Lucas v. Woody ( 2014 )

PRESENT: All the Justices
SUNDAY LUCAS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 131064 JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN
April 17, 2014
C. T. WOODY, JR., ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Michael C. Allen, Judge Designate
In this appeal, we consider whether a plaintiff who brings
a personal injury action relating to the conditions of her
confinement in a state or local correctional facility must be
incarcerated at the time her cause of action is filed in order
for the statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243.2 to be
applicable to that action.
Background
Sunday Lucas (Lucas) filed suits against C.T. Woody, Jr.,
Stanley Furman, Menyon Graham, Laura Terry, Robert Ford,
Anneika Brown, Carolyn Quigley, Robert Cushionberry, Yuvonka
Lewis and Darryl Hack (the Defendants). She alleged that she
was injured by the Defendants’ course of conduct that began on
January 16, 2008, while she was incarcerated in the Richmond
City Jail, and concluded on March 11, 2008, when she was
released from the jail.
Lucas filed her initial complaint against defendants
Woody, Graham, Terry, Ford, Brown, Quigley, Cushionberry and
Lewis on August 13, 2009, in the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond (Circuit Court). Another lawsuit concerning the same
events was filed against defendants Furman and Hack in the same
court on January 13, 2010. The two suits were consolidated on
March 18, 2011. The actions against all of the Defendants were
nonsuited by order dated October 5, 2011.
On February 1, 2012, Lucas refiled her causes of action
against the Defendants in the Circuit Court. In that
complaint, as in the previous complaints, Lucas asserted only
state law causes of action. Lucas was not incarcerated when
she filed any of her lawsuits.
In response to the complaint filed on February 1, 2012,
the Defendants filed a plea of the statute of limitations and
asserted the running of the statute of limitations in Code
§ 8.01-243.2 as an affirmative defense. At a hearing on
September 20, 2012, the Circuit Court sustained the plea in bar
regarding the statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243.2 as to
all of Lucas’s state claims, but granted Lucas leave to file an
amended complaint asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
On October 11, 2012, Lucas filed an amended complaint
against the Defendants asserting claims pursuant to § 1983 only
(amended complaint). Shortly thereafter, Lucas filed a motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint. The proposed
second amended complaint contained the state law claims
2
previously dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations,
as well as the § 1983 claims. A motion to reconsider the
statute of limitations ruling regarding the state law claims
was filed with the motion for leave to amend and the proposed
second amended complaint.
In response to the amended complaint, the Defendants each
filed a special plea of the statute of limitations alleging
that the § 1983 claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations or asserted the statute of limitations as a
defense. At a hearing on March 1, 2013, the Circuit Court
considered and denied Lucas’s motion to reconsider its statute
of limitations ruling on the state law claims. It also denied
her motion to file a second amended complaint.
The Circuit Court thereafter considered the Defendants’
special pleas and affirmative defense of the statute of
limitations to the amended complaint. The Defendants conceded
that a two-year statute of limitations applied to Lucas’s
§ 1983 claims. The Defendants also conceded that the conduct
or injury claimed in support of the § 1983 action was the same
as the conduct or injury alleged in the state law claims. The
primary issue considered by the Circuit Court in determining
whether such claims were barred by the statute of limitations
related to whether the claims alleged in the amended complaint
3
were allowed, by Code § 8.01-6.1, to relate back to the filing
of the initial complaints.
The Circuit Court ruled that the due diligence and absence
of prejudice requirements of Code § 8.01-6.1 had not been
satisfied and that the § 1983 claims filed in 2012 did not
relate back to the original filings of the state law claims.
It sustained the special plea and affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations on the § 1983 claims.
Lucas appeals. This Court has granted the following
assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in sustaining the
defendants’ pleas in bar to Lucas’ state law causes
of action based on the statute of limitations.
2. The trial court erred in refusing to grant
Lucas leave to file a second amended complaint which
would have allowed her to pursue the state law causes
of action and a § 1983 cause of action.
Analysis
Code § 8.01-243.2 states:
No person confined in a state or local
correctional facility shall bring or have brought
on his behalf any personal action relating to the
conditions of his confinement until all available
administrative remedies are exhausted. Such action
shall be brought by or on behalf of such person
within one year after cause of action accrues or
within six months after all administrative remedies
are exhausted, whichever occurs later.
