.1
    ORME, Judge:
    ¶1      Defendant Carl Mack Courtney was convicted of drug
    possession with intent to distribute and possession of drug
    paraphernalia. He appeals both convictions, arguing that the
    trial court abused its discretion by admitting impermissible
    character evidence and that he was denied his right to the
    effective assistance of counsel. We conclude that, even in the
    absence of the errors Defendant ascribes to the trial court and his
    1. Judge J. Frederic Voros Jr. participated in this case as a
    member of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court
    before this decision issued.
    State v. Courtney
    trial attorney, the jury would not have returned a different
    verdict. Accordingly, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2      On the morning of August 26, 2010, a police officer was
    patrolling the parking lot of an Ogden apartment complex when
    he noticed a man wandering the lot, “looking in and around
    vehicles.” The officer decided to investigate, as several vehicle
    burglaries had recently been reported in the area. The officer
    asked the man “what was going on.” Defendant responded that
    he was looking for a lost child, but—oddly—he declined the
    officer’s offer to assist in the search. Defendant’s pupils were
    dilated, and he appeared “nervous” and “very fidgety.” At the
    officer’s request, Defendant provided identification and
    permitted the officer to search his person.
    ¶3     During the search, the officer found several items that
    convinced him he had probable cause to arrest Defendant. The
    officer found approximately “60 small Ziploc plastic baggies”
    and a four- to five-inch pocket knife in Defendant’s left-front
    pants pocket. He also found a sheet of paper containing a list of
    names and dollar amounts, which ranged between $40 and $300.
    The officer recognized some of the names on the sheet—among
    them, “Half Pint,” “Truck,” and “Pops”—as belonging to
    individuals he had dealt with during previous narcotics
    investigations. He would later testify that the paper appeared to
    be an “owe sheet” and that he knew from his training and
    experience that distributors of narcotics often used such lists to
    keep track of “who owes you what.”
    ¶4     After he was taken into custody, Defendant requested
    that his then-girlfriend be informed of his arrest. The girlfriend,
    who resided at the apartment complex where the arrest took
    place, was watching Defendant’s daughter at the time. She
    would need to be informed that Defendant would not be driving
    his daughter to her first day of kindergarten that morning.
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    State v. Courtney
    ¶5      The officer agreed to inform the girlfriend of the situation
    and called for backup to assist him. When backup arrived, the
    officer left Defendant in the custody of another police officer
    while he and a third officer proceeded to meet with the
    girlfriend. After assuring the officers that she would get
    Defendant’s daughter to school on time, the girlfriend agreed to
    answer their questions about Defendant. She told them that
    Defendant had borrowed her car the day before and that he had
    driven it back to her apartment earlier that morning. She then
    agreed to allow the officers to search the car.
    ¶6      Inside the car the officers found a “black zip-up pouch”
    resting on top of a “blue and black zip-up sweatshirt.” Inside the
    pouch they found a “hypodermic needle” and a “plastic baggy
    containing a white crystal substance,” which the Utah State
    Crime Lab later confirmed to be methamphetamine. The officer
    later testified that the girlfriend, without being told of the
    contents of the pouch, informed him that the pouch belonged to
    Defendant and that she had seen him carrying his identification
    in it a few days earlier. Both the officer and the girlfriend
    testified that the car doors were locked and the windows were
    rolled up just before the search.
    ¶7     The officers questioned Defendant regarding what they
    had discovered in the vehicle. Defendant confirmed that he had
    driven the girlfriend’s car to her apartment that morning, that he
    had been the only one inside the car, and that he kept a
    sweatshirt in the car like the one on which the pouch had been
    found. He denied, however, that the pouch and its contents were
    his. He also told them that he used the Ziploc baggies to store
    coins from his coin collection, but the officers were unable to
    find any coins on Defendant’s person or in the car.2
    2. At oral argument, Defendant’s appellate counsel
    acknowledged that trial counsel introduced neither Defendant’s
    (continued…)
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    State v. Courtney
    ¶8      At the jail, the booking officer conducted an inventory
    search of Defendant’s personal belongings. As was his routine,
    the officer confiscated Defendant’s cell phone, intending to shut
    it off for storage. But before he could, a text message “popped
    through.” It read, “Are you willing to trade glass for a computer
    that hasn’t been tweaked off of[?]”
    ¶9      The State charged Defendant with possession of a
    controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of
    drug paraphernalia. The former is a second degree felony; the
    latter is a class B misdemeanor. See 
    Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37
    -
    8(1)(a)–(b), 58-37a-5(1) (LexisNexis 2016).
