Maurice Lance Duhart v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2019 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Humphreys and Russell
Argued at Leesburg, Virginia
MAURICE LANCE DUHART
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1672-18-4 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
NOVEMBER 12, 2019
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Richard E. Gardiner, Judge
Melissa Hasanbelliu, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Matthew P. Dullaghan, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
On January 10, 2017, appellant Maurice Lance Duhart (“Duhart”) pleaded guilty to three
counts of hit and run, in violation of Code § 46.2-894; unauthorized use of a vehicle, in violation
of Code § 18.2-102; and driving on a suspended license, in violation of Code § 46.2-301. The
Circuit Court of Fairfax County (“circuit court”) convicted Duhart of all charges. On April 7,
2017, the circuit court sentenced Duhart to sixteen years of incarceration, with six years
suspended.
On appeal, Duhart assigns the following three errors:
I. The trial court erred when it denied Mr. Duhart’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Sentence for lack of jurisdiction.
II. Prior decisions of Virginia Courts upholding the denial of
jurisdiction for Motions to Reconsider after a transfer to the
Department of Corrections, including Stokes v.
Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 388, 736 S.E.2d 330 (2013),
Holland v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 445, 749 S.E.2d 206
(2013), and Coe v. Commonwealth, Record No. 3293-02-2,
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
2004 Va. App. LEXIS 181 (Mar. 2, 2004) are wrongly decided
and must be overturned or modified.
III. The trial court erred when it failed to rule on the merits of
Mr. Duhart’s Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
On appeal, the facts concerning Duhart’s guilty pleas to multiple driving offenses are not
at issue. Duhart only alleges error related to his sentencing. On April 7, 2017, the circuit court
held a sentencing hearing during which it agreed to continue the issue of restitution until May 5,
2017. In sentencing Duhart, the circuit court explained that it was going to “depart above the
guidelines” because of “the heinousness of this offense.” On April 17, 2017, the circuit court
entered its sentencing order. The hearing on the issue of restitution was continued multiple
times, and restitution was eventually determined on August 18, 2017. That same day, the circuit
court also entered an order prohibiting Duhart from being transferred to the custody of the
Department of Corrections from the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center while his motion to
reconsider was pending.
On November 17, 2017, Duhart filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, asking for
a modification or suspension under Code § 19.2-303. Duhart argued that he had not been
transferred to the Department of Corrections and that there were mitigating circumstances
present, including his eligibility for the Men’s Recovery Program. He requested that the circuit
court suspend a period of his active sentence or that the case be reviewed in approximately six
months to allow him to complete the Men’s Recovery Program while at the Adult Detention
Center. The matter was scheduled for June 1, 2018, but Duhart requested a continuance so that
he could complete the Men’s Recovery Program. The circuit court continued the case to August
3, 2018.
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However, on January 29, 2018, Duhart was transferred from the Fairfax County Adult
Detention Center to Nottoway Correctional Center, despite the circuit court’s prior order that
Duhart remain at Fairfax County Adult Detention Center. According to the Department of
Corrections (“DOC”), Nottoway Correctional Center is “a DOC reception unit, where offenders
newly received into DOC institutions undergo thorough screening, assessment, and orientation
regarding procedures, rules, programs, and services.” On March 3, 2018, “Duhart’s initial
classification was completed and approved.” On March 6, 2018, DOC cancelled Duhart’s initial
assignments and scheduled him to be returned to jail after Duhart’s counsel provided notice of
the pending case review. DOC transferred Duhart back to the Fairfax County Adult Detention
Center on March 14, 2018.
On August 3, 2018, after hearing Duhart’s argument on his November 17, 2017 motion to
reconsider, the circuit court asked the parties to address whether it still had jurisdiction. Duhart
argued that the Nottoway Correctional Center was a “sorting facility” and that Duhart was not
transferred “to the actual facility that he will be in.” Therefore, the circuit court still had
jurisdiction. The circuit court requested additional briefing on the jurisdictional issue and
continued the case until October 5, 2018. Duhart subsequently filed a memorandum in support
of his motion for reconsideration arguing that a “reception unit” was not the same as a “receiving
unit.”
On October 5, 2018, the circuit court again heard argument on the motion for
reconsideration. The circuit court ruled, “I’m going to deny the motion to reconsider on the
ground that I don’t believe at this time that the [c]ourt has jurisdiction under Stokes [v.
Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 388 (2013),] which is a reported case of the Court of Appeals and
therefore one that binds this [c]ourt.” The circuit court clarified that it was only ruling on the
jurisdictional issue, not whether there were circumstances in mitigation. Without jurisdiction,
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the circuit court found that ruling on the merits would be “an advisory opinion.” The circuit
court entered an order denying the motion. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews issues regarding the circuit court’s jurisdiction and issues of statutory
interpretation de novo. See Holland v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 445, 451 (2013). When
construing a statute, “[this Court] must presume that the General Assembly chose, with care, the
words that appear in a statute, and must apply the statute in a manner faithful to that choice.”
