Linda Dixon v. Woodtech, Inc.and Reliance Ins.Co. ( 1999 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank
    LINDA DIXON
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.   Record No. 0459-99-3                         PER CURIAM
    SEPTEMBER 7, 1999
    WOODTECH, INC. AND
    RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Karen Brown Ryan; Ryan Law Firm, on brief),
    for appellant.
    (S. Vernon Priddy, III; Sarah Y. M. Kirby;
    Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on brief),
    for appellees.
    Linda Dixon (claimant) contends that the Workers'
    Compensation Commission (commission) erred in finding that she
    failed to prove that she sustained a change in condition on
    September 23, 1997 causally related to her compensable March 24,
    1995 injury by accident.     Upon reviewing the record and the
    briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
    merit.     Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
    decision.     See Rule 5A:27.
    "General principles of workman's compensation law provide
    that '[i]n an application for review of any award on the ground of
    change in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the
    evidence.'"   Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 
    4 Va. App. 459
    ,
    464, 
    359 S.E.2d 98
    , 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight Carriers,
    Inc. v. Reeves, 
    1 Va. App. 435
    , 438-39, 
    339 S.E.2d 570
    , 572
    (1986)).   The commission's findings are binding and conclusive
    upon us, unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant proved
    that her condition as of September 23, 1997 was causally related
    to her compensable March 24, 1995 injury by accident.   See Tomko
    v. Michael's Plastering Co., 
    210 Va. 697
    , 699, 
    173 S.E.2d 833
    , 835
    (1970).
    In denying claimant's application, the commission found as
    follows:
    [W]e find it significant that in causally
    relating the claimant's most recent
    condition to the work accident, Dr. [Anne
    Marie] Hynes diagnosed not the previously
    diagnosed strain, but rather, degenerative
    disc disease and a bulging disc. She
    offered no explanation for the change or why
    the change would be causally related to the
    work accident, especially in the context of
    long periods between bouts of symptoms.
    In contrast is the opinion of Dr.
    [Neal A.] Jewell, an orthopedist, who
    clearly stated that this condition is
    unrelated to the work accident and
    consistent with the claimant's age group.
    [B]ecause of his specialty and because the
    onset and duration of the symptoms is
    uncontradicted, we find that Dr. Jewell's
    opinion is more persuasive than that of Dr.
    Hynes. In view of the long gaps between
    symptoms and treatment following the
    accident, the change in diagnosis, the
    sudden onset of renewed symptoms in the fall
    of 1997 and Dr. Jewell's expertise, we agree
    with the Deputy Commissioner that the
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    claimant has not met her burden of proving a
    change in condition.
    The commission articulated legitimate reasons for giving
    little probative weight to Dr. Hynes's opinion.   In light of
    these reasons, the commission was entitled to conclude that Dr.
    Hynes's opinion did not constitute sufficient evidence to prove
    that claimant's post-September 23, 1997 condition was causally
    related to her March 24, 1995 injury by accident.   "Medical
    evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is subject to the
    commission's consideration and weighing."    Hungerford Mechanical
    Corp. v. Hobson, 
    11 Va. App. 675
    , 677, 
    401 S.E.2d 213
    , 215
    (1991).   Moreover, in its role as fact finder, the commission
    was entitled to accept Dr. Jewell's opinion and to reject the
    contrary opinion of Dr. Hynes.    "Questions raised by conflicting
    medical opinions must be decided by the commission."       Penley v.
    Island Creek Coal Co., 
    8 Va. App. 310
    , 318, 
    381 S.E.2d 231
    , 236
    (1989).
    Because the medical evidence was subject to the
    commission's factual determination, we cannot find as a matter
    of law that the evidence proved that claimant's condition as of
    September 23, 1997 was causally related to her March 24, 1995
    injury by accident.   Accordingly, we affirm the commission's
    decision.
    Affirmed.
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