Donald Victor Pickard v. Commonwealth ( 2005 )


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  •                                COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Bumgardner, Clements and McClanahan
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    DONALD VICTOR PICKARD
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.     Record No. 0543-04-3                                JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    MAY 17, 2005
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY
    James W. Updike, Jr., Judge
    Darren Shoen (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for
    appellant.
    Susan L. Parrish, Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams
    Jadgmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    A jury convicted Donald V. Pickard of driving after being declared an habitual offender,
    Code § 46.2-357(B)(3), and driving while intoxicated, second offense within ten years, Code
    § 18.2-266. He contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he was intoxicated when he
    drove. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
    On appeal, we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 
    265 Va. 505
    , 514, 
    578 S.E.2d 781
    , 786, cert. denied, 
    540 U.S. 972
     (2003). After doing so, we consider whether “any rational
    trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979).
    At about 5:30 p.m., James Leftwich heard a commotion outside his home. He saw a
    black pickup truck “in the pasture . . . spinning around, trying to get back out into the road.”
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    Leftwich, an animal control warden, radioed the sheriff’s office, and drove to the place where
    tire tracks showed the truck had broken through a fence and into the pasture field.
    Leftwich tried to get the driver to stop, but the driver ignored him and kept trying to get
    through the fence and up on the highway. The truck could not get sufficient momentum to break
    through the fence and kept getting entangled in the fence because the field was muddy. The
    driver came within twenty-five feet of Leftwich, who identified the defendant as the driver. He
    was alone in the truck and looked “like a wild man” while trying to break out of the field. After
    about five to eight minutes, the defendant drove over a hill and out of sight. The seventy-acre
    field was completely enclosed by wire fencing.
    Investigator Byrne arrived about five minutes after Leftwich radioed for help. Deputy
    Shull arrived shortly after that and obtained a description of the driver from Leftwich. Deputy
    Shull left to cut off the defendant. He drove down a private gravel road that curved around the
    back of the field. Investigator Byrne and Leftwich went through the field to the truck, which the
    defendant abandoned at the edge of the woods. The truck had barbed wire and fencing lodged in
    it. An empty beer can was in the cab, and the keys were still in the ignition. Investigator Byrne
    searched through the woods, stream, and ravine that separated the field from the gravel road, but
    he found no one.
    Deputy Shull followed the gravel road to its end, turned, and on his way back saw a
    figure stepping into a row of trees. The deputy asked the person to step out, and the defendant
    appeared. He was unsteady on his feet and swayed back and forth as he walked. The
    defendant’s eyes were glazed, his speech slurred, his face red. He had cut his wrist, and his
    clothes were messy. He had a strong odor of alcohol about his person. The defendant admitted
    to the deputy that the truck, a few hundred feet away in the field, was his.
    -2-
    The defendant concedes that he was intoxicated when Deputy Shull apprehended him.
    However, he maintains the evidence did not permit a finding that he was intoxicated when he
    was driving the truck in the field. He relies on Potts v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 1093
    , 
    408 S.E.2d 256
     (1991).1
    In Potts, the police reported to the scene of an accident involving the defendant’s car.
    They found the defendant intoxicated behind the wheel. The officer did not recall if the car was
    running. This Court reversed the conviction for driving while intoxicated because no evidence
    established who was driving the car at the time of the accident or how much time had passed
    between the accident and the police arriving. Id. at 1097, 408 S.E.2d at 258. Moreover, if the
    defendant had been driving before the accident, no evidence established that he was intoxicated
    at that time. Id. at 1098-99, 408 S.E.2d at 259.
    In this case, Leftwich identified the defendant as the driver and described his appearance
    and manner of driving. The truck left the highway and went through a fence. The defendant was
    the sole occupant, and looked like a “wild man” while erratically spinning through the field in a
    frantic and futile attempt to break back through the fence. He refused to stop and eventually
    drove to the end of the pasture, abandoned his truck, and fled on foot. The truck contained an
    empty beer can. The defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter, appeared intoxicated, and
    concedes that he was.
    1
    The defendant refers to two other cases that are distinguishable. In Fowlkes v.
    Commonwealth, 
    194 Va. 676
    , 
    74 S.E.2d 683
     (1953), the defendant admitted to police at
    3:55 p.m. that he drank a few beers in the early afternoon. His conviction of driving under the
    influence was reversed because the evidence did not establish when the accident occurred. In
    Coffey v. Commonwealth, 
    202 Va. 185
    , 
    116 S.E.2d 257
     (1960), the police found the defendant
    intoxicated approximately one hour after the accident, and he had drunk whiskey after the
    accident. The conviction was reversed because the evidence did not establish his condition at the
    time of the accident. In this case, the evidence established when the defendant drove and his
    condition at that time. It accounted for the time between his driving and apprehension.
    -3-
    The testimony was illustrated by photographs and a map, which depicted the
    geographical features and distances involved. The witnesses described the sequence and
    relationship of their actions. Their description of events accounted for the timing of events. The
    defendant’s appearance and manner of driving in the field resembled his appearance and
    condition when apprehended. The evidence accounted for time, distance, and action.
    The jury was entitled to decide whether the defendant’s admitted intoxication, and the
    degree of it, could have occurred between his abandoning the truck and his apprehension. The
    jury had sufficient facts to permit it to find the interval was too brief to account for the
    defendant’s condition. Upon doing so, it could reject the claim that the defendant was not
    intoxicated when observed spinning through the pasture. “The credibility of the witnesses and
    the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to
    see and hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 
    20 Va. App. 133
    ,
    138, 
    455 S.E.2d 730
    , 732 (1995).
    The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendant was
    intoxicated when he drove. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
    Affirmed.
    -4-