Douglas Olgers v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Bumgardner
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    DOUGLAS OLGERS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0856-99-2                 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    MAY 9, 2000
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BRUNSWICK COUNTY
    James F. D'Alton, Judge
    David B. Hargett (Morrissey & Hershner,
    P.L.C., on brief), for appellant.
    Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
    General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Douglas Olgers (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial for
    "kill[ing] antlerless deer during closed season," a misdemeanor in
    violation of Code § 29.1-550(i), and possession of a firearm by a
    convicted felon, a violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.   He complains
    on appeal that the trial court imposed an impermissible punishment
    for the misdemeanor and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
    to establish that the firearm was operational.   We agree that the
    court improperly sentenced defendant for the game offense and,
    therefore, reverse the order and remand for resentencing.
    However, because defendant raises the specific evidentiary
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    challenge to the firearm conviction for the first time on appeal,
    we decline to address the issue and affirm the trial court.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
    memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
    disposition of the appeal.
    I.
    Based on familiar principles, we view the record "'in the
    light most favorable to the Commonwealth, giving it all
    reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.   In so doing,
    we must discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with
    that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible
    evidence favorable to the Commonwealth . . . .'"    Watkins v.
    Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 335
    , 348, 
    404 S.E.2d 856
    , 866 (1998)
    (citation omitted).
    On December 18, 1997, James Campbell, a "Special Agent" of
    the Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries, while
    conducting an undercover investigation of unlawful "hunting
    activities," was invited to join defendant, Randall Coleman and
    Kenny Westmoreland in a deer hunt on property owned by
    Westmoreland's family.   At the inception of the outing,
    Campbell, Coleman and Westmoreland "got in a line around the
    woods," while defendant noisily "came through the woods,"
    "attempt[ing] to drive any deer" into the open area.   Although
    defendant's efforts were unsuccessful, he soon emerged "carrying
    . . . an antlerless [doe] deer across his shoulder," which he
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    identified as "one . . . he shot at the night before" with a
    "rifle" borrowed from Coleman.
    The hunt resumed and, after several hours, defendant tired
    and decided "to take a [deer] stand" and there await passing
    deer.    Armed with "Coleman's twelve gauge shotgun," he proceeded
    to "a stand in plain sight" of Campbell, while Coleman "made a
    drive without a weapon."    Despite these efforts, however, no
    game was harvested and "no shots were fired" by anyone in the
    party.
    II.
    Upon convicting defendant for a violation of Code
    § 29.1-550, the court imposed a sentence of "Incarceration in
    JAIL for a term of:    12 months," suspended upon certain terms
    and conditions.    However, the statute provides that a violation
    shall constitute a Class 2 misdemeanor, an offense punishable by
    "confinement in jail for not more than six months and a fine of
    not more than $1,000, either or both."    Code § 18.2-11.   Thus,
    the disputed sentence clearly exceeded the statutory limitation,
    and we, therefore, must reverse the order and remand for
    resentencing.     See Nesbit v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 391
    , 
    424 S.E.2d 239
     (1992).
    Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient
    to prove that the weapon that he allegedly possessed was a
    firearm within the intendment of Code § 18.2-308.2.    Relying
    upon Jones v. Commonwealth, 
    16 Va. App. 354
    , 
    429 S.E.2d 615
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    (1993), he asserts on brief that the Commonwealth must
    establish, as an element of the offense, that the weapon was
    "operational," "capable of firing bullets."     See also Gregory v.
    Commonwealth, 
    28 Va. App. 393
    , 
    504 S.E.2d 886
     (1998).       However,
    in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence before the trial
    court, defendant addressed only the possession component to the
    crime, rather than the nature and character of the weapon.
    Rule 5A:18 provides that "[n]o ruling of the
    trial court . . . will be considered as a
    basis for reversal unless the objection was
    stated together with the grounds therefor at
    the time of the ruling, except for good
    cause shown or to enable the Court of
    Appeals to attain the ends of justice."
    Redman v. Commonwealth, 
    25 Va. App. 215
    , 218, 
    487 S.E.2d 269
    ,
    271 (1997).    Thus, if the argument of an accused before the
    trial court fails to "specify in what respects the . . .
    evidence [is] insufficient to prove" the offense, such issue is
    "not properly preserved" for appeal.     Id. at 220, 487 S.E.2d at
    272.   Accordingly, we decline to address defendant's contention
    that the evidence failed to prove a firearm, and find that no
    miscarriage of justice supports invocation of the related
    exception to the rule.     See generally id. at 221-22, 487 S.E.2d
    at 272-73.
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    We, therefore, affirm the convictions, but reverse the
    misdemeanor sentencing order and remand for resentencing
    consistent with this opinion.
    Affirmed, in part,
    reversed and
    remanded, in part.
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