    ¶10 Prior to trial, the State filed notice of its intent to introduce
    evidence that Defendant had been convicted of distributing
    methamphetamine in 2012. That conviction, which resulted from
    events that occurred after the events giving rise to the
    convictions at issue in this case,3 involved a recorded sale of
    methamphetamine to a confidential informant in the presence of
    (…continued)
    baggie-encased coin collection nor any testimony concerning his
    numismatic interest, aside from Defendant’s own testimony.
    3. The trial court took note of the fact that, ordinarily,
    introducing evidence of prior bad acts involves putting on
    evidence of acts committed before the events that gave rise to the
    trial in which the evidence is introduced. However, the court did
    not suggest that the State’s attempt to introduce evidence
    relating to Defendant’s 2012 conviction was for that reason
    improper, and Defendant has not argued that the court’s failure
    to exclude the evidence on those grounds was error. Nor would
    such an argument be availing. See, e.g., State v. Lomu, 
    2014 UT App 41
    , ¶¶ 23–25, 
    321 P.3d 243
    .
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    State v. Courtney
    an undercover officer.4 The State sought to introduce evidence of
    the events underlying that conviction, arguing that the evidence
    would show Defendant’s “intent,” “any absence of mistake or
    lack of accident,” and “any motive that he would have for”
    possessing the methamphetamine. Although the trial court
    stated that it did not want to “spend an inordinate amount of
    time re-trying that other case,” it said it would allow the State to
    introduce “basic facts” relating to Defendant’s distribution
    conviction because it found the evidence “extremely probative”
    and not overly prejudicial.
    ¶11 At trial, the officer explained to the jury that based on his
    experience investigating narcotics crimes, the methamphetamine
    he seized from the car amounted to a “distribution quantity.”
    The officer also testified that narcotics dealers typically carry a
    weapon, such as the knife Defendant had been carrying on the
    morning of his arrest, to protect themselves against robbery. The
    officer answered questions regarding the text message the
    booking officer had discovered, explaining that “[g]lass is a
    common reference to methamphetamine” and that “tweaking”
    means “using meth.” Finally, he testified that baggies such as the
    ones Defendant had been carrying are commonly used to
    package and distribute narcotics.
    ¶12 The State also called the girlfriend to testify. She stated
    that the methamphetamine the officer had found in her car did
    not belong to her and that the sweatshirt and black pouch both
    belonged to Defendant. Further, she stated that at various times
    in the past she had seen Defendant store his identification and
    Social Security card in the pouch, as well as methamphetamine.
    She also testified that she had used methamphetamine with
    Defendant, that Defendant had provided the drug to her, and
    that she had seen Defendant sell the drug to others. When asked
    4. We recently vacated Defendant’s 2012 conviction and
    remanded for a new trial due to ineffective assistance by his trial
    counsel. See State v. Courtney, 
    2017 UT App 62
    , ¶ 24.
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    what Defendant used to store and distribute the drug, she
    responded that she had seen him use “little plastic baggies.”
    ¶13 The girlfriend then testified that while Defendant was in
    jail awaiting trial, he called to speak with her about the
    testimony she would be giving and about the black pouch the
    officer had found in her car. The call was recorded, and the State
    played it for the jury. During the recorded conversation,
    Defendant asked the girlfriend whether her windows were
    “down or up” when the officers searched her car. She
    responded, “Pretty sure my car windows were up.” “That’s the
    wrong answer,” he replied. The girlfriend continued to insist she
    was right, but he interjected, “You’re not fucking hearing what
    I’m saying. I know what they were and what they weren’t. . . . If
    they were down, anybody could have fucking threw that thing
    . . . in there. . . . [T]he Mexican people that we had no fucking
    clue who they are could have easily fucking done that[.]”
    ¶14 The girlfriend testified that, in fact, the windows of her
    car had been rolled up on the morning Defendant was arrested.
    She further testified that she had seen no one other than the
    officers standing near the car.
    ¶15 Finally, the State called the undercover officer who took
    part in the controlled buy that led to Defendant’s 2012
    distribution conviction. As the trial court had limited the scope
    of what it would allow with respect to that conviction, the
    undercover officer’s testimony was brief. He told the jury that
    four individuals were in the room where the controlled buy took
    place, that the purchase went forward, and that Defendant was
    later tried and found guilty of distributing methamphetamine.