Jones v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 412, 415 (2018) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 292 Va.
738, 742 (2016)). “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we are bound by
the plain meaning of that statutory language.” Id. (quoting Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va.
759, 769 (2007)).
B. Denial of Motion for Reconsideration for Lack of Jurisdiction
Duhart first argues that the circuit court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to
decide his motion for reconsideration because the circuit court had jurisdiction under Code
§ 19.2-303. Code § 19.2-303 is one of the limited exceptions to Virginia Supreme Court Rule
1:1. See Holland, 62 Va. App. at 452. Under Rule 1:1, “All final judgments, orders, and
decrees, irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the control of the trial court and
subject to be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no
longer.” Rule 1:1(a). “Thus, once the twenty-one-day time period following the entry of a final
sentencing order has run without modification, vacation, or suspension of that order, the trial
court loses jurisdiction to disturb the order, unless an exception to Rule 1:1 applies.” Patterson
v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 610, 614 (2003). The exception found in Code § 19.2-303
provides,
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If a person has been sentenced for a felony to the Department of
Corrections but has not actually been transferred to a receiving unit
of the Department, the court which heard the case, if it appears
compatible with the public interest and there are circumstances in
mitigation of the offense, may, at any time before the person is
transferred to the Department, suspend or otherwise modify the
unserved portion of such a sentence.
Here, it is undisputed that more than twenty-one days had passed from the time the circuit
court sentenced Duhart until he filed his motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the relevant
issue is whether Duhart’s transfer to Nottoway Correctional Center on January 29, 2018,
extinguished the circuit court’s jurisdiction under Code § 19.2-303.
Duhart argues that he was never in DOC custody within the meaning of the statute. He
argues that in order to defeat jurisdiction, the statute requires him to have been transferred to a
“receiving unit,” but the circuit court retained jurisdiction because he was transferred to a
“reception unit” of the Department. Duhart further argues that the “reception unit” at Nottoway
Correctional Center was used for classification. Therefore, “[b]y cancelling his classification,
the Department did not actually transfer Mr. Duhart to his final destination, or the location he
would be received to serve his sentence.”
The phrase “receiving unit” is not defined in the Code of Virginia. “Because ‘[a] statute
is not to be construed by singling out a particular phrase,’ we must also consider the disputed
portion in context.” JSR Mech., Inc. v. Aireco Supply, Inc., 291 Va. 377, 384 (2016) (alteration
in original) (quoting Eberhardt v. Fairfax Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs., 283 Va. 190, 195
(2012)). “[S]tatutes are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as
parts of a great connected, homogenous system, or a single and complete statutory arrangement.”
Id. (quoting Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405 (1957)).
In construing the phrase “receiving unit,” Code § 53.1-20 is instructive. It states in
relevant part, “Persons convicted of felonies committed on or after January 1, 1995, and
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sentenced to the Department . . . shall be placed in the custody of the Department and received
by the Director into the state corrections system within sixty days . . . .” Code § 53.1-20(B)
(emphasis added). Subsection E states,
Felons committed to the custody of the Department for a new
felony offense shall be received by the Director into the state
corrections system in accordance with the provisions of this
section without any delay for resolution of (i) issues of alleged
parole violations set for hearing before the Parole Board or (ii) any
other pending parole-related administrative matter.
Code § 53.1-20(E) (emphasis added). When read in conjunction with Code § 19.2-303, it
appears that a “receiving unit” is merely a generic term for the facility where a person is first
“received” into DOC custody. It does not refer to the specific facility where a person is assigned
to serve his or her sentence, as Duhart suggests.
Duhart’s argument misconstrues the statute’s plain meaning and is inconsistent with this
Court’s interpretive caselaw. Duhart’s proposed interpretation unnaturally isolates the phrase
“receiving unit” from the context of the entire statute. Although the first clause of Code
§ 19.2-303 does use the phrase “receiving unit,” the second clause refers to DOC generally,
stating, “before the person is transferred to the Department.” The statute, taken as a whole,
simply refers to a person’s transfer into DOC custody. The phrases “transferred to a receiving
unit of the Department” and “any time before the person is transferred to the Department” are
simply alternative ways of expressing the concept of DOC custody. The statute, in its entirety,
expresses clear legislative intent that the operative point in time for the circuit court to lose
jurisdiction over a case where a felon has been sentenced to prison is when a defendant begins
serving their sentence under the supervision of the Department of Corrections,1 which formally
1
See Holland, 62 Va. App. at 449 (finding that the circuit court’s jurisdiction was
terminated “upon Holland’s transfer to the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections”
(emphasis added)); see also Stokes, 61 Va. App. at 393 (“The burden is on the appellant, as the
moving party, to prove that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the matter by showing . . . that
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occurs when the person initially enters any DOC facility. Further, this Court has never
interpreted “receiving unit” as requiring a finding that a defendant be transferred to a specific
facility within DOC.2
In this case, Duhart was transferred to Nottoway Correctional Center, where the record
reflects that “offenders newly received into DOC institutions undergo thorough screening,
assessment, and orientation regarding procedures, rules, programs, and services.” Nottoway
Correctional Center is clearly a “receiving unit” as contemplated by the statute. Duhart was
transferred into DOC custody upon his arrival to Nottoway Correctional Center, thereby ending
the circuit court’s active jurisdiction under Code § 19.2-303.
