Maurice Donnell Taylor v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MAURICE DONNELL TAYLOR
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2540-98-2 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
OCTOBER 12, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
George F. Tidey, Judge
Robert P. Geary for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Maurice Donnell Taylor (appellant) appeals from his bench
trial conviction by the Circuit Court of Henrico County for
conspiring to distribute cocaine. The sole issue presented for
appeal is whether the trial court erred when it denied appellant's
motion to suppress evidence that appellant contends was obtained
as a result of an unlawful arrest. Finding no error, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, we are bound to review de novo the ultimate questions
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. See Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). But we "review
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
findings of historical fact only for clear error and . . . give
due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident
judges and local law enforcement officers." 1 Id.
So viewed, the evidence proved that on the night of
September 9, 1997, Airrion Agee proceeded to a motel room where
he sold crack cocaine to undercover police officer Richard
Popielarz. At Popielarz's signal, several police officers,
including Officer Hueston, entered the motel room and arrested
Agee. Although Agee was alone when arrested, Hueston believed
that Agee had driven to the motel with at least one other
person, so Hueston went to the motel parking lot to look for
possible accomplices. Popielarz had bought cocaine from Agee on
August 29, 1997, and Hueston knew that Agee was accompanied by
another male on that date.
Just around the corner of the motel building, Hueston saw
appellant and Natasha Shirelle sitting in a parked car. Hueston
testified that this was the only occupied car in the motel
parking lot. Hueston was approximately ten feet from the car
when he recognized appellant as someone he had seen sell drugs
1
"'Clear error' is a term of art derived from Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies when reviewing
questions of fact" in the federal system. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at694 n.3. In Virginia, questions of fact are binding on appeal
unless "plainly wrong." Quantum Dev. Co. v. Luckett, 242 Va.
159, 161, 409 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1991); Naulty v. Commonwealth, 2
Va. App. 523, 527, 346 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1986).
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to an informant the previous week. Hueston admitted, however,
that he could not remember appellant's name.
Hueston and another officer, acting in the interest of
officer safety, directed appellant and Shirelle to exit the
vehicle. Hueston patted down appellant for weapons and asked
appellant's name. When appellant identified himself, Hueston
recognized the name because four different informants had told
Hueston that a man named Maurice Taylor worked with Agee selling
drugs. The informants told Hueston that Taylor and Agee
supplied crack cocaine on the Route 60 corridor, where this
motel was located, and that "when you saw one you usually saw
both of them." The informants had told Hueston where Taylor and
Agee lived, and Hueston had been able to confirm this
information. Hueston testified that two of these informants may
have been associated with one another, but that the other two
informants were independent.
Hueston placed appellant under arrest and transported him
to the police station. After being advised of his Miranda
rights, appellant gave a self-incriminating statement to
Hueston.
"A police officer may seize a person by an arrest only when
the officer has probable cause to believe that the person seized
has committed or is committing a crime." Ewell v. Commonwealth,
254 Va. 214, 217, 491 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1997) (emphasis added).
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"'Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances
within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that" an offense has been or is being committed.'" Jefferson v.
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 1, 12, 497 S.E.2d 474, 479 (1998)
(citations omitted). The arresting officer is permitted to act
based on probabilities, and is not required to rely upon hard
certainties. See Carson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 497, 502,
404 S.E.2d 919, 922, aff'd on reh'g en banc, 13 Va. App. 280,
410 S.E.2d 412 (1991), aff'd, 244 Va. 293, 421 S.E.2d 415(1992).
"[T]he Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment
permits a police officer who has probable cause to make a
warrantless arrest even though there was an opportunity to
procure a warrant. Thus, probable cause, not exigent
circumstances, is the standard for measuring the constitutional
validity of an arrest." Thompson v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App.
117, 121, 390 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1990) (citing United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)).
Before he ever seized appellant, Hueston recognized
appellant as the person he had seen sell cocaine to an informant
one week previously. Based upon this knowledge and information,
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Hueston had probable cause to arrest appellant. 2 The fact that
Hueston may have decided to arrest appellant based on his belief
that appellant was Agee's accomplice in the September 9, 1997
drug sale is immaterial. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813 (1996) (a police officer's subjective intentions are
irrelevant if there is an objective basis for arresting a
defendant). Moreover, based on the information Hueston had
obtained from four different informants, and appellant's
presence in the parking lot of the motel where Agee had just
been arrested for distributing cocaine, Hueston had probable
cause to believe that appellant was involved in Agee's criminal
activity. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it
denied the motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
2
Because Hueston had probable cause to arrest appellant
before ordering appellant from the car, we need not determine
whether the initial seizure constituted a detention or an
arrest.
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