Commonwealth of Virginia v. Mouncey Ferguson, Jr. ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Senior Judge Cole
Argued by Teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0265-97-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
JULY 15, 1997
MOUNCEY FERGUSON, JR.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
James H. Chamblin, Judge
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellant.
Rodney G. Leffler (Timothy B. Hyland; Delmara
F. Bayliss; Leffler, Hyland & Thompson, on
brief), for appellee.
Mouncey Ferguson, Jr. is charged with possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. Ferguson filed a motion to
suppress certain statements he made to the police during the
search of his home. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court granted Ferguson's motion in part. The Commonwealth
appeals the suppression order pursuant to Code § 19.2-398. We
find that Ferguson was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and
reverse the trial court's suppression order.
On appeal from a trial court's decision to suppress
evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party. O'Toole v. Commonwealth, 20
Va. App. 540, 541, 458 S.E.2d 595, 596 (1995).
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
On the evening in question, Ferguson returned home to find
police officers searching his house. Deputy Beaver met Ferguson
at the driveway and escorted him to Investigator Pratt, who was
standing outside the house. Pratt told Ferguson what was going
on, read him the search warrant and gave him Miranda warnings.
Pratt and Beaver believed that Ferguson had invoked his right to
counsel when he inquired whether he could call his lawyer. Pratt
conveyed his belief to the other officers on the scene and
instructed them not to question Ferguson.
Ferguson returned with Beaver to the driveway area where
Beaver allowed Ferguson to make a call from a telephone in his
car. Pratt had refused to allow Ferguson to enter the house,
intending to wait until the officers conducting the search had
secured an area in which Ferguson could be placed. After about
an hour, Pratt allowed Ferguson to enter a first floor room of
the house which the officers had finished searching. Deputy
Finney, who had relieved Deputy Beaver, supervised Ferguson for
the next two hours while the search continued, waiting with
Ferguson in the living room and escorting him to the bathroom and
elsewhere to smoke. During that time, the officers brought
snacks to Ferguson and prepared his dinner, although, as Pratt
testified, Ferguson was not free to leave.
Investigator Garis, assigned to search the rooms on the
first floor of the house, completed his search and remained on
the first floor while another officer collected evidence. Garis
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and Ferguson then engaged in discourse, the substance of which
was the impetus for Ferguson's motion to suppress.
Following the search, Ferguson was arrested for possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute.
The trial court found that "Ferguson was in custody for
Miranda purposes when he arrived at his house and was told that
he must remain with an officer." "A person in Ferguson's
position," the court found, "would have then reasonably perceived
that he was not free to leave." The court suppressed statements
made by Ferguson during his discourse with Garis, having found
Ferguson had invoked his right to counsel and that Garis had
posed the functional equivalent of an investigative question.
The trial court's finding that Ferguson was in custody for
Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact which is,
ultimately, reviewable on appeal. Thompson v. Keohane, __ U.S.
__, __, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995).
The officers in the present case were justified in detaining
Ferguson while they executed the search of his home. See
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1982). Contrary to the
trial court's conclusion, that "Ferguson was in custody for
Miranda purposes when he arrived at his house and was told that
he must remain with an officer," "custody" for purposes of
Miranda does not result ipso facto from the detention of a
suspect during the execution of a search of the suspect's home.
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See id. 1
"`In determining whether an individual was in custody, a
court must examine all of the circumstances . . . but "the
ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a `formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated
with a formal arrest."'" Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373,
385, 457 S.E.2d 402, 407 (1995) (citations omitted). The issue
is whether "the objective circumstances would lead a reasonable
person to believe he was under arrest, thereby subjecting him or
her to pressure impairing the free exercise of the privilege
against self-incrimination." Cherry v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
135, 139, 415 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1992).
Here, Ferguson remained on the premises of his own house for
the duration of his detention. While a number of police officers
occupied the scene, Ferguson was supervised by only one officer.
At no time was Ferguson physically restrained by the officer or
handcuffed, and the officers brought Ferguson dinner and
permitted him to use the telephone in his car and to move about
his house. The evidence established that Ferguson was not free
to leave his home and that he was given Miranda warnings by the
police. In view of the totality of the circumstances, however,
we believe that Ferguson was not placed under formal arrest nor
1
This is not to suggest, however, that the execution of a
search warrant renders, ipso facto, such a detention
"non-custodial" for purposes of Miranda. See Wass v.
Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 33-35, 359 S.E.2d 836, 839-41
(1987).
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was his freedom of movement restrained to the degree associated
with a formal arrest.
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by
Miranda are to ensure that the police do not
coerce or trick captive suspects into
confessing, to relieve the "`inherently
compelling pressures'" generated by the
custodial setting itself, "`which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist'"
. . . .
May v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 348, 354-55, 349 S.E.2d 428, 431
(1986) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984)).
Such concerns are simply not implicated by the facts of the
present case. We find that Ferguson was not subject to
"custodial" interrogation and that he made his statements
voluntarily. Accordingly, the trial court should not have
suppressed them.
The trial court's order is reversed.
Reversed.
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