Wayne Gibson Weis v. Commonwealth ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
WAYNE GIBSON WEIS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1986-95-2 JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE
JANUARY 7, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GOOCHLAND COUNTY
F. Ward Harkrader, Jr., Judge
Jeffrey L. Galston (Hyder, Lowe & Galston, on
brief), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
On appeal from his conviction, Wayne Gibson Weis (defendant)
contends that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to
withdraw his waiver of a jury trial and in proceeding with a
bench trial. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
On November 25, 1994, a Goochland County grand jury indicted
the defendant upon two counts of statutory burglary and one count
of grand larceny. At arraignment on February 17, 1995, the
defendant entered not guilty pleas to all three charges. Upon
examination by the trial judge, Weis testified that he was twenty
(20) years old and fully understood the charges against him.
After discussing the matter with his attorney, Weis stated that
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
he wished to be tried by the court rather than a jury. Both the
court and the prosecution agreed to the waiver of trial by jury.
The defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of a trial by jury
was noted in the court's order regarding the February 17, 1995
hearing.
On February 24, 1995, defense counsel moved the court for a
psychological evaluation to determine the defendant's sanity at
the time of the offense. The motion was granted, and the matter
was set for review on March 24, 1995. On that date, the
psychological evaluation had not been completed, thus the case
was continued on the defendant's motion to the April term day.
On April 11, 1995, the case was continued to April 14, 1995. On
April 14, 1995, the case was set for trial on May 9, 1995. On
May 9, 1995, the defendant again requested a continuance and the
case was set for trial without a jury on June 9, 1995.
On the day of the trial on June 9, 1995, almost four months
after the defendant's waiver of a trial by jury, the defendant
informed the court that he wished to withdraw the waiver and be
tried by a jury. Counsel advised the court that the defendant
had "good reasons" for making this election, but no reasons were
disclosed to the court. Counsel advised the court that the
defendant had been attempting to contact him for three or four
days, but they had not been able to connect with one another.
The Commonwealth's attorney opposed the motion on the ground
that it was not timely made. He cited the approximately four
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month delay brought about by the defendant's motion for a
psychological evaluation. He advised that the Commonwealth would
be prejudiced by a delay to arrange a jury trial because of
inconvenience to the two victims, both of whom were present. One
victim had made several trips to the court concerning the case,
and the other lived in Northern Virginia, requiring a journey of
several hours to be present in court.
Referring to the numerous prior continuances, the trial
judge ruled that the motion to withdraw the waiver of trial by
jury was untimely. He commented that a failure to proceed would
be prejudicial to the Commonwealth and its witnesses. Therefore,
the bench trial proceeded.
The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Joan Cawthon and
Barbara Wyatt, the owners of the properties where the break-ins
occurred. Charles Mongold, an accomplice, testified concerning
the burglaries and the larceny, implicating the defendant. Two
other accomplices, Wayne Anderson and Phillip Hayes, refused to
answer some of the questions propounded to them by the
prosecution. The trial judge ordered them to answer the
questions, but they refused. Both were held in contempt, and the
trial recessed indefinitely until they agreed to testify.
On June 22, 1995, the trial resumed. Without introducing
any further evidence, the Commonwealth rested. The defendant did
not put on any evidence. Following closing arguments, the trial
judge found the defendant guilty of statutory burglary, grand
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larceny, and unlawful entry.
On appeal, the sole issue is whether the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his
waiver of trial by jury, which was timely made, and to have his
case tried by a jury.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of Virginia
guarantees to an accused in a criminal case the right to a jury
trial. This same section of the Constitution permits an accused
who pleads not guilty to waive a jury and to be tried by the
court "with the consent and the concurrence of the attorney for
the Commonwealth and of the court entered of record . . . ." Va.
Const. Art. I, § 8. See also Code § 19.2-257 and § 19.2-258;
Rule 3A:13(b).
The leading case in Virginia deciding when an accused may
withdraw a waiver of a jury trial is Thomas v. Commonwealth, 218
Va. 553, 238 S.E.2d 834 (1977). The general rule is stated as
follows:
"Whether one accused of crime who has
regularly waived a jury trial will be
permitted to withdraw the waiver and have his
case tried before a jury is ordinarily within
the discretion of the trial court. The rule,
as expressed in some cases, is that if an
accused's application for withdrawal of
waiver is made in due season so as not to
substantially delay or impede the cause of
justice, the trial court should allow the
waiver to be withdrawn.
