Landon T.A. Summers v. Marcia L.B. Summers ( 1998 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons
    LANDON TRACY ARCHER SUMMERS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 2669-97-4                            PER CURIAM
    NOVEMBER 10, 1998
    MARCIA LEE BROWN SUMMERS
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
    Gerald Bruce Lee, Judge
    (Dr. Landon Summers, pro se, on briefs).
    (David E. Roop, Jr.; Condo & Masterman, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Landon Tracy Archer Summers (father) appeals the decision of
    the circuit court awarding Marcia Lee Brown Summers (mother)
    permanent custody of the parties' two children. 1     Father contends
    that the trial court erred by (1) erroneously entering a final
    order for a Motion for Custody Pendente Lite prior to entry of a
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1
    Our review of the record does not disclose any notice of
    appeal filed in Chancery No. 147468, which is the case in which
    the trial court issued its ruling on permanent custody. Father
    filed a separate appeal of the trial court's pendente lite
    support order entered in Chancery No. 149903. That appeal was
    dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See Summers v.
    Summers, Record No. 2826-97-4 (Va. Ct. App. July 6, 1998).
    Father filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on January 14, 1998,
    also in Chancery No. 149903, purporting to be an appeal of the
    court's final custody order of December 18, 1997. Mother
    conceded that father filed a notice of appeal of the December 18,
    1997 custody order. Therefore, under these circumstances, we do
    not find that father's failure to properly caption the notice of
    appeal mandates dismissal of his appeal. See Carlton v. Paxton,
    
    14 Va. App. 105
    , 109-11, 
    415 S.E.2d 600
    , 602-03, aff'd on reh'g
    en banc, 
    15 Va. App. 265
    , 
    422 S.E.2d 423
     (1992).
    divorce decree; (2) failing to implement the recommendations of a
    custody evaluator; (3) changing joint custody to sole custody;
    and (4) failing to consider the best interests of the children.
    Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude
    that this appeal is without merit.       Accordingly, we summarily
    affirm the decision of the trial court.       See Rule 5A:27.
    On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
    favorable to mother as the prevailing party below.       See Peple v.
    Peple, 
    5 Va. App. 414
    , 422, 
    364 S.E.2d 232
    , 237 (1988).         "The
    trial court's decision, when based upon an ore tenus hearing, is
    entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless plainly
    wrong or without evidence to support it."       Venable v. Venable, 
    2 Va. App. 178
    , 186, 
    342 S.E.2d 646
    , 651 (1986).
    Appealable Order
    Father contends that orders entered by the trial court on
    October 10, 1997, November 24, 1997, 2 and December 18, 1997 were
    void ab initio and that there was no final appealable order.           We
    disagree.   Under Code § 17-116.05(3), the Court of Appeals has
    jurisdiction to hear appeals from "[a]ny final judgment, order,
    or decree of a circuit court involving: . . . Custody" and other
    domestic relations matters.   An aggrieved party may also appeal
    "[a]ny interlocutory decree or order entered in any of the cases
    listed in this section . . . adjudicating the principles of a
    cause."   Code § 17-116.05(4).
    2
    No order in the custody case was entered on this date.           An
    opinion letter was issued in Chancery No. 149903.
    - 2 -
    For an interlocutory decree to adjudicate
    the principles of a cause, the decision must
    be such that "'the rules or methods by which
    the rights of the parties are to be finally
    worked out have been so far determined that
    it is only necessary to apply those rules or
    methods to the facts of the case in order to
    ascertain the relative rights of the parties,
    with regard to the subject matter of the
    suit.'"
    Erikson v. Erikson, 
    19 Va. App. 389
    , 391, 
    451 S.E.2d 711
    , 712-13
    (1994) (citations omitted).
    The decree entered by the trial court on December 18, 1997
    set out the court's final ruling on custody.      We find that the
    order was an interlocutory decree which adjudicated the
    3
    principles of a cause.       The divorce and equitable distribution
    proceedings continued, but the custody issues were resolved.
