Anita Louise Murdaugh v. Marshall Elmore Murdaugh ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, McClanahan and Senior Judge Coleman
ANITA LOUISE MURDAUGH
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 0233-03-1 PER CURIAM
JUNE 24, 2003
MARSHALL ELMORE MURDAUGH
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Marc Jacobson, Judge
(Gary W. Searcy, on brief), for appellant.
Appellant submitting on brief.
(William R. O'Brien; Bridges, O'Brien &
Frucci, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Appellee submitting on brief.
Anita Louise Murdaugh (wife) appeals the circuit court's
final decree of divorce incorporating a written agreement signed
by wife and Marshall Elmore Murdaugh (husband). On appeal, wife
contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to rescind
the agreement on the ground that she was mentally incompetent to
enter into it. We disagree and affirm the trial court's decision.
Background
The parties married on October 17, 1987. Wife filed her
bill of complaint seeking a divorce from husband on December 13,
2000. On August 22, 2002, following a two-hour discussion and
negotiation in the commissioner's office in which both parties'
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
counsel participated, the parties entered into a handwritten
stipulation agreement providing for the division of certain
property and the payment of spousal support from husband to wife
in the amount of eight hundred dollars per month. Both parties
signed the agreement, which was witnessed by both counsel.
Wife testified she suffers from Lyme disease, among other
ailments. She explained that on the day she signed the
agreement she was afflicted by "brain fog, weakness, [and]
fatigue" which caused her to not "understand some of the things
[her counsel] was saying to [her]."
Wife's doctor, Charles L. Crist, confirmed wife suffers
from Lyme disease and elaborated on the symptoms the disease
produces. He explained wife had "good days and bad days" and
that, based upon the facts wife described to him, he concluded
wife did not understand the nature and character of the
agreement on the day she entered it. Crist indicated wife told
him she had made a "bad decision."
Analysis
In Virginia, "'marital property settlements entered into by
competent parties upon valid consideration for lawful purposes
are favored in the law and such will be enforced unless their
illegality is clear and certain.'" Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App.
118, 128, 336 S.E.2d 157, 162 (1985) (quoting Cooley v. Cooley,
220 Va. 749, 752, 263 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1980)). Code § 20-109.1
provides that a court in its discretion may incorporate by
- 2 -
reference into its final divorce decree "any valid agreement
between the parties."
The law presumes that every adult party
who executes an agreement is mentally
competent to enter into a contract.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Mosby, 93 Va.
93, 94, 24 S.E. 916, 916 (1896). A party
may rebut that presumption by proof that
when the person executed the agreement he or
she lacked the capacity to understand the
nature and consequences of the transaction.
Lohman v. Sherwood, 181 Va. 594, 607, 26
S.E.2d 74, 79-80 (1943). In order to be
competent to enter into a legally binding
obligation, a party is not required to
exercise good judgment or to make wise
decisions so long as he or she understands
the nature and character of the agreement
and consequences of entering into it. Thus,
"weakness of mind short of insanity; or
immaturity of reason in one who has obtained
full age; or the mere absence of experience
or skill upon the subject of the particular
contract affords per se, no ground for
relief at law or in equity." Mosby, 93 Va.
at 94, 24 S.E. at 916. The party's capacity
or condition before and after executing the
agreement is relevant evidence to determine
competency, but the dispositive question is
the individual's mental capacity to
understand the nature of the agreement and
the consequences of his or her act at the
time the agreement is executed. Price's
Ex'r v. Barham, 147 Va. 478, 481, 137 S.E.
511, 512 (1927). The party must have
"sufficient mental capacity to understand
the nature of and effect of the transaction
. . . ." Id. at 482, 137 S.E. at 512. The
resolution of conflicting evidence bearing
on an individual's mental capacity is a
factual determination to be made by the
trial court, Waddy v. Grimes, 154 Va. 615,
641, 153 S.E. 807, 815 (1930), and it will
not be disturbed on appeal, unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.
- 3 -
Pommerenke v. Pommerenke, 7 Va. App. 241,
244, 372 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1988).
Drewry v. Drewry, 8 Va. App. 460, 467, 383 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1989).
"The law does not require that one have the ability to make
a reasoned judgment concerning an agreement but only that he or
she understand the nature and consequences of his acts." Id. at
468, 383 S.E.2d at 16. The trial court determined wife failed
to demonstrate she did not understand the nature and
consequences of entering into the stipulation agreement. She
signed the agreement with the advice of counsel following a
two-hour discussion and negotiation of the terms in the
commissioner's office. The court found wife's testimony
concerning her comprehension of the events on the day she signed
the agreement was not credible. Similarly, the court determined
Crist's conclusion was based solely on wife's description to him
of her condition on that date. "We defer to the trial court's
evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses who testify ore
tenus." Shackelford v. Shackelford, 39 Va. App. 201, 208, 571
S.E.2d 917, 920 (2002). We cannot say that the trial court's
judgment was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
Affirmed.
- 4 -