4
The facts surrounding the dates the causes of action
accrued and the filing dates of the complaints are not in
dispute. Lucas’s complaints alleged that she was injured
between January 16, 2008, and March 11, 2008, while
incarcerated in the Richmond City Jail. She was released
from incarceration on March 11, 2008.
Lucas filed her initial complaints against the Defendants
on August 13, 2009, and January 13, 2010, and the actions were
refiled within six months of being nonsuited. The issue of
whether the actions filed by Lucas related to the conditions of
her confinement is settled for purposes of this appeal in that
no party disputes the Circuit Court’s ruling in that regard.
Thus, the only issue is whether the statute of limitations
contained in Code § 8.01-243.2 is applicable in this instance.
Where the facts are undisputed, as in the present
case, “the applicability of the statute of limitations is
a purely legal question of statutory construction which we
review de novo.” Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630, 702
S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010). In Conyers v. Martial Arts World
of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178
(2007), our Court stated:
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we
are bound by the plain meaning of that language.
Furthermore, we must give effect to the legislature's
intention as expressed by the language used unless a
literal interpretation of the language would result
5
in a manifest absurdity. If a statute is subject to
more than one interpretation, we must apply the
interpretation that will carry out the legislative
intent behind the statute.
(Citations omitted.)
Lucas asserts that the Circuit Court erred in
sustaining the Defendants’ pleas in bar to her state law
claims because Code § 8.01-243.2 is not applicable to her
claims. In support of this position, Lucas argues that
the statute of limitations provision in Code § 8.01-243.2
does not apply because she was no longer “confined” at the
time she filed her actions. Because she was not
incarcerated when she filed her actions, Lucas asserts
that she had two years from the time her causes of action
arose within which to file suit as provided in Code
§ 8.01-243(A).
The Defendants claim that the statute of limitations,
stated in the second sentence of Code § 8.01-243.2,
applies to all personal actions related to conditions of
confinement in a state or local correctional facility.
They claim the statute of limitations is applicable
whether or not a plaintiff is still confined at the time
he or she files an action.
In Bing v. Haywood, 283 Va. 381, 385, 722 S.E.2d 244,
246 (2012), this Court stated, “For the one-year provision
6
in Code § 8.01-243.2 to apply, the plaintiff must have
been confined at the time the cause of action accrued, and
the cause of action must relate to plaintiff’s conditions
of confinement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) It
is undisputed that Lucas was confined at the time the
cause of action accrued and that her causes of action
related to her conditions of confinement.
As the Court’s holding in Bing reflects, the plain
language of the first sentence of Code § 8.01-243.2
requires that a person confined in a state or local
correctional facility exhaust all available administrative
remedies before bringing a personal injury action relating
to conditions of confinement. The second sentence of Code
§ 8.01-243.2 creates a statute of limitations period for
the cause of action mentioned in the first sentence of the
statute — a personal injury cause of action relating to
the conditions of confinement in a state or local
correctional facility. This case concerns the question,
which was not directly addressed in Bing, of whether the
statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243.2 applies when
the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the time she
files her action relating to conditions of her
confinement. It does.
7
The terms “[s]uch action” and “such person” used in
the Code § 8.01-243.2 statute of limitations provision are
not defined. As mentioned above, “[s]uch action” clearly
refers to a personal action relating to the conditions of
the plaintiff’s confinement. The parties, however,
disagree as to what the term “such person” refers. Lucas
claims it refers to a person confined in a state or local
correctional facility. The Defendants assert that it
refers to a person who brings or has brought on his behalf
a personal action relating to the conditions of his or her
confinement. Both interpretations of “such person” can be
supported by the language of the statute.
If the term “such person” is interpreted as urged by
Lucas, the applicability of the statute of limitations is
dependent upon whether a plaintiff is confined at the time
he or she brings an action relating to conditions of
confinement. If the term is interpreted as urged by the
Defendants, the statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-
243.2 applies to all personal actions relating to the
conditions of confinement.
