CW, DSS,DCSE,ex rel.Lorene Bryant v. Ernest Carlton ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Bray
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ex rel.
LORENE BRYANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1387-99-1 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
FEBRUARY 29, 2000
ERNEST CARLTON
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge
Maryann Shea Bright, Special Counsel (Beth J.
Edwards, Regional Special Counsel; Mark L.
Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L. Taylor,
Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Robert B.
Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney
General; Craig M. Burshem, Regional Special
Counsel, on briefs), for appellant.
J. Barry McCracken (Cook & McCracken, on
brief), for appellee.
The Commonwealth's Department of Social Services (DSS)
appeals from a decision of the Norfolk Circuit Court holding
that it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (UIFSA), Code §§ 20-88.32 to 20-88.82, to register
for enforcement a North Carolina order directing Ernest Carlton
to reimburse the State of North Carolina for a "past public
assistance debt" of $6,170. On appeal, DSS contends the trial
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
court erroneously (1) refused to confirm registration of the
order after Carlton failed to contest the registration within
twenty days as required by UIFSA and (2) held the order was
unenforceable under UIFSA because it was not "for the benefit of
a child." Pursuant to our recent holding in Department of
Social Services v. Chamberlain, __ Va. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___
(2000), we hold that the foreign order was enforceable under
UIFSA and that the trial court erred in refusing to confirm the
registration which occurred by operation of law. Therefore, we
vacate the order of dismissal and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We hold first that the written record on appeal establishes
the public assistance benefits for which Wayne County, North
Carolina, sought reimbursement were paid on behalf of Sabrina
Thomas, Carlton's child. Although the order attached to the
request for registration does not explicitly so state, this is
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from its contents.
That order lists the plaintiff as "COUNTY OF WAYNE EX REL.
LORENE BRYANT" and indicates that Carlton was adjudicated the
father of Thomas. It also states that "the plaintiff is not
seeking child support" at this time and that "the defendant is
believed to be an able bodied individual and able to pay child
support and is able to repay said public assistance debt."
Based on those findings, the court ordered Carlton to repay to
the State of North Carolina the amount of $6,170 in installments
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of $100 per month. The only reasonable interpretation of this
order is that the public assistance debt accrued as a result of
benefits paid to Lorene Bryant on behalf of Sabrina Thomas.
Based on our recent decision in Chamberlain, __ Va. App. at
___, ___ S.E.2d at ___, we hold the legislature contemplated
that a state or political subdivision could register an order
for enforcement under UIFSA and obtain thereunder reimbursement
for public assistance benefits already paid on behalf of a
child. Although Chamberlain involved a support order entered in
Virginia rather than the state in which the public assistance
debt was owed, the underlying principles are the same. When
read in conjunction, UIFSA's definitions of "support order" and
"obligee" make clear that a state or political subdivision is
entitled under UIFSA to register an order for enforcement and to
obtain thereunder reimbursement or arrearages for benefits paid
on behalf of a child. See id.; see also UIFSA § 101 cmt.
(amended 1996), 9 U.L.A. 235, 259 (1999) (noting that "the
'obligee' may be a support enforcement agency that has been
assigned the right to receive support payments in order to
recoup [certain public assistance payments]" and that "[e]ven in
the absence of such an assignment, a state may have an
independent claim for reimbursement for general assistance
provided to . . . a child of an obligor").
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in
concluding that the foreign order was not subject to
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registration under UIFSA. Because appellant failed timely to
contest registration of the order and the order was, in fact,
subject to registration under the Act, "both the registered
order and the certified statement of arrearages . . . filed with
the order [were] confirmed by operation of law." Slawski v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 29 Va. App. 721, 723, 514 S.E.2d 773,
774 (1999). Therefore, we vacate the order of dismissal and
remand to the circuit court to "enter an order confirming the
registration, as required under the statutory scheme." Id. at
723, 514 S.E.2d at 775.
Vacated and remanded.
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