CW, DSS, DCSE, Spotsylvania CO DSS v. Fletcher ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Annunziata and
Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
ex rel. SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2041-01-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
APRIL 16, 2002
KATHERYN R. FLETCHER
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY
Dixon L. Foster, Judge Designate
Gary P. Webb, Special Counsel (Randolph A.
Beales, Attorney General; Bernard L. McNamee
II, Deputy Attorney General; Robert B.
Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney
General; Craig M. Burshem, Regional Special
Counsel, on brief), for appellant.
No brief or argument for appellee.
The Department of Social Services (DSS) appeals the trial
court's ruling that a court order which terminates the residual
parental rights of a parent to his or her children also
terminates the parent's obligation to support the children. DSS
contends that Katheryn R. Fletcher was required to support her
two children after her parental rights were terminated and,
thus, DSS could recover from her the sums paid in public
assistance to support the children while in foster care or in
DSS's custody. We affirm the trial court's ruling that
termination of parental rights also terminated Fletcher's
responsibility of parental support.
BACKGROUND
Fletcher is the natural mother of two daughters. In April
1997, Spotsylvania DSS was granted custody of the two children,
who have since remained continuously in foster care. In May
1998, the Spotsylvania Juvenile and Domestic Relations District
Court terminated Fletcher's residual parental rights to the
children. In October 1999, the Division of Child Support
Enforcement (DCSE) of DSS filed a juvenile court petition
pursuant to Code § 63.1-251.3 against Fletcher seeking child
support while the children were in the custody of DSS and in
foster care and receiving public assistance, including the time
after Fletcher's parental rights had been terminated. The
juvenile court held that Fletcher was required to support her
children while they were in DSS's custody or in foster care
prior to the termination of parental rights but that the duty of
support ended when parental rights were terminated.
On appeal, the circuit court ruled in the de novo
proceeding that Fletcher was obligated to reimburse DCSE based
upon Fletcher's income and the support guidelines at $65 per
child per month but only through the date Fletcher's parental
rights were terminated. DCSE appeals that ruling.
- 2 -
ANALYSIS
DSS argues that Code § 16.1-283, which authorizes a trial
court to terminate parental rights, is silent as to a parent's
responsibility thereafter to support a child; thus, DSS contends
the Code does not allow or authorize a court to terminate a
parent's responsibility to support his or her child. DSS argues
that because the statute only addresses termination of parental
"rights" and is silent as to parental "responsibilities," the
responsibility of a parent to support his or her child remains
intact after parental rights have been terminated. In support
of its argument, DSS points to Chapter 13 of Title 63.1,
relating to "Support of Dependent Children and their
Caretakers," which expressly provides that parental
responsibilities shall terminate upon adoption. Thus, DSS
argues that because the statutory scheme provides for
termination of the responsibility to provide child support only
upon a child's adoption, we should infer that the legislature
did not intend to terminate the support responsibility upon the
termination of parental rights. Accordingly, DSS argues that
Fletcher, whose parental rights had been terminated, had the
ongoing responsibility to support her children while they were
in DSS's custody or in foster care and to reimburse DSS within
Fletcher's support guideline ability for the public support paid
for the children.
- 3 -
Code § 16.1-283, which sets forth the grounds and
procedures by which the Commonwealth may involuntarily terminate
a parent's rights to his or her child, does not mention a
parent's obligation or responsibility to provide financial
support for a child. However, the sole purpose of that statute
is to define how and under what circumstances the Commonwealth
may sever the natural bond between a parent and his or her child
or the child and his or her parent. The statute does not
address the issue of support. Furthermore, the statute does not
address a parent's responsibility to provide his or her child
with the necessities of life – food, clothing or shelter. The
statute is also silent as to other parental rights and
responsibilities, including rights of inheritance or parental
rights to a minor's wages or the responsibility of a child to
support his or her elderly parents.
