In re K.T. , 2023 UT App 5 ( 2023 )

2023 UT App 5THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF K.T.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
J.K.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20210553-CA
Filed January 20, 2023
Third District Juvenile Court, Summit Department
The Honorable Elizabeth M. Knight
No. 1190244
Gregory W. Stevens, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY
concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 Appellant J.K. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order
substantiating several database findings of abuse entered by the
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In August 2020, the State filed with the juvenile court a
Verified Petition for Protective Supervision requesting the court
In re K.T.
to find Mother’s son, K.T., “abused, neglected and/or dependent
and to grant protective supervision of [K.T.] to DCFS.” The
petition alleged that DCFS had on three separate occasions
previously supported findings of abuse of K.T. against Mother. 1
In addition to the request for protective supervision of K.T., the
petition requested that the juvenile court enter an order
“[s]ubstantiating[2] the DCFS supported finding(s) pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-323,” now recodified at Utah Code
section 80-3-404. 3
¶3 In March 2021, following discussions with Mother, the
State filed with the juvenile court an Amended Verified Petition
for Protective Supervision. The amended petition again asked the
court to find K.T. “neglected and/or dependent and to grant
1. As relevant here, “abuse” is defined as “nonaccidental harm of
a child” or “threatened harm of a child.” Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-
102(1)(a)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). “‘Supported’ means a
finding by [DCFS] based on the evidence available at the
completion of an investigation, and separate consideration of each
allegation made or identified during the investigation, that there
is a reasonable basis to conclude that abuse, neglect, or
dependency occurred.” Id. § 80-1-102(89).
2. “‘Substantiated’ or ‘substantiation’ means a judicial finding
based on a preponderance of the evidence, and separate
consideration of each allegation made or identified in the case,
that abuse, neglect, or dependency occurred.” Id. § 80-1-102(87).
3. The statutory provisions of Title 78A of the Utah Code that were
in effect at the time of the juvenile court proceedings have since
been renumbered and recodified as part of the Utah Juvenile
Code, which is now found in Title 80 of the Utah Code. Because
the provisions relevant to our analysis have not been
substantively amended, we cite the recodified version for
convenience.
20210553-CA 2 2023 UT App 5In re K.T.
protective supervision of [K.T.] to DCFS,” but it eliminated the
prior request that the court find K.T. to be “abused.” The amended
petition repeated the original petition’s request that the court
enter a finding “[s]ubstantiating the DCFS supported finding(s)
pursuant to Utah Code” section 80-3-404.
¶4 The parties thereafter appeared before the juvenile court to
adjudicate the amended petition. At the outset of the hearing, the
State indicated it had reached an agreement with Mother to
submit the amended petition “for [a] finding of neglect” and
requested, without objection, that “the issue of substantiating the
DCFS supported findings” be “set over.” Thereafter, Mother
admitted many of the allegations of the amended petition. But
pursuant to rule 34(e) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, she
declined to either admit or deny the allegations that DCFS had
previously supported findings of abuse by Mother against K.T. 4
The parties then presented argument. The State argued for a
finding of neglect, while Mother argued for a finding of
dependency. After the hearing, the court entered a finding of
4. Under rule 34(e) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, “[a]
respondent may answer by admitting or denying the specific
allegations of the petition, or by declining to admit or deny the
allegations. Allegations not specifically denied by a respondent
shall be deemed true.” Utah R. Juv. P. 34(e).
Here, the juvenile court took great care to ensure that
Mother understood the consequences of not denying these
allegations. The court informed Mother that it was “going to find
[the allegations] to be true, even though [she was] not admitting
nor denying [them].” When Mother indicated she did not
understand, the court took a break to allow Mother to confer with
her counsel. Following the break, the court confirmed that Mother
had ample opportunity to discuss the issue with counsel and
understood what was happening with respect to the allegations
at issue.
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neglect 5 and granted “[p]rotective supervision of [K.T.] . . . to
DCFS.” 6 The court “reserve[d] the issue of substantiating the
DCFS supported findings for the next hearing.”