    ¶16 After the State rested, Defendant took the stand in his
    own defense. He testified that the methamphetamine the officer
    found in the black pouch did not belong to him. He did admit,
    however, that he had struggled with drug addiction throughout
    his life and that he had “relapsed” just two weeks before he was
    arrested. He also admitted that, before trial, he had contacted the
    girlfriend to tell her to “get lost” so that she could not be
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    subpoenaed to testify. Finally, he admitted that, a “long, long,
    long time ago in ’98,” he had gotten “in trouble” for distributing
    narcotics.
    ¶17 Defendant also offered several explanations to rebut the
    State’s evidence against him. First, he testified that the baggies
    the officer found were for storing coins, not narcotics. Second, he
    testified that the text message the booking officer found on his
    cell phone referred literally to glass and not to
    methamphetamine, as he had been asking around for help with
    fixing a broken window. Finally, he claimed that the “owe sheet”
    the officer found in his pocket did not belong to him. Rather, he
    said it belonged to his friend, “Missy,” and that he had been
    collecting on some loans for her when he was arrested.
    Acknowledging that Missy was not in the courtroom and would
    not be testifying on his behalf, Defendant stated that he had not
    seen her in three years and that his attorney “had trouble
    locating her.”
    ¶18 Apparently unmoved by Defendant’s testimony,5 the jury
    returned a guilty verdict on both counts. Defendant appeals.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶19 Defendant raises two arguments on appeal. First, he
    argues that it was error for the trial court to admit evidence of
    his 2012 distribution conviction under Utah Rule of Evidence
    404(b) for the purpose of proving that Defendant intended to
    5. Defendant’s wife, whom he married just prior to trial, also
    testified on his behalf. She testified that Defendant had been
    trying to “trade somebody a computer for a sheet of glass,” that
    she had never seen him carry a black pouch, that she had never
    seen him sell drugs, and that before his arrest he had indeed
    been collecting money on Missy’s behalf. The jury apparently
    did not credit these statements.
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    State v. Courtney
    distribute narcotics in the instant case.6 Generally, we review a
    trial court’s decision to admit evidence under rule 404(b) for an
    abuse of discretion. See State v. Burke, 
    2011 UT App 168
    , ¶ 17, 
    256 P.3d 1102
    . Even if we see error, “we will not overturn the
    defendant’s conviction unless the error was harmful.” State v.
    High, 
    2012 UT App 180
    , ¶ 28, 
    282 P.3d 1046
    .
    ¶20 Second, Defendant maintains that his trial counsel’s
    performance was so deficient that he was denied his right to the
    effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the
    United States Constitution. “A claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of
    law,” which we consider de novo. State v. Charles, 
    2011 UT App 291
    , ¶ 18, 
    263 P.3d 469
    . But even if we conclude that trial
    counsel’s performance was deficient, the claim must fail absent a
    reasonable probability that Defendant would have obtained a
    more favorable outcome but for trial counsel’s blunders. See
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984); State v. Clark,
    
    2004 UT 25
    , ¶ 6, 
    89 P.3d 162
    .
    ANALYSIS
    I. Evidence of Prior Conviction
    ¶21 Defendant maintains that “the lack of similarity” between
    the facts underlying the 2012 conviction and the instant
    circumstances, as well as the “lengthy interval of time between
    the crimes,” are “pivotal factors that weigh against admission”
    6. Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
    other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order
    to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
    conformity with the character.” Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But the
    rule further provides that such “evidence may be admissible for
    another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
    . . . or lack of accident.” 
    Id.
     R. 404(b)(2).
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    and that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to learn of
    that conviction. Upon reviewing the other evidence adduced at
    trial, however, we think it unnecessary to further consider
    Defendant’s argument, given the harmless error doctrine.
    ¶22 “‘Harmless errors are those that are sufficiently
    inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood exists that the error
    affected the outcome of the proceedings.’” State v. Ferguson, 
    2011 UT App 77
    , ¶ 19, 
    250 P.3d 89
     (quoting Taylor ex rel. C.T. v.
    Johnson, 
    1999 UT 35
    , ¶ 18, 
    977 P.2d 479
    ). Even where “the trial
    court erred in failing to conduct a thorough analysis under rule
    404(b), [we] will not overturn a jury verdict . . . if the admission
    of the evidence did not reasonably affect the likelihood of a
    different verdict.” 
    Id.
     (alteration in original) (citations and
    internal quotation marks omitted). Such is the case where, as
    here, the other evidence of guilt is “overwhelming.” See 
    id.