The first sentence of Code § 8.01-243.2 clearly
requires a person who is confined to exhaust all
administrative remedies before filing a personal action
relating to conditions of confinement. This makes sense
8
in that an individual would necessarily need to be
confined in order to take advantage of administrative
remedies offered by a state or local correctional
facility. However, a person does not need to be confined
to file a personal action relating to the conditions of
his or her confinement. Therefore, it does not follow
that the legislature intended continued confinement to be
a prerequisite for the applicability of the statute of
limitations imposed upon a personal action relating to
conditions of the plaintiff’s confinement.
Having the applicability of a statute of limitations
change based upon the confinement status of the plaintiff
at the time a lawsuit is filed, rather than the particular
cause of action asserted and the plaintiff’s status at the
time the action accrued would be anomalous. It would
result in two different and shifting statutes of
limitations for the same cause of action relating to a
plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. It would create
uncertainty concerning when the statute of limitations for
personal actions relating to confinement has run because a
claim barred by the statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-
243.2 could be revived by a change in a plaintiff’s
confinement status and a resulting change in the
applicable statute of limitations. Reading the statute as
9
Lucas suggests, such that the applicability of Code
§ 8.01-243.2 is dependent upon the plaintiff’s confinement
status at the time suit is filed, would produce bizarre
results. For instance, it would allow a cause of action
otherwise barred by the statute of limitations to be
revived upon the individual’s release from incarceration,
and then, perhaps, to be extinguished once again if the
individual is reincarcerated before filing suit. The
purpose of a statute of limitations is to provide parties
and potential parties certainty with regard to when a
cause of action is extinguished; the interpretation of
Code § 8.01-243.2 urged by Lucas would do the opposite.
Additionally, Code § 8.01-230 provides that “the
right of action shall be deemed to accrue and the
prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the
date the injury is sustained.” When Code § 8.01-230 is
read in conjunction with Code § 8.01-243.2, the statutes
mandate the conclusion that a cause of action for personal
injury related to conditions of confinement in a state or
local correctional facility accrues on, and the statute of
limitations period begins to run from, the date the injury
is sustained. If a person’s confinement status is
relevant, it is the confinement status of the plaintiff at
the time that the cause of action accrues that determines
10
the proper statute of limitations. Inherently, a personal
action relating to conditions of confinement accrues while
the plaintiff is confined. So, even if the language in
the Code § 8.01-243.2 statute of limitations is
interpreted as Lucas argues, that statute of limitations
would still apply to any claim relating to the conditions
of a plaintiff’s confinement.
The statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243.2
applies to personal actions relating to conditions of
confinement in a state or local correctional facility.
The General Assembly clearly intended to impose a defined
end-point for commencement of such claims. There is no
obvious rationale which explains how exempting individuals
from that statute of limitations upon their release from
incarceration would further that intent. We rule that the
statute of limitations provision in Code § 8.01-243.2
applies to all personal actions relating to the conditions
of an individual’s confinement regardless of whether the
plaintiff is still incarcerated when such action is filed.
Thus, the Circuit Court did not err in finding that
Lucas’s state law claims were barred by the statute of
limitations contained in Code § 8.01-243.2.
Lucas also alleges that the Circuit Court erred in
not granting leave for her to file a second amended
11
complaint. The applicable standard of review for this
assignment of error is an abuse of discretion standard.
“On appeal, review of the trial court’s decision to grant
or deny a motion to amend is limited to the question
whether the trial judge abused his discretion.” Hetland
v. Worcester Mutual Ins. Co., 231 Va. 44, 46, 340 S.E.2d
574, 575 (1986). We hold that the Circuit Court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Lucas leave to
file her second amended complaint, which sought to
reassert state law claims that the court had properly
dismissed pursuant to pleas in bar.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we will
affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE MILLETTE, with whom JUSTICE MIMS and JUSTICE POWELL
join, dissenting.
I believe the majority fails to apply the plain language
of Code § 8.01-243.2, and instead improperly invokes the
doctrines of ambiguity and absurdity to apply the statutory
language it might have preferred. I therefore respectfully
dissent.
I. The Applicable Statute of Limitations
A. Code § 8.01-230
12
Code § 8.01-230 reads in relevant part:
In every action for which a limitation period is
prescribed, the right of action shall be deemed to
accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall
begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in
the case of injury to the person or damage to
property.
