Troy Lee Atkins, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1998 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Annunziata
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    TROY LEE ATKINS, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2740-96-2                 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    FEBRUARY 24, 1998
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
    Robert W. Duling, Judge
    Carl C. Muzi for appellant.
    Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
    (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Troy Lee Atkins, Jr., was convicted of second degree murder.
    On appeal, he argues that the trial judge abused his discretion
    by allowing a witness to be recalled to testify at trial after
    the witness violated the trial judge's order not to discuss the
    case with other witnesses.   He also argues that the evidence was
    insufficient to support his conviction.    We affirm the
    conviction.
    I.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth, granting it all reasonable inferences fairly
    deducible therefrom.   See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).    So viewed, the evidence
    proved that in the early morning hours of December 27, 1995,
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    Atkins drove from Emporia to Richmond with Sara Lee Odom, two of
    their children, and another couple.     Atkins and Odom registered
    at a motel and put the children to bed.
    A registered nurse testified that Atkins arrived at the
    hospital emergency room on the afternoon of December 27.     When
    the nurse went outside to see Odom in Atkins' truck, Odom did not
    have a pulse.   Atkins told the nurse that several girls attacked
    Odom after Odom went to a store.   He said when Odom returned
    home, Odom told Atkins what happened and complained of a
    headache.   Atkins said when he asked Odom if she wanted to go to
    the hospital, Odom refused and said she would be fine after
    taking a shower.
    Atkins also spoke with a clinical social worker in the
    emergency room and repeated the same events.     The social worker
    noted that Atkins was upset.    Atkins said that he brought Odom to
    the hospital after she passed out.      The social worker informed
    Atkins that Odom's situation was life threatening.     She also told
    him that if Odom was attacked, criminal assault charges would be
    filed against the assailants.   Atkins walked through the
    emergency room entrance to smoke a cigarette and never returned.
    Detective Leonard testified that when he went to the
    hospital on December 27, Odom's body had been removed by the
    medical examiner.   Detective Leonard visited Emporia several
    times looking for Atkins and left his business cards with Atkins'
    friends and family.   Atkins was apprehended in North Carolina on
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    February 6, 1996, brought to Richmond for questioning, and gave a
    lengthy statement to the Richmond police explaining the events
    that occurred on December 27.
    Testifying from Atkins' written statement, Detective Leonard
    stated that Atkins said he and Odom were waiting in Atkins' truck
    for a friend at 6:00 a.m. on December 27 when Odom decided to go
    to a nearby store for sodas and cigarettes.   About twenty minutes
    later, Atkins heard loud "fussing" outside his truck.   When he
    exited the truck, he saw Odom with a stick.   Odom told Atkins
    that two or three women were "messing with her."   After Atkins
    yelled at the women, they ran.    He saw two or three people
    running off.    Odom had a gash and two scratches on her face and a
    bleeding finger.   When Atkins told Odom she should go to the
    hospital, she said she was fine and asked him to take her to the
    motel.
    Atkins said that when he arrived at the motel he sent the
    children to get a soda for Odom.    Odom then went into the room
    and got into the bathtub.   Atkins said Odom complained because he
    made the water too hot and at one point said "ouch."    Atkins said
    that he asked Odom if she had been hit with sticks and she said
    that she had.   After the children returned, Odom sat on the bed,
    changed her clothes, talked and joked with the children, walked
    around the room, smoked cigarettes, and drank a soda.   Atkins
    said that Odom asked him to not mention the beating to the
    children.   At Odom's request, he took the children to a friend's
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    house.
    Atkins' statement further recited that when he took the
    children to the friend's house, Odom's daughter saw blood in the
    truck.    She accused Atkins of fighting with her mother and asked
    him where the blood came from.    She said "I know you and
    mama . . . got mad and been fighting."    Atkins said he told her
    she was being "nosy."   In his statement, Atkins admitted that he
    and Odom had had fights before but never so severe as to require
    medical attention.
    After leaving the children, Atkins went to a store and
    purchased something for Odom's pain.     When he returned to the
    motel, Odom was dressed.   Odom said she did not have a headache
    and was not sore.    Although he rubbed the ointment on her, Odom
    did not take the medicine he purchased for her pain.
    Atkins said that later in the afternoon he and Odom went to
    Atkins' uncle's house and remained inside for twenty minutes.
    Odom said she couldn't breath, and she fainted.    With the
    assistance of another woman, Atkins gave Odom mouth-to-mouth
    resuscitation.   Atkins then took Odom to the hospital.   Atkins
    said that he did not contact the police after leaving the
    hospital because he did not have their phone number and because
    he was afraid a warrant would be issued for his arrest.