¶5 In June 2021, the case came before the juvenile court for a
disposition hearing, during which the State requested that the
court address the substantiation issue. The court entertained
argument and took the matter under advisement. It thereafter
entered a written order substantiating the three DCFS supported
findings of abuse by Mother contained in both the original and
amended petitions. Specifically, it substantiated the supported
findings that K.T. had suffered emotional abuse, physical abuse,
and chronic emotional abuse.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶6 Mother now appeals the juvenile court’s order
substantiating the DCFS supported findings of abuse and raises
three issues for our review. The first two issues present questions
as to the statutory authority of the juvenile court. Mother first
argues the juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority to
substantiate the DCFS findings of abuse because the amended
petition alleged only neglect or dependency and the court had
adjudicated only a finding of neglect. “Questions of jurisdiction
and statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review
for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower court
decisions.” In re B.B.G., 2007 UT App 149, ¶ 4, 160 P.3d 9.
5. Although the juvenile court entered a finding of neglect
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, it indicated the evidence
was also sufficient to support a finding of abuse.
6. Even though the court placed K.T. under the protective
supervision of DCFS, K.T. remained in his father’s custody.
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¶7 In a similar vein, Mother next argues the State and the
juvenile court were bound by the stipulation of the parties to
submit the amended petition only for “a finding of neglect.”
When “the facts [are] stipulated, we review the conclusions
drawn by the juvenile court for correctness.” In re B.T., 2009 UT
App 182, ¶ 5, 214 P.3d 881 (quotation simplified).
¶8 Lastly, Mother alternatively argues her trial counsel was
ineffective for not advising her that the juvenile court could
deviate from its legal adjudication of neglect and later
substantiate for abuse. “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim
raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” State
v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162.
ANALYSIS
I.
¶9 We turn first to Mother’s argument that the juvenile court
exceeded its statutory authority in substantiating the DCFS
findings for abuse because the amended petition alleged only
neglect or dependency and the court had adjudicated K.T. as
neglected. We are unpersuaded by this argument because it
conflates the State’s request that the court adjudicate K.T. as
neglected with its independent request that the court substantiate
the DCFS supported findings of abuse. The State’s request to
adjudicate K.T. as neglected so as to bring the child within the
jurisdiction of the court and under the protective supervision of
DCFS was separate from its request that the court substantiate
DCFS’s finding that K.T. had suffered a severe type of child abuse.
As explained below, the juvenile court had independent statutory
authority to adjudicate both issues.
¶10 In Utah, proceedings concerning abuse, neglect, and
dependency are governed by Chapter 3 of the Utah Juvenile Code
(the UJC). Pursuant to Chapter 3, “any interested person may file
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an abuse, neglect, or dependency petition” in the juvenile court.
Utah Code Ann. § 80-3-201(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). Among
other things, the petition must include “a concise statement of
facts, separately stated, to support the conclusion that the child
upon whose behalf the abuse, neglect, or dependency petition is
brought is abused, neglected, or dependent.” Id. § 80-3-201(4)(a).
After the petition is filed, the court may, upon making specific
findings, “order that the child be removed from the child’s home
or otherwise taken into protective custody.” Id. § 80-3-204(2). If
the court so orders, a shelter hearing must then be held to
determine whether continued removal and placement of the child
in DCFS’s temporary custody are necessary. See id. § 80-3-301.
¶11 After the shelter hearing, the juvenile court conducts an
adjudication hearing. See id. § 80-3-401. An adjudication is a
determination of the merits of the State’s petition of abuse,
neglect, or dependency. “If, at the adjudication hearing, the
juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
allegations contained in the abuse, neglect, or dependency
petition are true, the juvenile court shall conduct a dispositional
hearing.” Id. § 80-3-402(1); see also In re S.A.K., 2003 UT App 87,
¶ 14, 67 P.3d 1037 (“In child welfare proceedings, if the petition’s
allegations of neglect, abuse, or dependency are found to be true
in the adjudication hearing, those findings provide the basis for
determining the consequences in the disposition hearing.”). “The
dispositional hearing may be held on the same date as the
adjudication hearing . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 80-3-402(2).
Dispositions available after adjudication include, among other
things, vesting custody of an abused, neglected, or dependent
minor in DCFS or any other appropriate person. Id. § 80-3-
405(2)(a)(i). Thus, an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or
dependency brings the child and family within the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction.
