Ottis Lee Wainwright v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
OTTIS LEE WAINWRIGHT
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0166-99-2 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
MAY 16, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Margaret P. Spencer, Judge
Gregory W. Franklin, Assistant Public
Defender (David J. Johnson, Public Defender,
on brief), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Ottis Lee Wainwright, appellant, appeals his convictions for
rape, forcible sodomy, abduction with intent to defile, and
robbery. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by
allowing the prosecution to use appellant's previously suppressed
statement for a purpose other than impeachment. For the following
reasons, we find no error and affirm the convictions.
Facts
On the morning of April 11, 1998, the victim was walking near
the intersection of "1st Street and James" when appellant grabbed
her and forced her to walk with him. Appellant threatened to kill
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
the victim if she screamed, and told her to act like they were
"girlfriend and boyfriend" as they walked. Appellant took the
victim directly to a nearby abandoned house where there was a
mattress on the floor. Appellant, while promising not to do
anything to his victim if she stayed quiet, put her on the
mattress and removed some of her clothing. Appellant put his
tongue on the victim's vagina. Thereafter, he put his penis into
her vagina. The victim was crying and begging to leave so she
could see her "little girl" again. Appellant said he would not
kill her if she stayed quiet. Then appellant sat on top of his
victim and forced her to suck his penis. After several other acts
of sodomy, appellant had sexual intercourse again with his victim.
When appellant was finished, he helped the victim dress.
Appellant took $335 and a pack of bus tickets from the victim's
pocketbook. As appellant and the victim walked away from the
abandoned house, he told her "to walk out here like nothing
happened." Appellant walked up "Saint James Street," and the
victim fled to a friend's house.
At trial, appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with
the victim, "playing" with her vagina, and putting his penis into
her mouth, but denied that he threatened or forced her to commit
these acts. Appellant claimed that when he saw the victim walking
on the street, she proposed to have sex with him for $15.
According to appellant, the victim told him to follow her and she
led him to a mattress located at the back of a house. Appellant
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claimed he did not know where they were going or that a mattress
was at the house. After the encounter, the victim asked for her
$15, but appellant only had $5. Appellant claimed the victim
refused to accept his $5 and said she wanted her money if she ever
saw him again. Appellant denied taking anything from the victim's
pocketbook.
During cross-examination, appellant explained that a "smitty"
was "an old house that's not used for anything." The prosecutor
questioned appellant about his knowledge of abandoned houses in
the vicinity of the house where the victim was raped. He admitted
that during the weekend of the incident, he had slept in an empty
house, but denied that it was in the "Saint James" area where the
incident occurred. The prosecutor confronted appellant with a
statement appellant had made to the police, and that was later
suppressed because of a Miranda violation, that on the night
before the incident, he had stayed in a "smitty" in "Saint James
bottom."
Analysis
Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in
allowing the prosecution to use his previously suppressed
statement during cross-examination about where he stayed the night
before the incident. It is well settled that a statement obtained
in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may be
used by the government to impeach the defendant's credibility if
he or she chooses to testify. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
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222, 226 (1971); Blaylock v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 579,
596-97, 496 S.E.2d 97, 105-06 (1998).
Appellant's statement to the police that he stayed in an
abandoned house in Saint James bottom the night before the
offenses contradicted his testimony on direct that he was not
familiar with the location where the crimes occurred.
Appellant's knowledge of the area where the crimes occurred and
his knowledge of whether a mattress was located in the abandoned
house was relevant to the validity and accuracy of his denials
that he accosted the victim and forced her to go to the
abandoned house. This subject was relevant to the proof of the
charged offenses, was not a collateral matter, and was a proper
subject of cross-examination and impeachment once appellant
offered himself as a witness. See Talbert v. Commonwealth, 17
Va. App. 239, 243, 436 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1993). Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in admitting appellant's statement for
impeachment purposes. 1
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
1
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial judge misspoke in
saying the evidence went to "motive," appellant's statement was
clearly admissible impeachment evidence. Therefore, the
judgment should be affirmed. See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14
Va. App. 449, 451, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (judgment upheld
where court reached right result for the wrong reason).
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