Mark Shawn Wallace v. Commonwealth ( 1997 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Overton
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    MARK SHAWN WALLACE
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.          Record No. 0795-96-3           JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
    FEBRUARY 25, 1997
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG
    Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge
    Sharon K. Eimer, Senior Assistant Public
    Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on
    brief), for appellant.
    Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
    General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee.
    Mark Shawn Wallace was convicted by a jury of malicious
    wounding and the use of a firearm in the commission of malicious
    wounding.    He appeals, contending (1) that the evidence does not
    prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) that the trial
    court erred by barring the defendant’s evidence of mitigating
    circumstances at the sentencing phase.    We affirm as to the first
    issue but remand for resentencing as to the second.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record in the
    cause, and because this memorandum opinion carries no
    precedential value, no recitation of the facts is necessary.
    On appeal, the evidence must be viewed in a light most
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    favorable to the Commonwealth.     See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth,
    
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).    A judgment will
    not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without
    evidence to support it.     See Traverso v. Commonwealth, 
    6 Va. App. 172
    , 176, 
    366 S.E.2d 719
    , 721 (1988).    “Whether malice existed is
    a question for the jury.”     Branch v. Commonwealth, 
    14 Va. App. 836
    , 841, 
    419 S.E.2d 422
    , 426 (1992); Essex v. Commonwealth, 
    228 Va. 273
    , 280, 
    322 S.E.2d 216
    , 220 (1984).    The defendant’s
    conduct and words at the time of the incident and thereafter may
    be used to show malice.     See Slusher v. Commonwealth, 
    196 Va. 440
    , 445, 
    83 S.E.2d 719
    , 721 (1954).
    The record contains ample evidence for the jury to conclude
    that Wallace acted with malice.    Wallace shot the victim at a
    distance of five to six feet.    He said, “Let’s go,” immediately
    afterwards.   He rendered no assistance to the bleeding victim
    lying next to him for several minutes after the shooting.      He
    wiped off the gun and disposed of it.    When questioned, Wallace
    denied seeing or hearing anything.     This evidence clearly
    supports the jury’s conclusion that Wallace maliciously wounded
    the victim.
    Wallace also argues that he should have been allowed to
    present evidence of mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase,
    even though the Commonwealth presented no evidence of a criminal
    record.   We agree, based on our decision in Pierce v.
    Commonwealth, 
    21 Va. App. 581
    , 
    466 S.E.2d 130
     (1996).     We
    2
    therefore remand for a new sentencing proceeding to be conducted
    under the revised Code § 19.2-295.1, in which the defendant may
    introduce evidence relevant to punishment regardless of whether
    the Commonwealth presents evidence of a criminal record.
    Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and remand for
    resentencing.
    Affirmed in part,
    reversed in part,
    and remanded.
    3