¶12 A separate chapter of the UJC addresses child welfare
services. Chapter 2 creates DCFS and establishes its statutory
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authority and responsibilities. Among these is its responsibility to
investigate reports that a child is abused, neglected, or dependent
and to enter findings at the conclusion of its investigations. See id.§ 80-2-701. A “supported” finding by DCFS is based on evidence
available at the completion of an investigation indicating that
“there is a reasonable basis to conclude that abuse, neglect, or
dependency occurred.” Id. § 80-1-102(89). Chapter 2 requires that
DCFS notify alleged perpetrators of supported findings and
establishes a procedure for challenging such findings. Id. §§ 80-2-
707, -708. In cases involving a supported finding of a severe type
of child abuse, the statute also gives DCFS authority to file a
petition in the juvenile court seeking substantiation of a
supported finding. Id. § 80-2-708(1)(c).
¶13 Part 10 of Chapter 2 governs DCFS’s record-keeping
responsibilities. DCFS uses a database known as the Management
Information System to track child welfare and protective services
cases. See id. § 80-2-1001(3), (4). DCFS uses a subset of that system
known as the Licensing Information System (the LIS) to track
cases for licensing purposes. See id. § 80-2-1002(1)(a)(i). In cases
involving a severe type of child abuse or neglect, DCFS enters
supported findings into the LIS and the alleged perpetrator
thereafter “may be disqualified from adopting a child, receiving
state funds as a child care provider, or being licensed by DCFS, a
human services program, a child care provider or program, or a
covered health care facility.” State v. A.C., 2022 UT App 121, ¶ 3,
521 P.3d 186 (quotation simplified).
¶14 All these statutes were in play in these proceedings. On
three separate occasions prior to the State’s filing of the petition,
DCFS had investigated Mother for abuse of K.T. Following each
of its three investigations, DCFS had supported a finding of abuse
of K.T. against Mother. One of those supported findings was of
“chronic emotional abuse” of K.T., which falls within the
statutory definition of a “severe type of child abuse” under Utah
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Code section 80-1-102(78)(a)(i)(A) that then must be entered into
the LIS.
¶15 The amended petition removed the request that the
juvenile court adjudicate K.T. as abused. Instead, it requested that
the court adjudicate K.T. as neglected. But the amended petition
also recited DCFS’s history with K.T., stating that DCFS had
previously supported findings of abuse against Mother, and
requested that the court substantiate these supported findings of
abuse. Adjudicating both requests for relief fell squarely within
the juvenile court’s express statutory authority. Indeed, Mother
identifies no statutory provision limiting the court’s authority to
substantiate DCFS findings of abuse based on the outcome of the
State’s independent request to adjudicate the status of an
allegedly abused, neglected, or dependent child.
¶16 Mother’s argument that the juvenile court’s substantiation
decision must be consistent with its adjudication decision in a
related petition for abuse, neglect, or dependency is also
inconsistent with the burdens of proof dictated by the UJC. While
the juvenile court may adjudicate a minor as abused, neglected,
or dependent based only on clear and convincing evidence, it can
substantiate a DCFS finding based on a mere preponderance of
the evidence. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-102(87), with id.§ 80-3-402(1). These different standards give rise to the distinct
possibility that a juvenile court could decline to adjudicate a
minor as abused, while still substantiating a DCFS finding of
abuse based on the lower burden of proof.
¶17 Despite the absence of a statutory provision linking the
outcome of the amended petition to the outcome of a request for
substantiation, Mother argues the juvenile court’s ruling on the
neglect petition ended the court proceedings, “leaving no
question open for further judicial action.” (Quoting In re M.W.,
2000 UT 79, ¶ 25, 12 P.3d 80.) But this argument is directly
contrary to the statutory language. Utah Code section 80-3-404
20210553-CA 8 2023 UT App 5In re K.T.
addresses the responsibility of the juvenile court to adjudicate
DCFS supported findings of severe child abuse or neglect and
their inclusion in or removal from the LIS. Upon the filing of “an
abuse, neglect or dependency petition . . . that informs the juvenile
court that [DCFS] has made a supported finding that an
individual committed a severe type of child abuse or neglect, the
juvenile court shall . . . make a finding of substantiated,
unsubstantiated, or without merit” and include the finding in a
written order. Utah Code Ann. § 80-3-404(1) (emphasis added).
