Robert Leon Parker v. Commonwealth ( 1995 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Bray
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    ROBERT LEON PARKER
    v.          Record No. 1548-94-1           MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA                   NOVEMBER 14, 1995
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
    Dennis F. McMurran, Judge
    Dianne G. Ringer, Assistant Public Defender,
    for appellant.
    Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    The sole issue presented by Robert Leon Parker (Parker) in
    this appeal is whether the Circuit Court of the City of
    Portsmouth (trial court) erred when it permitted the Commonwealth
    to introduce evidence that Johnille Dubois (Dubois), a
    co-defendant, had pled guilty.     The facts relevant to the issue
    are not in dispute.
    On November 20, 1991, Sherry Watson (Watson), Angela Garcia
    (Garcia), and Philip Council (Council), employees at In-A-Hurry,
    a fast food convenience store located in the City of Portsmouth,
    were at work when four men entered the store.       As the men
    entered, a shot was fired.    Two of the men went behind the
    counter.    A third man, armed with a gun, ordered Council to empty
    ____________________
    *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    the cash register.   Council, who suffered from brain damage and
    was described by his co-workers as "slow" and "kind of clumsy,"
    attempted to comply with the order to empty the register but,
    because of his slowness, was having difficulty doing so.    As a
    result, at least three of the men then attacked Council.    While
    the men beat Council, one or more shots were fired.    Council was
    shot and killed as the robbery progressed.    One of the men then
    ordered Garcia to open the register.    Garcia complied.   The
    robbers took the money from the register and left.
    Both Watson and Garcia identified Dubois as the gunman, and
    Watson identified Garrett Porter (Porter) as one of the other
    participants in the robbery.   The store was equipped with a
    security camera, but the tape was not clear enough to identify
    any of the perpetrators of the robbery.
    Porter testified on behalf of the Commonwealth and stated
    that he knew Parker and that they used to "hang together."       He
    said that on November 20, he was with Parker, Johnson Ruffin, and
    Dubois, and that Parker had a gun.     He said that Dubois told them
    that he had been "scoping on this In-A-Hurry" and began to tell
    them, in detail, the layout of the store.    Thereafter, they all
    decided to rob the store, and later the four of them divided the
    money.   Porter further testified that during the robbery Dubois
    shot Council.
    When Porter was arrested, he gave police a statement in
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    which he admitted his part in the crime.    In addition, at trial
    he testified that he had entered into a written plea agreement
    because he was not the gunman. 1   During cross-examination, Porter
    responded to a defense question saying that he had originally
    been charged with capital murder and in the agreement his charge
    had been reduced to first degree murder.    During redirect
    examination, Porter was questioned by the prosecutor concerning
    Dubois's plea agreement. The transcript discloses the following:
    Q    Now, we've been over your plea
    agreement; is that right? Are you familiar
    with Mr. Dubois' plea agreement?
    A    Not really.
    Q    Did you ever discuss it with your
    attorney?
    A    I did know he pleaded guilty, but I
    don't know to what.
    MR. LINDAUER: Your Honor, I don't know
    that that would be relevant whether he knows
    about another person who's not Mr. Parker.
    MR. BULLOCK:    If he knows.
    THE COURT:     If you can connect it up,
    I overrule the objection.
    MR. BULLOCK:
    Q    Do you know what Mr. Dubois was
    charged with?
    A    Capital murder and robbery.
    Q    Do you know what he pled guilty to?
    A    No, I don't.
    1
    The plea agreement was entered into evidence.
    - 3 -
    The sole objection made to the above testimony was that it
    was not relevant.    Parker asserts that it was reversible error
    for the trial court to admit that testimony into evidence.    This
    is the only alleged error presented for our consideration.
    It is clear that the purpose of the questions Parker's
    counsel asked Porter concerning his plea agreement was to
    challenge his credibility by showing he was testifying on behalf
    of the Commonwealth as a part of a deal whereby Porter would
    avoid a possible death sentence.   It further is clear that unless
    a defendant has given cause to permit it, the introduction into
    evidence of a guilty plea and sentencing of a co-defendant or an
    accomplice for the purpose of showing the accused's guilt
    constitutes error.    See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 
    211 Va. 80
    , 
    175 S.E.2d 236
     (1970); Ward v. Commonwealth, 
    205 Va. 564
    , 
    138 S.E.2d 293
     (1964).   Here, the question differs from those cases in that
    the purpose of Parker's inquiry into the terms of Porter's plea
    agreement was to attempt to show that Porter had a reason to lie,
    thereby challenging his credibility.    The questions in issue were
    intended to rehabilitate Porter's credibility by showing that
    Dubois, the gunman, already had been convicted of the charge of
    capital murder and, therefore, the plea agreement obtained by
    Porter was not an inducement for Porter to testify against
    Parker.   For that reason, the questions and answers, if known,
    were relevant.   The determination of admission of relevant
    evidence lay within the sound discretion of the trial court
    - 4 -
    subject to the test of abuse of that discretion.   See Coe v.
    Commonwealth, 
    231 Va. 83
    , 
    340 S.E.2d 820
     (1986).
    We hold that under the facts of this case, the trial court
    did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its judgment.
    Affirmed.
    - 5 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1548941

Filed Date: 11/14/1995

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021