Retreat Hospital and Continental Ins. v. Hammersley ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
RETREAT HOSPITAL and
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1465-97-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
FEBRUARY 24, 1998
MARLENE HAMMERSLEY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
John M. Oakey, Jr. (F. Brawner Greer;
McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, on brief),
for appellants.
Timothy J. Healy (Levit and Mann, on brief),
for appellee.
Retreat Hospital and its insurer (employer) contend that the
Workers' Compensation Commission erred when it found: (1) that
Marlene Hammersley's (claimant) continuing disability is causally
related to her compensable January 15, 1996 injury by accident,
and (2) that she adequately marketed her residual work capacity.
Because credible evidence supports the commission's findings, we
affirm the commission's award.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the party prevailing before the commission. See R.G. Moore
Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788
(1990). The commission's factual findings are conclusive and
binding on appeal if supported by credible evidence in the
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
record. See Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Goad, 15 Va. App. 710, 712,
427 S.E.2d 215, 217 (1993); Classic Floors, Inc. v. Guy, 9 Va.
App. 90, 95, 383 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1989).
Viewed accordingly, the evidence proved that claimant worked
as a progressive care nurse for employer for twenty-three years.
While doing yard work in September 1994, claimant injured her
neck which resulted in neck and shoulder pain. Dr. Claude Wilson
diagnosed claimant with acute cervical disc herniation at C6-7
with severe C7 radiculopathy, for which he performed a cervical
discectomy and fusion and placed claimant on a fifty pound
lifting restriction. After the yard work injury, claimant
aggravated the cervical disc condition on several occasions from
non-work-related exertion.
On January 15, 1996, when lifting a patient, claimant
suffered a compensable injury by accident that aggravated her
pre-existing neck condition. Dr. Wilson reported that "[e]very
time she lifts much she develops some radiculitis corresponding
to a C7 nerve root." On January 24, 1996, Dr. Wilson advised
claimant's supervisor that claimant "was in a situation at work
recently where she had to do some lifting and aggravated her
radiculitis in her left arm." He stated that claimant was unable
to lift the amount of weight usually required to perform her
nursing duties and recommended a ten pound lifting restriction.
Dr. Wilson reexamined claimant on March 20, 1996. He
reviewed the results of a recent MRI, noted no abnormalities in
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claimant's cervical discs, and reported that she could "gradually
increase her activities" and "start lifting more."
On September 13, 1996, in a letter to counsel, Dr. Wilson
opined:
It is my opinion that the lifting, twisting
incident which occurred on January 15
aggravated a preexisting condition of
cervical radiculopathy in Ms. Hammersley. It
is my professional opinion that this incident
exacerbated the problem such that Ms.
Hammersley is unable to continue to perform
the duties required as a progressive care
nurse.
(Emphasis added). Subsequently, in his deposition, Dr. Wilson
stated that the reason claimant could no longer work as a
progressive care nurse was because the job required lifting that
would likely cause her to re-aggravate the pre-existing cervical
condition.
Claimant immediately returned to work after the January 15
accident, performing a light duty job in which she delegated work
to other nurses. In late January, employer directed her to take
a medical leave of absence. Claimant contacted employer's human
resources coordinator and inquired as to other job vacancies with
employer. She was not qualified for some of the vacancies, and
others either required lifting weight in excess of her
restrictions or were eliminated. Claimant admitted that she was
offered a part-time job in a doctor's office in February 1996,
but she declined it because the job did not offer the same
benefits as employer, and she desired to continue trying to find
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a job at the hospital. On April 23, 1996, the employer
terminated claimant.
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CAUSATION
It is well established that the commission's determination
of causation is a factual finding that will not be disturbed on
appeal if supported by credible evidence. See American Filtrona
Co. v. Hanford, 16 Va. App. 159, 165, 428 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1993);
Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v. Farrar, 13 Va. App. 229, 230, 409
S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991). "[A] party seeking compensation bears
the burden of proving his disability and the periods [or
duration] of that disability." Marshall Erdmen and Assoc. v.
Loehr, 24 Va. App. 670, 679, 485 S.E.2d 145, 150 (1997). Here,
Dr. Wilson's opinion in his September 13 letter to counsel "that
Ms. Hammersley is unable to continue to perform the duties
required as a progressive care nurse," is credible evidence to
support the commission's finding that claimant's continuing
disability was causally related to her compensable injury by
accident. Although Dr. Wilson's statements at the deposition may
arguably conflict with his earlier medical opinion rather than
explain the primary cause of claimant's disability, the
commission was entitled to determine the weight, meaning, and
credibility to give to Dr. Wilson's respective statements. Where
the statements can be read in a manner to be compatible, the
commission does not err by reconciling the statements and giving
meaning to both opinions. Furthermore, "[q]uestions raised by
conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission.
Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d
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231, 236 (1989). "The fact that there is contrary evidence in
the record is of no consequence if there is credible evidence to
support the commission's finding," Wagner Enters., Inc. v.
Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991); "the rule
respecting conflicting medical opinions also applies when . . . a
sole expert gives conflicting opinions." Chandler v. Schmidt
Banking Co., 228 Va. 265, 267, 321 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1984). See
The Greif Cos. v. Hensley, 22 Va. App. 546, 552, 471 S.E.2d 803,
806 (1996) ("The Commission's findings of fact are conclusive and
binding on this Court if supported by credible evidence. This
rule applies when an expert's opinion contains internal
conflicts.") (citations omitted). Because the commission's
finding that claimant's disability continues to be "exacerbated"
by the incident is supported by credible evidence in the record,
we uphold that finding on review. See Classic Floors, 9 Va. App.
at 95, 383 S.E.2d at 764.
RESIDUAL CAPACITY
Employer's contention regarding the marketing of residual
capacity is that claimant unjustifiably declined selective
employment procured by employer at the nearby doctor's office.
"If an injured employee refuses employment secured for him
suitable to his capacity, he shall not be entitled to any
compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal,
unless in the opinion of the Commission such refusal was
justified." DePaul Medical Center v. Brickhouse, 18 Va. App.
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506, 508, 445 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1994) (citing Code § 65.2-510)
(emphasis in original). Code § 65.2-510 vests broad discretion
in the commission to determine whether under the circumstances an
employee is justified in refusing selective employment. See
Brickhouse, 18 Va. App. at 508, 445 S.E.2d at 495. Here, the
commission concluded that claimant's refusal was justified
because she "concentrated her efforts toward returning to [the
hospital] during her . . . leave of absence and rejected a
part-time job with no benefits." Considering the fact that
claimant expected and was attempting to return to work at the
hospital, and in light of the relatively brief period of time
that she was away from work, credible evidence supports the
commission's determination that claimant justifiably refused the
selective employment. Therefore, we uphold the commission's
finding. See id.; Food Lion, Inc. v. Lee, 16 Va. App. 616,
619-20, 431 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (1993).
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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