This provision also allows joinder of proceedings for adjudication
of supported findings of severe abuse or neglect with those that
do not constitute severe abuse. Id. § 80-3-404(3). And it does not
limit the juvenile court’s ability to substantiate findings of severe
abuse to those cases in which the court has granted a petition to
adjudicate a child as abused. In short, the juvenile court was
required to rule on the State’s substantiation request. 7
II.
¶18 Next, Mother argues the State and juvenile court were
bound by the facts and legal conclusions contained in the
amended petition to which the parties had stipulated. Mother
reasons that because the parties had stipulated to a finding of
neglect, the juvenile court could not substantiate DCFS’s
supported findings of abuse.
¶19 Mother’s argument is inconsistent with both the language
of the amended petition and the course of the proceedings before
the juvenile court. At the hearing on the amended petition, the
7. Mother also argues the juvenile court erred by not ruling on the
State’s substantiation request at the time it adjudicated the
petition for neglect. But Mother did not preserve this argument
below. When the State raised the substantiation request at the
adjudication hearing and asked that it be continued to a later
hearing, Mother did not object.
20210553-CA 9 2023 UT App 5In re K.T.
State informed the court that the State and Mother had agreed to
submit the matter to the court for a “finding of neglect” and that
they “would ask also the Court to reserve the issue of
substantiating the DCFS supporting findings at this point in time
and set that over for disposition.” In connection therewith,
Mother agreed to admit the allegations of the amended petition
except those in paragraphs 5 and 6. Paragraph 5 alleged DCFS’s
history with the family, including DCFS’s supported findings of
abuse. Paragraph 6 alleged additional facts supporting the
conclusion that K.T. was neglected or dependent.
¶20 Although Mother declined to admit the allegations of
paragraphs 5 and 6, she did not deny them. Instead, she
proceeded pursuant to rule 34(e) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile
Procedure by neither admitting nor denying them. But as the
juvenile court expressly informed Mother at the hearing, Mother’s
decision not to deny those allegations had legal significance since
“[a]llegations not specifically denied by a respondent shall be
deemed true.” See Utah R. Juv. P. 34(e). The court was therefore
free to base its decision on all the allegations of the amended
petition, including those in paragraph 6 regarding DCFS’s
supported findings of abuse. Because the parties’ stipulation was
not inconsistent with the court’s ruling, it did not err.
III.
¶21 Lastly, we turn to Mother’s argument that her trial counsel
was ineffective for not advising her that the juvenile court could
deviate from its adjudication of neglect and substantiate DCFS’s
findings of abuse for entry into the LIS. To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mother must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient
performance prejudiced her defense. See In re C.M.R., 2020 UT
App 114, ¶ 19, 473 P.3d 184. A reviewing court must “indulge in
a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance, and that under the
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circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound
trial strategy.” State v. J.A.L., 2011 UT 27, ¶ 25, 262 P.3d 1(quotation simplified).
¶22 After indulging these presumptions, we are unable to
conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient because there
are many sound reasons why Mother’s decision to settle the
petition with a finding of neglect, while allowing the juvenile
court to resolve the substantiation issue, was sound strategy. The
petition sought a finding that K.T. had been abused, and it was
possible, if not likely, that proceeding to trial on the original
petition could have resulted in both an adjudication of abuse and
a substantiation of the abuse claims against Mother. The fact that
Mother now regrets her decision to settle does not lead to the
conclusion that counsel performed deficiently. Mother appeared
before the juvenile court, and the court explained her rights and
questioned her about the voluntariness of her decision. Nothing
in the record suggests that Mother’s decision to settle was the
result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
¶23 The juvenile court acted well within its statutory authority
in substantiating DCFS’s findings of child abuse, and the court
was entitled to consider all the allegations of the amended petition
when determining whether to substantiate that finding. Mother
has not demonstrated how her decision to settle was the result of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm.
20210553-CA 11 2023 UT App 5