Albemarle School Board v. Virgie I. Morris ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Overton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
ALBEMARLE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0075-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
JUNE 17, 1997
VIRGIE IRENE MORRIS, ETC.
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Patricia C. Karppi (McGuire, Woods, Battle &
Boothe, L.L.P., on brief), for appellants.
Michael T. Hemenway (Dygert & Hemenway, on
brief), for appellee.
Albemarle County School Board and School Systems of
Virginia, self-insured association, (appellants) appeal an order
of the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) awarding
temporary total disability benefits, death benefits, medical
benefits, and burial expenses to the widow of Elson C. Morris,
(claimant). Appellants contend that the evidence was
insufficient to support the commission's conclusion that
claimant's disability following the discovery of a heart ailment
in July, 1993 and eventual death due to heart failure on
November 15, 1993 were causally related to his work-related
accident on March 19, 1993. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
"In order to recover on a workers' compensation claim, a
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
claimant must prove: (1) an injury by accident, (2) arising out
of and (3) in the course of his employment." Kane Plumbing, Inc.
v. Small, 7 Va. App. 132, 135, 371 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1988)
(citations omitted); see Code § 65.2-101. An "injury by
accident" requires proof of "(1) an identifiable incident; (2)
that occurs at some reasonably definite time; (3) an obvious
sudden mechanical or structural change in the body; and (4) a
causal connection between the incident and the bodily change."
Chesterfield County v. Dunn, 9 Va. App. 475, 476, 389 S.E.2d 180,
181 (1990) (citing Lane Co. v. Saunders, 229 Va. 196, 199, 326
S.E.2d 702, 703 (1985)). Under Code § 65.2-512, "a claimant for
death benefits . . . is required to prove a causal connection
between the accident and the subsequent death by a preponderance
of the evidence." Lilly v. Shenandoah's Pride Dairy, 218 Va.
481, 483, 237 S.E.2d 786, 787 (1977).
When it is established that an accident
to an employee activates an undeveloped and
dangerous physical condition with mortal
consequences, such accident is properly
considered the proximate cause of the
fatality. Causal connection is established
when it is shown that the employee has
received a compensable injury which
materially aggravates or accelerates the
pre-existing latent disease which becomes the
direct cause of death.
Rogers v. Williams, 196 Va. 39, 42, 82 S.E.2d 601, 602-03 (1954).
[W]here a claimant has suffered a heart
attack which arose out of and in the course
of his employment and which is determined to
have been a producing or contributing factor
in a second fatal heart attack, regardless of
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whether the second incident itself is
compensable, death benefits are available to
the dependent distributees . . . .
Appellants concede that claimant was involved in an
identifiable incident at a reasonably definite time -- his car
accident on March 19 -- and that this accident arose out of and
occurred in the course of his employment. In addition,
appellants do not contest the commission's finding that claimant
suffered a heart attack prior to November 15 that directly
contributed to his death from heart failure on that date.
Instead, appellants argue that credible evidence does not support
the commission's finding that claimant's heart attack occurred at
the time of his accident on March 19.
"Decisions of the commission as to questions of fact, if
supported by credible evidence, are conclusive and binding on
this Court." Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v. Farrar, 13 Va. App. 227,
229, 409 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991); see Code § 65.2-706(A). On
appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10
Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). Whether or not an
injury has occurred is a question of fact.
We hold that the commission's finding that claimant suffered
a heart attack at the time of his accident on March 19 is
supported by credible evidence. In reaching its conclusion, the
commission relied solely upon the expert medical opinion of Dr.
Bergin, who testified that claimant suffered a heart attack at
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the time of his accident. Dr. Bergin's opinion constituted
credible evidence of the timing of claimant's initial heart
attack.
In order to possess relevant evidential value, a doctor's
expert medical opinion must not be speculative. See Gilbert v.
Summers, 240 Va. 155, 160, 393 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1990); Spruill v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 475, 479, 271 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1980). A
doctor's expert medical opinion is not speculative if it is based
on an accurate understanding of the relevant facts and if it is
based on a reasonable probability and not a mere possibility.
See Gilbert, 240 Va. at 160, 393 S.E.2d at 215 (stating that an
expert's opinion is speculative if not based upon facts within
his knowledge or established by other evidence); Clinchfield Coal
Co. v. Bowman, 229 Va. 249, 252, 329 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1985)
(holding that a doctor's medical opinion was not credible when
based upon a faulty premise); Spruill, 221 Va. at 479, 271 S.E.2d
at 421 (stating that a medical opinion is speculative if based on
a "possibility" and admissible if based on a "reasonable
probability").
Dr. Bergin's opinion possessed evidential value because it
was based on his expert knowledge and an accurate understanding
of claimant's case and because it was not based on a mere
possibility. First, Dr. Bergin's opinion was based on the facts
of claimant's case. Dr. Bergin was qualified as an expert in
medicine and cardiology. He testified that he had reviewed
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claimant's medical records from the Central Virginia Community
Health Center, the University of Virginia emergency room on the
date of claimant's accident, Dr. Caughron, which dated back to
1990, as well as his own records of claimant's treatment. He
expressly testified that his opinion that claimant suffered a
heart attack on March 19 was based on both his professional
knowledge and his knowledge of claimant's case. The record does
not indicate that Dr. Bergin's medical opinion was based on
either a faulty premise or misinformation. See Clinchfield Coal
Co., 229 Va. at 252, 239 S.E.2d at 16; Sneed v. Morengo, Inc., 19
Va. App. 199, 205, 450 S.E.2d 167, 171 (1994).
In addition, Dr. Bergin's opinion was based on a reasonable
probability, not a mere possibility. He testified that the
occurrence of claimant's heart attack at the time of his accident
on March 19 was "more than likely." He also had the following
exchange with claimant's lawyer:
Q. Based on your review of his medical
records and the history you obtained from Mr.
Morris' family, and also from Dr. Caughron,
and based on your training and experience, do
you have an opinion, within a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, as to whether or
not he suffered a heart attack in the
accident which occurred on March 19, 1993?
A. Yes, I do think he suffered a heart
attack at the accident.
Because Dr. Bergin's medical opinion possessed relevant
evidential value, we cannot say that the commission's factual
finding based on this opinion that claimant suffered a heart
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attack at the time of his accident was not supported by credible
evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the commission's award.
Affirmed.
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