Although Code § 16.1-228 defines "'Residual parental rights
and responsibilities'" as "all rights and responsibilities
remaining with the parent after the transfer of legal custody or
guardianship of the person, including but not limited to the
right of visitation, consent to adoption, the right to determine
religious affiliation and the responsibility for support," that
code section does not suggest that any "rights" or
"responsibilities" exist after the legal bond between a parent
and child has been terminated.
- 4 -
Because the statutes do not address the issue before us, we
look to case law to decide the question. The issue that DSS
presents is whether severing the legal tie between a parent and
child extinguishes a natural parent's responsibility to support
his or her child. Although no Virginia appeals court has
directly decided this issue, other jurisdictions have either
directly or indirectly addressed whether a parent whose parental
rights have been terminated has a continuing responsibility to
support his or her child. The Kansas Supreme Court held that "a
person who has relinquished parental rights through . . . a
voluntary termination of parental rights, or an involuntary
severance of parental rights is no longer a parent." State of
Kansas, Sec'y of Soc. and Rehab. Servs. v. Clear, 804 P.2d 961,
967 (Kan. 1991). The Kansas court noted that rights and
responsibilities "arising from the relationship of parent and
child are generally reciprocal." Id. at 965 (citing Roelfs v.
Wallingford, Inc., 486 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Kan 1971) (holding that
judicial severance of parental rights terminated child's right
to receive worker's compensation benefits upon father's death,
and explaining that upon "permanently depriving a parent of
parental rights there remains no legal obligation of support")).
In Coffey v. Vasquez, 350 S.E.2d 396 (S.C. App. 1986), the
South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he duty of a
parent to support his or her minor child is often viewed as
correlative to the parent's rights in and to the child." Id. at
- 5 -
397 (citing Walker v. Walker, 167 S.E. 818 (N.C. 1933); 59 Am.
Jur. 2d Parent & Child 67A (1971 & 1978 Cum. Supp.)). "Indeed,
the term 'parental rights,' in the context of termination
proceedings, has been construed to include both parental rights
and parental obligations." Id. (citing Anguis v. Superior
Court, 429 P.2d 702, 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967)). Thus, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals held that "a parent's obligation
to feed, clothe and otherwise support a child, being correlative
to the parent's rights in and to the child, does not exist where
the parent's reciprocal rights in and to the child have been
terminated." Id. at 398 (ruling that father whose parental
rights had been terminated was "not a person legally chargeable
for [the child's] support" under state statute) (emphasis
added).
DSS asks us to reject the rationale of the foregoing
decisions and instead to adopt the holding from the Maryland
Supreme Court in Carroll v. Edelmann, 577 A.2d 14 (Md. 1990),
holding that a father whose parental rights had been terminated
and who had agreed to repay social services for public
assistance had a continuing legal and contractual support
obligation. Significant in Carroll is the fact that the father
had contracted with social services to continue to provide child
support.
In defining the effect of termination of parental rights
upon the legal relationship between a parent and child, the
- 6 -
Virginia Supreme Court has held "[t]he termination of parental
rights is a grave, drastic, and irreversible action. When a
court orders termination of parental rights, the ties between
the parent and child are severed forever, and the parent becomes
'a legal stranger to the child.'" Lowe v. Department of Pub.
Welfare, 231 Va. 277, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986) (quoting
Shank v. Department of Soc. Servs., 217 Va. 506, 509, 230 S.E.2d
454, 457 (1976)); see also Cage v. Harrisonburg Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 13 Va. App. 246, 249, 410 S.E.2d 405, 406 (1991)
(holding that Cage erroneously asserted a "right" to visit his
children, notwithstanding the termination of all parental
rights) (citing Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citing
Lowe, 231 Va. at 280, 343 S.E.2d at 72))). We construe the
unambiguous language that termination of parental rights is a
complete severance of all ties between the child and parent so
as to render them "legal strangers" to include the termination
of parental responsibilities as well as any correlative rights.
Because a party whose parental rights have been terminated is a
"legal stranger" to the child, that parent no longer has a duty
to support the child.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
- 7 -