Sandra A. Wheeler v. Roanoke Memorial Hosp. ( 1997 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick
    SANDRA A. WHEELER
    v.   Record No. 2682-96-3                        MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    PER CURIAM
    ROANOKE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL                          MARCH 18, 1997
    AND
    PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS'
    ASSOCIATION INSURANCE COMPANY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (William H. Fralin, Jr.; Jolly, Place, Fralin &
    Prillaman, on briefs), for appellant.
    (Richard D. Lucas; Carter, Brown & Osborne,
    P.C., on brief), for appellees.
    Sandra A. Wheeler (claimant) contends that the Workers'
    Compensation Commission (commission) erred in finding that (1)
    the notice requirements contained in Code § 65.2-600 applied to
    her claim for a back injury arising out of her August 17, 1995
    compensable injury by accident; (2) she did not provide a
    reasonable excuse for her failure to give timely notice of her
    back injury to Roanoke Memorial Hospital (employer); and (3)
    employer was not required to show that it was      prejudiced by
    claimant's failure to give timely notice of her back injury.
    Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we
    conclude that this appeal is without merit.   Accordingly, we
    summarily affirm the commission's decision.   Rule 5A:27.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    I.
    On August 17, 1995, claimant tripped and fell at work,
    sustaining a right ankle fracture.    Employer accepted the ankle
    fracture as compensable.   Thereafter, the parties executed a
    memorandum of agreement with respect to the ankle fracture.     On
    January 23, 1996, the commission entered an award pursuant to the
    memorandum of agreement.
    Claimant testified that at the time of her accident, she
    also felt immediate low back pain.    However, she did not report
    her back pain to any physician until December 1995.   In addition,
    she did not notify employer of her back injury until she filed a
    change in condition application for a back injury on February 28,
    1996, six months after her accident and two and one-half months
    after she had undergone back surgery.
    "'The "change in condition" which justifies reopening and
    modification is ordinarily a change, for better or worse, in
    claimant's physical condition.   This change may take such form as
    progression, deterioration, or aggravation of the compensable
    condition. . . .'"   Board of Supervisors v. Martin, 
    3 Va. App. 139
    , 141, 
    348 S.E.2d 540
    , 541 (1986) (quoting Leonard v. Arnold,
    
    218 Va. 210
    , 214, 
    237 S.E.2d 97
    , 99 (1977) (other citation
    omitted)).
    The commission correctly held that claimant's back injury
    was not a change in condition.   The evidence established that
    claimant's back injury existed before the commission's award for
    2
    compensation and medical expenses related to claimant's
    compensable ankle fracture.   The back injury did not arise after
    the award as a progression, deterioration, or aggravation of
    claimant's compensable ankle fracture.   Moreover, no evidence
    showed that claimant's back injury was a compensable consequence
    of the ankle fracture.   Rather, the evidence established that the
    back injury was a separate and distinct injury, which occurred
    immediately upon the happening of the accident.   Accordingly, the
    commission did not err in finding that the notice provisions
    contained in Code § 65.2-600 applied to claimant's back injury.
    II.
    Code § 65.2-600 prohibits an employee from receiving
    compensation or medical benefits unless the employee has given
    the employer written notice of the accident within thirty days of
    its occurrence.   The notice must state the name and address of
    the employee, the time and place of the accident, the nature and
    cause of the accident, and the injury.   Id.   A claimant's failure
    to give timely notice is not a bar to an award of compensation
    and medical benefits if the claimant shows a reasonable excuse to
    the satisfaction of the commission for not giving such notice and
    the commission is satisfied that the employer has not been
    prejudiced thereby.   Id.
    "The employee [bears] the burden of proving a reasonable
    excuse for failing to give timely notice of any injury."     Wagner
    Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 896, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 36
    3
    (1991).   Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's
    evidence sustained her burden of proof, the commission's findings
    are binding and conclusive upon us.    Tomko v. Michael's
    Plastering Co., 
    210 Va. 697
    , 699, 
    173 S.E.2d 833
    , 835 (1970).
    Claimant testified that she did not give timely notice of
    her back injury to employer because she and her physician focused
    on her more painful ankle injury.    In addition, she stated that
    she did not realize that the back injury was related to her fall
    until December 1995 when her physician took her off her crutches,
    and she was uncertain as to whether the back injury was the
    result of the fall or of a prior back condition.
    The commission did not find these explanations satisfactory
    to excuse claimant's failure to give timely notice pursuant to
    Code § 65.2-600. In so ruling, the commission found as follows:
    The claimant testified that she was
    aware of low back pain immediately after the
    fall. If so, there was no reason that this
    complaint could not have been made known to
    her employer and the treating physicians at
    that time, or certainly within 30 days of the
    occurrence. Instead, no complaint was made
    for three and one-half months after the fall.
    This is not a defect or inaccuracy in her
    notice of accident to the employer, as argued
    by counsel for the claimant, but rather is an
    omission. Moreover, it is an omission which
    is not satisfactorily explained . . . .
    Based upon this record, we cannot say as a matter of law
    that claimant's evidence sustained her burden of proving that she
    had a reasonable excuse for failing to give timely notice of her
    back injury to employer as required by Code § 65.2-600.
    4
    III.
    The burden of proving prejudice caused by a claimant's delay
    in giving notice does not shift to the employer unless the
    claimant has established a reasonable excuse for the delay to the
    satisfaction of the commission.       Lucas v. Research Analysis
    Corp., 
    209 Va. 583
    , 586, 
    166 S.E.2d 294
    , 296 (1969); Maryland
    Cas. Co. v. Robinson, 
    149 Va. 307
    , 311, 
    141 S.E. 225
    , 226 (1928).
    Because claimant did not establish a reasonable excuse for
    failing to give employer notice of her back injury within thirty
    days of its occurrence, the commission did not err in not
    requiring employer to show prejudice.
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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