Ronald L Morissette v. Custom Telephone Service ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton and Kelsey
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
RONALD L. MORISSETTE
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1820-02-2 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY
FEBRUARY 19, 2003
CUSTOM TELEPHONE SERVICE, INC. AND
VIRGINIA FARM BUREAU FIRE & CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Gregory O. Harbison (Geoffrey R. McDonald &
Associates, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Cathie W. Howard (Pierce & Howard, P.C., on
brief), for appellees.
Ronald L. Morissette asserts that the Virginia Workers'
Compensation Commission erroneously characterized his claim as a
change-of-condition request seeking "additional compensation," and
thus, subject to the 90-day limitation of Va. Work. Comp. Rule
1.2(B). Even if the time bar applied, Morissette contends, his
claim nonetheless should have been allowed under the doctrine of
imposition. For the following reasons, we disagree with
Morissette and affirm the commission.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
I.
On appeal, "we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party" before the commission. Tomes
v. James City (County Of) Fire, 39 Va. App. 424, 429, 573 S.E.2d
312, 315 (2002); Grayson County Sch. Bd. v. Cornett, 39 Va. App.
279, 281, 572 S.E.2d 505, 506 (2002).
CTS employed Morissette from December 4, 1997 to August 30,
1999 as a "computer installer." Morissette suffered an injury to
his back in October 1998, but was able to work until he
experienced severe pain on the morning of December 2, 1998. From
December 2, 1998 until January 8, 1999, he was unable to work.
During this period, CTS paid Morissette an advance on his wages so
that he would have income "until the workmen's compensation first
check came in." An award was entered in January 1999 granting
Morissette compensation for temporary total incapacitation
beginning December 9, 1998. Morissette returned to work on light
duty on April 15, 1999. Upon returning to work, Michael Barbeau,
president of CTS, told him "things were tight" financially.
Morissette told Barbeau "he would work with the company as long as
things did not get out of hand," and he returned to work knowing
that he would not then receive wages for his light duty work.
On April 16, 1999, Morissette signed an Agreed Statement of
Fact (ASF) and Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
reflecting that he returned to work on April 15 at a lower than
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pre-injury average weekly wage of $173.04. The commission
approved the MOA and entered a Supplemental Award Order on April
30, 1999, providing Morissette with temporary partial disability
benefits in the amount of $464.52 commencing April 15, 1999. From
April 15, 1999, through July 26, 1999, a period of over three
months, Morissette received partial disability payments from the
carrier, Virginia Farm Bureau Fire & Casualty Insurance Company.
During this time, however, CTS paid him no wages.
On July 20, 1999, Morissette signed another ASF and
supplemental MOA that showed him working at a lower than
pre-injury wage of $115.36 as of June 29, 1999. The commission
entered a new Supplemental Award Order granting Morissette
temporary partial disability benefits in the weekly amount of
$502.98 commencing June 29, 1999. Morissette worked at this rate,
still not receiving any wages from CTS, for another month. On
September 1, 1999, Morissette started his own business and ceased
working for CTS.
On November 15, 1999, Barbeau sent a letter stating that CTS
would pay Morissette certain reimbursable costs and commissions.
Barbeau, however, added that the proffered amount
does not include the wages (part time
workman comp) in the amount of $2768.64 that
CTS owes you or the wages of $3461.58 that
you were to refund CTS with the workman comp
payment. If you insist pursuing the wages
for the part time work, you will have to sue
CTS over the $2768.64 and we will have to
counter sue you for the $3461.58 that is
owed CTS.
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On January 18, 2001, nearly sixteen months after leaving CTS,
Morissette filed a claim with the commission. Morissette's claim
letter stated:
Claimant seeks the payment of temporary
total disability benefits from April 15,
1999 through August 30, 1999. The
Commission's file will reflect that he was
placed on a Temporary Partial Award during
this period that paid only $464.52.
Claimant submits that he returned to work
during this period. However, his employer
never paid him any wages. Accordingly, he
should have received full temporary total
disability even though he had returned to
work due to the employer's failure to make
any payments.
(Emphasis added). The commission characterized the claim as a
change-of-condition request seeking additional benefits rather
than as a mere enforcement action of an earlier award. Despite
repeated references to the claim as such, Morissette did not
object to the characterization of his claim as a
change-of-condition request.
CTS defended the claim by asserting that Rule 1.2(B) barred
Morissette's request for additional compensation and,
alternatively, by seeking a credit for amounts paid to Morissette,
including wages paid from December 2, 1998 through January 1999.
Under Rule 1.2(B), "[a]dditional compensation may not be awarded
more than 90 days before the filing of the claim with the
Commission." The deputy commissioner agreed with CTS and
dismissed Morissette's claim. The deputy commissioner also
awarded CTS a credit against future payments in the amount of
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$3,887.70. The full commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's
application of Rule 1.2(B) and declined to apply the doctrine of
imposition to cure the time default. Imposition would not be
appropriate, the commission held, because Morissette "agreed, or
at least acquiesced, that he would not be paid his wages from
April 15, 1999, until August 30, 1999, because of the employer's
poor financial condition."