Code § 8.01-230 establishes when a plaintiff's cause
of action accrues and when the applicable statute of
limitations begins to run. Notably, Code § 8.01-230 does
not identify what statute of limitations applies to any
particular cause of action. That is, although Code § 8.01-
230 certainly provides a starting point for a court to
determine when a statute of limitations clock begins, it
provides no guidance to determine just how long that clock
will run before time has run out.
This appeal requires us to resolve whether Lucas's
conditions of confinement action is governed by the two
year limitations period in Code § 8.01-243, or by the
variable limitations period in Code § 8.01-243.2. Because
the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2 does not apply to
Lucas's action, I would hold that the two year limitations
period prescribed by Code § 8.01-243 governs.
B. Code § 8.01-243.2
Code § 8.01-243.2 consists of only two sentences and reads
in its entirety:
13
[1] No person confined in a state or local
correctional facility shall bring or have brought on
his behalf any personal action relating to the
conditions of his confinement until all available
administrative remedies are exhausted. [2] Such
action shall be brought by or on behalf of such
person within one year after [the] cause of action
accrues or within six months after all administrative
remedies are exhausted, whichever occurs later.
(Bracketed numbers added.)
Sentence [1] is not a statute of limitations provision.
Instead, it creates a prerequisite for a person currently
"confined in a state or local correctional facility" who wants
to "bring" an action "relating to the conditions of his
confinement." Code § 8.01-243.2. Before bringing such an
action, such person must first "exhaust[]" "all available
administrative remedies." Id. Sentence [1] does not apply to
Lucas because she was not "confined in a state or local
correctional facility" when she "brought" her February 2012
complaint.
Sentence [2] of Code § 8.01-243.2 is a statute of
limitations provision. Two key terms are used in this
sentence: "[s]uch action" and "such person." These terms are
not defined within Sentence [2]. However, this Court
"examine[s] a statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating
particular words or phrases." Small v. Fannie Mae, 286 Va.
119, 127, 747 S.E.2d 817, 821 (2013). Indeed, by using the
word "such" to modify both "action" and "person," Sentence [2]
14
directs this Court to look elsewhere in the same statute to
understand those terms. See, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 190
Va. 10, 18, 55 S.E.2d 427, 430 (1949) ("In our opinion, 'such
person' in the second portion of [then existing Code § 4488]
refers to 'any person' in the first portion thereof."); see
also Black's Law Dictionary 1570 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the
adjective "such" as referring to "[t]hat or those; having just
been mentioned").
The only other provision within Code § 8.01-243.2 alluding
to "person" and "action" is Sentence [1]. It is there that
this Court can find what actions and persons are governed by
Sentence [2]. Thus, "[s]uch action" and "such person" are not
ambiguous terms by being "difficult to comprehend" or
"lack[ing] clearness and definiteness." Brown v. Lukhard, 229
Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985).
In Sentence [1], "[s]uch action" is defined as "any
personal action relating to the conditions of his [or her]
confinement." Code § 8.01-243.2; see also Bing v. Haywood, 283
Va. 381, 385, 722 S.E.2d 244, 245-46 (2012). In Sentence [1],
"such person" is defined as a "person confined in a state or
local correctional facility." Code § 8.01-243.2. The terms
"action" and "person," as used in Sentence [2], are matched
with the phrases in Sentence [1] that define those very terms.
Thus, this is the "plain, obvious, and rational meaning" of the
15
terms "[s]uch action" and "such person," and it is the
construction that this Court must "prefer[] over any curious,
narrow, or strained construction." Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285
Va. 187, 237, 738 S.E.2d 847, 875 (2013). Indeed, this is the
method this Court employed to previously define "[s]uch action"
as a "personal action relating to the conditions of [the
plaintiff's] confinement." See Bing, 283 Va. at 387, 722
S.E.2d at 247. It stands to reason that this Court should also
employ this method to define "such person" in this case.
Substituting the applicable phrases from Sentence [1] for
the terms "[s]uch action" and "such person," Sentence [2]
reads:
["[A]ny personal action relating to the conditions of
his confinement"] shall be brought by or on behalf of
[a "person confined in a state or local correctional
facility"] within one year after cause of action
accrues or within six months after all administrative
remedies are exhausted, whichever occurs later.