    ¶23 Even after disregarding all evidence admitted as a result
    of the errors Defendant ascribes to his trial attorney on his claim
    of ineffective assistance of counsel,7 more fully considered
    hereafter, we conclude that the case against Defendant was all
    but insurmountable, in view of the admissions he made on the
    stand, the implausibility of the explanations he offered to rebut
    the State’s evidence, and his damning pre-trial phone call with
    the girlfriend. And the other evidence against Defendant was so
    overwhelmingly strong that it only bolsters our conclusion that
    any error in admitting evidence of the 2012 conviction was
    harmless.
    ¶24 As to Defendant’s admissions, the jury did not need to
    hear evidence of the 2012 conviction to learn that Defendant had
    7. Defendant attributes to his trial counsel Missy’s failure to
    testify. Even if Missy had testified, and did so in the favorable
    way Defendant anticipates, the jury would not have been
    shielded from the officer’s testimony regarding the incriminating
    “owe sheet” he found on Defendant’s person.
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    used and distributed drugs in the past; Defendant told them as
    much himself. When asked whether he had a history of
    distributing narcotics, Defendant responded that he had indeed
    gotten “in trouble” for it, albeit “[a] long, long, long time ago.”
    And while he did not confess to selling drugs recently, he did
    confess that getting “in trouble” did not put a stop to his own
    drug abuse. In fact, he admitted that his last “relapse” occurred
    only two weeks prior to his arrest.
    ¶25 The explanations Defendant offered to rebut the State’s
    evidence against him did little to help Defendant’s case because
    they were altogether implausible. Defendant’s attempt to explain
    away the text message that the booking officer found on his
    phone was entirely incredible. Even if it were true that
    Defendant had been in the market for some “glass” in the literal
    sense of the word, this would not explain why the text message’s
    author felt compelled to add the caveat that the offer to trade
    glass for a computer was contingent on the computer’s not
    having been “tweaked off of.” Likewise, Defendant’s claim that
    he carried around plastic baggies for the purpose of storing coins
    from his coin collection is dubious at best, as the officer was
    unable to find any coins in the baggies, in Defendant’s pocket, or
    in the girlfriend’s car. And while Defendant did testify on his
    own behalf at trial, he did not introduce his coin collection into
    evidence or otherwise substantiate his claimed numismatic
    interest.
    ¶26 What is perhaps most damaging to Defendant’s
    credibility, and what best underscores the harmlessness of any
    rule 404(b) error made by the trial court, is the call he made to
    the girlfriend while he was in jail awaiting trial. The jury was
    given the opportunity to listen to Defendant berate the girlfriend
    for hesitating to accept his instructions about her trial testimony.
    In response to the girlfriend’s insistence that her windows had
    been rolled up on the morning of Defendant’s arrest, he roared
    back, “You’re not fucking hearing what I’m saying. I know what
    they were and what they weren’t. . . . If they were down,
    anybody could have fucking threw that thing . . . in there.”
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    Moreover, while on the stand Defendant admitted that he had
    called the girlfriend to tell her to “get lost” so that the
    prosecution could not subpoena her testimony.
    ¶27 In sum, evidence of Defendant’s 2012 conviction was
    inconsequential in the context of his own testimony and the
    other evidence against him. Any error regarding the admission
    of that conviction into evidence was therefore harmless.
    II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    ¶28 Defendant argues that his trial attorney performed so
    poorly that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of
    counsel. In Defendant’s view, more competent counsel would
    have (1) objected when the State introduced evidence under
    Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) detailing the underlying facts of
    the 2012 conviction; (2) requested that the State give notice of its
    intent to introduce rule 404(b) evidence 8 and objected when such
    evidence was elicited from the girlfriend; and (3) subpoenaed
    Missy to appear as a witness on Defendant’s behalf.9
    8. Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that a “prosecutor must
    . . . provide reasonable notice of the general nature” of any
    evidence it intends to introduce of a defendant’s prior “crime,
    wrong, or other act.” Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1), (b)(2)(A).
    9. Defendant does not contend that his trial counsel was
    ineffective for permitting him to take the stand and undercut his
    own case. This is well-advised. Our Supreme Court has
    previously held that a defendant’s decision to take the stand
    rather than rely on his privilege against self-incrimination is a
    decision that is personal to the defendant. State v. Anderson, 
    495 P.2d 804
    , 806 (Utah 1972) (“An attorney for a [defendant] cannot
    claim a privilege against self-incrimination; he can only advise
    the [defendant].”).
