Antonio Wright v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                                              COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Humphreys, Malveaux and Senior Judge Frank
    Argued at Hampton, Virginia
    UNPUBLISHED
    ANTONIO WRIGHT
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.     Record No. 1238-18-1                                     JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
    SEPTEMBER 17, 2019
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
    Leslie L. Lilley, Judge
    Melissa I. Bray, Senior Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Kelsey M. Bulger, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring,
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    Antonio Wright was convicted in a bench trial of providing false information to the Sex
    Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry and two counts of failing to register as a violent sex
    offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because
    “the Commonwealth failed to prove that appellant was previously convicted of a sexually violent
    offense.” For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    BACKGROUND
    “Under familiar principles of appellate review, we will state ‘the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court, and will accord the
    Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.’”
    Chavez v. Commonwealth, 
    69 Va. App. 149
    , 153 (2018) (quoting Sidney v. Commonwealth, 
    280 Va. 517
    , 520 (2010)).
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    The facts relevant to this appeal are uncontested. On April 9, 2003, in the Circuit Court
    for the City of Norfolk, Wright was convicted of carnal knowledge of a minor, in violation of
    Code § 18.2-63, and in an amended sentencing order entered April 28, 2005 was sentenced to
    five years of incarceration with three years suspended. As a result of his conviction, Wright was
    ordered to register with the Virginia State Police pursuant to Code § 19.2-298.11 within ten days
    of his release from confinement. Wright was required to re-register within ten days following
    any change of residence. The order also showed Wright’s date of birth as June 17, 1972, making
    him thirty years old at the time of his conviction.
    On June 13, 2003, Wright completed an SP 236, the “sex offender and crimes against
    minors registration form,” provided by the Virginia State Police. The form includes Wright’s
    social security number, date of birth, and photograph. It is noted on the form Wright had been
    convicted2 of carnal knowledge of a minor, in violation of Code § 18.2-63, and that the victim
    was thirteen years old.
    Between December 31, 2014, and August 1, 2016, Wright submitted five forms to the
    Virginia State Police. On each form, Wright signed his name next to the box labeled “Sexually
    Violent Offender.”
    Wright failed to re-register in September and October 2016 and failed to report his
    change of address on December 27, 2016.
    1
    Code § 19.2-298.1 was repealed in 2003, and subsequently replaced by Code §§ 9.1-900
    et seq.
    2
    We do not include the evidence to support these charges because Wright does not
    contest these convictions, but only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether he
    was a violent sex offender.
    -2-
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Wright contends the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was convicted
    of a violent sexual offense on April 9, 2003 in Norfolk Circuit Court.
    When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction,
    “the judgment of the trial court shall not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that
    such judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Code § 8.01-680. When
    reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court “must . . . ask whether ‘any rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Cheung
    v. Commonwealth, 
    63 Va. App. 1
    , 8 (2014) (quoting Crowder v. Commonwealth, 
    41 Va. App. 658
    , 663 (2003)). “If there is evidence to support the conviction, an appellate court is not
    permitted to substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact, even if the appellate court
    might reach a different conclusion.” 
    Id. (quoting Conrad
    v. Commonwealth, 
    31 Va. App. 113
    ,
    123 (1999) (en banc)). “This deferential standard of review ‘applies not only to the historical
    facts themselves, but [also to] the inferences from those facts.’” Bennett v. Commonwealth, 
    69 Va. App. 475
    , 492 (2018) (quoting 
    Crowder, 41 Va. App. at 663
    n.2).
    Code § 9.1-902(E) defines a “sexually violent offense,” in part, as a violation of
    Subsection A of § 18.2-63 where the perpetrator is more than five years older than the victim. A
    violation of § 18.2-63(B) is not a sexually violent offense.
    Code § 18.2-63 in its present form states, in part:
    A. If any person carnally knows, without the use of force, a child
    thirteen years of age or older but under fifteen years of age, such
    person shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
    B. If any person carnally knows, without the use of force, a child
    thirteen years of age or older but under fifteen years of age who
    consents to sexual intercourse and the accused is a minor, and such
    consenting child is three years or more the accused’s junior, the
    accused shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. If such consenting
    -3-
    child is less than three years the accused’s junior, the accused shall
    be guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor.
    Wright’s sole argument on appeal is that the conviction order of April 9, 2003 failed to
    state that he was convicted under subsection A. Wright correctly states that the order only shows
    a conviction under Code § 18.2-63 without indicating whether he was convicted under
    subsection A or B. Without such designation, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove
    a sexually violent offense and thus he could not be found guilty of violating Code § 18.2-472.1.3
    Wright’s argument ignores the provisions of Code § 18.2-63 at the time of the original
    conviction. That statute contained the exact same language as the present version, except for the
    lettered subparagraph.
    Prior to July 1, 2007, Code § 18.2-63, in pertinent part, read as follows:
    § 18.2-63. Carnal knowledge of child between thirteen and fifteen
    years of age.
    If any person carnally knows, without the use of force, a child
    thirteen years of age or older but under fifteen years of age, such
    person shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony. [now subsection A]
    However, if such child is thirteen years of age or older but under
    fifteen years of age and consents to sexual intercourse and the
    accused is a minor and such consenting child is three years or more
    the accussed’s junior, the accused shall be guilty of a Class 6
    felony. If such consenting child is less than three years the
    accused’s junior, the accused shall be guilty of a Class 4
    misdemeanor. [now subsection B]
    In calculating whether the child is three years or more a junior of
    the accused minor, the actual dates of birth of the child and the
    accused, respectively, shall be used.
    3
    Code § 18.2-472.1 states in part:
    B. Any person convicted of a sexually violent offense or murder,
    as defined in § 9.1-902, who knowingly fails to register or
    reregister, or who knowingly provides materially false information
    to the Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry is guilty
    of a Class 6 felony. A second or subsequent conviction for an
    offense under this subsection is a Class 5 felony.
    -4-
    Clearly, since Wright was an adult when the offense occurred, the second paragraph could not
    apply. We are left with the first paragraph, which falls under the sexually violent offender
    definition.
    Wright argues that he could have originally been convicted under what is now subsection
    B as part of a plea agreement. This argument is based on pure speculation. Hypotheses of
    innocence that must be excluded “are those which flow from the evidence itself, and not from the
    imaginations of defense counsel.” Cook v. Commonwealth, 
    226 Va. 427
    , 433 (1983).
    It should be noted that Wright acknowledged that he was a violent sex offender by
    initially registering every ninety days, as required by Code § 18.2-472.1. Between December
    2014 and August 2016 he signed five forms with his signature next to the box labeled “Sexually
    Violent Offender.”
    We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Wright’s prior conviction
    constituted a sexually violent offense and that he was required to register as a sexually violent
    offender. The judgment is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1238181

Filed Date: 9/17/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/17/2019