William C. Penley v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1998 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Senior Judge Duff
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    WILLIAM C. PENLEY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1880-97-2                 BY JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF
    SEPTEMBER 8, 1998
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
    L. A. Harris, Jr., Judge
    John M. Wright, Jr. (Downs and Wright, on
    brief), for appellant.
    Pamela A. Rumpz, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Steven A.
    Witmer, Assistant Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    William C. Penley appeals his convictions for attempted
    taking of indecent liberties with children.   He asserts that the
    evidence was insufficient to prove an attempt, and insufficient
    to prove that he was acting with lascivious intent.      We disagree
    and affirm.
    "Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after
    conviction, it is our duty to consider it in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom."    Higginbotham v.
    Commonwealth, 
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).
    So viewed, the evidence proved that on the morning of
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    November 6, 1996, thirteen-year-old J.G. and her eleven-year-old
    sister, H.G., were waiting for their school bus when Penley drove
    by them.   Penley turned around in a driveway, then drove back to
    the girls and asked "[h]ave you ever seen a dick before?"      When
    the girls turned away, he said "[n]o, I'm serious, have you ever
    seen one?"   J.G. then said "[n]o," and Penley responded "[w]ould
    you like to see one?"   Both girls responded "[n]o."
    At that moment, a car driven by the girls' neighbor
    approached the area, and Penley drove away quickly.    J.G.
    testified that Penley looked in his rear view mirror as the
    neighbor's car approached.   Because of his position in the car,
    the sisters could not see Penley's body much below his shoulders,
    and Penley never got out of the car.
    Kay Miles testified that on Monday, November 4, 1996, she
    noticed an unfamiliar car backing out of her neighbor's driveway.
    The driver of the car, whom Miles subsequently identified as
    Penley, then backed in and out of Miles' driveway.     Miles
    proceeded out of her driveway on her way to drop her daughter off
    at the school bus stop.   She testified that Penley went in the
    same direction, that he subsequently pulled in and out of another
    driveway before finally parking his car on the side of the road.
    Miles stated that Penley parked facing--and approximately twenty
    feet away from--Miles' daughter's bus stop.   Although Penley did
    not get out of his car, Miles testified that he appeared to stare
    at the children as they boarded the school bus.   Miles testified
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    that her daughter's bus stop was approximately three miles from
    J.G. and H.G.'s bus stop.
    Investigator Morris arrested Penley on November 12, 1996,
    and questioned him regarding the November 6, 1996 incident.
    Penley explained that he had been in the victims' neighborhood
    while looking for his former boss.     He initially told Morris that
    he stopped and spoke to the victims because he thought he heard
    them call him a "dick."   Penley subsequently agreed with Morris
    that it would have been impossible for him to hear the girls say
    anything when he first drove by because his car window nearest to
    them was closed, and he was playing his radio.
    Penley testified that he thought he heard one of the girls
    say "dick" and that he made the offending statements to the
    victims because he was frustrated and angry.    In a written
    statement provided to Morris on November 12, 1996, Penley
    indicated that he confronted the victims because he "was bored
    and curious."   Penley further wrote that he had driven away from
    the victims quickly because he was "very nervous" and that he
    realized what he had done "was wrong."
    Penley admitted being in Miles' neighborhood on November 4,
    1996, and being behind a bus that morning, although he denied
    purposely following it.   He further admitted that he was not in
    the Brookland Middle School area (where both victims and Miles'
    daughter attended school) on Tuesday and that he knew Tuesday was
    a school holiday.
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    In finding Penley guilty, the trial judge stated that he did
    not believe Penley's testimony.    The trial judge further found
    that the victims, Miles, and Morris had testified credibly.
    A.     Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove an Attempt
    A defendant is guilty of taking indecent liberties if he,
    "with lascivious intent," exposes his genital parts to a child
    under the age of fourteen years to whom he is not married.      Code
    § 18.2-370.    To convict a defendant of attempted taking of
    indecent liberties, the Commonwealth must prove "the intention to
    commit the crime, and the doing of some direct act towards [sic]
    its consummation which is more than mere preparation but falls
    short of execution of the ultimate purpose."     Sizemore v.
    Commonwealth, 
    218 Va. 980
    , 983, 
    243 S.E.2d 212
    , 213 (1978).
    "To prove an attempt, the Commonwealth must demonstrate a
    direct, ineffectual act that 'must go beyond mere preparation and
    be done to produce the intended result.'"     Jordan v.
    Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 759
    , 762, 
    427 S.E.2d 231
    , 233 (1993)
    (citation omitted).    "'[I]t may be said that preparation consists
    in devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the
    commission of the offense and that the attempt is the direct
    movement toward the commission after the preparations are made.'"
    Granberry v. Commonwealth, 
    184 Va. 674
    , 678, 
    36 S.E.2d 547
    , 548
    (1946) (citation omitted).    "'[T]here must be some appreciable
    fragment of the crime committed, it must be in such progress that
    it will be consummated unless interrupted by circumstances
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    independent of the will of the attempter, and the act must not be
    equivocal in nature.'"      Lewis v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 337
    ,
    340, 
    423 S.E.2d 371
    , 373 (1992) (citation omitted).
    The evidence proved that, after passing the victims, Penley
    turned around in a driveway and returned to the location where
    they were standing.     He asked them twice if they had ever seen a
    "dick," and when they responded "no," asked if they wanted to see
    one.    This latter inquiry reasonably could be interpreted as an
    attempt by appellant to entice the victims to approach his car.
    The trial court could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that this
    crime would have been consummated had a neighbor not approached.
    Penley's actions went beyond mere preparation, and instead,
    constituted "direct movement" toward completion of the crime.
    B.   Sufficiency of the Evidence Proving Lascivious Intent
    The word "lascivious" is not defined in
    the statute, and must therefore be given its
    ordinary meaning in determining the
    legislative intent in the use of the word in
    this particular statute. As so determined,
    the word "lascivious" describes a state of
    mind that is eager for sexual indulgence,
    desirous of inciting to lust or of inciting
    sexual desire and appetite.
    McKeon v. Commonwealth, 
    211 Va. 24
    , 27, 
    175 S.E.2d 282
    , 284
    (1970).
    The Supreme Court has identified four factors that can be
    utilized in proving lascivious intent:     1) whether the defendant
    was sexually aroused when he performed the act; 2) whether he
    made any gestures to himself or the victim; 3) whether he made
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    any improper remarks to the victim; and 4) whether he asked her
    to do anything wrong.   See Campbell v. Commonwealth, 
    227 Va. 196
    ,
    199, 
    313 S.E.2d 402
    , 404 (1984).    "[P]roof of any one factor can
    be sufficient to uphold a conviction under [Code § 18.2-370]."
    Id. at 200, 
    313 S.E.2d at 404
    .
    "Because direct proof of intent is often impossible, it must
    be shown by circumstantial evidence."    Servis v. Commonwealth, 
    6 Va. App. 507
    , 524, 
    371 S.E.2d 156
    , 165 (1988).   "When a
    conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence
    'is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct
    evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every
    reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.'"    Hollins v.
    Commonwealth, 
    19 Va. App. 223
    , 229, 
    450 S.E.2d 397
    , 400 (1994)
    (citation omitted).   "The Commonwealth need only exclude
    reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence,
    not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant."
    Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 
    16 Va. App. 751
    , 755, 
    433 S.E.2d 27
    , 29
    (1993).
    "The fact finder is not required to believe testimony that
    is inconsistent with the facts, may reject testimony that has
    been impeached, and may rely solely upon circumstantial evidence
    to prove an offense, provided the circumstances point unerringly
    to prove the necessary elements of the offense."   Doss v.
    Commonwealth, 
    23 Va. App. 679
    , 685, 
    479 S.E.2d 92
    , 95 (1996).
    "[F]light may be considered as evidence of guilt . . . ."     Hope
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    v. Commonwealth, 
    10 Va. App. 381
    , 386, 
    392 S.E.2d 830
    , 833 (1990)
    (en banc).    Likewise, "[a] defendant's false statements are
    probative to show he is trying to conceal his guilt, and thus
    [are] evidence of his guilt."   Rollston v. Commonwealth, 
    11 Va. App. 535
    , 548, 
    399 S.E.2d 823
    , 831 (1991).
    Penley's questions to the thirteen-year-old and
    eleven-year-old victims, asking them if they had ever seen a
    "dick" and if they wanted to see one, were "improper remarks" and
    constituted competent, circumstantial evidence of lascivious
    intent.   Penley then drove off quickly when a car approached.