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    ¶29 In proving that counsel performed ineffectively, a
    defendant must show “(1) that counsel’s performance was
    objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that
    but for the deficient conduct the defendant would have obtained
    a more favorable outcome at trial.” State v. Clark, 
    2004 UT 25
    , ¶ 6,
    
    89 P.3d 162
    . See Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984).
    ¶30 Under the “prejudice” prong of the ineffective assistance
    of counsel test, the defendant has the burden of “show[ing] that
    the error was harmful.” State v. Jimenez, 
    2012 UT 41
    , ¶ 15, 
    284 P.3d 640
    . See also Menzies v. State, 
    2014 UT 40
    , ¶ 77, 
    344 P.3d 581
    (“The defendant . . . has the obligation to affirmatively prove
    prejudice[.]”). In other words, the defendant must convince us
    that the error was so prejudicial to the defendant’s case that
    “‘our confidence in the verdict is undermined.’” State v.
    Munguia, 
    2011 UT 5
    , ¶ 12, 
    253 P.3d 1082
     (quoting State v. Holgate,
    
    2000 UT 74
    , ¶ 13, 
    10 P.3d 346
    ).
    ¶31 We conclude that Defendant’s ineffective assistance of
    counsel claim fails under the prejudice prong for the same
    reason that any error the trial court may have committed in
    allowing evidence of his 2012 distribution conviction was
    harmless: the evidence against Defendant was overwhelming.
    The damaging admissions Defendant made on the stand, the
    implausible explanations he put forward to rebut the State’s
    evidence, and the incriminating statements Defendant made to
    the girlfriend over the phone collectively establish that the jury
    would have returned the same verdict regardless of any
    deficiencies in the performance of Defendant’s trial attorney.
    ¶32 Defendant’s contention that his trial counsel should have
    objected to the State’s introduction of his 2012 conviction is, in
    essence, a restatement of the rule 404(b) error he attributes to the
    trial court in his first argument. We concluded above that the
    jury would not have returned a different verdict even if evidence
    of Defendant’s 2012 conviction had been excluded. Accordingly,
    it would have made no difference if Defendant’s counsel had
    successfully objected to that evidence. Likewise, Defendant’s
    second ineffective assistance argument fails because any
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    evidence admitted as a result of his trial counsel’s failure to
    request notice of rule 404(b) evidence would have done nothing
    to mitigate the prejudicial effect of the other evidence against
    him, as outlined in the preceding section.10
    ¶33 Finally, we conclude that the failure of Defendant’s trial
    counsel to subpoena Missy cannot support an ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim. We reach this conclusion for two
    independent reasons.
    ¶34 First, as with the girlfriend’s testimony regarding
    Defendant’s past wrongful acts, the testimony Defendant claims
    Missy would have provided would not have mitigated the
    overwhelming persuasive power of the State’s other evidence.
    Even if Missy had been located, appeared in court to testify, and
    acknowledged that the owe sheet belonged to her, such
    testimony would not have counteracted the damage that was
    done as a result of Defendant’s own admissions, his implausible
    explanations, and his pre-trial communications with the
    girlfriend.
    ¶35 Second, the testimony Defendant claims he could have
    elicited from Missy would have been cumulative. Defendant
    insists that “[Missy’s] testimony would have clearly supported
    [his] story that the owe sheet was not his.” He also maintains
    that since “the owe sheet was key to the State’s argument that
    [Defendant] intended to distribute drugs, it is likely that the
    outcome of the trial would have been different” had Missy taken
    the stand. Yet Defendant’s arguments ignore the fact that the
    jury learned this information during the testimony of other
    witnesses. Defendant, of course, testified that the owe sheet
    10. Because we conclude that Defendant was not prejudiced by
    the girlfriend’s testimony regarding his past wrongful acts, we
    have no need to address the State’s argument that her testimony
    provided evidence “intrinsic” to the charged offenses and
    therefore fell outside the scope of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b).
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    belonged to Missy and not to him. But the jury did not even
    need to take his word for it. The girlfriend, whose testimony
    Defendant otherwise seeks to bar, offered the same testimony. In
    fact, she went so far as to testify that she did not recognize the
    handwriting on the owe sheet as being Defendant’s. Thus, even
    assuming that Missy’s testimony would have been as favorable
    to Defendant as he contends, our confidence in the jury’s verdict
    is unshaken by her absence.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶36 We conclude that any errors committed by the trial court
    and any missteps by Defendant’s counsel had no prejudicial
    impact upon the result of Defendant’s trial. Accordingly, we do
    not disturb the verdict and resulting convictions.
    ¶37   Affirmed.
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