Charles W. Vincent v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    CHARLES W. VINCENT
    v.   Record Nos. 0416-95-1 and            MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    0557-95-1               JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
    JANUARY 30, 1996
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
    Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge
    Andrew M. Sacks (Stanley E. Sacks; Michael F.
    Imprevento; Sacks, Sacks & Imprevento, on
    briefs), for appellant.
    Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Charles W. Vincent was convicted in a jury trial of nine
    counts of unethical solicitation of a gift by a public employee
    having official responsibility for a procurement transaction, in
    violation of Code § 11-75 and § 11-80.    On appeal, Vincent
    contends: (1) that the indictment failed to state an offense; (2)
    that Code § 11-75 is unconstitutional; (3) that the evidence was
    insufficient to prove that the defendant "willfully" violated
    Code § 11-75; (4) that the trial court erred in denying
    defendant's pretrial motion for a continuance; and (5) that the
    trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a stay of
    execution of sentence.    For the reasons that follow, we affirm
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    the convictions.
    I. Facts
    Charles Vincent was elected to the Virginia Beach City
    School Board on May 3, 1994, and assumed office on July 1 of that
    year.    By August he had joined the Architectural Review
    Committee, tasked with selecting architectural and engineering
    firms for subsequent contracts for work on the school system.
    On August 29-30, Vincent met with representatives of nine
    firms who later were awarded school contracts.    On September 7,
    Vincent sent a letter to each of the nine firms, who at that time
    had been notified that they were recommended by the committee for
    contracts. The letters stated in whole:
    Gentlemen,
    It was a pleasure meeting with you, and
    representatives of your firm, when you recently
    appeared before our committee. I am pleased to have
    been a part in the selection of [your firm] for [a
    particular school project].
    On another matter . . . I am trying to retire (or
    at least trim) my campaign debt from the recent School
    Board election. If you would like to contribute,
    please send your checks, payable to VINCENT FOR SCHOOL
    BOARD CAMPAIGN, in the enclosed envelope.
    Thank you for your support. I look forward to
    working with you during the next four years during my
    term of office.
    The nine letters varied only slightly.    Less than two weeks
    later, Vincent sent follow-up letters reiterating the last two
    paragraphs of the first letter.    The follow-up letters contained
    a notice on the bottom of the page referencing campaign
    contribution filing and reporting requirements.    The first
    letters did not.
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    On October 3, a grand jury indicted Vincent on nine counts
    of unethical solicitation of a gift.     A jury found him guilty on
    all counts and recommended a fine of $200 for each count.     The
    trial judge sentenced the fine in accordance with the jury's
    recommendation and further ordered that Vincent forfeit his
    school board seat.    The judge stayed the execution of the fines
    pending appeal, but refused to stay the forfeiture of the public
    position.
    II. Indictment
    Vincent first argues that the indictment did not properly
    state an offense because the wording in the indictment did not
    parallel the wording of the statute sections he was charged with
    violating.   His argument has no merit.     The indictment cited Code
    §§ 11-75 and 11-80, defining both the crime and the necessary
    criminal intent.   "By citation of the statute in the indictment
    appellant was informed of the essential elements of the case
    against him."   Reed v. Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 665
    , 667, 
    353 S.E.2d 166
    , 167-68 (1987).   The reference to the applicable
    statute sections and the plain wording of the indictment made the
    charges against Vincent clear.    The indictment sufficiently
    stated the offense.
    Vincent also contends that Code § 11-75 is
    unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.     It is neither.
    Code § 11-75 states:
    No public employee having official
    responsibility for a procurement transaction
    shall solicit, demand, accept, or agree to
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    accept from a bidder, offeror, contractor or
    subcontractor any payment, loan,
    subscription, advance, deposit of money,
    services or anything of more than nominal or
    minimal value, present or promised, unless
    consideration of substantially equal or
    greater value is exchanged. The public body
    may recover the value of anything conveyed in
    violation of this section.
    In order to withstand a void for vagueness challenge, the statute
    must provide a reasonably intelligent person with fair notice
    that his contemplated conduct is proscribed.      Papachristou v.
    City of Jacksonville, 
    405 U.S. 156
    , 162 (1972).      Code § 11-75
    clearly delineates the kinds of activities the General Assembly
    intended to prohibit: "solicit, demand, accept, or agree to
    accept" something of value from a bidder or contractor.       A
    reasonable public official or employee has sufficient notice as
    to potential wrongdoing, and the statute therefore does not fail
    for vagueness.
