Alfred Christian Darlington v. Commonwealth ( 1997 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Elder, Fitzpatrick and Annunziata
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    ALFRED CHRISTIAN DARLINGTON
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.     Record No. 2937-96-2           JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
    SEPTEMBER 23, 1997
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
    James B. Wilkinson, Judge
    Felipita Athanas for appellant.
    Ruth Ann Morken, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    On July 29, 1996, Alfred C. Darlington (appellant) was
    convicted in a bench trial of manufacturing marijuana not for his
    own use and of possessing drug paraphernalia.         The sole issue
    raised on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support
    appellant's conviction of manufacturing marijuana not for his own
    use.       Finding that it is not sufficient, we reverse.
    I.
    On October 8, 1995, Detective John Truehart (Truehart) of
    the Chesterfield County Police Department arrived at appellant's
    home located at 4715 Castlewood Road in the City of Richmond.          He
    observed appellant inside the house "smoking a marijuana pipe."
    As appellant came toward the door, Truehart saw him "put the pipe
    in the sofa closest to the door."        Appellant then stepped out
    onto the front stoop of the house.       When Truehart requested that
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    appellant return stolen property (a CD tower) to him, Truehart
    observed appellant take a bag of marijuana out of the CD shelves
    and drop it "off the railing down to the ground."
    After obtaining appellant's permission, Truehart, Officer
    Michael Bender (Bender) of the Richmond police and other officers
    searched appellant's home.   In the basement the officers found
    scales, plastic bags, and, behind a fake wall, "four pots with
    plants inside them, grow lights, and a fan for ventilation."
    Bender testified at trial that "[t]he plants were recovered
    downstairs.   The marijuana itself was recovered upstairs," and no
    marijuana was recovered from appellant's person.    Bender also
    recovered the marijuana that was dropped to the ground.
    Appellant testified that he smoked marijuana, and he
    admitted ownership of the plants in his basement.   He denied
    selling or giving the marijuana away.   He denied using the scales
    or knowing that the scales or the bags were located in the
    basement.    Appellant stated that prior to this incident he had
    never grown marijuana before.   He said that in the past when he
    smoked marijuana it was because he had gotten it from someone
    else, and that he had been smoking marijuana for ten to fifteen
    years.
    Among the items recovered from appellant's home were the
    following:    marijuana, plastic baggies, rolling papers, a "bong,"
    a number of smoking bowls, a grow light, scales, and fourteen
    marijuana plants.   The amount of marijuana at issue is
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    approximately .15 ounces.
    II.
    Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that
    appellant had the intent to distribute the marijuana recovered
    from his home, and that such proof is necessary to establish that
    the marijuana was not for appellant's personal use.   We agree
    that the evidence was insufficient to convict appellant of
    manufacturing marijuana not for his own use.
    "On appeal, when the sufficiency of the evidence is
    challenged, 'we review the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences
    fairly deducible therefrom.'"   Welch v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 518
    , 523, 
    425 S.E.2d 101
    , 105 (1992) (quoting Bright v.
    Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 248
    , 250, 
    356 S.E.2d 443
    , 444 (1987)).
    "The Commonwealth is required to prove every material element of
    the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and, when it relies
    on circumstantial evidence to sustain that burden, 'all necessary
    circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and
    inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence.'"   Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 
    9 Va. App. 430
    , 440, 
    388 S.E.2d 659
    , 665 (1990) (quoting Inge v.
    Commonwealth, 
    217 Va. 360
    , 366, 
    228 S.E.2d 563
    , 567 (1976)).
    "'The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury . . . will
    not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the
    judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'"
    3
    Josephs v. Commonwealth, 
    10 Va. App. 87
    , 99, 
    390 S.E.2d 491
    , 497
    (1990) (en banc) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    ,
    443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987)).
    In the instant case, our decision is controlled by our
    holding in Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 
    9 Va. App. 430
    , 
    388 S.E.2d 659
     (1990).   In that case, the defendants were charged with
    manufacturing marijuana not for their own use.   The Commonwealth
    proved that the police seized twenty-nine marijuana plants, a
    scale and a smoking pipe from the defendants' home.   However, in
    Reynolds, we held that such evidence was insufficient to convict
    defendants of manufacturing marijuana for distribution rather
    than for personal use.   The defendants explained that they grew
    the plants for their own use, and the Commonwealth failed to
    introduce evidence of:   (1) how many plants were healthy enough
    to produce a useable product; (2) how much saleable marijuana
    could be produced from the seized plants; (3) the value of the
    contraband; (4) the presence of the receptacles to bag the
    marijuana for sale; or (5) watering devices and lights to assist
    in the plants' growth.   We held that the Commonwealth failed to
    meet its burden of proof.
    We find that the circumstantial evidence proved by the
    Commonwealth in the instant case is similarly insufficient to
    support appellant's conviction.   The evidence recovered from
    appellant's home, .15 ounces of marijuana and fourteen marijuana
    plants, when combined with the other evidence adduced, does not
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    permit the inference that appellant was manufacturing marijuana
    for other than his personal use.       Rather, the evidence is
    consistent with the personal use of marijuana.      Here, the police
    observed appellant smoking when they arrived at his house.
    Appellant testified that he had been smoking marijuana for ten to
    fifteen years, and that he had the marijuana solely for his own
    use.    He specifically denied selling or giving the marijuana
    away.    Moreover, the minimal quantity of marijuana at issue is
    consistent with personal use.     See, e.g., Davis v. Commonwealth,
    
    12 Va. App. 728
    , 730, 
    406 S.E.2d 922
    , 923 (1991) (analyzing
    expert testimony that 6.88 ounces of marijuana is not consistent
    with personal use, but that "an ounce or less of the drug on
    hand" is typical for a marijuana user).
    Finally, the Commonwealth failed to produce any evidence of
    how much saleable marijuana could be produced from the fourteen
    plants recovered or of the value, if any, of the marijuana.
    Viewing the evidence in its entirety and in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth as the prevailing party, we find
    that "the deficiencies identified are sufficient in this case to
    point to a failure of the Commonwealth to exclude the reasonable
    hypothesis that the plants were being grown for personal use."
    Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 441, 388 S.E.2d at 666.       Accordingly, the
    judgment of the trial court is reversed.
    Reversed and dismissed.
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