Le N Tran v. United Airlines, Inc ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton
LE N. TRAN
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 2075-02-4 PER CURIAM
DECEMBER 17, 2002
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Kathleen G. Walsh, on brief), for
appellant.
(Michael N. Salveson; Hunton & Williams, on
brief), for appellee.
Le N. Tran (claimant) contends the Workers' Compensation
Commission erred in finding that she failed to prove she
sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of her employment on September 1, 2000. Upon reviewing the
record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
"To be compensable as an injury by accident, a purely
psychological in jury must be causally related to a physical
injury or causally related to an obvious sudden shock or fright
arising in the course of employment." Chesterfield County v.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Dunn, 9 Va. App. 475, 477, 389 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1990).
Moreover, purely psychological disability resulting from
"disagreements over managerial decisions and conflicts with
supervisory personnel that cause stressful consequences . . .
ordinarily are not compensable." Teasley v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 14 Va. App. 45, 49, 415 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1992).
In holding that claimant failed to prove a compensable
injury by accident, the commission found as follows:
The deputy commissioner found that the
claimant was not credible in stating that
Ms. [Orawan] Tudor[, the lead worker,]
struck her in the chest with her knuckles
causing a bruise. Rather, the incident was
essentially "a heated verbal exchange" and
"perceived harassment." We agree.
It is well established that the
Commission does not have jurisdiction over
stress and psychological damage resulting
from supervisory actions and conflicts over
working conditions.
As fact finder, the commission was entitled to reject
claimant's testimony that Tudor struck claimant's chest with her
knuckles and caused a bruise and to accept Tudor's testimony to
the contrary. It is well settled that credibility
determinations are within the fact finder's exclusive purview.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 381, 363
S.E.2d 433, 437 (1987). Tudor's testimony was consistent with
the testimony of Todd Maffe and Stephanie Toporcer. Both Maffe
and Toporcer testified that when claimant discussed the incident
with them she never said Tudor struck or touched her. In
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addition, when interviewed by Maffe and Toporcer, claimant's
co-worker, Shing Lin, did not tell them that Tudor struck
claimant. Lin testified at the hearing that Tudor never struck
the claimant. This evidence supported the commission's
conclusions that Tudor did not touch or strike claimant and that
claimant did not sustain a physical injury as a result of the
incident.
Furthermore, Tudor's testimony supported the commission's
finding that the incident was "nothing more than a heated verbal
exchange" or "perceived harassment of one employee by another"
and the further finding that the incident was "neither shocking
nor sufficiently frightening to give rise to a claim of
psychological injury." Thus, the commission did not err in
concluding that claimant's psychological condition and
disability resulting from her verbal conflict with her
supervisor did not constitute a compensable injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment. See
Teasley, 14 Va. App. at 49, 415 S.E.2d at 598. Accordingly, we
cannot find as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
sustained her burden of proof. See Tomko v. Michael's
Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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