United Airlines, Inc. v. Mark F. Fozel ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton and Annunziata
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0313-00-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
NOVEMBER 7, 2000
MARK F. KOZEL
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Steven T. Billy (Pierce & Howard, P.C.,
on brief), for appellant.
Nikolas E. Parthemos (Parthemos & Bryant,
P.C., on brief), for appellee.
United Airlines, Inc. ("employer") contends the Workers'
Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in awarding
temporary total and medical benefits to Mark F. Kozel
("claimant"). On appeal, employer argues that claimant is
barred from receiving additional benefits on his claim because
he entered into a full settlement agreement of this claim in
Illinois. We hold that this case is controlled by Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980), and affirm the
commission's decision.
I. BACKGROUND
"On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the claimant, who prevailed before the commission."
Allen & Rocks, Inc. v. Briggs, 28 Va. App. 662, 672, 508 S.E.2d
335, 340 (1998) (citations omitted). "'Decisions of the
commission as to questions of fact, if supported by credible
evidence, are conclusive and binding on this Court.'" Id.
(quoting Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v. Farrar, 13 Va. App. 227,
229, 409 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991)). "'The fact that there is
contrary evidence in the record is of no consequence.'" Id.
(quoting Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894,
407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991)).
Claimant was employed as a pilot for employer on August 5,
1992. While en route from Phoenix, Arizona to Washington, D.C.,
his plane was struck by lightning. Claimant felt an electrical
charge in his right leg. He had resulting paresthesia and
weakness in that leg.
The parties stipulated that claimant filed a claim for
benefits in Virginia, received benefits under that claim and
that an award order was issued. Claimant also filed a claim for
benefits in Illinois, the location of employer's base of
operations.
The parties further agree that: (1) claimant suffered a
change in condition and that change in condition caused him to
be totally disabled from employment beginning January 31, 1999;
(2) the change in condition and the treatment therefor is
causally related to the August 5, 1992 accident; (3) the parties
entered into a settlement contract in Illinois; (4) claimant was
represented by counsel in Illinois through negotiation,
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acceptance and approval of the settlement; (5) the settlement
contained language that settled all claims arising from this
accident and specifically included the existing, concurrent
Virginia claim; (6) claimant accepted and received benefits
under the Illinois settlement and the Virginia claim; and (7)
neither party submitted the Illinois settlement documents to the
Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission for approval as
required by Code § 65.2-701.
Employer argued before the deputy commissioner that
Virginia was required to give full faith and credit to the
Illinois settlement that excluded any further Virginia payments.
In the alternative, it argued that the commission should have
approved the Illinois settlement or allowed employer credit for
the benefits received by claimant in Illinois. The deputy
commissioner retroactively approved the Illinois settlement and
denied claimant's request for temporary total benefits from
January 31, 1999 and continuing, never reaching the full faith
and credit issue. Claimant appealed the deputy commissioner's
decision to the full commission.
In addressing the issue of full faith and credit, the
commission declined to allow the findings of another state's
administrative law agency interpreting and applying its own
workers' compensation law to control Virginia's claim procedure.
Using the United States Supreme Court's decision in Thomas, 448
U.S. 261, the commission reasoned that "one State has no
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legitimate interest within the context of the federal system in
preventing another State from granting a supplemental award of
compensation benefits, when the second State would have had the
power to apply its workers' compensation law in the first
instance." Illinois approved the 1998 settlement in the context
of Illinois law, not Virginia's workers' compensation law. The
commission stated that Illinois had no power to include the
language specifically settling the claimant's Virginia claim
and, thus, the commission was not required to give full faith
and credit to the Illinois settlement.
Employer also argued that the commission should have
approved the 1998 Illinois settlement. The commission refused
to retroactively approve the Illinois settlement pursuant to
Code § 65.2-701(A) which requires all parties to be in agreement
before any settlement can be approved. The commission awarded
Kozel "temporary total disability benefits beginning January 31,
1999, and continuing until a change in condition warrants
reconsideration thereof." However, the commission granted
employer's request for a dollar for dollar credit of the amount
paid pursuant to the settlement.
II. Full Faith and Credit
Employer contends the Illinois settlement, barring further
consideration of claimant's application for change in condition
benefits in Virginia, should be afforded full faith and credit
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by the commission. 1 In support, employer cites Osborne v.
Osborne, 215 Va. 205, 207 S.E.2d 875 (1974). "'The
constitutional mandate, as implemented by Congress, requires
every state to give a foreign judgment at least the res judicata
effect which the judgment would be accorded in the state which
entered it.'" Id. at 208, 207 S.E.2d at 879 (quoting Durfee v.
Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963)). However, before accepting
another state's judgment, each state must determine if the
underlying state used a factual determination in arriving at the
judgment. "[T]here emerges the general rule that a judgment is
entitled to full faith and credit . . . when the second court's
inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and
fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered
the original judgment." Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111. In the
instant case, there is no evidence the Illinois Industrial
Commission (IIC) made any factual finding prior to its approval
of the settlement. The only finding of any kind was the generic
language used at the bottom of the settlement order that the
lump sum settlement was in the best interests of the parties and
should be approved. This finding concerns only the application
of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act and is insufficient to
1
Employer also argues that the principle of equitable
estoppel bars the claimant from withdrawing his consent to the
settlement. Employer argues this issue was preserved by inference
in the deputy commissioner's opinion. After review of the record,
we find the employer's equitable estoppel argument was not
preserved and is barred by Rule 5A:18.
