Commonwealth v. Leone ( 2013 )

PRESENT: All the Justices
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 122053 JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
September 12, 2013
PAUL ANTHONY LEONE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judge
In this appeal we consider whether the Circuit Court of the
City of Virginia Beach ("circuit court") erred when it restored
Paul Anthony Leone's ("Leone") right to ship, transport, possess
or receive firearms pursuant to Code § 18.2-308.2(C).
I. Facts and Proceedings
Leone was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute on December 4, 1994. Because of that conviction,
Leone suffered certain political disabilities. On January 9,
2012, Governor Robert F. McDonnell restored all of Leone's civil
rights except his right to ship, transport, possess or receive
firearms. On June 20, 2012, Leone filed a petition in the
circuit court to have his right to ship, transport, possess or
receive firearms restored in accordance with Code § 18.2-
308.2(C). The Commonwealth filed an answer and motion to
dismiss, and argued that the circuit court lacked venue to grant
Leone's petition for restoration because Leone resides in North
Carolina, and not in the City of Virginia Beach ("Virginia
Beach"). 1
The circuit court held a hearing on the petition on July
10, 2012. On August 30, 2012, the circuit court granted Leone's
petition and by order restored his right to ship, transport,
possess or receive firearms. The order specifically noted that
the restoration did not include the right to carry a concealed
weapon.
The Commonwealth filed a petition for appeal and we granted
an appeal 2 on the following assignment of error:
1. Did the court err by granting the petition when the
petitioner did not reside in the City of Virginia Beach and
Virginia Code Section 18.2-308.2(C) specifically requires
the petitioner to reside in the jurisdiction where the
petition is filed?
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Well-settled principles of statutory construction guide our
analysis in this case.
[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a
pure question of law which we review de
novo. When the language of a statute is
unambiguous, we are bound by the plain
1
There is some discrepancy as to the date of the conviction.
The circuit court order and Leone's petition state the
conviction was December 4, 1994, but the Governor's executive
order and the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss list the
conviction date as December 4, 1995. The original conviction
order is not part of the record.
2
No constitutional challenges to the statute were presented in
the trial court and, consequently, are not before us on appeal.
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meaning of that language. Furthermore, we
must give effect to the legislature's
intention as expressed by the language used
unless a literal interpretation of the
language would result in a manifest
absurdity. If a statute is subject to more
than one interpretation, we must apply the
interpretation that will carry out the
legislative intent behind the statute.
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96,
104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citations omitted).
B. Code § 18.2-308.2
Code § 18.2-308.2(A) states that anyone who has been
convicted of a felony may no longer possess or transport a
firearm or ammunition. Code § 18.2-308.2(C) provides that any
person prohibited from possessing, transporting or carrying a
firearm under subsection A
may petition the circuit court of the
jurisdiction in which he resides for a
permit to possess or carry a firearm or stun
weapon; however, no person who has been
convicted of a felony shall be qualified to
petition for such a permit unless his civil
rights have been restored by the Governor or
other appropriate authority. A copy of the
petition shall be mailed or delivered to the
attorney for the Commonwealth for the
jurisdiction where the petition was filed
who shall be entitled to respond and
represent the interests of the Commonwealth.
Code § 18.2-308.2(C) (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that Leone was convicted of a felony,
and that he had his civil rights restored by the Governor.
There is also no dispute that Leone resides in North Carolina,
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and that he filed his petition for restoration in the Circuit
Court of the City of Virginia Beach.
As we have stated on numerous occasions, it is well-settled
that when the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound
by the plain meaning of that language. Conyers, 273 Va. at 104,
639 S.E.2d at 178; see also Campbell v. Harmon, 271 Va. 590,
597-98, 628 S.E.2d 308, 311-12 (2006); Virginia Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive Return Serv., 271 Va. 304,
309, 626 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006). The plain language of Code §
18.2-308.2(C) provides only one method by which a petitioner can
have his firearm rights restored, and that method is to
"petition the circuit court of the jurisdiction in which he
resides."
Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia
grants to the General Assembly the power to determine the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Commonwealth. In Gallagher v.
Commonwealth, 284 Va. 444, 452, 732 S.E.2d 22, 26 (2012), we
held that "[t]he legislative grant of jurisdiction to the
circuit courts, in Code § 18.2-308.2(C), to restore firearm
rights falls directly within that constitutional grant of power
to the General Assembly." Id. The jurisdiction to restore
firearm rights is vested solely in the circuit courts. Id.
However, when the General Assembly granted circuit courts
the jurisdiction to restore those rights, it limited the
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territorial jurisdiction of circuit courts to adjudication of
petitions for restoration filed by persons who reside within the
territorial jurisdiction of the circuit court. See Code § 18.2-
308(C). Territorial jurisdiction is synonymous with venue.
Kelso v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 134, 139, 710 S.E.2d 470, 473
(2011). Territorial jurisdiction is the "authority over
persons, things or occurrences located in a defined geographic
area." Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 228, 661 S.E.2d
415, 426 (2008)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Territorial jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction,
can be waived. Id. at 229, 61 S.E.2d at 427. However, it was
not waived in this case. The Commonwealth clearly objected to
the circuit court adjudicating Leone's petition because he was
not a resident of Virginia Beach.
Leone admits that he does not currently reside in Virginia
Beach, and did not reside in Virginia Beach when he filed his
petition for restoration. Because Leone is not a resident of
Virginia Beach, the circuit court lacked territorial
jurisdiction to adjudicate Leone's petition for restoration of
firearms rights.
III. Conclusion
We hold that the circuit court erred when it granted
Leone's petition for restoration of his right to ship,
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transport, possess or receive firearms. Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment of the circuit court and dismiss the petition.
Reversed and dismissed.
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