Joleane Dutzman v. J. Douglas Wooddell, DDS ( 1999 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank
    JOLEANE DUTZMAN
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.   Record No. 1735-99-4                         PER CURIAM
    NOVEMBER 16, 1999
    J. DOUGLAS WOODDELL, D.D.S.
    AND
    HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Robert W. Dowler, on briefs), for appellant.
    (William R. Korth; Law Offices of Francis H.
    Foley, on brief), for appellees.
    Joleane Dutzman (claimant) contends that the Workers'
    Compensation Commission (commission) erred in failing to
    (1) exclude the September 1, 1998 medical report of Dr. Philip
    Edelman; (2) award temporary total disability benefits to
    claimant after March 31, 1996 and continuing; 1 and (3) award
    medical benefits to claimant after April 25, 1996 and continuing
    for her lifetime.     Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of
    the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision.        See
    Rule 5A:27.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    1
    Questions Presented 2, 3, and 4 relate to this issue and
    have been consolidated for purposes of this opinion.
    I.
    Employer's counsel possessed Dr. Edelman's September 1,
    1998 medical report for a substantial period of time before he
    filed it with the commission and provided a copy of it to
    claimant's counsel eight days before the hearing.      However, it
    was undisputed that the late filing constituted an inadvertent
    oversight by employer's counsel.       Pursuant to Rule 4.2 of the
    Rules of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission and Code
    § 65.2-902, the commission fined employer's counsel for his
    oversight.
    The deputy commissioner admitted Dr. Edelman's report into
    evidence and provided claimant with ample opportunity to
    cross-examine Dr. Edelman before the record closed.      Claimant
    elected not to cross-examine Dr. Edelman in any manner
    whatsoever.   Having chosen not to take advantage of the
    opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Edelman regarding the
    September 1, 1998 medical report, claimant cannot claim that she
    was prejudiced by the late filing.       Under these circumstances,
    the commission did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr.
    Edelman's medical report into evidence.
    II. and III.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.     See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).
    Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
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    sustained her burden of proof, the commission's findings are
    binding and conclusive upon us.     See Tomko v. Michael's
    Plastering Co., 
    210 Va. 697
    , 699, 
    173 S.E.2d 833
    , 835 (1970).
    The commission denied claimant disability benefits after
    March 31, 1996 and denied her medical benefits for treatment
    incurred after April 25, 1996.    In doing so, the commission
    relied upon the opinions and medical records of Drs. William J.
    Thompson and Richard J. Redding and rejected the opinions of
    Drs. William J. Meggs and Thomas J. Callender.    The medical
    records and opinions of Drs. Thompson and Redding support the
    commission's findings that claimant was not disabled after
    March 31, 1996 due to the effects of her exposure to Lysol Brand
    Concentrate at work in February 1996; that the effects of that
    exposure ended by April 25, 1996; and that her symptoms
    thereafter were due to pre-existing conditions or other causes.
    The commission articulated sound reasons for giving little
    probative weight to the contrary opinions of Drs. Meggs and
    Callender.   "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive and
    is subject to the commission's consideration and weighing."
    Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 
    11 Va. App. 675
    , 677, 
    401 S.E.2d 213
    , 215 (1991).   "Moreover, "[q]uestions raised by
    conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission."
    Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 
    8 Va. App. 310
    , 318, 
    381 S.E.2d 231
    , 236 (1989).
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    Because the medical evidence was subject to the
    commission's factual determination, we cannot find as a matter
    of law that claimant sustained her burden of proof.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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