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require the Virginia commission to give full faith and credit to
the Illinois award. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 281-82.
Employer next contends that the rationale of Thomas does
not control the instant case. In Thomas, claimant received
benefits under an award in Virginia and sought further benefits
in the District of Columbia. The benefits were not duplicative,
and no agreement had been reached regarding benefits available
to claimant in either state. 448 U.S. at 264–66. 2 In the
instant case, claimant entered into an agreement in Illinois
with employer. That agreement was approved by the IIC settling
2
We note that while neither side in the instant case argued
the rule set forth in Industrial Comm'n of Wis. v. McCartin, 330
U.S. 430 (1944), it applies to precisely the situation here.
McCartin, one of a trilogy of Supreme Court cases on workers'
compensation and full faith and credit, held that successive
awards in different states are permitted; however, double recovery
is not. This is the accepted application of McCartin in most
states. See also Lowery v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 597
P.2d 1011 (Ariz. 1979) (when employee is otherwise entitled to
benefits in Arizona, he will not be barred by a prior
"nonexclusive" award in another state, but his recovery will be
offset by the amount of the prior award); Martin v. L. & A.
Contracting Co., 162 So. 2d 870 (Miss. 1964) (more than one statute
can apply to a single compensable injury, so long as each state
has a relevant interest in the case; successive awards can be made
in different states, deducting the amount of the first award from
the second); Gulf Interstate Geophysical/Gulf Interstate Piping v.
Industrial Commission, 555 N.E.2d 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (a
final award of workers' compensation benefits in Indiana did not
preclude claimant from seeking supplemental award for same injury
under Illinois workers' compensation law); and Landry v. Carlson
Mooring Service, 643 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1981) (full faith and
credit did not require that judicially approved settlement of
employee's Texas workers' compensation claim bar his subsequent
assertion of claim under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act).
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his rights under his Illinois claim. The agreement also
included language that attempted to settle his future Virginia
rights. Employer argues that the claimant gave Illinois the
right and authority to terminate any future Virginia claims,
including a change of condition request. We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court in Thomas stated: "To be
sure, . . . the factfindings of state administrative tribunals
are entitled to the same res judicata effect in the second State
as findings by a court. But the critical differences between a
court of general jurisdiction and an administrative agency with
limited statutory authority forecloses the conclusion that
constitutional rules applicable to court judgments are
necessarily applicable to workmen's compensation awards." 448
U.S. at 281-82.
In its decision, the commission found:
As shown by the document itself, this
process involved the submission of a signed
agreement reflecting the terms of the
agreement, but there were no specific
findings of fact or conclusions of law.
There is no evidence regarding the basis
upon which the Illinois Commission reviewed
this information and reached its
determination. Ultimately, it determined
that the settlement--under Illinois law--was
legally in the claimant's best interest.
The Illinois Commission did not purport to,
and could not have adjudicated the
appropriateness of the proposed settlement
under the laws of Virginia. Nonetheless,
the Illinois Commission approved language in
the settlement agreement that purported to
foreclose the claimant's right to seek
further relief before the Virginia
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Commission. This is a determination that
the Illinois Commission had no power to
make. Accordingly, pursuant to the Supreme
Court's decision in Thomas, we are not bound
by the Illinois Order under principles of
comity.
We agree with the commission's reasoning.
III. Retroactive Approval of the Illinois Settlement
Employer next contends the commission should have approved
the 1998 Illinois settlement. The commission refused to
retroactively approve the Illinois settlement pursuant to Code
§ 65.2-701(A), 3 which requires all parties to be in agreement
before any settlement can be approved. Claimant did not consent
to the commission's approval of the Illinois settlement, see
Damewood v. Lanford Bros. Co., 29 Va. App. 43, 509 S.E.2d 530(1999), and in fact seeks continuing benefits. Without
agreement between the parties, the commission declined to
approve the settlement. See id. at 47, 509 S.E.2d at 532. We
affirm this finding.
IV. Credit
The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to
compensate a claimant for lost wages and medical benefits. It
is not the purpose of the Act to allow a claimant to be unjustly
3
Code § 65.2-701(A) states "If after injury or death, the
employer and the injured employee or his dependents reach an
agreement in regard to compensation or in compromise of a claim
for compensation under this title, a memorandum of the agreement
in the form prescribed by the Commission shall be filed with the
Commission for approval."
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enriched. The commission granted employer's affirmative request
for a dollar for dollar credit, in the full amount of the
settlement paid to claimant in Illinois. The employer is
entitled to credit for payments made in another state for the
same accident and the same injuries. See Harris v. Otis
Elevator, 73 VWC 223, 225 (1994); Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge
Construction Co., 43 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 1950); Spietz v.
Industrial Comm'n, 28 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 1947).
For the foregoing reasons and finding no error, we affirm
the commission's finding.
Affirmed.
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