Arthur Rucker v. City of Richmond ( 1998 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Overton
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    ARTHUR RUCKER
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.        Record No. 0731-97-2        JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
    MARCH 17, 1998
    CITY OF RICHMOND
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
    Thomas N. Nance, Judge
    S. Neil Stout (Steven Billy; Flax, Billy &
    Stout, on brief), for appellant.
    Jan T. Reid, Assistant City Attorney, for
    appellee.
    Arthur Rucker appeals his conviction in the Circuit Court of
    the City of Richmond of violation of the City of Richmond Code
    §§ 5-3 (failure to demolish an unsafe building), 19-52 (allowing
    refuse to accumulate on the property) and 28-305 (allowing
    inoperable motor vehicles to remain on the property).     He
    contends these convictions violate the double jeopardy clause of
    the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.    Because
    1
    we disagree, we affirm.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record in this
    case, and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1
    Appellant also argued that the City was without authority
    to prosecute the violations as continuing offenses. Lawless v.
    County of Chesterfield, 
    21 Va. App. 495
    , 
    465 S.E.2d 153
     (1995).
    Under Rule 5A:18 we decline to address this argument.
    value, no recitation of the facts is necessary.
    "The [F]ifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    declares that no person shall 'be subject for the same offense to
    be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.'"     Peterson v.
    Commonwealth, 
    5 Va. App. 389
    , 394, 
    363 S.E.2d 440
    , 443 (1987)
    (citation omitted).   Even so, "the burden is on the defendant to
    establish the identity of the offenses."     Low v. Commonwealth, 
    11 Va. App. 48
    , 50, 
    396 S.E.2d 383
    , 384 (1990).    In order to meet
    this burden, defendant's "plea of former jeopardy must be in
    writing and 'set forth the court in which the accused was tried,
    the time thereof, the specific offense charged, the acquittal or
    conviction of the accused and any other circumstance necessary to
    identify the offense and the accused."     Cooper v. Commonwealth,
    
    13 Va. App. 642
    , 644, 
    414 S.E.2d 435
    , 436 (1992) (quoting DeBoer
    v. Commonwealth, 
    147 Va. 671
    , 675, 
    137 S.E. 469
    , 470 (1927)).
    Defendant has not met his burden.     He offers copies of three
    summonses addressing his previous charges under the city
    ordinances at issue as proof that his most recent prosecution is
    barred.   The trial court indicated on two of the summonses that
    defendant was present, and the charges were dismissed.    The trial
    court did not check the boxes provided on the summonses
    indicating defendant was tried.    If there was no trial, jeopardy
    did not attach.   See Serfass v. United States, 
    420 U.S. 377
    , 388
    (1975) ("In a bench trial, jeopardy does not attach until the
    first witness has been sworn.").
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    Only one summons indicates defendant was tried and found
    guilty, but it also indicates the conviction was set aside and
    dismissed.   When a trial court declares a mistrial, a defendant
    is presumed to have waived his Fifth Amendment objections.      See
    United States v. Jorn, 
    400 U.S. 470
    , 484-85 (1971).    See also
    United States v. Dinitz, 
    424 U.S. 600
    , 611 (1976) (holding that
    prosecutorial or judicial impropriety vitiate the waiver).      A
    mistrial is the functional equivalent to a conviction which has
    been set aside if defendant consented to it.    See Allen v.
    Commonwealth, 
    252 Va. 105
    , 110-11, 
    472 S.E.2d 277
    , 280 (1996)
    ("Regardless of the terminology used by the trial court, for
    purposes of double jeopardy protection, we find no difference of
    constitutional significance between setting aside a verdict . . .
    and declaring a mistrial . . . .").    The record before us shows
    defendant not only consented to the conviction being set aside,
    but he affirmatively returned to court and asked that it be set
    aside.   Under these circumstances, he waived his right to raise
    double jeopardy during the instant case.
    Defendant has failed to prove that jeopardy attached during
    any previous litigation.   Therefore, his most recent prosecution
    was not barred.   Accordingly, his convictions are affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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