Code § 8.01-243.2.
With these statutory definitions plugged into Sentence
[2], the plain language is clear. The statute of limitations
provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 applies only if two requirements
are met: if "[s]uch action" is a "personal action relating to
the conditions of [the plaintiff's] confinement," and if that
personal action is "brought by or on behalf of such person,"
16
who is a "person confined in a state or local correctional
facility." See Bing, 283 Va. at 387, 722 S.E.2d at 247.
1. The "Such Action" Requirement
In this case, Lucas's state law claims related to the
conditions of her confinement at the Richmond Jail. Indeed,
Lucas was confined at a state or local correctional facility at
the time her cause of action accrued because the injuries
giving rise to Lucas's state law claims occurred while Lucas
was an inmate at the Richmond Jail. See Code § 8.01-230; Laws
v. McIlroy, 283 Va. 594, 599, 724 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2012); see
also Bing, 283 Va. at 387, 722 S.E.2d at 247. Because Lucas's
claims relate to the conditions of the confinement she endured
when her cause of action accrued, the "[s]uch action"
requirement was satisfied. Bing, 283 Va. at 385-87, 722 S.E.2d
at 245-47.
2. The "Such Person" Requirement
The "[s]uch action" requirement looks to see if the
plaintiff was confined at the time her cause of action accrued.
In contrast, the "such person" requirement evaluates whether
the plaintiff was a person "confined" when the action is
"brought." When a plaintiff's cause of action accrues is not
synonymous with when a plaintiff "brought" a personal action.
A personal action is brought when a complaint is filed.
See Ahari v. Morrison, 275 Va. 92, 96, 654 S.E.2d 891, 894
17
(2008) ("Only at that time was the amended complaint deemed
filed, thereby adding the new party defendants and commencing
the action as to them."); Mendenhall v. Douglas L. Cooper,
Inc., 239 Va. 71, 76, 387 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1990) ("[I]t is
well-established that when a new party is brought into a suit
by an amended pleading, the suit must be deemed to have been
commenced as to him at the time that he was so brought in."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bulala v. Boyd,
239 Va. 218, 224, 389 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1990) ("[Plaintiffs]
brought this civil action against [defendant] by complaint
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia."). In contrast, a "cause of action
accrues [at the time when] the injury is sustained in the case
of injury to the person." McIlroy, 283 Va. at 599, 724 S.E.2d
at 702 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Code
§ 8.01-230.
Thus, the "such person" requirement is met when the
plaintiff was "confined" at the time when that plaintiff
"brought" her personal action. Code § 8.01-243.2 (emphasis
added). In this case, Lucas was not "confined in a state or
local correctional facility" when she "brought" her "conditions
of . . . confinement" action by filing the February 2012
complaint. Thus, the "such person" requirement was not
satisfied.
18
For these reasons, by its plain language, the statute of
limitations provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 did not apply to
Lucas's state law claims alleged in her February 2012
complaint.
C. The Court Ignores the Plain Language of Code § 8.01-243.2
Today, the Court commits error by incorrectly invoking the
doctrines of ambiguity and absurdity — while conspicuously
refusing to identify those doctrines by their names — to avoid
the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2.
1. The Court Finds Ambiguity Where None Exists
The Court summarily holds that two interpretations of the
phrase "such person" appearing in Sentence [2] can be supported
by the language of the statute. It utilizes this ambiguity to
justify its deviation from the plain language of the statute.
However, this invocation of ambiguity is valid only if the
Court ignores the plain language of Sentence [1], which it
cannot do. BBF, Inc. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 274 Va. 326, 331,
645 S.E.2d 467, 469 (2007) ("[W]e are not free . . . to ignore
language[] contained in statutes.") (quoting SIGNAL Corp. v.
Keane Federal Sys., Inc., 265 Va. 38, 46, 574 S.E.2d 253, 257
(2003)).
The first understanding of "such person," argued for by
Lucas, is what Sentence [1] states plainly: "such person[s]"
are those plaintiffs who, simply and unqualifiedly, are
19
"confined." (Emphasis added.) This is how Sentence [1]
clearly reads without judicial alteration.