    Nor is the statute constitutionally overbroad.      If a statute
    can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable
    construction, the court is under a legal duty to give it that
    construction.    Pederson v. City of Richmond, 
    219 Va. 1061
    ,
    1065-66, 
    254 S.E.2d 92
    , 98 (1979).      When statutory construction
    is required, the court must construe a statute to promote the end
    for which it was enacted, if such an interpretation can
    reasonably be made from the language used.      Wollfolk v.
    Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 840
    , 847, 
    447 S.E.2d 530
    , 533 (1994).
    Contrary to Vincent's assertion, the statute as written does not
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    prohibit an official who once had procurement responsibility
    from that point onward ever receiving a campaign contribution
    from anyone who once was a contractor.     The statute as applied to
    the appellant can be construed narrowly so as to confine the
    period when he was a public official with procurement
    responsibility and the solicitees who were firms involved in that
    current transaction.
    III. Willful Requirement
    At trial, the jury was instructed that a "willful" act as
    defined in the offense was "an act done voluntarily and
    intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the
    law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey
    or to disregard the law."    The instruction was given without
    objection and becomes the law of the case, thereby binding the
    parties in the trial court and this Court on review.      Owens-
    Illinois, Inc. v. Thomas Baker Real Estate, 
    237 Va. 649
    , 652, 
    379 S.E.2d 344
    , 346 (1989); Shamblee v. Virginia Transit Co., 
    204 Va. 1
    591, 594-95, 
    132 S.E.2d 712
    , 714 (1963).
    In the absence of direct evidence, willfulness may be
    established through circumstances.      Lambert v. Commonwealth, 
    6 Va. App. 360
    , 363, 
    367 S.E.2d 745
    , 746 (1988).     "On appeal, we
    review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    1
    Because it is the law of this case on appeal, we need not
    decide whether this instruction states the law inaccurately,
    although we do note in passing that the instruction as given may
    have provided the appellant with a more favorable standard than
    that to which he was entitled.
    - 5 -
    Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly
    deducible therefrom."    Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    ,
    443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987).    "[W]hat inferences are to be
    drawn from proved facts is within the province of the jury and
    not the court so long as the inferences are reasonable and
    justified."    LaPrade v. Commonwealth, 
    191 Va. 410
    , 418, 
    61 S.E.2d 313
    , 316 (1950).
    The Commonwealth proved that Vincent was provided with
    specific guidelines concerning the ethical responsibilities
    associated with his new position, and that Vincent acted in
    contradiction of the statutory prohibitions.   Vincent was given a
    copy of the Virginia Beach School Board manual containing the
    school board bylaws, policies, and division regulations.    This
    manual included a section specifically addressing the ethics of
    public contracting and the relevant statutory provisions.
    Vincent was also present at a special orientation meeting held
    for new school board members prior to taking office.   These
    facts, taken as a whole, provide sufficient evidence to allow a
    jury to infer that Vincent's actions were willful.
    IV. Trial
    Vincent further assigns error to two decisions of the judge
    at trial.    Vincent first contends that the judge erred in denying
    his motion for a continuance because of negative pretrial
    publicity.    "The decision to grant a continuance is within the
    sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will be
    - 6 -
    overturned only "if it is plainly erroneous and upon a showing of
    abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice to the movant.'"
    Ohlen v. Shively, 
    16 Va. App. 419
    , 422, 
    430 S.E.2d 559
    , 560
    (1993) (quoting Mills v. Mills, 
    232 Va. 94
    , 96, 
    348 S.E.2d 250
    ,
    252 (1986)).
    The trial judge ascertained that three of the potential
    jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity.   One of the jurors
    indicated that he had formed an opinion and was stricken for
    cause.   The other two represented to the judge that they would be
    able to render a fair judgment based upon the evidence at trial.
    Having empaneled a fair and impartial jury, the judge properly
    refused to grant the continuance.
    After the sentence was pronounced, the defendant moved to
    stay execution of the forfeiture of his elected seat.     Code
    § 11-80, of which Vincent was convicted, provides that "[u]pon
    conviction, any public employee . . . shall forfeit his
    employment."   Unlike the other statutes cited by Vincent, Code
    § 11-80 does not expressly postpone removal of a public official
    from his position until the exhaustion of all appeals.    In light
    of the express language of Code § 11-80, we cannot say that the
    trial court abused its discretion by denying the stay of
    execution.
    Accordingly, we affirm the appellant's convictions.
    Affirmed.
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