    Father noted an appeal, thereby bringing this matter before us
    for review.   We find no merit in the errors alleged by father in
    connection with the trial court's entry of the permanent custody
    order.
    Custody Evaluator
    The trial court is not required to adopt recommendations
    made by an expert witness.      "It is well established that the
    trier of fact ascertains [an expert] witness' credibility,
    3
    A pendente lite order is a holding action pending final
    decision in the case. See Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 
    12 Va. App. 899
    , 903, 
    407 S.E.2d 37
    , 39-40 (1991). Pendente lite orders are
    not appealable. See 
    id.
     In contrast, the trial court explicitly
    noted that the custody order now appealed was its final decision
    on custody. Therefore, because this order fully determined the
    custody issues, it adjudicated the principles of a cause and was
    an appealable order. See Code § 17-116.05(4).
    - 3 -
    determines the weight to be given to their testimony, and has the
    discretion to accept or reject any of the witness' testimony."
    Street v. Street, 
    25 Va. App. 380
    , 387, 
    488 S.E.2d 665
    , 668
    (1997) (en banc) (citation omitted).   "[T]he fact finder is not
    required to accept the testimony of an expert witness merely
    because he or she has qualified as an expert.   In determining the
    weight to be given the testimony of an expert witness, the fact
    finder may consider the basis for the expert's opinion."   Id. at
    387, 
    488 S.E.2d at 668-69
    .
    The trial court's decision was supported by substantial
    evidence presented during three days of testimony, including that
    elicited during the cross-examination of the custody evaluator.
    Specifically, the trial court noted that
    Dr. Schutz's judgment of a joint custody
    arrangement has been tried out, and it is
    important to me to describe to you what joint
    custody means. 20-124.1 of the Code says
    that joint custody means where both parents
    retain joint responsibility for the care and
    control of a child, and joint authority to
    make decisions concerning the child, even
    though the child's primary residence may be
    with only one parent. . . . It is
    self-evident that a key component of joint
    custody is communication and cooperation, and
    mutuality, and purpose. It is fair to say
    that in this case that joint custody has
    failed.
    Because the trial court's decision is fully supported by the
    evidence, we find no error in the trial court's decision not to
    follow the recommendation of the custody evaluator.
    Award of Sole Custody
    - 4 -
    Father also contends that the trial court erred when it
    awarded mother sole custody with visitation to father rather than
    continuing joint custody.    The record amply demonstrates that
    these parties were unable to communicate or otherwise cooperate
    in raising their two young children.    Testimony from numerous
    witnesses, including the custody evaluator, documented the
    confusion caused by the parents' battles to control the
    children's schooling, toilet training, and daily care. 4    We find
    the trial court's decision to award sole custody to mother,
    rather than continuing the unsuccessful attempt at joint custody,
    amply supported by the evidence.
    Best Interests of the Children
    "'In determining custody, the court shall give primary
    consideration to the best interests of the child.'"     Sargent v.
    Sargent, 
    20 Va. App. 694
    , 701, 
    460 S.E.2d 596
    , 599 (1995)
    (quoting Code § 20-124.2).   The record demonstrates that the
    trial court's decision rested on its evaluation and consideration
    of the best interests of the parties' young children.      In
    addition, the trial court specifically addressed the best
    interests of the children in its detailed opinion letter denying
    father's motion for reconsideration.    The evidence supports the
    trial court's conclusions, and it is clear that the decision was
    4
    While this Court is not a fact finder, we need look no
    further than the multiple motions, replies, and supplemental
    replies filed by the parties in connection with this appeal to be
    convinced that the trial court properly noted that "[t]hese
    parents cannot agree on the time of day."
    - 5 -
    made with the best interests of the children as the foremost
    concern.      Father has not demonstrated error.
    Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
    affirmed. 5
    Affirmed.
    5
    Both parties have filed numerous motions with this Court.
    We deny father's motion for leave to proceed with mediation,
    motion for leave to file a supplemental brief, motion to stay
    divorce proceedings, and motion to stay enrollment of the
    parties' son. We deny mother's motion to strike, except as the
    issues raised are addressed in this opinion.
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