Frank E. Pennington, Jr. v. Commonwealth ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Elder and Bray
Argued at Salem, Virginia
FRANK E. PENNINGTON, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1346-95-3 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
FEBRUARY 4, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY
Kenneth E. Trabue, Judge Designate
John E. Lichtenstein (Charles M. Smith, Jr.;
Lichtenstein & Fishwick, P.L.C., on briefs),
for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General;
Margaret Ann B. Walker, Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Frank E. Pennington, Jr., (defendant) was convicted by a
jury for first degree murder and related use of a firearm. On
appeal, he complains that the trial court erroneously refused
(1) to strike for cause a prospective juror with demonstrable
bias, and (2) to suppress defendant's statement to police. For
the reasons that follow, we reverse the convictions and remand
for a new trial.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
IMPARTIALITY OF JUROR STUART
An accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to trial
by "an impartial jury." U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Va. Const.
art. I § 8; see Code § 8.01-358; Rule 3A:14. "Trial courts, as
the guardians of this fundamental right, have the duty to procure
an impartial jury," a responsibility primarily discharged
"through meaningful voir dire." Griffin v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.
App. 619, 621, 454 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1995).
"[T]he test of impartiality is whether the venireperson can
lay aside . . . preconceived views and render a verdict based
solely on the law and evidence presented at trial." Id.
Persistence in a "view . . . inconsistent with an ability to give
an accused a fair and impartial trial, or . . . a misapprehension
of law," determined in the "context of the entire voir dire,"
mandates exclusion of a prospective juror. Sizemore v.
Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 208, 211-12, 397 S.E.2d 408, 410-11
(1990). Reasonable doubt that a juror possesses the ability to
render a fair and impartial service must be resolved in favor of
the accused. See Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298, 227
S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976).
"The partiality or impartiality of an individual juror is a
factual issue best determined by the trial court." Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 480, 331 S.E.2d 422, 431 (1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1099 (1986). On appeal, "we must give deference
to the trial court's decision whether to retain or exclude
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individual veniremen because the trial court 'sees and hears the
juror.'" Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d
385, 391 (1990) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426
(1985)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991). Hence, we will not
disturb the trial court's decision "absent a showing of 'manifest
error.'" Id. (quoting Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 94,
393 S.E.2d 609, 619, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990)).
Here, during individual voir dire, venireperson Stuart
indicated in response to several inquiries by the court and
counsel that she "would try" to presume defendant innocent and
afford him a fair trial, despite her "religious beliefs"
pertaining to "tak[ing] another one's life." When further
questioned whether she "would . . . vote for acquittal," "if at
the end of the case [she had] a reasonable doubt as to whether
the Commonwealth . . . proved" defendant's guilt, she responded,
"if . . . they can't prove that he did it, sure, you'd have to
vote for acquittal," adding later, "[As long as] they prove that
he didn't do it, you know." (Emphasis added). Brief additional
voir dire provided little assurance that Stuart understood and
would apply the proper burden of proof.
Viewing Stuart's voir dire in its entirety, we find that the
record discloses a series of tentative, equivocal responses to
questioning intended to probe and ascertain Stuart's state of
mind, leaving reasonable doubt of her partiality as a matter of
law and requiring that she be removed for cause. See Griffin, 19
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Va. App. at 622-26, 454 S.E.2d at 365-66. Under such
circumstances, it was reversible error to require defendant to
exhaust a peremptory strike to remove the juror. See, e.g.,
Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 451, 339 S.E.2d 899,
900-01 (1986), aff'd, 233 Va. 5, 353 S.E.2d 460 (1987).
DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In reviewing the ruling on a suppression motion, we assess
the evidence in the "light most favorable to . . . the prevailing
party below," the Commonwealth in this instance, and the decision
of the trial court will be disturbed only if plainly wrong.
Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47,
48 (1991). Our consideration of the record includes evidence
adduced at both trial and suppression hearings, if any. See
DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 583, 359 S.E.2d 540,
542-43 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 985 (1988). To prevail on
appeal, the defendant must "show . . . that the denial of [his]
motion . . . constitute[d] reversible error." Motley v.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41, 437 S.E.2d 232, 233
(1993).
Assuming, without deciding, that Detective Kern's stop of
defendant exceeded the jurisdictional limitations of Code
§ 19.2-249, such violation does not necessitate suppression of
related evidence. See, e.g., Troncoso v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.
App. 942, 944, 407 S.E.2d 349, 350 (1991). We have previously
held that
"historically, searches or seizures made
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contrary to provisions contained in Virginia
statutes provide no right of suppression
unless the statute supplies that right."
Virginia employs the rule . . . that evidence
obtained in violation of constitutional
proscriptions against unreasonable searches
and seizures may not be used against an
accused. However, our Supreme Court has
steadfastly refused to extend that rule to
encompass evidence [obtained] pursuant to
statutory violations, absent an express
statutory provision for suppression.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 8 Va. App. 41, 44, 378 S.E.2d
623, 625 (1989) (Baker, J., concurring)) (other citations
omitted).
The constitutional implications of the subject seizure 1 are
governed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny.
Police may conduct an investigatory stop when armed with
reasonable and articulable suspicion that an individual "'is
committing, has committed or is about to commit' a crime." Layne
v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 23, 25, 421 S.E.2d 215, 216 (1992)
(quoting Simmons v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 552, 557, 231 S.E.2d
218, 221-22 (1977)). In assessing the constitutionality of a
stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances,
including the length of the detention, its purposes and attendant
requirements, and the officer's diligence and choice of
investigative means. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
1
"'When the police stop a motor vehicle and detain an
occupant, this constitutes a seizure of the person for Fourth
Amendment purposes . . . .'" Logan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App.
437, 441, 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994) (reh'g en banc) (quoting
Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709
(1988)).
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685-86 (1985); DePriest, 4 Va. App. at 587, 359 S.E.2d at 545.
These factors must be assessed objectively, and the officer's
motivations are of no relevance "as long as the circumstances
. . . justify that action." Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417,
420-21 (1996) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138
(1978)); see Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774
(1996).
Here, Detective Kern was aware that Bedford County police
were en route to arrest defendant on two misdemeanor warrants.
He, therefore, properly detained defendant, pending the imminent
arrival of the Bedford officers. Kern also "wanted to talk to
[defendant]" relative to Kern's investigation of an unsolved
murder and questioned him while awaiting the Bedford officers.
However, Kern's primary motivation does not displace other
justifications for the stop.
The trial court, therefore, correctly denied defendant's
motion to suppress, but erroneously denied the motion to strike
juror Stuart for cause. Accordingly, we reverse the convictions
and remand the proceedings for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
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