II.
Rule 1.2(B) serves as a narrow exception to the prohibition
against retroactive awards. See generally Bristol Door & Lumber
Co. v. Hinkle, 157 Va. 474, 161 S.E. 902 (1932). The rule allows
the commission to award additional compensation "retroactively for
a limited period of time" prior to the filing of a
change-of-condition request for additional compensation. Graham
v. Peoples Life Ins. Co., 7 Va. App. 61, 68, 372 S.E.2d 161, 165
(1988) (en banc) (interpreting predecessor Rule 13(B)). The
commission is "powerless to award benefits beyond the period
authorized by the rule." Id.Morissette claims the commissioner erroneously characterized
his claim as one for additional compensation (implicating Rule
1.2(B)'s 90-day deadline), rather than one for enforcement of a
prior award (implicating the commission's continuing authority
under Code § 65.2-710). If the claim had been properly deemed a
mere enforcement action, Morissette argues, the 90-day deadline
would not apply.
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Because Morissette did not make this argument to the
commission, we will not consider it on appeal. See Buck v.
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 452-53, 443 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1994);
West Alex. Prop. v. First Va. Mort., 221 Va. 134, 138, 267 S.E.2d
149, 151 (1980); Shenk v. Shenk, 39 Va. App. 161, 169, 571 S.E.2d
896, 901 (2002) (To preserve an issue for appeal, the "specific
argument" made on appeal must have been made below.).
Though Rule 5A:18 contains a "good cause" or "ends of
justice" exception to procedural default, we decline to use it in
this case. See generally M. Morgan Cherry & Assocs., Ltd. v.
Cherry, 38 Va. App. 693, 701, 568 S.E.2d 391, 395 (2002) (en
banc). This exception "is narrow and is to be used sparingly" by
appellate courts. Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215,
220-21, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth,
8 Va. App. 126, 132, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1989)). Morissette
presents no basis for declaring the commission's application of
Rule 1.2(B) to Morissette's claim to be a miscarriage of justice.
Morissette also argues that, even if Rule 1.2(B) bars his
claim, the doctrine of imposition should apply and relieve him of
his procedural default. Under the imposition doctrine, the
commission has "the power and authority not only to make and
enforce its awards, but to protect itself and its awards from
fraud, imposition and mistake." Harris v. Diamond Constr. Co.,
184 Va. 711, 720, 36 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1946); see also Avon Prods.,
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Inc. v. Ross, 14 Va. App. 1, 7, 415 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1992). The
doctrine, however, requires a threshold showing of unfairness:
The doctrine focuses on an employer's or the
commission's use of superior knowledge of or
experience with the Workers' Compensation Act
or use of economic leverage, which results in
an unjust deprivation to the employee of
benefits warranted under the Act.
Butler v. City of Virginia Beach, 22 Va. App. 601, 605, 471 S.E.2d
830, 830 (1996).
This threshold showing can be found in all Virginia cases
applying the doctrine. In Avon Prods., Inc., 14 Va. App. at 7,
415 S.E.2d at 228, for example, we approved an award where the
employer incorrectly represented to the claimant that all
documents necessary to assure entry of the award had been timely
filed. Similarly, in Odom v. Red Lobster # 235, 20 Va. App. 228,
456 S.E.2d 140 (1995), we permitted the claimant's late filing of
a claim because the employer and the commission had mistakenly led
her to believe that a timely claim had already been filed. In
John Driggs Co. v. Sommers, 228 Va. 729, 735, 324 S.E.2d 694, 697
(1985), the Virginia Supreme Court relieved a claimant of an
erroneous average weekly wage calculation prepared by the employer
because the calculation "substantially deviate[d] from the
statutory guidelines."
Here, the commission found that the circumstances of this
particular case have not worked an imposition upon Morissette. We
agree. No evidence suggests that CTS misled Morissette or used
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"superior knowledge of or experience with the Workers'
Compensation Act" to deprive Morissette of his claimed
compensation. Butler, 22 Va. App. at 605, 471 S.E.2d at 830. In
November 1999, two months after Morissette left the employ of CTS,
Barbeau admitted that CTS owed Morissette the wages but claimed a
setoff for compensation CTS had previously paid. Morissette,
however, did not file at that time an enforcement action or even a
request for additional compensation. Instead, he waited sixteen
months to file a claim for temporary total benefits. Neither
Morissette's delay nor his election to treat his claim as one for
temporary total benefits can be blamed, even indirectly, on CTS.
III.
In sum, we affirm the commission's application of Rule 1.2(B)
to the claim for additional compensation. Morissette failed to
preserve his objection to the commission's characterization of his
claim and did not present any persuasive reasons for applying the
doctrine of imposition. 1
Affirmed.
1
We do not address, nor is our holding meant to affect, the
possibility of any other viable right of action that may exist to
enforce Morissette's wage claim against CTS.
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