Ronnie James Goode v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Bumgardner
Argued at Salem, Virginia
RONNIE JAMES GOODE
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1643-98-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
SEPTEMBER 28, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG
Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge
Margaret A. Nelson, Senior Assistant Public
Defender, for appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Ronnie James Goode (appellant) was indicted by a grand jury
for possession of cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-250.
Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the cocaine found
on his person, contending that the police officer had neither a
warrant nor probable cause for an arrest. The trial court
denied the motion and subsequently convicted appellant in a
bench trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
On an appeal from a trial court's ruling on a suppression
motion, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
party prevailing below, in this case the Commonwealth. See
Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d
47, 48 (1991). However, "'[u]ltimate questions of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause . . . are reviewed de novo on
appeal.'" McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487
S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (quoting Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996)). Similarly, whether a seizure
occurred at all is both a factual and legal question for this
Court to review de novo. See id. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261.
The evidence established that approximately two weeks prior
to appellant's arrest, Officer Benedict (Benedict) and Officer
Graves (Graves) went to 2200 Poplar Street in the City of
Lynchburg and spoke to Emma Wade (Mrs. Wade), one of the owners
of the property. Mrs. Wade stated she was "interested in
getting a letter on file" to ensure that the police would
enforce the trespassing laws on her property. She also
indicated that she and her husband were elderly and that they
were the only two residents of the property. The letter, signed
by Mrs. Wade on February 23, 1998, stated the following:
In order to enforce the No Trespassing signs
posted on my property at 2200 Poplar
Street[,] I would like to request the
assistance of the Lynchburg Police
Department.
Increasingly, I have experienced problems
with trespassers on my porch and around my
yard. I have been advised that these
subjects are hiding there [sic] drugs behind
- 2 -
my house and selling them on the corner of
Poplar St. and Florida Ave.
At the time of the instant offense, Benedict was aware that Mrs.
Wade's letter requesting enforcement of the trespassing laws was
on file with the police department.
On March 3, 1998, at approximately 1:40 a.m., Benedict
drove by the Wade residence, which had the no trespassing sign
posted, and saw appellant and another individual "walking
through Wade's yard." The two men appeared to be between twenty
and forty years old, and the officer did not observe an elderly
man with them. Benedict also noticed that the lights in the
house were off. 1
Officer Benedict exited his vehicle and approached the two
men, stopping within two feet of appellant. Benedict testified
as follows:
Q. And did you get out of your vehicle and
approach him?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you speak with him?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you say to him, if anything?
A. When I got to him, I asked him if he
lived there.
1
The Commonwealth introduced into evidence a drawing of the
property, including the streets, residence, trespassing sign and
location of appellant when the officers first arrived on the
scene.
- 3 -
Q. And what was his response?
A. He said nothing.
* * * * * * *
Q. He didn't respond at all?
A. He said nothing at all.
Q. And did the other subject with him say
anything?
A. No.
Q. Did you see where his hands were?
A. Yes.
Q. Where were his hands?
A. He had some sort of shirt on [sic]
which had pockets in the front and he
had his hands in the pockets.
Q. Both hands?
A. Both hands.
Q. When the Defendant didn't respond to
your question, what did you do at that
point?
A. I placed him under arrest for
trespassing.
In a search incident to arrest, Benedict found a sandwich baggie
containing .39 grams of cocaine in the appellant's right hand.
Mrs. Wade testified that she had been acquainted with
appellant for about ten to fifteen years and she considered him
a friend. She had never denied appellant access to her
property, and he had been in her house on several occasions.
- 4 -
However, Mrs. Wade also stated that she had not given anyone
permission to be on her property late at night and that it was
uncommon for appellant to be there at that hour of the night.
The trial court found that Officer Benedict had probable
cause to arrest appellant and that the search incident to the
arrest was lawful. The trial judge stated as follows:
It's 1:40 in the morning. It's in the
middle of the night. [Appellant] was
walking through the yard in the vicinity of
a No Trespassing sign. I realize the sign
is facing the street, but the officer
doesn't know whether he approached the house
from the street and circled it or whether
he's casing the joint.
