Diaby Mohamed v. Commonwealth ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Humphreys and Kelsey
Argued by teleconference
DIABY MOHAMED
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 3439-01-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
MAY 6, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
William C. Andrews, III, Judge
Stephen K. Smith for appellant.
Jennifer R. Franklin, Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Diaby Mohamed (appellant) 1 was convicted of uttering a forged
public document in violation of Code § 18.2-168. He contends the
evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to utter a forged
public document and that he obstructed justice. 2 Finding no
error, we affirm.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
1
At various times in the record, appellant refers to
himself as Diaby Mohamed, Sylla Famara and Famara Sylla.
2
We note that the sentencing order indicates that appellant
was found guilty of obstruction of justice pursuant to Virginia
Code § 24-6. However, the warrant reflects this to be a
violation of the City of Hampton Code § 24-6. This matter is
remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting
that clerical error.
I. BACKGROUND
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the prevailing party below, granting to that evidence all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Juares v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997).
So viewed, the evidence proved that on April 26, 2001,
appellant, using the name Diaby Mohamed, approached Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) employee Brenda Johnson and obtained title to
a vehicle. He stated he did not have the necessary identification
and used a "second title because he had another record already set
up so [Johnson] used that title record to bring up his information
to title that vehicle." Johnson found appellant's "T number" 3 on
the second title and "rolled it over to title the other vehicle."
On April 27, 2001 appellant again approached Johnson. He had
an application for a driver's license and stated his name was
Famara Sylla. He presented Johnson with a New York identification
card, a New York international driver's license and the Virginia
DMV application for a driver's license. The DMV application was
complete except for a signature. Johnson asked appellant to sign
it, and he wrote "Famara Sylla" in Johnson's presence. Johnson
asked him "for proof of his residence and proof of his social
security." Appellant had neither. When Johnson questioned the
difference in the names, appellant said Famara Sylla was his
Muslim name. Johnson became suspicious and asked Officer Roberto
Cruz of the Hampton Police Department to handle the situation. He
3
"T" numbers are used in lieu of social security numbers as
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approached appellant and requested identification. Appellant then
produced a Virginia identification card in the name of Diaby
Mohamed. When Cruz asked appellant to have a seat, appellant
attempted to run out of the DMV office. Appellant and Cruz
fought, and Cruz sustained two broken ribs and a bruised spleen.
Appellant moved to strike the evidence of uttering a forged
public record as insufficient at the end of the Commonwealth's
case. In overruling the motion, the trial court stated:
[T]he argument is that he has two
names. One of them is a Muslim name and
what [appellant's counsel] said is an
American name. . . .
Even if I got by that, I wonder if
Americans or Muslims, as the case may be,
have two different birth days. On the
Famara Sylla he shows a birth date of April
5, 1959. On the Diaby Mohamed it shows a
birth date of January 7, 1950.
I don't think a person is entitled to
have two different birth days so I would
respectfully deny the motion.
(Emphasis added).
Appellant then testified in his case as follows:
My real name is Diaby Mohamed . . . . I
come here as Sylla Famara. . . . [S]omebody
used my name Sylla Famara. . . . The police
arrest me, I've been in prison for one year.
I pay $8,000 and I go to the law library to
take an application to change my new name
Diaby Mohamed because somebody stole my
driver's license Sylla Famara. . . . I got
a social security on Sylla Famara. I change
my name. This is my new name Diaby Mohamed
because I got a robbery in New York City
because I want to come stay here. I stayed
in New York City one year in the prison for
identification numbers.
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this case. I never drove, I never got a
ticket and the police arrested me for one
year in the prison that's why I changed my
name.
The trial court then attempted to sort out appellant's date
of birth.
[APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL:] [C]an you tell
the Judge why there are different birth
dates on these identifications . . . ?
[APPELLANT:] No, no.
[COUNSEL:] [T]here was one I believe
January of 1950 and then another one of
April the 5th of '55, can you explain to the
Judge how those different birth dates?
[APPELLANT:] No, I never put this birth
date here because on the other ID I take
this -
COURT: You didn't put that birth date -
what's the birth date on that Commonwealth's
Number 4?
[COUNSEL:] It looks like April the 5th of
'55.
COURT: Okay. And whose name is that?
[COUNSEL:] This is Famara Sylla.
COURT: Well, I've got a card here that's
Commonwealth's Number 7 it says January 7th,
1950, date, birth date of Diaby Mohamed.
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
COURT: Which one is your birth day?
[APPELLANT]: My birth day?
COURT: Do you know which one is your birth
day?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
COURT: Would you like to tell us.
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[APPELLANT]: My birth day?
COURT: Yes, sir.
[APPELLANT]: The day I was born?
COURT: Yes, the day you were born.
[APPELLANT]: 4-15-55.
