Markeith Alan Turner v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1998 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Lemons
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    MARKEITH ALAN TURNER
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.         Record No. 2090-97-1           JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
    SEPTEMBER 22, 1998
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
    Randolph T. West, Judge
    John D. Konstantinou (McKenna & Konstantinou,
    on brief), for appellant.
    Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Markeith Alan Turner (appellant) was convicted of robbing
    James Lisciandri and Stephen Muller.   On appeal, he contends the
    evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions.     For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
    in a criminal case, this Court views the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom.   See Higginbotham v.
    Commonwealth, 
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).
    The weight which should be given to evidence
    and whether the testimony of a witness is
    credible are questions which the fact finder
    must decide. However, whether a criminal
    conviction is supported by evidence
    sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    doubt is not a question of fact but one of
    law.
    Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 523
    , 528, 
    351 S.E.2d 598
    ,
    601-02 (1986).
    We hold that the evidence, when viewed in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to prove that
    appellant was guilty of the robbery of Lisciandri.
    "Robbery . . . is defined as the 'taking, with intent to steal,
    of the personal property of another, from his person or in his
    presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation.'"     Jones
    v. Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 736
    , 738, 
    496 S.E.2d 668
    , 669 (1998)
    (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 519
    , 521, 
    351 S.E.2d 356
    , 356 (1986)).    The evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt
    that appellant took Lisciandri's wallet from his person with
    intent to steal and against Lisciandri's will.   On July 9, 1996,
    a group of male teenagers, which included appellant, approached
    Lisciandri and Muller as they were walking through a field
    adjacent to a church on their way home.   The group split into
    two, and about four members surrounded each victim.    One person
    asked Lisciandri if he had "any loot."    Lisciandri responded by
    displaying his whole wallet.   Lisciandri later testified that he
    displayed his wallet because he was "afraid not to."   The person
    who asked for "any loot" then "grabbed" the wallet from
    Lisciandri's hand.
    The evidence proved that appellant was the member of the
    group who spoke to Lisciandri and grabbed the wallet from his
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    hand.    In his statement to the police after his arrest, appellant
    stated that he asked one of the victims "for a dollar" and that
    the victim responded by giving appellant his "his whole wallet."
    The testimony of Lisciandri and Muller indicates that Lisciandri
    was the only one of the two victims to relinquish his wallet to
    the group at this stage of the confrontation.    Lisciandri
    testified that, following the initial request for money, he
    showed his wallet to the group and "the guy that asked [him] for
    it" grabbed the wallet from him.    Muller testified that he
    responded to the initial request for money by giving a member of
    the group a twenty-dollar bill and that he did not lose
    possession of his wallet until he was knocked to the ground later
    in the confrontation.
    The evidence also proved that appellant accomplished the
    theft of the wallet from Lisciandri's person by "intimidation."
    In order to constitute robbery, the act of intimidation must
    precede or be concomitant with the taking.     See Harris, 3 Va.
    App. at 521, 351 S.E.2d at 356.    "'Intimidation results when
    words or conduct of the accused exercise such dominion and
    control over the victim as to overcome the victim's mind and
    overbear the victim's will, placing the victim in fear of bodily
    harm.'"     Jones, 
    26 Va. App. at 740
    , 
    496 S.E.2d at 670
     (quoting
    Bivins v. Commonwealth, 
    19 Va. App. 750
    , 753, 
    454 S.E.2d 741
    , 742
    (1995)).    The evidence proved that appellant and several other
    male teenagers ran up to the two victims from a store across the
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    street in a maneuver that appellant described as an "ambush."
    Appellant then acted with the other members of the group to
    isolate Lisciandri from his companion by surrounding him.
    Appellant then asked Lisciandri if he had any "loot."     Lisciandri
    testified that he displayed his wallet because he was "scared."
    From these circumstances, the trial court could infer beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Lisciandri actually surrendered his
    property to appellant because of his fear of bodily harm induced
    by appellant's intimidating words and conduct.      Cf. Harris, 3 Va.
    App. at 521, 351 S.E.2d at 357.
    We also hold that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable
    doubt that appellant was criminally responsible for the robbery
    of Muller.
    If there is concert of action with the
    resulting crime one of its incidental
    probable consequences, then whether such
    crime was originally contemplated or not, all
    who participate in any way in bringing it
    about are equally answerable and bound by the
    acts of every other person connected with the
    consummation of such resulting crime.
    Rollston v. Commonwealth, 
    11 Va. App. 535
    , 541-42, 
    399 S.E.2d 823
    , 827 (1991) (citation omitted).      Concert of action is defined
    as "'[a]ction that has been planned, arranged, adjusted, agreed
    on and settled between parties acting together pursuant to some
    design or scheme.'"     Id. at 542, 
    399 S.E.2d at 827
     (citation
    omitted).
    The evidence proved that ninety dollars was taken from
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    Muller's presence against his will by an act of violence.    Muller
    lost possession of his wallet, which contained ninety dollars, 1
    as he was knocked to the ground by members of the group.    After
    he was beaten, he found his wallet and discovered that the ninety
    dollars was missing.
    The evidence also supports the conclusion that appellant
    acted in concert with the members of the group who robbed Muller.
    Appellant told Detective Williams that all members of the group,
    himself included, ran toward the victims in an "ambush."    Marti
    Jones, a member of the group, testified that when the group of
    teenagers saw Lisciandri and Muller, someone said "let's go get
    them."   The group split into two and confronted both Lisciandri
    and Muller separately.   The record proved that the beatings of
    the two victims commenced within seconds of each other.
    Lisciandri testified that the group "seemed like they were
    together."   Muller testified that, after he was beaten, all of
    the members of the group who had confronted both him and
    Lisciandri left the scene of the robberies "together."    From this
    evidence, the trial court could conclude beyond a reasonable
    doubt that appellant both joined and participated in the group's
    1
    Muller testified that, when he was initially confronted by
    the group, his wallet contained $110 dollars. When a member of
    the group asked him for money, he responded by removing a
    twenty-dollar bill from his wallet and giving it to one of the
    teenagers. He only gave them twenty dollars "because [he] didn't
    want to give them more." Thus, it is reasonable to infer that,
    at the time the group knocked Muller to the ground, his wallet
    contained ninety dollars.
    - 5 -
    plot to accost the victims en masse and that Muller's robbery was
    an incidental probable consequence of the group's plan.    Cf.
    Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 
    195 Va. 523
    , 528-29, 
    79 S.E.2d 443
    , 446
    (1954).
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions.
    Affirmed.
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