Fairfax Co. School Board v. Louise S. Rostker ( 1997 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick
    FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.         Record No. 3092-96-4               PER CURIAM
    JUNE 10, 1997
    LOUISE S. ROSTKER
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Michael N. Salveson; Hunton & Williams, on
    briefs), for appellant.
    (James F. Green; Ashcraft & Gerel, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Fairfax County School Board (employer) contends that the
    Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) erred in finding
    that Louise S. Rostker (claimant) proved a reasonable excuse for
    failing to give her employer timely notice of her October 10,
    1995 injury by accident.   Upon reviewing the record and briefs of
    the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision.     Rule
    5A:27.
    Code § 65.2-600(d) requires an employee to give written
    notice of an injury by accident within thirty days of the
    accident "unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of
    the Commission for not giving such notice and the Commission is
    satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby."    In
    applying the statute, the principles are well established that
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    "[t]he burden of showing a reasonable excuse for . . . delay in
    giving notice is upon the [employee, and, that] . . . the burden
    is upon the employer to show that [the employer] has been
    prejudiced by the delay."   Maryland Cas. Co. v. Robinson, 
    149 Va. 307
    , 311, 
    141 S.E. 225
    , 226 (1928); see also Lucas v. Research
    Analysis Corp., 
    209 Va. 583
    , 586, 
    166 S.E.2d 294
    , 296 (1969);
    Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Coffey, 
    13 Va. App. 446
    , 448, 
    412 S.E.2d 209
    , 211 (1991).
    The commission found that claimant offered a reasonable
    excuse for her failure to provide written notice in accordance
    with Code § 65.2-600.   In its opinion, the commission made the
    following findings:
    The claimant testified that,
    notwithstanding the pain and swelling, she
    thought her injury was trivial. The Deputy
    Commissioner found the claimant's testimony
    credible. We agree and further note that the
    claimant did not miss any time from work
    after the accident and that Dr. Lofton's
    [sic] initial treatment corroborates the
    claimant's testimony that the injury was not
    severe. When Dr. Lofton [sic] recommended a
    bone scan and more aggressive treatment, the
    claimant realized her injury was more serious
    and she notified her employer. The claimant
    has presented a reasonable excuse and there
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    was no evidence of prejudice.
    In reviewing decisions of the commission with respect to
    reasonable excuse under Code § 65.2-600 (formerly 65.1-85), the
    Supreme Court has stated that the principal issue is whether
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    Employer does not challenge the commission's finding that
    it failed to prove it suffered prejudice as a result of
    claimant's delay in giving notice.
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    evidence is offered to the satisfaction of the commission.        See
    Lucas, 209 Va. at 586, 166 S.E.2d at 296.
    On October 10, 1995, claimant, who worked for employer as a
    special education teacher, injured her right foot, when a student
    accidentally knocked over a chair, which landed on the top of
    claimant's right foot.   Claimant continued to work, believing
    that her pain "would pass."    When the swelling and pain did not
    resolve, claimant sought medical treatment from Dr. Charles
    Lefton on November 2, 1995.    Dr. Lefton took x-rays of claimant's
    foot, which she believed were normal.      Claimant understood from
    Dr. Lefton that she had a bruise, which would go away.      Dr.
    Lefton prescribed anti-inflammatory medication.      When the
    medication did not bring the swelling down, Dr. Lefton injected
    claimant's foot.   The injection made claimant's condition worse,
    and Dr. Lefton then prescribed orthotics for claimant's shoes,
    which were also ineffective.
    At the end of January 1996, Dr. Lefton recommended that
    claimant undergo a bone scan.     At that time, claimant panicked
    because she thought she might need some "extreme kind of medical
    care that might prevent working."      Claimant reported the accident
    to employer on January 31, 1996.       Claimant testified that she did
    not report the accident earlier because "[i]t didn't seem
    necessary.   It seemed trivial.   And once a couple of weeks had
    passed and other people were aware that I was in pain I was told,
    you can't report after 24 hours."
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    The February 5, 1996 bone scan revealed probable occult
    fractures of the second and third metatarsals.   Due to these
    results, Dr. Lefton prescribed a boot for claimant to wear on her
    foot, similar to a cast.   Because claimant was still in pain
    after the boot was removed, Dr. Lefton referred claimant to Dr.
    Mark Myerson for evaluation.   Dr. Myerson returned claimant to
    Dr. Lefton's care.   On June 19, 1996, claimant started physical
    therapy.
    The commission found that claimant's excuse was reasonable.
    Credible evidence established that she did not immediately report
    the accident because she thought her injury was trivial.    "Notice
    is reasonably excused if an accident, first regarded as trivial,
    is later learned through medical diagnosis to be serious."
    Coffey, 13 Va. App. at 449, 412 S.E.2d at 211.   Because credible
    evidence supports the commission's finding that claimant had a
    reasonable excuse for not reporting the accident to her employer
    earlier, we may not disturb the commission's decision.     See James
    v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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