The second understanding of "such person," argued for by
the Defendants, is that it refers to all persons who bring a
conditions of confinement claim regardless of their confinement
status when the action is brought. But the Defendants' reading
of "such person" is supported by the statutory language only if
the Court ignores the statement in Sentence [1] that a "person"
is someone who is "confined in a state or local correctional
facility." By embracing such a reading, however, the Court
abandons its obligation "to provide meaning to all the words of
a statute," and thereby impermissibly creates an ambiguity
where none otherwise exists. Commonwealth v. Squire, 278 Va.
746, 752, 685 S.E.2d 631, 634 (2009); see LaCava v.
Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 471, 722 S.E.2d 838, 841 (2012).
2. The Court Utilizes the Absurdity Doctrine to Impose Its
Policy Preferences
The Court does not invoke the absurdity doctrine by name,
but instead describes the application of the plain language of
Code § 8.01-243.2 as being "anomalous" and "bizarre." Taking
this assessment of the plain language at face value reveals
error, because the Court "traverse[s] the separation of powers
and enter[s] the domain of . . . questions of legislative
policy." Starrs v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 1, 14, 752 S.E.2d
20
812, 820 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not
the role of the judicial branch to question the soundness of
the policies adopted by the political branches. Elizabeth
River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks, 286 Va. 286, 309, 749
S.E.2d 176, 187 (2013) ("[If the political branches have] acted
within the constitutional boundaries that limit the exercise of
their governmental power, . . . then their policy decisions are
subject to, and properly evaluated by, the political will of
the people, and [this Court has] no authority to override such
political decisions.").
But a deeper problem exists with the Court's avoidance of
the absurdity doctrine. Both the circuit court and the
Defendants characterized the application of the plain language
of Code § 8.01-243.2 as being absurd. The Court today adopts
those arguments as its own, but simply reframes the argument as
describing an "anomalous" and "bizarre" result, rather than an
absurdity. To the extent this is the Court's invocation of the
absurdity doctrine in all but name, it is error. No absurdity
results from applying the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2.
The absurdity doctrine is a tool of statutory construction
employed in rare circumstances involving fundamentally flawed
legislative drafting. The doctrine is implicated only if
adopting the plain language of a statute would result in
absurdity. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116, 597
21
S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004). If an absurd result would occur, this
Court replaces the literal meaning of the statute's plain
language with a construction avoiding such absurdity. See,
e.g., Baker v. Wise, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 139, 214-15 (1861).
Because of the absurdity doctrine's potential to enable
the judicial branch to appropriate the Commonwealth's
legislative power, which is constitutionally vested in the
General Assembly, Va. Const. art. IV, § 1, this Court prohibits
courts from exploiting that doctrine as a back door to impose
their own policy preferences upon duly enacted statutes. To
this end, we recognize absurdity in only two narrowly defined
situations: when "the law would be internally inconsistent,"
and when the law would be "otherwise incapable of operation."
Covel v. Town of Vienna, 280 Va. 151, 158, 694 S.E.2d 609, 614
(2010). A related doctrine, although not directly arising from
absurdity, requires that when the plain language of multiple
statutes conflict, this Court construes those statutes in
harmony. See Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 228-29 & n.11,
623 S.E.2d 922, 926-27 & n.11 (2006).
Applying the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2, so that
its statute of limitations provision applies only if the
plaintiff is "confined" at the time the action is "brought," is
not absurd. It is not internally inconsistent because it
applies identically to identically situated plaintiffs: the
22
statute of limitations consistently applies to all plaintiffs
who are "confined" at the time their action is "brought," and
consistently does not apply to all plaintiffs who are not
"confined" at the time their action is "brought." It is not
incapable of operation because a court need only determine
whether a plaintiff is or is not "confined" when the complaint
was "brought." And it does not conflict with any other
statutory provision because, when Code § 8.01-243.2 does apply,
it still operates in conjunction with Code § 8.01-230 for the
separate determination of when the plaintiff's cause of action
accrued and when the limitations period began to run.
II. Conclusion
Because I believe the Court fundamentally errs in its duty
to construe the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2, I must
respectfully dissent.
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