The trial court found him guilty of both offenses:
I don't have any evidence that this man has
ever legally changed his name. You have one
legal name. I find him guilty as charged.
It's incredible that he will sit here and
tell me that he never touched the officer.
The officer has testified about what
happened in some detail. . . . The officer
suffered two fractured ribs and a bruised
spleen, it's incredible. And then we have
the fact that he tried to flee,
consciousness of guilt.
Appellant appeals from those convictions.
II. Forged Public Document
Appellant first contends that the evidence is insufficient to
prove he had the requisite intent to forge a public document
pursuant to Code § 18.2-168. 4 We disagree.
"Forgery is a common law crime in Virginia. It is defined
as 'the false making or materially altering with intent to
defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be
of legal efficacy, or the foundation of legal liability.'"
Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 171, 173-74, 313 S.E.2d 394,
4
Code § 18.2-168 provides: "If any person forge a public
record, . . . or utter, or attempt to employ as true, such
forged record, . . . he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
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395 (1984) (quoting Bullock v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 558, 561,
138 S.E.2d 261, 263 (1964)).
In 1874, in its only opinion on the subject,
the Virginia Supreme Court defined a public
record as a written memorial, intended to
serve as evidence of something written, said
or done, made by a public officer authorized
to make it. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 66 Va.
(25 Gratt.) 865, 881-82 (1874). Since that
time, the General Assembly has broadened the
definition. The Virginia Public Records Act
provides as follows:
"Public Records" means, but is not limited
to, all written books, papers, letters,
documents, photographs, tapes, microfiche,
microfilm, photostats, sound recordings,
maps, other documentary materials or
information in any recording medium
regardless of physical form or
characteristics, including electronically
recorded data, made or received in pursuance
of law or in connection with the transaction
of public business by any agency or employee
of state government or its political
subdivisions. Id.Reid v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 468, 470, 431 S.E.2d 63, 64
(1993). "Intent is a state of mind that may be proved by an
accused's acts or by his statements and that may be shown by
circumstantial evidence." Wilson v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95,
101, 452 S.E.2d 669, 673-74 (1995) (citations omitted).
The specific intent to commit [a crime] may
be inferred from the conduct of the accused
if such intent flows naturally from the
conduct proven. Where the conduct of the
accused under the circumstances involved
points with reasonable certainty to a
specific intent to commit [the crime], the
intent element is established.
Id. at 101, 452 S.E.2d at 674.
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"[W]hile a person may adopt any name he may choose so long
as it was done for an honest purpose, under the broad definition
of forgery the crime is committed by signing an assumed name, or
a fictitious name, for a dishonest purpose and with intent to
defraud." Moore v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 838, 841, 153 S.E.2d
231, 234 (1967).
"[T]he trial court evaluates the credibility of witnesses,
resolves the conflicts in their testimony, and weighs the
evidence as a whole. Its finding is entitled to the same weight
on appeal as that accorded a factual finding by a jury and will
not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong." Stockton v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 140, 314 S.E.2d 371, 381 (1984).
The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish
that appellant uttered a forged public document. An application
for an operator's license and an application for a vehicle title
are squarely within the accepted definition of "public records."
Appellant's attempt to obtain each in a different name was
evidence of a forgery of one or both of the names. Appellant made
contradictory and inconsistent statements concerning his name and
provided documentation that was plainly false. As the trial court
noted, appellant presented no evidence of a legal name change and
listed at least two different dates of birth. Further, he said he
had a social security number in the name of Sylla Famara but not
Diaby Mohamed and then said he had a social security number in the
name of Diaby Mohamed. Lastly, the trial court could properly
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consider appellant's flight from Cruz as "tending to show a
consciousness of guilt." See Ricks v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App.
330, 335, 573 S.E.2d 266, 268 (2002). Ample evidence supports
the finding that his testimony was incredible.
III. Obstruction of Justice
Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to
prove he obstructed justice.
Hampton City Code § 24-6 states:
If any person, by threats, or force,
knowingly attempts to intimidate or impede a
judge, magistrate, justice, juror, attorney
for the Commonwealth, witness or any
law-enforcement officer, lawfully engaged in
his duties as such, or to obstruct or impede
the administration of justice in any court,
he shall be deemed to be guilty of a Class 1
misdemeanor.
Both Johnson and Cruz testified that when appellant attempted
to flee, he attacked and injured Cruz who suffered severe
injuries. Appellant stated that he "never touched the officer."
The court believed Cruz and Johnson and found appellant's
testimony "incredible." "The credibility of the witnesses and
the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact
finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as
it is presented." Hughes v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 448, 462,
573 S.E.2d 324, 330 (2002) (quoting Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20
Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995)).
Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant
intended to utter a forged public document and obstructed justice.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Affirmed.
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