    Miles' testimony that Penley had been in her neighborhood on
    November 4, 1996 and that he had watched several young girls
    board a school bus was also probative of his intent.   Finally,
    Penley admitted that, while he was in the area on Monday and
    Wednesday, he did not go there on November 5, which he knew to be
    a school holiday.
    Penley gave inconsistent statements to the police regarding
    the incident.   At first, he alleged that the girls had called him
    a "dick."    He then conceded that he would not have been able to
    hear anything they said when he drove by.    He then wrote out a
    statement wherein he indicated that he had said these things
    because he was "bored" and "curious."   At trial, Penley testified
    that he made the remarks because he was "frustrated" and "angry."
    He also provided a suspect explanation for why he was in the
    neighborhood in the first place.   Accordingly, the Commonwealth's
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    evidence was sufficient to prove Penley acted with lascivious
    intent.
    The trial judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor
    of the witnesses.   The judge specifically stated that he found
    Penley's testimony incredible and that he believed the testimony
    of the victims, Miles, and Morris.     "The weight which should be
    given to evidence and whether the testimony of a witness is
    credible are questions which the fact finder must decide."
    Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 523
    , 528, 
    351 S.E.2d 598
    ,
    601 (1986).   The Commonwealth's evidence was competent, was not
    inherently incredible, and was sufficient to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Penley was guilty of attempted taking
    indecent liberties with a child.   Accordingly, the convictions
    appealed from are affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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    Benton, J., dissenting.
    "It is well established that an attempt is composed of two
    elements:   the intention to commit the crime, and the doing of
    some direct act towards its consummation which is more than mere
    preparation but falls short of execution of the ultimate
    purpose."   Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 
    218 Va. 980
    , 983, 
    243 S.E.2d 212
    , 213 (1978).   To convict William C. Penley of attempting to
    take indecent liberties with a child, the Commonwealth had to
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Penley attempted to expose
    his genital parts to a child under fourteen years of age.    See
    Code § 18.2-370(1).   The evidence was insufficient to satisfy
    that burden of proof.
    Although the evidence might be sufficient to prove intent to
    commit the crime, see Campbell v. Commonwealth, 
    227 Va. 196
    ,
    199-200, 
    373 S.E.2d 402
    , 404 (1984) (defendant's improper remarks
    to the victim are sufficient to prove lascivious intent), intent
    is but one element of the attempted offense.   The evidence also
    must prove "an overt but ineffectual act committed in furtherance
    of the criminal purpose."   Howard v. Commonwealth, 
    221 Va. 904
    ,
    906, 
    275 S.E.2d 602
    , 603 (1981).   "While it is not necessary to
    show that the conduct was thwarted at the instant of
    consummation, the evidence must prove that the preparation
    proceeded 'far enough towards the accomplishment of the desired
    result to amount to the commencement of the consummation.'"
    Lewis v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 337
    , 340, 
    423 S.E.2d 371
    , 373
    - 9 -
    (1992) (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 
    210 Va. 153
    , 156, 
    169 S.E.2d 449
    , 451 (1969)).
    Thus, the evidence "must demonstrate a direct, ineffectual
    act that 'must go beyond mere preparation and be done to produce
    the intended result.'"   Jordan v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 759
    ,
    762, 
    427 S.E.2d 231
    , 233 (1993) (citation omitted).
    "'Preparation alone is not enough, there must be some appreciable
    fragment of the crime committed, it must be in such progress that
    it will be consummated unless interrupted by circumstances
    independent of the will of the attempter, and the act must not be
    equivocal in nature.'"   Lewis, 15 Va. App. at 339-40, 
    423 S.E.2d at 373
     (citation omitted).
    Penley committed no act that can be deemed "beyond mere
    preparation."   The girls testified that they could only see
    Penley from the shoulders or stomach up.   No evidence proved he
    was undressed or undressing.   The girls testified that Penley
    never attempted to get out of the car.   He did not ask the girls
    to get into the car, and he did not offer them anything to get
    them to come closer.   No evidence proved that Penley made any
    gestures such that would indicate he was about to expose his
    genitals.
    Because the record is devoid of any evidence that Penley
    committed any "acts that can be characterized as well calculated
    to accomplish the intended result" of exposing his genitals to
    the girls, Tharrington v. Commonwealth, 
    2 Va. App. 491
    , 496, 346
    - 10 -
    S.E.2d 337, 340 (1986), I would hold that the evidence was
    insufficient to prove Penley committed a direct act toward the
    commission of the offenses.
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