    Later in his statement, Atkins gave another version of the
    events.   Atkins said that when he was sitting in the truck and
    heard the voices, he jumped out of the truck and saw Odom coming
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    toward him.   Odom had a gash on her face.   Later, when Odom was
    taking her bath and Atkins saw her injuries, he told her it
    looked as if she had been hit with sticks.   She told him she had
    been beaten with sticks.
    Odom's fourteen-year-old daughter testified that at 8:00
    a.m. on December 27, her mother was seated motionless in Atkins'
    truck in front of the motel room.   Atkins got a coat from the
    motel room.   Odom's daughter next saw the coat over her mother's
    shoulders.    Atkins sent the two children to get sodas, and he
    told them he and Odom were going to visit another couple in the
    motel.   When the children returned with the sodas, Atkins and
    Odom were in the bathroom of the motel room.   Odom's daughter
    passed a soda through the slightly opened door and heard her
    mother say "ouch."    Later, Odom's daughter saw her mother lying
    in bed with the sheets pulled up to her shoulders.   Odom's
    daughter said her mother never spoke to her or the other child.
    She never saw Odom walking around, smoking, talking, or drinking
    her soda.
    Later, when the children awoke, Atkins left Odom at the
    motel and took the two children to a friend's house.   The
    daughter saw blood in Atkins' truck on the rear passenger window
    and headrest.   When she asked Atkins if he had been fighting with
    her mother, he just smiled.   He asked her why she asked, and she
    replied "[b]ecause I see blood."    She testified that Atkins made
    no further comment.
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    Dr. Jack Daniel, the assistant medical examiner, opined that
    Odom died of acute head trauma.    He testified that "her entire
    back, her buttocks, . . . the entire extent of her left arm,
    [and] much of her right arm were covered with prominent bruises.
    Associated with those bruises were a large number of small
    angular . . . lacerations."    Four lacerations on Odom's head
    caused "a great deal of bleeding into her scalp" and bleeding on
    the top of her brain.    Odom had bruising and abrasions on the
    front of both of her lower legs and her right knee, and she had
    extensive bruising and swelling on both hands.      Her right ring
    finger was broken.    Dr. Daniel testified that Odom also had
    abrasions on the tip and sides of her nose and around her mouth.
    The most severe injury on her face was a deep laceration about a
    quarter of an inch long on the right side of her face near her
    nose.    Dr. Daniel further testified that if a stick had been used
    in the beating, he would have expected a broken nose rather than
    this type of injury.
    Dr. Daniel opined that the "very, very severe bruising," the
    extensive tissue damage, and the absence of major bone fractures
    indicated that a flexible instrument was used to inflict Odom's
    injuries.    He testified that all of the marks, including the
    angular irregular marks, were "entirely consistent" with having
    been inflicted with a belt buckle.       He also opined that the
    configuration of a belt and its buckle recovered by the police
    from Atkins' truck was "entirely consistent" with Odom's
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    injuries.   He testified, however, that any other belt could have
    been used and that he could not rule out the possibility that a
    tree branch was used to inflict these injuries.    Dr. Daniel
    further testified that Odom's injuries were inflicted by a dozen
    or more blows and that the severity of Odom's injuries would have
    been immediately apparent to anyone who saw her.
    Dr. Daniel was recalled to testify after several witnesses
    had testified.   When Atkins' counsel objected to his further
    testimony, Dr. Daniel was questioned to determine whether he had
    violated the judge's admonition not to discuss the case with
    others.   During the course of this voir dire, Dr. Daniel
    testified that a North Carolina detective, who had testified
    earlier in the trial and had sat through Dr. Daniel's testimony,
    talked with him during lunch.    After further voir dire, the trial
    judge overruled the objection.
    Dr. Daniel testified again and opined that while Odom might
    have been conscious for several hours after the injuries were
    inflicted, he could not say "with any confidence" that she would
    have been coherent.   He stated that Odom would have become
    "progressively less coherent, less responsive over a period of
    hours if in fact she did not lose consciousness immediately."
    At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge convicted
    Atkins of second degree murder.
    II.
    Atkins first contends that the trial judge erred in not
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    barring Dr. Daniel's second testimony.   Atkins argues that Dr.
    Daniel violated the judge's order not to discuss the case with
    others and that the doctor had been prepared by other
    Commonwealth's witnesses to answer certain questions prior to
    being recalled to testify.    Atkins asserts that he was prejudiced
    by the testimony because without it, the Commonwealth would not
    have established when Odom was beaten.