The authorities are uniformly to the
effect that a motion for withdrawal of waiver
made after the commencement of the trial is
not timely and should not be allowed.
Whether a motion for the withdrawal of a
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waiver of trial by jury made prior to the
actual commencement of the trial of the case
is timely depends primarily upon the facts
and circumstances of the individual case.
Where there is no showing that granting the
motion would unduly delay the trial or would
otherwise impede justice, the motion is
usually held to be timely. In some cases,
however, it has been held that a motion for
withdrawal of a waiver of jury trial,
although made prior to the trial, was not
timely and was properly denied by the trial
court, the decisions in these cases being
based primarily upon the ground that granting
the motion wold have resulted in an
unreasonable delay in the trial."
Id. at 555, 238 S.E.2d at 835 (citations omitted). See also
Patterson v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 698, 700-01, 454 S.E.2d
367, 369 (1995); Wright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 303, 308-09,
357 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1987); Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App.
392, 398-99, 345 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1986).
The defendant does not dispute the fact that he knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial at
the arraignment held on February 17, 1995 and that both the trial
judge and the prosecution concurred. He contends that his motion
to withdraw the waiver of a jury trial was timely made at trial
on June 9, 1995. However, our review of the record discloses
that four months, lacking one week, had elapsed since the waiver
was made at the arraignment. The delay in scheduling the trial
was mostly attributable to the defendant. On February 17, 1995,
the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a psychological
evaluation for sanity on the date of the crimes. The case was
set for March 24, 1995, to review the evaluation. After several
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continuances relating to the completion of the evaluation, the
trial judge specifically asked defense counsel on April 14, 1995
if this was to be a jury trial. The defendant responded "no,"
and the case was set for trial on May 9, 1995. On this date the
defendant was required to appear in the Circuit Court of
Mecklenburg County as a witness and by agreement of all parties
Weis' case was again continued to June 9, 1995. At none of these
court appearances did defendant indicate a desire to withdraw his
waiver of a jury trial.
When the motion to withdraw the waiver of the jury trial was
raised for the first time at trial, neither the defendant nor his
counsel provided any reason for a jury trial instead of a bench
trial. The Commonwealth demonstrated the prejudice that its
witnesses would suffer should the court permit a continuance to
allow a jury trial. In addition, several prisoners had been
transported from correctional centers to appear as witnesses for
the Commonwealth, creating the potential for additional security
problems.
Upon these arguments, the trial court found that the motion
to withdraw the waiver of a jury trial was untimely, denied the
motion, and ordered that the bench trial proceed. Based upon
this record we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion to deny the motion to withdraw the waiver of a jury
trial.
In argument before this Court, defense counsel admitted that
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the trial judge would have acted within his discretion in denying
the motion to withdraw the waiver of a jury trial except for the
refusal of two of the Commonwealth's witnesses to testify.
Anderson and Hayes were held in contempt for refusing to answer
the prosecutor's questions, and the case was recessed
indefinitely. The defendant argues on appeal that since the case
had to be recessed that the trial judge should have reconsidered
the motion to withdraw the waiver of a jury trial because the
reasons for denying the motion no longer existed. He also argues
that if the Commonwealth had properly prepared its case through
discovery and had determined what the testimony of Anderson and
Hayes would be, the recess would not have been necessary.
However, the defendant did not renew his motion to withdraw
the waiver of a jury trial and did not request the trial judge to
reconsider his ruling in any manner. Therefore, the trial judge
had no opportunity to rule upon the question the defendant now
presents to this Court.
It is well established that on appeal a ruling of a trial
court cannot be a basis for reversal unless an objection is
stated together with the grounds therefore at the time of the
ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of
Appeals to attain the ends of justice. Campbell v. Commonwealth,
12 Va. App. 476, 480, 405 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1991)(en banc); Rule
5A:18. Arguments not presented to the trial court will not be
entertained on appeal. Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591,
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593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991). Finding no justification for
the application of the "good cause" or "ends of justice"
exceptions to Rule 5A:18, we are precluded from considering this
argument. See Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436, 357
S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987). We find that this argument is
procedurally barred.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the defendant's
convictions.
Affirmed.
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