He doesn't know what's going on. And
when [appellant] doesn't answer, he's either
got to release him or arrest him. . . . Your
motion is overruled.
* * * * * * *
. . . The question is whether there was
probable cause to arrest [appellant] for
trespass at 1:40 a.m. in the morning when
he's walking on property and the police
observed him and there's a No Trespassing
sign in the vicinity. Actually, there are
two [individuals] on the property and the
police have been asked to enforce the no
trespass. . . . The motion is overruled.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found
appellant guilty as charged.
II.
Appellant concedes that Officer Benedict had a reasonable
basis to approach him and conduct a Terry stop. However, he
- 5 -
contends that the circumstances did not rise to the level of
probable cause to arrest for trespass solely because appellant
failed to respond to Benedict's inquiry whether appellant lived
on the property. He argues that Benedict was required to
conduct further investigation in order to establish probable
cause for arrest. Accordingly, the cocaine seized in the search
incident to his arrest should have been suppressed. We
disagree.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes three categories
of police-citizen confrontations, including the following: "(1)
consensual encounters, (2) brief, minimally intrusive
investigatory detentions, based upon specific, articulable
facts, commonly referred to as Terry stops, and (3) highly
intrusive arrests and searches founded on probable cause."
Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 169, 455 S.E.2d 744,
747 (1995) (citations omitted). "[P]robable cause exists when
the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and
of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense is being committed." Taylor v. Commonwealth,
222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 906 (1982).
Probable cause is determined by the totality of the
circumstances and does not require "an actual showing" of
- 6 -
criminal activity, but, rather, "only a probability or
substantial chance" of such activity. Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). Additionally, we have recognized
that "[t]rained and experienced officers . . . may be able to
perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be
wholly innocent to the untrained observer." Richards v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 612, 616, 383 S.E.2d 268, 270-71
(1989).
In the instant case, Officer Benedict observed appellant
and another man walking through the yard of the home of an
elderly couple in the middle of the night. The lights in the
house were off. Benedict knew that the owners did not want
trespassers on their property and that Mrs. Wade had signed a
letter requesting police enforcement of the posted no
trespassing signs. The letter also indicated that Mrs. Wade
"experienced problems with trespassers on [her] porch and around
[her] yard." The letter specified that with the exception of
her, her husband, and a few guests, there should be no one else
on her property. Additionally, the area was known for illegal
drug sales. When Benedict approached appellant and asked if he
lived in the house, appellant did not respond, but stood silent,
with his hands in his pockets. Under the totality of the
circumstances, Benedict had probable cause to arrest appellant
for trespassing. See Langston v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 276,
- 7 -
283-84, 504 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1998) (holding that the defendant's
actions, standing and walking on property known to be abandoned
with "no trespassing" signs, gave the officers probable cause to
believe that defendant was trespassing); see also Jordan v.
Commonwealth, 207 Va. 591, 596, 151 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1966)
(holding that "a police officer may arrest without a warrant
when a misdemeanor is committed in his presence, and . . . when
a person without authority of law goes upon the lands, buildings
or premises of another after having been forbidden to do so by a
sign or signs . . ."). 2 Because Officer Benedict had probable
cause to arrest appellant for trespassing, the search incident
to arrest was lawful. Accordingly, appellant's conviction is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
2
Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 491 S.E.2d 721 (1997),
is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Ewell,
the Supreme Court held the arresting officer did not have a
reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have been engaged in
trespassing or any other activity. The Court noted that the
officer "merely observed an unfamiliar automobile and its
operator in the parking lot of the apartment complex about 12:30
a.m." Id. at 217, 491 S.E.2d at 723. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the defendant was seized in violation of her
Fourth Amendment rights. See id. However, in the present case,
appellant was walking in the yard of a private residence at
1:40 a.m. Officer Benedict was patrolling the area in response
to a specific request to enforce the no trespassing signs, and
he was aware that the property owners experienced problems with
drug sales in their yard.
- 8 -