Duhart also argues that “the location of the defendant at the time of the hearing is a
significant factor the court should consider.” However, it is immaterial that Duhart was
transferred back to Fairfax County Adult Detention Center, where he was located at the time of
the circuit court’s August and October 2018 hearings. “When read in conjunction with Rule 1:1,
Code § 19.2-303 establishes an absolute event, i.e., a transfer to the Department of Corrections,
when a trial court can no longer modify a sentence.” Stokes, 61 Va. App. at 394 (emphasis
the defendant had not been transferred to the custody of the Department of Corrections.”
(emphasis added)); see also Harris v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 205, 212 (2010) (stating the
burden to show “that the defendant had not been transferred to the custody of the Department of
Corrections” (emphasis added)); see also Neely v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 239, 240 (2004)
(holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction under Code § 19.2-303 because “the evidence did
not establish that the defendant had been transferred to the custody of the Virginia Department of
Corrections” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 271 Va. 1 (2006).
2
See Stokes, 61 Va. App. at 394 (“When read in conjunction with Rule 1:1, Code
§ 19.2-303 establishes an absolute event, i.e., a transfer to the Department of Corrections, when
a trial court can no longer modify a sentence.” (emphasis added)); see also Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 631, 640 (2009) (finding that it was error for the circuit court to
find that it did not have jurisdiction when the defendant had “not yet transferred to the
Department of Corrections” (emphasis added)); see also Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App.
600, 605 (1999) (“We hold that Code § 19.2-303 reflects the legislature’s intent to provide for
review and suspension of sentences imposed for all felony convictions provided the defendant
has not been sent to the Department of Corrections.” (emphasis added)).
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added). In other words, once Duhart was transferred into DOC custody, by transfer to Nottoway
Correctional Center, the circuit court lost jurisdiction absolutely. Any subsequent temporary
transfer back to Fairfax County Adult Detention Center does not serve to reinstate the circuit
court’s jurisdiction.
Because more than twenty-one days from the circuit court’s entry of judgment had
elapsed, and Duhart’s transfer to DOC custody defeated exercise of the circuit court’s
jurisdiction under the statutory exception found in Code § 19.2-303, the circuit court did not err
in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Duhart’s motion.
C. Overruling or Modifying Existing Precedent
Although Duhart invites this Court to overturn or modify our precedent affecting his first
assignment of error, he acknowledges that a three-judge panel lacks the authority to do so under
the interpanel accord doctrine. See Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 293 (2011)
(explaining that a decision by a panel of the Court “cannot be overruled except by the Court of
Appeals sitting en banc or by the Virginia Supreme Court” (quoting Clinchfield Coal Co. v.
Reed, 40 Va. App. 69, 73 (2003))). Instead, Duhart presents the argument to “preserve his
ability to raise the issue before the Court of Appeals sitting en banc and/or the Supreme Court of
Virginia.” Consequently, while noting his position, we hold that the circuit court did not err in
relying on clear precedent from this Court.
D. Failing to Rule on the Merits
“[A] court ‘always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.’” Holland, 62
Va. App. at 454 (quoting Lewis v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son Jr., Inc., 266 Va. 513, 516 (2003)).
However, it is error for a circuit court to address the merits of a motion when it erroneously
concludes that it has jurisdiction to address it. See id. Here, Duhart acknowledges that a circuit
court cannot rule on the merits when it lacks jurisdiction. However, he argues that under Rule
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5A:12(c)(1), the circuit court erred by not making a ruling. This argument is without merit.
Rule 5A:12(c)(1) relates only to the requirements for assignments of error in a petition for
appeal. See 5A:12(c)(1) (“If the error relates to failure of the tribunal or court below to rule on
any issue, error must be assigned to such failure to rule, providing an exact reference to the
page(s) of the record where the issue was preserved in the tribunal below, and specifying the
opportunity that was provided to the tribunal or court to rule on the issue(s).”).
Because, as stated in subsection B, the circuit court lost jurisdiction, the circuit court
properly refused to rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration.
For these reasons, the judgment below is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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