Timothy Lynn Williams, Jr. v. Commonwealth ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Frank
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
TIMOTHY LYNN WILLIAMS, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0170-03-1 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
DECEMBER 30, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Louis R. Lerner, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Jennifer R. Franklin, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Timothy Lynn Williams, Jr. was convicted after a bench trial of five counts of robbery
and four counts of using a firearm while committing a robbery. He appeals the convictions on
the ground that the trial court infringed on his constitutional right to impeach a juvenile witness
because it would not allow him to question the juvenile about his prior convictions. We affirm
Williams’s convictions.
I. Background
On appeal, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in the
light most favorable to the party prevailing below, in this instance, the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). So viewed,
the evidence shows that Williams admitted to the underlying facts of three of the five robberies.
He denied, however, any involvement in the robbery of Charles Kirkpatrick and Paul Keefe on
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
March 27, 2002, at an automated teller machine (ATM) in Hampton, Virginia. The
Commonwealth called two witnesses, James McMillan and Mark Corbett, who identified
Williams as one of the robbers at the ATM. James McMillan, a juvenile, testified that the
robbery was Williams’s idea. McMillan further testified that Williams and Corbett planned the
robbery in advance and intended to use McMillan as a lookout. While the robbery was taking
place, McMillan said he hid behind some bushes and emerged to discover Williams and Corbett
fleeing the scene. Corbett also testified that Williams was actively involved in the robbery.
On cross-examination, counsel for Williams attempted to impeach McMillan by asking
him if he had ever been convicted of any crimes involving lying, cheating, or stealing. The
Commonwealth objected on the grounds that juvenile convictions can only be used to show bias
and cannot be used for general impeachment purposes. The trial court sustained the objection.
Williams now appeals, conceding the correctness of the Commonwealth’s objection but
arguing for a change in the law.
II. Analysis
Williams concedes in his reply brief that he asked McMillan about his prior juvenile
convictions for the purpose of impeaching him generally. Williams argues, however, that the
distinction between impeachment to show bias and impeachment to show a general lack of
credibility affords no basis to deny him his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses
presented against him. Established precedent clearly mandates we reject Williams’s argument.
This Court in Moats v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 349, 404 S.E.2d 244 (1991), held
that a defendant may not use a juvenile’s prior convictions to attack his credibility generally, but
that the defendant may use those convictions to show bias.
The “defendant’s right of confrontation is paramount to the State’s
policy of protecting juvenile offenders, so that the right effectively
to cross-examine a witness to show bias, a specific attack on the
credibility, outweighs any embarrassment to the witness resulting
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from a disclosure of his juvenile court record.” Fulcher v.
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 96, 99, 306 S.E.2d 874, 876 (1983)
(emphasis added) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).
However, a court may refuse the use of juvenile convictions in a
general attack on witness credibility. Kiracofe v. Commonwealth,
198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957). The issue thus becomes
whether the appellant sought to use the juvenile convictions to
demonstrate that the witness was biased or whether instead he
sought to use the juvenile convictions to attack generally the
witness’ credibility.
Moats, 12 Va. App. at 354, 404 S.E.2d at 246. Furthermore, in Bostic v. Commonwealth, 31
Va. App. 632, 525 S.E.2d 67 (2000), we noted that we were compelled by the decision in
Kiracofe to maintain the distinction between impeachment to show bias and impeachment
generally. Bostic, 31 Va. App. at 636, 525 S.E.2d at 68. We consequently affirmed Bostic’s
conviction, finding the trial court committed no error in refusing to permit the general
impeachment of a witness with his prior juvenile convictions. Id.
Clearly, the law is squarely against Williams on this issue, and Williams concedes as
much. He therefore argues for a change in the law. We decline the invitation to do so, finding
no reason in this case that warrants changing the balance between protecting the juvenile’s
anonymity and a defendant’s right to confrontation that the Virginia appellate courts and the
Supreme Court of the United States have struck and preserved in settled decisional law.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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