    On voir dire, before his second testimony, Dr. Daniel
    testified that when he spoke to the North Carolina detective at
    lunch, "there was some question as to whether or not . . .
    certain questions that might have been asked . . . about the
    length of survival" and "what [the victim] might have been
    capable of doing."   Dr. Daniel stated that his opinions were not
    changed as a result of his conversation with the detective.     When
    questioned by the trial judge, Dr. Daniel testified that although
    he was aware of the nature of the questions he was about to be
    asked by the Commonwealth's attorney, any response he would give
    was unrelated to his conversation with the detectives.
    The North Carolina detective testified that during their
    walk to lunch he said to Dr. Daniel, "in North Carolina one of
    the questions . . . would have asked the time.   How long she
    would have lived."   He said that Dr. Daniel's response was "that
    would have been a responsible or respectable question."
    Detective Leonard, who testified after the lunch recess,
    overheard the conversation.   He testified that the North Carolina
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    "detective . . . asked him -- he didn't understand why . . . the
    Commonwealth attorney didn't ask Dr. Daniel . . . what the girl
    could do after the beating.   What she would be able to do."
    Detective Leonard could not recall Dr. Daniel's response and
    stated that he did not remember contributing to the conversation.
    The Commonwealth's attorney stated that after lunch he
    realized that he had forgotten to ask Dr. Daniel several
    important questions.   The Commonwealth's attorney stated that he
    did not discuss these questions with Detective Leonard or the
    North Carolina detective and that the questions were in his notes
    but that he simply forgot to ask them.
    Defense counsel asked the trial judge to prohibit Dr. Daniel
    from testifying or to declare a mistrial.   The judge denied the
    motion and ruled as follows:
    The paramount question in the Court's mind is
    whether the conversations that took place
    outside of this courtroom that should not
    have taken place is likely to change the
    testimony to be offered at this time by Dr.
    Daniel. The Court has concluded that those
    conversations and the manner in which this
    situation arose will not affect the testimony
    by Dr. Daniel as to whatever questions he may
    be asked at this point during the remainder
    of his time on the stand as a witness and for
    that reason the Court sees no useful purpose
    would be served by declaring a mistrial and I
    shall not do that.
    "The purpose of excluding witnesses from the courtroom is,
    of course, to deprive a later witness of the opportunity of
    shaping his testimony to correspond to that of an earlier one."
    Huddleston v. Commonwealth, 
    191 Va. 400
    , 405, 
    61 S.E.2d 276
    , 279
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    (1950).   "A judge's admonition to witnesses not to discuss
    [their] testimony with third parties until the trial is completed
    . . . [is intended to] lessen the danger that [a witness']
    testimony will be influenced by hearing what other witnesses have
    to say, and to increase the likelihood that [witnesses] will
    confine themselves to truthful statements based on their own
    recollections."     Perry v. Leeke, 
    488 U.S. 272
    , 281 (1989).
    "A trial [judge] has discretion to decide whether a witness
    who violates an exclusion order should be prevented from
    testifying."    Bennett v. Commonwealth, 
    236 Va. 448
    , 465, 
    374 S.E.2d 303
    , 314 (1988).    On review, we must consider "whether
    there was prejudice to the defendant . . . [,] whether there was
    intentional impropriety attributable to the prosecution . . . [,]
    whether the out-of-court comments concerned any substantive
    aspect of the case[,] and whether [the comments] had any effect
    on the witness' testimony."     
    Id.
       Thus, "we cannot reverse the
    trial court's action in permitting [Dr. Daniel] to testify unless
    it appears that [Atkins] was prejudiced by such action."        Satcher
    v. Commonwealth, 
    244 Va. 220
    , 244, 
    421 S.E.2d 821
    , 836 (1992).
    Although Dr. Daniel's testimony regarding the length of time
    Odom would be conscious after the beating and Odom's degree of
    coherence was damaging to Atkins, that is not the test of
    prejudice.   Rather, prejudice occurs where the violation of the
    exclusion order somehow influences the testimony of the witness
    on the stand.     See Bennett, 236 Va. at 464-65, 374 S.E.2d at
    - 10 -
    314-15 (no abuse of discretion where witness did not change
    testimony as result of information obtained from Commonwealth in
    violation of exclusion order); Jury v. Commonwealth, 
    10 Va. App. 718
    , 721, 
    395 S.E.2d 213
    , 215-16 (1990) (abuse of discretion to
    refuse to allow witness who unintentionally remained in courtroom
    in violation of exclusion order to testify because there was no
    showing that witness' presence in courtroom influenced his
    testimony).   No evidence proved that Dr. Daniel's testimony was
    influenced by his conversation with the North Carolina detective.
