Johnson v. Anis ( 2012 )


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  • PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, McClanahan,
    and Powell, JJ., and Russell, S.J.
    GENE M. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR OF
    THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
    OPINION BY
    v.   Record No. 111937          SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL
    September 14, 2012
    ANTHONY LOUIS ANIS
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
    Daniel T. Balfour, Judge
    This appeal presents a question of the circumstances in
    which a defendant in a criminal case, who has entered a guilty
    plea, may be permitted to withdraw that plea and proceed to
    trial on a plea of not guilty.   It involves the distinction that
    applies when a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made after,
    rather than before, a sentence has been imposed.
    In 2006, Anthony Louis Anis entered an Alford plea of
    guilty in the Circuit Court of Henrico County to an indictment
    charging him with grand larceny.   At the plea colloquy, the
    court asked him whether he was satisfied with the services of
    his attorney.   Anis replied:   "I think he's been about the best
    attorney I probably could have had."   The court found that the
    plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered and found Anis
    guilty.   The Commonwealth recommended an active sentence
    equivalent to the time Anis had spent in jail awaiting trial,
    four and one-half months.   Pursuant to that recommendation, the
    court imposed a sentence of five years, with four years, seven
    months, and fifteen days suspended.
    Within the 21-day period before the sentencing order became
    final, Anis informed his attorney that he wished to withdraw his
    guilty plea, plead not guilty and go to trial.    His attorney
    later testified that he knew of no legitimate basis for
    withdrawal of the plea, but that he filed a motion to withdraw
    it on "ends of justice" grounds because of the shortness of the
    time the case would remain in the circuit court's jurisdiction.
    The court ultimately denied the motion in an order entered
    March 1, 2007, and Anis did not appeal.
    Approximately twenty months later, on October 24, 2008,
    Anis filed a petition for habeas corpus in the circuit court.
    One of the claims made by the petition was that he had been
    denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel
    had failed to base his motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the
    specific grounds of mistake, misunderstanding, fear, and
    misrepresentation, causing the plea to be entered "inadvisedly
    and involuntarily."   The court   declined to grant an evidentiary
    hearing and denied the petition, citing this Court's decision in
    Anderson v. Warden, 
    222 Va. 511
    , 516, 
    281 S.E.2d 885
    , 888
    (1981).
    Anis appealed that decision to this Court.   We awarded Anis
    an appeal and entered an order directing the circuit court to
    2
    conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide Anis' claims.      Anis v.
    Johnson, Dir., Dep't of Corr., Record No. 092485 (April 23,
    2010).
    At the evidentiary hearing, Melvin Crawley testified that
    he was the owner of a commercial building in Henrico County upon
    which a new roof was being installed.   There were three 5-ton
    air conditioning units on the roof which were in good working
    order.   They were not to be disturbed by the roofers except to
    ensure that the rubberized seals around them remained intact.
    Crawley testified that his employee, George Gayles, called to
    inform him that someone was dismantling the air-conditioning
    units.   Crawley came to the site and found Anis on the roof.
    Two of the units had been "gutted" and the third was partially
    dismantled.   Anis told him that the "owner" had given him
    permission to remove the units.   When Crawley told him "I'm the
    owner.   I've never seen you before," Anis fled, jumping into his
    truck and driving away, nearly running over Gayles in the
    process.   Crawley reported the event, including the truck's
    license number, to the police.
    When arrested, Anis told the police that some "black guy"
    who was in charge of the roofing work had given him permission
    to remove the air conditioning units.   His trial counsel
    testified that Anis had said his permission had come from "a
    3
    Mexican with a red bandanna."   Anis could furnish no name,
    address, or contact information for this individual. *
    Anis had two prior convictions for larceny.   Trial counsel
    concluded that in the absence of any witness to corroborate
    Anis' account, and in view of his flight from the scene when
    confronted by the owner, and his prior larceny convictions,
    Anis' best choice would be an Alford plea in exchange for an
    agreed sentence recommendation of "time served" and the
    Commonwealth's agreement to nolle prosequi an additional charge
    of felony vandalism.   Anis agreed with this recommendation and
    informed the court that he thought an Alford plea was his best
    option.
    The circuit court granted Anis a writ of habeas corpus on
    his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
    allege the specific grounds of mistake, fear, misunderstanding
    and misrepresentation in his motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
    We awarded the Commonwealth this appeal.
    In granting the writ, the court relied on Justus v.
    Commonwealth, 
    274 Va. 143
    , 153, 
    645 S.E.2d 284
    , 288 (2007), and
    Parris v. Commonwealth, 
    189 Va. 321
    , 325, 
    52 S.E.2d 872
    , 874
    (1949) (" '[t]he least surprise or influence causing a defendant
    *
    Approximately five years after his arrest, at the
    evidentiary hearing, Anis testified that the previously unnamed
    man who had given him permission to remove the units was "clean-
    cut," was wearing a mustache and a ball cap, and was named
    "José."
    4
    to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be
    sufficient grounds for permitting a change of a plea from guilty
    to not guilty'").   The circuit court erred in applying that
    rule, which applies only before a sentence has been imposed.
    After sentencing, a more stringent standard has been imposed by
    the General Assembly.   Code § 19.2-296 provides:
    Withdrawal of plea of guilty. – A motion to
    withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
    may be made only before sentence is imposed
    or imposition of a sentence is suspended;
    but to correct manifest injustice, the court
    within twenty-one days after entry of a
    final order may set aside the judgment of
    conviction and permit the defendant to
    withdraw his plea.
    In Justus, we expressly pointed out this distinction.   274 Va.
    at 152-53, 645 S.E.2d at 287-88.
    The term "manifest" is defined as being "synonymous with
    open, clear, visible, unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable,
    evident, and self-evident.   In evidence, that which is clear and
    requires no proof; that which is notorious."    Black's Law
    Dictionary 962 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
    Anis testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had "been
    getting scrap metal for extra money."    The evidence was that the
    scrap value of the metal removed was at least $3,000 and that
    Crawley's replacement cost would be $25,000.   Anis made no
    denial of any facts except his claim that he had permission from
    an unknown person to remove the units.
    5
    If the case had gone to trial, Anis' sole defense would
    have been his own self-serving and uncorroborated testimony.   He
    would have been subject to cross-examination with regard to his
    changing accounts of the person who had allegedly given him
    permission, his precipitate flight from the scene when
    confronted by the owner, and his two prior larceny convictions.
    There was no evidence at the evidentiary hearing, or elsewhere
    in the record, to support a conclusion that Anis was denied the
    effective assistance of counsel or that manifest injustice
    occurred.
    Because the circuit court applied an inapplicable standard
    in granting the writ, we will reverse the judgment appealed from
    and dismiss the writ of habeas corpus.
    Reversed and writ dismissed.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 111937

Filed Date: 9/14/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016