Steven Lamont Carney v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Retired Judge Olitsky*
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    STEVEN LAMONT CARNEY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION ** BY
    v.   Record No. 0137-99-2                   JUDGE NORMAN OLITSKY
    JULY 18, 2000
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
    Robert W. Duling, Judge
    Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender
    (David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on
    brief), for appellant.
    Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Steven Lamont Carney, appellant, was convicted of robbery and
    the use of a firearm in the commission of robbery.      Appellant
    argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove he
    committed the offenses.    We affirm his convictions.
    FACTS
    "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'"     Archer v.
    *
    Retired Judge Norman Olitsky took part in the
    consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code
    § 17.1-400, recodifying Code § 17-116.01.
    **
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 1
    , 11, 
    492 S.E.2d 826
    , 831 (1997)
    (citation omitted).    Officer John Rockwood testified that on
    June 23, 1998 at approximately 2:45 to 3:00 a.m., he was
    traveling in a marked police vehicle with Officer Charles
    Edmonds.   As they approached a parking lot, they saw four men
    standing in a group.   Two of the men had their hands up.
    Rockwood testified that appellant and the other man were
    "[h]olding guns on them."   Rockwood then saw appellant "reach
    out and grab something off the chest" of Tesfa Borland.
    Rockwood testified that the item "turned out to be a gold
    medallion necklace."
    When appellant and his accomplice, Damond Hilliard, saw the
    police officers, Hilliard threw down his gun.   He and appellant
    fled in a car.   Rockwood testified that Borland said, "[T]hey
    just robbed me."
    After the police pursued and stopped appellant's vehicle,
    appellant fled on foot.   The officers apprehended appellant and
    searched him incident to his arrest.    They recovered a gold
    necklace and a medallion from appellant's pocket.    The chain had
    "snapped."   Rockwood testified this was the item he saw
    appellant remove from Borland's chest.   In addition, the
    officers recovered a gun from the path of pursuit.   Rockwood
    testified the gun looked "like the weapon" appellant held during
    the incident in the parking lot.
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    Officer Edmonds testified he saw the men standing together
    in the parking lot, but he did not see any weapons.   Edmonds
    also testified that Borland told the officers, "[T]hey just
    robbed me."   The trial judge convicted appellant of robbery and
    use of a firearm in the commission of robbery.
    ANALYSIS
    Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support
    the convictions because the Commonwealth failed to prove the
    necklace recovered from appellant was the "personal property of
    another" or that Borland had a right to possession of the
    necklace superior to the rights of all others.   Appellant also
    contends the evidence failed to prove the item was taken against
    Borland's will, by force or violence, and that appellant
    intended to steal the necklace.
    Appellant first argues that Rockwood's identification of
    the victim as Borland was inadmissible hearsay evidence.
    Appellant did not appeal that issue however.   Thus, in the
    absence of an appeal from the ruling on admissibility of the
    evidence, we assume for purposes of deciding the issue of
    sufficiency that the evidence was properly considered.     See
    e.g., Bell v. Commonwealth, 
    22 Va. App. 93
    , 99 n.1, 
    468 S.E.2d 114
    , 117 n.1 (1996); McQuinn v. Commonwealth, 
    19 Va. App. 418
    ,
    424, 
    451 S.E.2d 704
    , 707 (1994), aff'd on other grounds, 
    20 Va. App. 753
    , 
    460 S.E.2d 624
     (1995) (en banc).
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    "Robbery is defined at common law as '"the taking, with
    intent to steal, of the personal property of another, from his
    person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or
    intimidation."'"   Brown v. Commonwealth, 
    24 Va. App. 292
    , 295,
    
    482 S.E.2d 75
    , 77 (1997) (citation omitted).
    In the commission of robbery the
    property must be taken by force and
    violence, not necessarily from the owner,
    but from any person in possession thereof
    whose right of possession is superior to
    that of the robber. The very fact that
    property is taken from a person by the use
    of firearms, violence or threatened
    violence, is, within and of itself,
    sufficient to show that the person from whom
    it was taken was in possession thereof.
    Johnson v. Commonwealth, 
    215 Va. 495
    , 496, 
    211 S.E.2d 71
    , 72
    (1975).
    Rockwood testified he saw appellant point a gun at Borland,
    then "reach out and grab" something from Borland's chest.
    Borland then exclaimed to the police, "[T]hey just robbed me."
    Rockwood recovered a gold necklace and medallion from
    appellant's pocket.   The recovered necklace had a broken chain.
    From that statement, the trial judge could infer that appellant
    took personal property belonging to Borland.   Clearly, this
    evidence, if believed, proved the necklace was in Borland's
    possession when appellant took it and that appellant took the
    necklace against Borland's will.
    Moreover, appellant failed to present any evidence to
    support his "claim of right" theory, and the trial judge did not
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    accept appellant's "claim of right" argument.   Appellant's
    conduct was inconsistent with a claim of right.   Appellant fled
    from the police both in a car and on foot just after the
    incident.   "Flight following the commission of a crime is
    evidence of guilt . . . ."    Clagett v. Commonwealth, 
    252 Va. 79
    ,
    93, 
    472 S.E.2d 263
    , 271 (1996).    In addition, the police
    recovered a gun from the path of the pursuit, and Rockwood
    stated that the gun had the appearance of the weapon he saw
    appellant point at Borland.
    The trial judge believed the testimony of the
    Commonwealth's witnesses.    "The credibility of the witnesses and
    the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact
    finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as
    it is presented."   Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 
    20 Va. App. 133
    ,
    138, 
    455 S.E.2d 730
    , 732 (1995).   The testimony of the
    Commonwealth's witnesses was competent and was not inherently
    incredible.   From the evidence presented, the trial judge could
    conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant took, with the
    intent to steal, personal property belonging to Borland, from
    Borland's person, against Borland's will, by violence or
    intimidation.   The trial judge could further conclude that
    appellant used a firearm in the commission of the robbery.
    Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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