Rodney Leon Wells v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
RODNEY LEON WELLS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1116-99-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
MARCH 28, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY
Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge
Peter L. McCloud (Boyle, Bain & Downer, on
brief), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
On appeal from his conviction of grand larceny, in
violation of Code § 18.2-95, Rodney Leon Wells contends (1) that
the trial court erred in admitting the out-of-court statement of
a codefendant, Regina Allen, and (2) that without Allen's
statement the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction. Wells did not properly preserve the evidentiary
issue for appeal, and the evidence as received was sufficient.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On appeal, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. The
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
judgment of a trial court sitting without a
jury is entitled to the same weight as a
jury verdict and will not be set aside
unless it appears from the evidence that the
judgment is plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418
(1987).
On July 27, 1998, Wells drove Regina Allen and Maurice
Buckner to a Kroger supermarket. Allen and Buckner entered the
store, filled two carts with groceries, and ran out of the store
without paying. They dumped the groceries into the trunk of
Wells' car. Witnesses testified that a third person was in the
driver's seat of the car. The store manager initially
identified Wells as that person, but on cross-examination was
unsure of that identification. An employee at the store
testified that the woman who had been in the store got into the
back seat of the car and that the man who had been in the store
got into the passenger's side of the front seat. The car then
pulled out of the parking lot "very fast and recklessly."
Store personnel called the police. When the police cruiser
caught up to Wells' car, it sped up in an attempt to get away.
Once the officer stopped the vehicle, all three occupants fled
from the vehicle and were apprehended on foot. The police
officer testified that Allen exited the rear passenger door,
Buckner from the right front passenger door, and Wells from the
driver's door.
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Allen confessed to the police that she, Buckner, and Wells
had decided to drive to the store to steal groceries for a
cookout, that she and Buckner went into the store to steal the
items, and that Wells remained with the car as the getaway
driver. This contradicted Wells' explanation that he was
unaware that Allen and Buckner were planning to steal groceries,
that Buckner took the keys from him and drove away, and that he
jumped in the passenger side of the car. Without objection, the
trial court admitted Allen's statement into evidence. On the
basis of that statement and of the other evidence in the case,
it convicted Wells of grand larceny.
Wells contends that the trial court erred in admitting
Allen's statement. Acknowledging that he lodged no objection,
he argues that Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), should be
applied nonetheless, because Lilly was decided subsequent to his
trial.
As a general proposition, cases which have precedential
value and are decided while an appeal is pending will be "good
law" for the appeal. See Darnell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.
948, 952-53, 408 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1991). However, the issue to
which that authority is applied must have been addressed
properly in the trial court. See id.; Herrera v. Commonwealth,
24 Va. App. 490, 495, 483 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1997).
[W]here an appellate decision overrules
prior law and announces a new principle,
unless the decision specifically declares
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the rule to be prospective only, the new
rule is to be applied retroactively to cases
where the issue in question is properly
preserved at all stages of adjudication up
to and including any direct appeal.
Commonwealth v. Ardestani, 736 A.2d 552, 555 (Pa. 1999)
(emphasis supplied).
No ruling of the trial court . . . will
be considered as a basis for reversal unless
the objection was stated together with the
grounds therefor at the time of the ruling,
except for good cause shown or to enable the
Court of Appeals to attain the ends of
justice.
Rule 5A:18. The rule operates to bar constitutional claims
raised for the first time on appeal. See Deal v. Commonwealth,
15 Va. App. 157, 161, 421 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1992).
Because Wells lodged at trial no objection to the admission
of Allen's statement into evidence, and because we perceive no
reason to invoke the ends of justice exception to the operation
of Rule 5A:18, we will not address on appeal the correctness of
that admission, even in light of Lilly.
Because Wells' contention that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction relies on the assumption
that Allen's statement was admitted in error, an assumption to
which we give no support, we do not address the merits of his
sufficiency of the evidence claim. The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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