Rodrissa Elizabeth Polite Collins v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2007 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Clements and Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
RODRISSA ELIZABETH POLITE COLLINS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2080-06-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
DECEMBER 27, 2007
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BRUNSWICK COUNTY
W. Allan Sharrett, Judge
David O. Prince for appellant.
Karri B. Atwood, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Rodrissa Elizabeth Polite Collins (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of
misdemeanor obstruction of justice, in violation of Code § 18.2-460. On appeal, appellant
contends the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support her conviction. We disagree
and, thus, affirm appellant’s conviction.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, and because this
memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and
incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of
this appeal.
BACKGROUND
“On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” Zoretic v. Commonwealth,
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
13 Va. App. 241, 242, 409 S.E.2d 832, 833 (1991) (citing Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216
Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975)). We discard evidence favorable to the accused that
conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence. Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380,
564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002). So viewed, the evidence demonstrates that after observing
appellant’s vehicle traveling at a rate of 84 miles per hour in a posted 65 mile-per-hour zone
Trooper E.T. Singleton activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. When
Singleton approached, appellant told him she was not speeding and demanded a “prayer for
judgment.” Singleton told appellant that he did not know what a “prayer for judgment” was, but
that he needed to see her license and registration. Appellant eventually handed her license and
registration to Singleton, and he returned to his patrol car to prepare a summons.
When Singleton asked appellant to sign the summons, explaining that the promise to be
present for trial was not an admission of guilt, she refused to do so. Singleton explained that if
appellant did not sign the summons, he would arrest her. She again refused to sign the summons.
Singleton repeated several times that he would arrest her if she did not sign. When appellant
returned the summons to Singleton unsigned, he informed her that she was under arrest.
Singleton ordered appellant to exit her car, and repeated this command several times, but
appellant refused to exit the vehicle. Appellant told Singleton she was now willing to sign the
summons, but he responded that it was too late. After she continued to refuse to exit the vehicle,
Singleton returned to his vehicle to request backup, and waited “a while” for it to arrive. When
no backup arrived, he returned to appellant’s car.
Appellant had rolled up her window, and she now ignored his repeated order to exit the
vehicle. Singleton then displayed his collapsible baton and tapped several times on appellant’s
window, warning that he would break the glass if she did not exit. Appellant rolled down her
window. When Singleton eventually got the appellant’s door open appellant remained belted to
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her seat and made no move to exit. Singleton then brandished his pepper spray and told
appellant he would spray her if she did not exit. She complied.
Singleton ordered appellant to turn her back to him, and appellant turned, then walked
toward the back of her vehicle. Singleton told her to stop, but she continued, stopping at the
back of her vehicle. Singleton “took her by the arm” to handcuff her, but she pulled away, her
sweater stretching in his grasp. Singleton grabbed her arm again, and appellant “kept pulling
away,” moving to the passenger side of the vehicle rear. Eventually Singleton was able to
handcuff appellant.
Appellant was charged with felony obstruction under Code § 18.2-460(C), but at trial the
court reduced the charge to misdemeanor obstruction. At the conclusion of the trial, the court
convicted appellant of that charge. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, appellant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain
her conviction under Code § 18.2-460(A). 1 We disagree.
Code § 18.2-460(A) states:
If any person without just cause knowingly obstructs . . . any law
enforcement officer in the performance of his duties as such or
fails or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when
requested to do so by such . . . law enforcement officer, he shall be
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
To violate the statute, there need not “‘be an actual or technical assault upon the officer.’”
Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones
v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79, 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). Rather, “‘there must be acts
1
Based on colloquy in the trial court, there is some reason to believe that appellant
may—in the alternative—have been convicted under the provisions of subsection B. Appellant
argues solely that the evidence was insufficient under subsection A. We assume therefore,
without deciding, that appellant was convicted under Code 18.2-460(A).
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clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing
his duty, as to “obstruct” ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.’” Id.
(quoting Jones, 141 Va. at 479, 126 S.E. at 77).
Here, appellant’s conduct clearly indicates she intended to prevent Singleton from
performing his duty. Appellant refused to exit her car, thereby causing the officer to call for
back-up and threaten to use pepper spray on her and break her car window. Once outside the car,
she did not heed Singleton’s instruction to stop, and instead moved away from the rear of the
vehicle. She then physically resisted the efforts of Singleton to handcuff her. She kept pulling
away from him as he attempted to put her in handcuffs, causing her sweater to stretch.
Appellant’s refusal to obey Singleton’s order to get out of her car, her walking away after having
been told she was under arrest, and her “pulling” and “tugging” from Singleton’s grasp
obstructed his execution of her arrest.
We hold, therefore, that the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant obstructed
justice, in violation of Code § 18.2-460(A). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
and appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
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