    Although the conversation between Dr. Daniel and the North
    Carolina detective violated the nondiscussion order, it did not
    constitute a "coaching session" as Atkins suggests.   The North
    Carolina detective merely commented that the Commonwealth's
    attorney forgot to ask a pivotal question, and Dr. Daniel agreed.
    The detective did not prepare Dr. Daniel to answer certain
    questions; indeed, he and Dr. Daniel did not discuss Dr. Daniel's
    responses to any questions.   Furthermore, Dr. Daniel testified
    that although he knew what he would be testifying about, his
    answer to the question was based on his autopsy and examination
    of the victim, not on his lunch time conversation.
    Having examined the record, we hold that the trial judge did
    not abuse his discretion in permitting the witness to testify.
    III.
    We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support
    Atkins' conviction for second degree murder.   Although the
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    evidence in this case is entirely circumstantial, the principle
    is well established that circumstantial evidence alone may be
    sufficient to support a conviction.      See Johnson v. Commonwealth,
    
    2 Va. App. 598
    , 604-05, 
    347 S.E.2d 163
    , 167 (1986).     When a case
    is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved
    must be consistent with guilt and exclude every reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence.     See Garland v. Commonwealth, 
    225 Va. 182
    , 184, 
    300 S.E.2d 783
    , 784 (1983).     The Commonwealth "'is not
    required to disprove every remote possibility of innocence, but
    is, instead, required only to establish guilt of the accused to
    the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.'"      Cantrell v. Commonwealth,
    
    7 Va. App. 269
    , 289, 
    373 S.E.2d 328
    , 338 (1988) (citation
    omitted).
    Atkins argues that his mere presence with Odom was
    insufficient to support his conviction and that the evidence does
    not exclude the hypothesis suggested by his statements to police
    that Odom was injured when she was attacked on the street by a
    group of people.    The principle is firmly established that
    "[o]pportunity is always a relevant circumstance . . . and, when
    reinforced by other incriminating circumstances, may be
    sufficient to establish criminal agency beyond a reasonable
    doubt."     Christian v. Commonwealth, 
    221 Va. 1078
    , 1082, 
    277 S.E.2d 205
    , 208 (1981).    Here, there is substantial other
    circumstantial evidence that supports the trial judge's finding.
    Atkins' statement that Odom was functioning normally several
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    hours after receiving her injuries was contradicted by the
    medical evidence presented by Dr. Daniel and the testimony of
    Odom's daughter.   Dr. Daniel testified that by the nature and
    severity of Odom's injuries, she could not have functioned as
    Atkins suggests.   If Odom had not been rendered unconscious by
    the beating, Odom would have become progressively less coherent
    and responsive.    Odom's daughter's testimony further contradicts
    Atkins' statements about Odom's behavior after the beating.     She
    did not see Odom smoke, drink, walk around, or even talk after
    Odom and Atkins arrived at the motel.
    The trial judge was not required to accept Atkins' version
    of events.    See Rollston v. Commonwealth, 
    11 Va. App. 535
    , 547,
    
    399 S.E.2d 823
    , 830 (1991).   The trial judge could disregard
    Atkins' versions of events and chose to believe the testimony of
    Dr. Daniel and Odom's daughter.    "[D]eterminations of credibility
    lie within the purview of the fact finder, who may reject a
    witness' testimony and base a finding of guilt upon contradictory
    statements.   The fact finder may conclude that the defendant lied
    to conceal his guilt."    Moore v. Commonwealth, 
    25 Va. App. 277
    ,
    289, 
    487 S.E.2d 864
    , 870 (1997).    See Sheppard v. Commonwealth,
    
    250 Va. 379
    , 389, 
    464 S.E.2d 131
    , 137 (1995).   Indeed, Atkins'
    contradictory statements to police and witnesses about the events
    leading up to Odom's death render doubtful the hypothesis
    suggested by Atkins that Odom's injuries were caused by others.
    The trial judge could reasonably infer that Odom could not have
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    functioned normally as Atkins suggests but that she would be
    increasingly approaching a state of unconsciousness.
    In summary, Atkins was present when Odom was injured and
    bleeding; he gave several contradictory statements about the
    events in question; and Atkins' version of Odom's functioning
    ability after the beating was contradicted by the medical
    evidence.   In addition, the belt found in Atkins' truck was
    consistent with the marks on Odom's body.   Atkins fled the
    hospital, left the jurisdiction, and intentionally evaded the
    police for one and a half months after the incident.    See
    Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 
    13 Va. App. 97
    , 102, 
    409 S.E.2d 476
    ,
    480 (1991) (an inference of guilty conduct arises from evidence
    and avoidance of the police).    Viewed in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond
    a reasonable doubt Atkins' guilt of the offense of second degree
    murder.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction.
    Affirmed.
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