Corom Morrisett v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Annunziata and Bumgardner
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
COROM MORRISETT
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1296-98-1 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
MAY 18, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
Johnny E. Morrison, Judge
Dianne G. Ringer, Senior Assistant Public
Defender, for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Corom Morrisett was convicted in a jury trial of two counts
of robbery and two counts of use of a firearm in the commission
of a robbery. On appeal, Morrisett contends the trial court
erred by compelling him to appear before the jury in a jail
uniform. Additionally, Morrisett contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. We find that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion, or violate Morrisett’s
constitutional rights, by proceeding with the trial.
Additionally, we find that the evidence was sufficient to
support the convictions.
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
BACKGROUND
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va.
349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975).
Morrisett and another individual entered a gas station
convenience store as the cashiers prepared to change shifts.
Morrisett, the taller of the two, wore a red hat with the flaps
down and stated, “this is a hold-up.” The shorter man
brandished a handgun. The two cashiers emptied their respective
cash register drawers giving the contents to Morrisett and his
accomplice who, thereafter, fled from the store.
Neither cashier could identify the defendant from a photo
lineup, but both identified Morrisett at trial, and both
identified a red hat officers found in Morrisett’s bedroom as
the hat that Morrisett wore during the robbery.
While in custody, Morrisett viewed a surveillance tape from
the store’s security camera. While watching the tape, without
any provocation, the defendant pointed to the taller man with
the hat and said, “that’s me.” At trial Morrisett denied making
the statement, and denied owning the red hat. Additionally,
Morrisett testified that he was in Baltimore when the crime
occurred. His mother corroborated the alibi.
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Before the trial date, Morrisett discussed with his
attorney the merits of requesting a jury trial or bench trial.
Morrisett “wavered” between requesting a jury or a bench trial
but on the day before trial he told his attorney he wanted to be
tried by the court, and the case was set for a bench trial.
About fifteen minutes before the judge called the case,
Morrisett informed his attorney that he wanted a jury trial.
Despite the late notice, the trial judge was able to accommodate
Morrisett’s request because a jury was available.
However, when the trial judge asked if the defense was
ready to proceed, counsel for Morrisett responded:
Judge the defense is not ready on this
case. Mr. Morrisett just informed me . . .
he wanted a jury trial. Seeing that that
was the case, Judge, you can see that he is
in a jail uniform, Portsmouth City Jail
uniform.
If we’re going to have a jury case, I
think it would be prejudicial for the client
to be sitting at the defense table in jail
clothes.
I did talk with my investigator to have
him . . . check to see whether we had any
clothes that would fit Mr. Morrisett. . . .
He indicated to me that we didn’t have any
. . . .
Based on that, judge, we’re not ready.
Morrisett indicated that he was otherwise ready to proceed,
and the judge determined to proceed with the case.
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ANALYSIS
The conduct of a trial is left to the discretion of the
judge, however, “it is incumbent upon the trial court to
exercise that discretion with extreme caution to avoid
infringing upon the rights of the accused to a fair and
impartial trial.” Miller v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 367, 371,
373 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1988).
“Every procedure which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man . . .
to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead
him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law.”
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
One of the “axiomatic and elementary” requirements of a
fair trial is the presumption of innocence which “lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Coffin
v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); see Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976). As part of this
presumption, defendants at trial are “entitled to be clothed
with indicia of innocence” until such time as guilt is
determined by the judge or jury. See Vescuso v. Commonwealth,
4 Va. App. 32, 40, 354 S.E.2d 68, 72 (citing Harrell v. Israel,
672 F.2d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1982)), aff’d en banc, 5 Va. App.
59, 360 S.E.2d 547 (1987). Moreover, the accused is entitled to
have his or her “‘guilt or innocence determined solely on the
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basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of
official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other
circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.’” See id. (quoting
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)).
The United States Supreme Court, in Williams, stated that a
trial court violates a defendant’s due process right to the
presumption of innocence when the trial court compels the
accused to wear prison clothes before a jury during trial. See
Williams, 425 U.S. at 503-06; see also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475
U.S. 560, 568 (1986) (discussing Williams); United States v.
Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 580-82 (2nd Cir. 1995) (applying
Williams). Unlike the necessity to apply shackles or physical
restraints to an unruly defendant, compelling a defendant to
appear in jail clothing “furthers no essential state policy.”
Williams, 425 U.S. at 504. “That it may be more convenient for
jail administrators, a factor quite unlike the substantial need
to impose physical restraints upon contumacious defendants,
provides no justification for the practice.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
We find that by proceeding with the trial over Morrisett’s
objection, the trial court neither compelled Morrisett to stand
trial in prison garb, nor abused its discretion.
Morrisett, who had earlier agreed to a bench trial, decided
to request a jury trial approximately fifteen minutes before his
trial was to begin. When the court accommodated that last
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minute request, Morrisett then told the court that he was not
prepared for trial because he wore prison garb. His counsel
stated, “The defense is not ready in this case,” and proceeded
to explain why. Morrisett made no motion for relief, other than
to state that under the circumstances, the defense was not
prepared to begin. The defendant made no motion for a recess or
brief delay to obtain non-prison garb and did not propose any
course of action to obtain non-prison garb. As the trial court
noted, Morrisett’s mother was present at the trial and possibly
could have obtained clothes for Morrisett, but he made no
request or motion to be allowed to do so.
The record suggests that Morrisett was attempting to delay
trial. He requested a jury trial at the last moment. When that
request failed to delay the trial, he stated he was unprepared
for trial due to the prison garb. When the court refused to
continue the trial, Morrisett stated that he was dissatisfied
with his lawyer due to a conflict of interest.
Under these circumstances, where the defendant informed the
court that he was not prepared to proceed but did not move the
court to accommodate any course of action to obtain non-prison
garb, or for any other relief, the trial court did not err in
proceeding to trial as scheduled. No motion having been made
requiring a trial court ruling, the court did not “compel”
Morrisett to wear prison garb at trial.
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Additionally, we find the evidence was sufficient to
support the convictions. Viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, the evidence proved that Morrisett confessed
to being the taller individual in the videotape of the robbery.
That confession, the two positive identifications at trial, the
admission of the videotape and the admission of the identified
red hat into evidence, entitled the jury to convict Morrisett.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
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