James Anthony Clark v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Annunziata
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
JAMES ANTHONY CLARK
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2226-99-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
NOVEMBER 14, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KING AND QUEEN COUNTY
Thomas B. Hoover, Judge
John W. Luxton (Morchower, Luxton & Whaley,
on brief), for appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
James Anthony Clark was convicted in a bench trial of
malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51. On appeal,
Clark argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction. We disagree and affirm the conviction.
BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence proved that on the evening prior to the charged offense,
the victim, Michael Dale Johnson, went to a party where his cousin
Robert Berry and the defendant James Clark, were working
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
as DJs. When Johnson arrived at the party, he refused to pay the
required coverage charge, and an argument ensued between Johnson
and Clark. After the argument, Johnson left the party and waited
in Berry's car until after the party in order to be taken home by
Berry.
The next evening, both Johnson and Clark attended another
party. Johnson was dancing with a female companion, and Clark was
there with his wife. According to Johnson, Clark "rushed" at him
and swung at him stating: "I'm going to fuck you up." Clark
asked Johnson to step outside, but Johnson refused, stating that
he did not want any trouble because he was already on probation.
Johnson testified that the two "got locked up" and they had to be
separated by other people at the party. Johnson then saw Clark
walk toward the door. Other witnesses testified that Clark left
the building, but Clark testified that he had stopped to talk to
the owner when he saw an argument ensue between Johnson and Berry.
Clark decided to intervene. At that point, according to Johnson,
Berry approached him and shoved him and Johnson shoved Berry in
return. While Johnson and Berry were shoving one another, Johnson
"sensed" somebody coming up from behind him. As Johnson turned
around, Clark struck Johnson with his fist in the eye. Clark
acknowledged that he walked back over to Johnson and struck him
once in the eye. Johnson fell to the ground and then Clark stood
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over him and continued to strike Johnson three or four times in
the back of the head.
As a result of the blow to the eye, Johnson sustained a
one-half inch laceration on the eyeball, causing permanent loss of
sight in his right eye. The medical evidence was that Johnson's
injury was consistent with direct blunt trauma to the eye.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Clark argues that, at most, the evidence proves
assault and battery and fails to prove that he acted maliciously
with the intent to maim, disable, or disfigure Johnson. Clark
asserts that the uncontroverted evidence is that he struck Johnson
in the face only once and that no evidence proves he struck the
one blow with such violence or brutality to establish he harbored
the intent to maim or kill Johnson. Malice, he argues, can not be
inferred from a single blow with a bare fist.
"On review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party, and grant to it all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Robertson v.
Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 814, 820, 525 S.E.2d 640, 643 (2000)
(citation omitted). "The judgment of a trial court sitting
without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict,
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or
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without evidence to support it." Beck v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.
App. 170, 172, 342 S.E.2d 642, 643 (1986).
To sustain a conviction for malicious wounding under Code
§ 18.2-51, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant
inflicted the victim's injuries "maliciously and with the intent
to maim, disfigure, disable or kill." Campbell v. Commonwealth,
12 Va. App. 476, 483, 405 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991) (en banc).
"'"Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally,
or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will. It
may be directly evidenced by words, or inferred from acts and
conduct which necessarily result in injury."'" Hernandez v.
Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 626, 631, 426 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1993)
(citations omitted). "Malice is evidenced either when the
accused acted with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design,
or committed any purposeful and cruel act without any or without
great provocation." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836,
841, 419 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1992) (citation omitted). Whether
malice existed is a question for the fact finder. Id."Intent in fact is the purpose formed in a person's mind,
which may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the offense,
including the person's conduct and his statements. And a person
is presumed to intend the immediate, direct, and necessary
consequences of his voluntary act." Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218
Va. 548, 551, 238 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1977) (citations omitted).
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"'Under ordinary circumstances, an intent to maim may not be
presumed from a blow with a bare fist. But an assault with a
bare fist may be attended with such circumstances of violence
and brutality that an intent to kill may be presumed.'"
Williams v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 393, 397, 412 S.E.2d 202,
205 (1991) (citation omitted).
Here, Clark's threatening words that he intended "to fuck
[Johnson] up" and Clark's invitation for Johnson "to go outside,"
Clark's return to join the fight between Berry and Johnson, the
force of Clark's initial blow and the severity of Johnson's
injury, and the fact that Clark continued to beat Johnson when he
was on the floor and had to be pulled away, were sufficient
evidence for the fact finder to conclude that Clark acted with a
malicious intent to maim, disfigure, or disable Johnson.
Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to support the
conviction.
Affirmed.
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